

ISBN81-89832-00-1

AN EXPOSITION OF THE CITRAMĪMĀMSĀ

By

Dr. Mangalpati Jha

Published by

Kashinatha Mishra

Director,

**Mithila Institute of Post-Graduate Studies and Research in
Sanskrit Learning, DARBHANGA.**

AN EXPOSITION OF THE CITRAMĪMĀMSĀ

By

Dr. Mangalpati Jha


Published by

Kashinatha Mishra

Director,

Mithila Institute of Post-Graduate Studies and Research in
Sanskrit Learning, DARBHANGA.

ISBN81-89832-00-X



ISBN81-89832-00-X

Mithila Institute Series,

Studies in English No. 6

AN EXPOSITION OF THE CITRAMĪMĀMSĀ

(upto the figure Reminiscence)

BY

Mangalpati Jha, M. A. Ph. D.

Edited by

UMESH JHA, M. A., Ph. D.
Mithila Sanskrit Research Institute,
DARBHANGA

General Editor

Kashinath Mishra

Director,

Mithila Institute of Post-Graduate Studies and Research
in Sanskrit Learning, Maheshnagar, Darbhanga,

1979

Copies of this Volume can be had from the Director,
Mithila Institute of Post-Graduate Studies and Research
in Sanskrit Learning, Maheshnagar, Darbhanga on payment
of Rs. 32/-by M. O. or Postal Order or Cash.

First Edition 500 Copies

**Printed at Shree Lakshmi Press, Muzaffarpur and Published by
the Director, Mithila Institute of Post-Graduate Studies and Research
in Sanskrit Learning, Maheshnagar, Darbhanga.**



The Government of Bihar established the Mithila Institute of Post-Graduate Studies and Research in Sanskrit Learning at Darbhanga in 1951 with the object, inter alia, to promote advanced studies and research in Sanskrit Learning to bring together the traditional Pandits with their profound learning and the modern scholars with their technique of research and investigation, and to publish work of permanent value to scholars. This institute is one of the five others planned by this Government as a token of their homage to the tradition of learning and scholarship for which ancient Bihar was noted. Apart from the Mithila Institute, four others have been established and have been doing useful work during the last eighteen or nineteen years—Nalanda Institute of Research and Post-Graduate studies in Buddhist learning and Pali at Nalanda, K.P. Jaisawal Research Institute at Patna, the Bihar Rashtriya Bhasha Parishad for research and advanced studies in Hindi at Patna, and the Vaishali Institute for Post-Graduate studies in Prakrit and Jainology at Vaishali. In the establishment of the Mithila Institute the State Government received a generous donation from Maharajadhiraja of Darbhanga for construction of the building on a plot of land also donated by him.

2 As part of this programme of rehabilitating and reorientating ancient learning and scholarship, the editing and publication of this volume have been undertaken with the co-operation of scholars in Bihar and outside. The Government of Bihar hope to continue to sponsor such projects and trust that this humble service to the World of scholarship and learning would bear fruit in the fulness of time.

PREFACE

What passes under the name of *Alaṃkāraśāstra* in Sanskrit literature is the equivalent of the discipline called literary criticism. A large number of ancient works of this particular department is lost--a fate which befell specially all branches of Sanskrit learning depriving a modern student of the data which might make possible a systematic reconstruction of the history of evolution. Our knowledge of *Alaṃkāraśāstra* practically starts from Bhāmaha and Daṇḍin. The treatment of *alaṃkāras* in Bharata's *Nāṭyaśāstra* is more allusive than comprehensive. The stages of evolution of *Alaṃkāraśāstra* have been discovered and settled with considerable clarity and precision by previous writers on the subject. The names of H. Jacobi, Mr. P. V. Kane, Dr. S. K. De and Dr. V. Raghavana deserve specific mention in this connexion. There is small room for improvement in this line of treatment. I have therefore selected for my study and treatment of a particular author and the representative work he wrote on a branch of the subject.

Bhāmaha gave the prerogative place of honour to *alaṃkāras* --embellishments of speech and sense of a literary production--which are generally styled figures of

speech.¹ He was also aware of the concept of literary excellence (*guṇa*)², style (*rīti*)³, manner of representation (*vṛtti*)⁴, which received prominence at the hands of later writers and thinkers. Bhāmaha was content to account for these concepts by his concept of *alaṃkāra*, which became naturally enlarged in its content by inclusion of literary excellences (*guṇas*) and *rasas* in their orbit. The concept of *rasa* was developed by Bharata and perhaps

1. Cf. 'Rupakūdir alaṃkāras tasya'nyair bahudhōditaḥ | Na kāmam api nirbhūṣam vibhātī vanitā mukham ||' KV, chap. 1, śl. 13

"Na nitāntūdimātreṇa jāyate cārutā girām | Vakrābhidheya śabdoktir iṣṭā vācām alaṃkāṛtiḥ ||" KV, chap. 1, śl. 36

'S'aiṣa sarvaiva vakroktir anyā'rtho vibhāvayate | yatno'syām kavinaḥ kāryaḥ ko'laṅkāro'nayā vinā ||' KV, chap. 2, śl. 85

2. Cf. Mādhuryam aphivāñchantāḥ prasādam ca samedhasaḥ | samāsavanti bhūyāmsi na padāni prayūñjate || kecid ojaḥ bhidhi-
tsantaḥ samasyanti bahūnyapi | yathā mandārakusumareṇu-
piñjari tālakāḥ / KV, chap. 2, śl. 1—2

3. 'vaidarbham anyad astīti manyante sudhiyo'pare | Tada ca kila
jyūyaḥ sadartham api nā'param || Gauḍīyam idam etattu vaidar-
bham iti kim prthak |' Gatānugatika nyūyān nūnā'khyam amedha-
sām ||' KV, chap. 1' // śls. 31—32

4. Pratihārendurāja in his commentary on the *Kāryālaṅkāra saṃgraha* of Udbhaṭa has made this pertinent observation :
'Bhāmaho hi grāmyopānāgarikāvṛttibhedena dviprakāram eva'vaprāsam
vyākhyātavān |' OP. cit. PP. 1—2

- cp. 'Grāmyānuprāsam anyattu manyante sudhiyo'pare | Sa laleṣaṭa-
nīlalikulakulagalo balah || Lāṭīyam.....KV., chap. 2. śl. 6, 8.

earlier writers on dramaturgy. But its dominant role in poetry—epic, lyric, ballad, *et seq.* was only emphasised by subsequent thinkers. It was rather an extension of the dramatic motive to poetry proper. But so far as Bhāmaha and his followers such as Udbhaṭa, Rudraṭa and their adherents are concerned, they sought to incorporate these concepts under *alaṃkāra*.¹ Daṇḍin gave greater prominence to literary excellences (*guṇas*) which according to him constitute the *elan* 'vital' of poetry². What was obscured and inchoate in Daṇḍin's *Kāvyaadarśa* was developed and systematized by Vāmana in his *Kāvyaalaṃkāra sūtra* which though brief is a representative master-piece³. It emphasised the importance of *rīti*, that is, style and method as the primary concern of literary art⁴. The subsequent speculations

1. cp. "Iha hi tāvad bhāmahodbhaṭa prabhṛtayaś cirañtanūla-
mākarakāraḥ pratiyamānām artham vācyaśāstrakāratayā'laṃkāra
pakṣamiksiptam manyante.....udbhaṭādibhis... tad evam alāṃ-
kāra eva kāvyē pradhānam iti prācyānām matam ||" AS, PP. 3-9
2. cf. "Śleṣaḥ prasādaḥ samatā mādhyam sukumārata | Arthavya-
ktir udātuvam ojaḥkānti samādhayaḥ || Itivaidarbhamārgasya
prāṇa-daśa guṇāḥ smṛtāḥ ||" KD, chap. P. śls 41—42
3. cp. "kāvyasobhāyāḥ kartāro dharmā guṇāḥ | Tadatiśaya hetu vastu
alaṃkāraḥ | Pūrve nityāḥ | Aujjvalyam kāmūḥ"
KRS, adhi. 3, chap. 1 Sūs 1—24
4. cf. "Rītir ātmā kāvyasya | viśiṣṭā padaracanā rītiḥ | viśeṣo-
guṇātmā / sa tridhā vaidarbhī gaudīyā pāñcālī ca |
vaidarbhādīṇa dṛṣṭavāt tatsamākhyā | samagraguṇopetā vaidarbhā"

which constitute the intermediate link between Vāmana and Ānandavardhana are not found in a clear and unambiguous record. But it is remarkable that Ānandavardhana made Vāmana's theory the main platform of his critique. He observes most probably with reference to Vāmana that the concept of *dhvani* was indistinctly grasped by him.¹ Ānandavardhana created a school by the systematic promulgation of his *dhvani* theory. He anticipated the majority of the objections of the opponents and justified his standpoint by showing that the ancient theory was inadequate and the objections, actual and possible, were the outcome of slipshod and confused thinking.

The reactionary writers such as Bhaṭṭanāyaka and Mahima Bhaṭṭa and Dhananjaya, the solitary supporter

ojah kūtumatī gaudīyā | Mādhuryasaukūmyopapannā pāñcālī |

KRS, adhi. 1 chap 2, Sū. 6—13

1. vide *kāvyalamkāra Sūtrāṇi* of Vāmana adhi. 4, chap. 3, sū. 8

cf. "yady'pi ca dhvaniśabda saṁkīrtanena kāvya lakṣaṇa vidhāyibhir
gūṇaḥ śīlir anyavā na kaścit prakāraḥ prakāśitaḥ, tathāpi amukhya
vṛttīyā kāvyeṣu vyavahāram darśayatā dhvanimārgo manākspr̥ṣṭo'pi
na lakṣitā iti |" DL, PP. 31-32

And also compare the commentary of Abhinava Gupta :

"*Taistāvat dhvanidig unmīlita yathalikhita—pāthakais tu svarūpa-
vivekam kartum aśaknuvadbhis tatsvarūpa—viveko na kṛtaḥ, pratyut'
upālabhyate, abhagnanūrikelavat yathāśrutatadgranthodgrahaṇa—mātr-
e'ti'*" Locana, PP. 32—33

of Bhaṭṭanāyaka, Kuntaka and Ksemendra were not successful in creating schools in spite of their extraordinary acumen, logical equipment and flashes of insight. The *dhvani* school came to stay and dominate all the subsequent thoughts of the writers on poetics.

Mammata Bhaṭṭa wrote a powerful standard text on poetics which by its popularity and influence made the *dhvani* theory universally acceptable. Subsequent writers such as Vidyānātha, Vidyādhara and Viśvanātha only dotted the *is* and crossed the *ts*. But in spite of the masterly exposition and marshalling of the data and topics of discussion in the *Kāvya-prakāśa* which made it the *vade-mecum* in the academics, it suffers from a lop-sidedness in so far as the treatment of figures of speech (*alaṅkāras*) is taken into account. It is not liable to doubt that the analysis of the *alaṅkāras* and their divisions in the *Kāvya-prakāśa* are thorough and comprehensive, befitting an author of his reputation. But the classification of the rhetorical figures is not so logical and methodical as the other parts. It was Ruṣyaḥ who gave the first scientific treatment of this important topic. Later writers followed Ruṣyaḥ in spirit and in letter for the most part.

All these writers professed their adherence to the *dhvani* school, though they have differed in minor details. We may cite the case of double entendre (*śleṣa*). It became a centre of controversy as to whether double entendre was a dominant figure and overshadowed all

field of poetics, I have endeavoured to the utmost of my ability and light to give a thorough exposition of the *Citramīmāṃsā* in a modern language of international status. It is undoubtedly an uphill task and the prospect of success is problematic. It is a pioneer effort and must, therefore, suffer from the drawbacks which are incidental to all pioneer attempts. In the course of progress I have found that the work has exceeded the reasonable limit of a doctoral thesis. I have therefore reserved the publication of the treatment of the remaining part of this abstruse work for the second volume.

I claim neither perfection nor thoroughness. My purpose is to make a difficult work intelligible to modern minds interested in the subject. I may submit that I have tried to break a new ground. This work will make the modern students familiar with the incisive analytical method and the result that may be achieved by it in the field of poetics.

Mangalpati Jha

Editor's Note

Appaya Dīkṣita was a polymath. His numerous authoritative treatises on the different branches of Sanskrit learning afford unimpeachable testimony to the versatility of his genius. He was one of the ablest exponents of the Advaita Vedānta and the Mīmāṃsā philosophy. There is hardly any department of ancient Indian thought which did not form the theme of his masterpiece. And no wonder that his *Citramīmāṃsā* is an outstanding classic in the field of Sanskrit Poetics. He introduced the method and mode of expression of the neo-logic and this ushered in a new epoch in the domain of literary criticism. It is worthwhile to mention that his intellectual successors developed them with meticulous precision. But despite the pervasive and trail-blazing influence of the *Citramīmāṃsā*, the studied brevity and stiffness of its language have ever since inhibited the students of average intelligence from embarking on a serious study of it. But it is a matter of gratification to observe that Dr. Mangalpati Jha, the writer of the book, has succeeded to dissolve the iceberg solidity of the original texts of the *Citramīmāṃsā* by the glare of his intellect. The fundamental figures of speech which have been dealt in it has been laid bare by Dr. Jha with admirable clarity and thoroughness. In this expository treatise he has provided ample evidences of his high level of logical and philosophical acumen and insight. Moreover the present expo-

sition testifies to his power of original reflection on the crucial issues of Sanskrit rhetoric and poetics which are perennially green and evoke challenge and stimulation.

Still more remarkable is the fact that Dr. Jha has presented an objective and unbiassed appraisal of Panditarāja Jagannatha's animadversion on the view of the author of the *Citramīmāṃsā*. It reflects his penetrative analytical power harmoniously combined with aesthetic sense.. His contribution to the realm of advanced study and researches on *Alaṃkāraśāstra* is bound to preserve its everlasting worth.

The present dissertation was submitted as a thesis for the Ph D degree of the University of Bihar, Muzaffarpur and was unanimously approved by the Board of adjudicators. It is hoped that the book will be found useful by all those who want a clear and accurate exposition of this classical treatise on Sanskrit poetics.

It is a matter of great pleasure for me to acknowledge my deep obligations to my revered guru Dr. Sitansusekhar Bagchi, M. A.; Ph D.; D. Litt, ex-Director, Mithila Sanskrit Research Institute, Darbhanga, for his kind help and affectionate encouragement and to Dr. Jaymant Mishra (Professor and Head of the Department of Sanskrit, University of Bihar, Muzaffarpur), who has throughout taken a very kindly and helpful interest in the publication of this work. I shall be failing in my duty if I do not record my debts to Dr. K. N. Mishra, Director, Mithila

Sanskrit Research Institute, Darbhanga, who, widely known for his erudition, has been a source of help and inspiration to me.

Lastly, it is a matter of great satisfaction for me that this humble work has seen the light of the day. I must accept without reservation that it is all due to the indomitable will of *Śrī Śatrughna Prasad Singh*, Laxmī Press, Muzaffarpur, who, in the difficult days of erratic supply of power, had to struggle hard to bring the publication of the work to completion.

Darbhangā, May 1979

Umesh Jha

*A Scheme of
Roman Transliteration of Devanāgarī Alphabet.*

Vowels:—

अ - a	आ - ā	इ - i
ई - ī	उ - u	ऊ - ū
ए - e	ऐ - ai	ओ - o
औ - au or ou		

‘ऽ’ (अर्ध-‘अ’)-a

Consonants:—

क - ka	ख - kha	ग - ga
घ - gha	ङ - ṅ	च - ca
छ - cha	ज - ja	झ - jha
ण - ṇ	ट - ṭa	ठ - ṭha
ड - ḍa	ढ - ḍha	ण् or ण - ṇ
त - ta	थ - tha	द - da
ध - dha	न - na	प - pa
फ - pha	ब - ba	भ - bha
म - ma	य - ya	र - ra
ल - la	व - va	श - śa
ष - ṣa	स - sa	ह - ha

Mixed Alphabet (Sanyuktākāṣaras)

अं - aṁ or pṁ	अः - aḥ	ः - ḥ
क्ष - kṣa	त्र - tra	ज्ञ - jña

CONTENTS

	Page
Preface	i—viii
Editor's note	ix—xi
Roman Transliteration	xii—
Contents	xiii—xiv

CHAPTER I

Classification of <i>belles-lettres</i>	1
---	---

CHAPTER II

Classification of <i>belles-lettres</i> (Contd)	40
---	----

CHAPTER III

Definitions of <i>Similis</i> Propounded by the Predecessors of Appaya Dīkṣita Criticised	74
--	----

CHAPTER IV

Appaya Dīkṣita's Definition of <i>Similis</i> and its Critical Examination	128
---	-----

CHAPTER V

Elaboration and Classification of Complete <i>Similis</i>	161
--	-----

CHAPTER VI

Classification of Elliptical <i>Similis</i>	188
---	-----

CHAPTER VII

A Succinct Classification of <i>Similis</i> and	
---	--

	Page
its Criticism	240
CHAPTER VIII	
A Critical Analysis of the Defects of <i>Similis</i>	260
CHAPTER IX	
The Definition of the Figure Reciprocal Simile set forth by the Predecessor of Appaya Dīkṣita Critically Examined.	297
CHAPTER X	
The Definition of Reciprocal Simile as Formulated and Illustrated by Appaya Dīkṣita and its Trenchant Criticism by the Author of the <i>Rasagaṅgādhara</i>	328
CHAPTER XI	
Elucidation of the Figure Self-compa- rison	357
CHAPTER XII	
Essential Features of the Figure Remi- niscence Analysed and Reviewed	383
APPENDIX	
Abbreviations	i-iv
Index of verses	v-xiv

CHAPTER 1

CLASSIFICATION OF *BELLES-LETTRES*

First of all, the author of the *Citramīmāṃsā* pays obeisance to Lord Śiva in order to overcome the hindrances which may occur in the course of the composition of the present work. 'At the beginning, having offered salutation to the God containing the moon on his forehead, the companion of Gauri, the Supreme Light, I elaborate the critique of the figure pertaining to the meaning endowed with transparent significance (*viśadārtha*) and multifarious subjects.' The *belle-lettres* usually admits of a threefold classification: (1) the suggestive poetry (*dhvani-kāvya*), (2) the poetry of subordinate suggestion (*guṇabhūta vyangya*), and (3) the *śabdā* (*śāstra*). The suggestive poetry (*dhvani-kāvya*) is that in which the suggested sense transcends the primary meaning in point of excellence. It may be substantiated by the following verse: 'Fresh raindrops stayed for a moment on the eyelashes of her (Pārvatī), then, they striking the lower lip, were broken into pieces due to their fall at the height of her breasts; they, afterwards, gliding into the three folds of her skin, entered into her navel totally after a long duration.' (CM, p. 1.)¹

In this verse, there is the description of the distinctive features of the function of the first raindrops that are falling upon the body of goddess Pārvatī, who is engaged in practising penance. The present description paves the way for the suggestion of

1. KS. can.5, śl. 24; SKĀ, pp. 54, 230, KāA, p. 235 reads *kṣaṇam sthitāḥ* for *sthitāḥ kṣaṇam*; A M, p. 206

the postures of her body while absorbed in meditation. Over and above, through the medium of this, the present delineation culminates in the suggestion of the state of her contemplation as immune from all obstructions. It deserves mention that the first raindrops are falling upon such a body which has been parched by the heat of prolonged summer. So they would have been the cause of a stir bound to be produced by her own overpowering feeling of joy. But even in the face of this inevitability of the obstruction, the continuance of her undisturbed contemplation ultimately becomes suggested by the function of suggestion. (CM, p. 1)

The following verse indicates the bodily postures of an individual engaged in deep meditation: 'He should meditate upon the deity by his mind, after expanding his chest frontward, sitting motionless, with the mouth closed and the eyes fixed at the end of the nose'. These four characteristics of one engrossed in deep meditation have been clearly suggested by the directly expressed meaning of the present verse cited as an instance of *dhvani*. The expression 'stayed on the eyelashes' forms the ground of the suggestion of the half-closedness of her eyes partaking the character of the eyes fixed at the forepart of the nose. The position stands in need of an elucidation. Her eyes cannot be in a state of their complete expansion. Since in that event the eyelashes will evidently be with their ends upwards. On the other hand, her eyes cannot become as entirely closed. For in such a case, the ends of the eyelashes will go downwards. So in either of these two states, the staying of the raindrops on her eyelashes will be rendered absolutely impossible. It is manifest that the expression under review, that is, 'stayed on the eyelashes' has succeeded in suggesting the first characteristic of the meditative posture in the form above indicated. (CM, p. 1)

The raindrops have fallen from her eyelashes, but they fail to have their passage into her mouth. And the assertion is made that they by descending down on her lower lip have dropped down again from it. These two facts undoubtedly suggest that her mouth was fully closed. For, even the slightest opening of her mouth will be discordant with the two facts adverted to above. So the second bodily posture, indicative of her absorption in meditation, stands suggested by the function of suggestion. Besides, the description of the raindrops as falling from the lower lip at the height of her breasts and so forth has suggested the complete expansion of her chest. The fact is simple. If she were in a stooping posture on account of indolence, the raindrops owing to the inner contraction of her breasts would not fall at the height of the breasts. It may be supposed that the raindrops are still in a position to fall at the height of her breasts in some way or other. But in that eventuality, they, even after reaching the three folds of her skin, will be bound to proceed towards the recess of them only in an oblique way. And consequently they cannot attain to the area of the navel. Further, her stooping posture will obviously cause the sealing up of her navel. And the navel being sealed up, the raindrops can, in no way, be expected to enter within it. (CM, p. 2)

Moreover, it is averred that raindrops have fallen upon her eyelashes, the lower lip and the rest in their successive stages of descent. And this averment clearly suggests the static condition of her body as appropriate to meditation. It is undeniable that there was not even the slightest movement of her face and the other parts of her body. Since in that contingency the raindrops, after falling at her eyelashes, could not have descended down in an order of succession, viz. to

her lower lip, the breast and the rest. So it is conspicuous that the present description has successfully suggested these four characteristic features of her posture essential for perfect meditation. And in this way it has culminated in the apprehension of the state of her profound contemplation as unimpeded under all circumstances. (CM, p. 2)

Further, by these adjectives the divine beauty of the goddess Pārvatī has been suggested. The term 'stayed' reveals the denseness of her eyelashes. Since the sparsely situated eyelashes cannot sustain the raindrops even for a moment. The expression 'for a moment' indicates that her eyelashes were smooth. For, in the case of their roughness, the raindrops might have stayed even for a longer while. It is further stated that her lower lip receives the stroke of the raindrops notwithstanding the fact that their force has already been slackened due to their fall upon her eyelashes. And this depiction suggests the excessive tenderness of her lower lip by means of the function of suggestion. The excessive tenderness of the lower lip has been suggested by the utterance that it was veritably hit (*tāḍita*) by the raindrops despite the fact that their force was spent up.

Thereafter the raindrops are depicted as completely broken into pieces by their fall on the height of her breasts. And it is attested that their force has already been slowed on account of their descent on her eyelashes and the lower lip in order of succession. This depiction suggests that her breasts are undoubtedly solid. The ground is apparent. Even the slightest looseness on the part of her breasts cannot be the cause of the total smash of the raindrops, which have fallen upon with such a slowed force. It has already been clearly indicated that her chest was fully expanded. And in spite of this, the raindrops

have been delineated as gliding into her folds of skin. So it is suggested that her folds of skin are assuredly discernible in a distinct manner. Since it is a fact beyond dispute that in the case of her indistinct folds of skin, the gliding of the raindrops cannot be rendered possible so long she is seated with her chest completely expanded. And ultimately the deep depth of her navel becomes suggested by the statement that all raindrops have finally entered into the very navel of the goddess Pārvatī. In this way the suggestive element apparently predominates over the primary meaning of the verse under consideration. And consequently the present verse becomes entitled to be the accredited instance of *dhvani kāvya*. (CM, p. 2)

The example of the suggestive¹ poetry may be substantiated by the following verse also: 'Sandal-paste has entirely vanished from the foreparts of your breasts; redness of your **beet** lip has been completely wiped out; your eyes have been ~~rendered~~ devoid of collyrium to a great extent and this slim body of yours stands bristled...; from all these, I learn, O pande-ress, the teller of lies, you are unaware of your friend's pain, and that you have gone from this place to bathe in the pond and did not approach again that wretched person(adhama). 'In this verse the direct meaning of the sentence is expressible in the form as follows 'you have gone to bathe in the pond and not to him'. But the import, viz. 'you have gone to that very person in

1 AS, śl 105 (reads °game for °gamū); KP, p. 20 (reads °game for °gamū); SD, chap. II, p. 59 (reads °gāme for °gamā); SKA, p. 50 (reads °game for °gamū); SM, p. 166 (reads °game for °gamā). SR, p. 293, śl. 7; KāA, p. 42; AM, p. 54, p. 327 (reads tatheyam for tareyam). See also *infra*.

order to indulge in the amorous enjoyment with him' stands predominantly suggested due to the supreme importance of the word wretched person (*adhama*) occurring in the present verse (CM, p. 2).

The position deserves clarification. Wretchedness signifies inferiority. It may arise either by birth or by conduct. A cultured lady cannot mention inferiority of her beloved arising out of his lineage. Since such an utterance will lower the prestige of her beloved in the estimation of the public. And it is bound to produce a sense of humiliation in her mind. Nor can she speak of the inferiority engendered by his shortcomings and backsliding other than this particular unfaithful act, that is, the amorous enjoyment of the panderess and so forth. The reason is this. The disclosure of his other lapses and aberrations will betray the inherent drawbacks in his character. And a lady of noble birth is not able to endure the unwarranted censure of her own sweet heart. So it is only his amorous enjoyment with the panderess that may possibly be desired to be disclosed by her. This misdeed, in spite of its offensive character, may somewhat be liable to disclosure. For, the average laity owing to their natural desire for sexual indulgence cannot claim absolute immunity from the type of moral slip above alluded to. And this fact operates as a redeeming feature in the matter of making this an open allegation against her beloved. And consequently, all other misconducts of her lover prior to the amorous enjoyment of the panderess have apparently been tolerated. And as such they do not deserve their disclosure. Otherwise, the sending of the panderess by her own self will be rendered obviously incompatible. Consequently, this amorous enjoyment of the panderess sent by her own self can only be the possible

particular heinous act alleged to have been committed by her lover. And as such the present act, that is, the amorous enjoyment of the panderess can be obviously detected by her own self due to the presence of the marks of its own. So the meaning of the word *adhama* occurring in the verse under review will admittedly culminate in the form of the repugnant act as above referred to. And as a sequel of it, the intended import, viz. 'you have gone to indulge in amorous enjoyment with that very person' becomes suggested by means of the word *adhama* without any hitch.¹ (CM, p. 3)

The directly expressed meanings such as, 'sandal-paste has entirely vanished from the foreparts of your breasts and so forth' evidently render assistance in obtaining the present suggested sense by laying bare the marks of amorous enjoyment. A pertinent doubt arises. There occurs apparently the qualifying term 'entirely' in the assertion, viz. 'sandal-paste has entirely vanished from the foreparts of your breasts.' And it (this qualifying term) serves the purpose of excluding the possibility of the disappearance of sandal-paste by other means, namely, the obliteration of it owing to its being rubbed off with her upper garment. The simple fact is that the sandal-paste cannot vanish in its entirety from her breasts only by means of friction with the upper garment of the panderess. On the contrary a meagre of it is bound to remain visible in some portion of the surface of her breasts. The result is that the directly expressed meaning, that is, 'you have gone from here to bathe in the pond' stands substantiated. Since it is only

1. *Vide infra*, pp. 37-38.

her bathing in the pond that can cause the complete effacement of the sandal-paste from the surface of her breasts. Besides, the word 'forepart' occurring in the present assertion serves the purpose in a befitting manner. For, it divulges the evidences of the amorous enjoyment by ruling out the possibility of disappearance of the sandal-paste owing to its wash in her usual bath. Since in the event of her bathing in a pond, it will be bound to be washed off from the entire surface of her breasts. But in her case, the vanishing of the sandal-paste is noticeable only in the upper surface of the foreparts of the breasts. And this can be brought about by means of the embrace alone. So it is made abundantly clear that the directly expressed meaning, namely, 'the sandal-paste has entirely vanished from the foreparts of your breasts' has acted as unfailing ground for securing the suggested sense as above indicated.

(CM, p. 3)

Furthermore, the directly expressed meaning, viz. 'the redness of your lower lip has completely been wiped out' requires elaboration for the clarification of the position. The expression, viz. 'redness as completely wiped out' has indicated the complete fading of the redness of her lower lip. It has been employed in order to show the impossibility of its effacement by other means, namely, 'prior redness of the lower lip has slightly become indistinct due to the expiry of a long period in the matter of taking the betel-piece'. For, it is true that the elapsion of a long duration occasions the fading of redness usually produced by chewing of the betel-piece. But it can under no circumstances efface it (the redness) in its totality as is distinctly perceived in her lower lip. So it is evident that the complete effacement of the redness of her lower lip cannot

be possible by the alleged means. Again, the lower lip is specially mentioned with a view to making the marks of her amorous enjoyment divulged. It precludes the wiping out of redness of her lower lip by other means, that is, the act of bathing with which it is a common phenomenon. To be more elaborate. The wash in her usual bath is bound to entail the effacement of the redness of both of her lips. But contrary to the expectation, the upper lip of the panderess looks bright with its redness. And it is only her lower lip that has become completely obliterated of redness. This marked distinction in the matter of wiping out of redness cannot be engendered by the wash in her usual bath. And consequently, it can be rendered possible exclusively by means of kissing. So it has been highlighted that even the second expression succeeds in lending its support to the attainment of the above suggested sense. (CM, p. 3)

In the expression 'your eyes have been rendered devoid of collyrium to a great extent', the phrase 'to a great extent' has been employed with a view to avoiding its vanishing by other means. That is to say, 'the collyrium painted at morning is likely to become faded a little owing to the elapsion of a long time'. For the phrase 'to a great extent' apparently signifies excessive effacement in a particular part of her eyes. And such excessive effacement of the collyrium cannot be possible merely by the passing away of a long period. It is needless to elaborate that the collyrium is bound to be wiped out from the entire portion of the eyes if it be due to either the passage of a long time or wash in bathing. On the contray, it is only a certain part of her eyes which has excessively been rendered devoid of collyrium. And the eventuation of it can be possible exclusively by means of kissing. In this way, even this assertion

co-operates in the matter of securing the suggested sense, viz. 'you have gone to that very person in order to indulge in the amorous enjoyment with him' (CM, p.3)

The statement, viz. 'This slim body of yours stands bristled' requires elucidation. The adjective, 'slim' reveals that her slimness is an apparent fact. And as such it culminates in the portraiture of the natural slenderness of her body. This natural slenderness together with the act of bathing may account for her bristling. So the predication 'stands bristled' is regarded as the evidence of her bathing in the pond. Since the panderess who is naturally slender is bound to get herself bristled if she has taken her bath in the pond. In this way the directly expressed meaning, that is, 'you have gone from here to bathe in the pond and not to him' has been established by the statement, viz. 'the slim body of yours stands bristled'. But the intended meaning which is actually in the mind of the lady is to the effect that the panderess is slim although bristled. The reason is transparent. The act of bristling is universally recognised as the effect of bathing in the pond irrespective of one's being naturally slender or not. And the body of the panderess has apparently preserved her slimness even in the state of bristling. On the face of the fact, it may be discovered that the body bristled due to the act of bathing is likely to appear somewhat swelled. That is to say, the fact of being slim and the state of bristling are antipodally opposite in nature. But the case is reverse with the panderess. She is obviously slim despite the fact that she stands bristled. So the implicit meaning underlying the present statement is revealed in the following way: 'her slimness and the state of her bristling owe their existence to weariness in the amorous enjoyment.'

For it has been rendered manifest that her bathing in the pond cannot operate as the ground of both the fact of her being slim and the state of bristling. So it is conspicuous that even the statement, 'the slim body of yours stands bristled' contributes to the realization of the above suggested sense. (CM, pp.3-4)

In this way the meaning of the word 'wretched (*adhama*)' has been embellished by the above preceding assertions. And the result is that the present word becomes capable of suggesting the intended import, namely, 'you have gone to that very person in order to indulge in the amorous enjoyment with him.' It is remarkable that the meaning, viz. 'you have gone from here to bathe in the pond' becomes linked with the above suggested sense as being helpful to it when it (the meaning) remains directly expressed. The position stands in need of elaboration. There are assertions, namely, 'the sandal-paste has entirely vanished from the foreparts of your breasts and so forth.' In the initial stage, they, by means of their different components have established the directly expressed meaning, that is, 'you have gone from here to bathe in the pond.' And in the succeeding stage, they have exhibited the impossibility of the effacement of the sandal-paste and the like by the act of bathing which stands as directly expressed. Thereafter they come in a position to serve the basis of the suggestion of the above suggested sense. It is transparent on scrutiny that the act of bathing may claim to be regarded as the possible cause of the disappearance of sandal-paste and similar other evidences of the amorous enjoyment. And the possibility of this fact renders its exclusion necessary. And as a result of it, the directly expressed meaning, viz. 'you have gone from here to bathe in the pond' will assuredly find its scope for becoming

conducive to the obtainment of the above suggested sense.
(CM, p. 4)

Even the address, 'the teller of lies' signifies the meaning which is also contributory to the unfoldment of the suggested sense. Since it indicates that the panderess is wont to utter falsehood to her mistress. And as such credence cannot be placed upon her message, that is, 'I entreated your beloved on your behalf. But he did not come to you.' In conformity with her conduct she may be suspected of having made her amorous enjoyment with him. So the meaning of even this address will provide a basis for the suggestion of the intended import, viz. 'you have gone to that very person in order to indulge in the amorous enjoyment with him. Thereafter it is deducible that the directly expressed meaning, namely, 'you have gone from here to bathe in the pond' becomes surpassed by the suggested sense in the point of excellence. And consequently, the suggested sense, that is, 'you have gone to that very person in order to indulge in the amorous enjoyment with him' stands in superior position in comparison with the directly expressed meaning of the verse. So even this verse has a claim to be considered as an authentic instance of the suggestive poetry. (CM, p. 4)

A critique of the explanation offered

by Appaya Dīkṣita

Jagannātha, the celebrated author of the *Rasagaṅgādhara*, has restated and reproduced the *ipsissima verba* of the

explanation of this verse offered by the author of the *Citrāmīmāṃsā*.¹ And he has subsequently refuted it at great length accompanied with his usual vigour and vehemence. He has observed that the interpretation² of the present verse as given by Appaya Dīkṣita betrays his complete ignorance in the rhetorical discipline³ (*alaṃkāraśāstra*). Since it is in direct conflict with the principle of the literary criticism propounded in all the older treatises on the subject and its incompatibility to reason. As regards its conflict with older classics, it is worthy of remark that the author of the *Kāvyaaprakāśa* towards the end of the fifth chapter of his⁴ work has made momentous observation in connexion with refutation of Mahima Bhaṭṭa's contention. It has been asserted by him in his *Vyaktiviveka* that 'the superior suggested sense deserves to be subsumed under inference.'⁵ And the arguments as set forth by Mammaṭa against the view of the author of the *Vyaktiviveka* may be employed with equal telling effect against the interpretation of the above verse by Appaya Dīkṣita.

In the verse, namely, 'sandal-paste⁶ has entirely vanished etc.', the effacement of sandal-paste and so forth have been asserted in the *Citrāmīmāṃsā* as probars of the amorous enjoyment. Because the relation of invariable concomitance subsists between them. But this is untenable. Since in this very verse,

1. *Vide supra*, pp. 6-12.

2. *Ibid*,

3. RG. p. 13.

4. *Vide KP*. pp. 252-56 for its elaborate discussion.

5. 'anumāne'ntarbhāvaṃ sūrvasy'aiva dhvaneḥ prakāśayitum
Vyaktivivekaṃ kurute prañamya mahimā parām vācam·VV; p.1.

6. *Vide supra*, p. 5

the effacement of sandal-paste and so forth have been stated to be the effects of bathing. Therefore, these supposed effects, namely, the effacement of sandal-paste and so forth, owing to the lack of invariable concomitance with the amorous enjoyment will involve the fallacy of non-concomitant probans. The position deserves elucidation. In the case under consideration the amorous enjoyment or bathing may be the possible cause of the effacement of the sandal-paste and the like. If these visible effects, namely, the effacement of sandal-paste and the like be produced invariably by the amorous enjoyment to the exclusion of the act of bathing, then the effacement of sandal-paste, etc. may be resorted to as a valid probans for the inference of the amorous enjoyment. But in the event of the possibility of their production also from bathing, they will forfeit their right to be considered as a valid probans for inference of amorous enjoyment as such. The existence of the probans in the homologue (*sapakṣa*) and heterologue (*vipakṣa*) relegates it to the status of an illegitimate probans, technically called 'non-concomitant probans.' So the supposed probans of the amorous enjoyment, namely, the effacement of sandal-paste and the like remains exposed to the serious charge.¹

Again in the same context the author of the *Kāvyāprakāśa* has critically considered the following verse : 'O pious'

1. RG, p. 13.

2. GS, 2, 75 (reads *deṇa* for *teṇa* and °*aḍa* *viḍa* *Kuraṇḡga*° for °*ṇaika* *cchanikuḍaṇḡga*°); DL, p. 52 (Reads *deṇa* for *teṇa* and °*kuḍaṇḡga*° for °*nikuḍaṇḡga*°); KP, p. 253 (reads *viśaddh*° for *viśatth*°, *māri*° for *mālid*° and °*kuḍaṇḡga*° for *nikuḍaṇḡga*°);

man ! roam about with confidence, for today that dog has been killed by the furious lion that lives in the thick bower at the bank of the river Godāvarī.' In the present context it has been described that a pious man used to visit the bower at the bank of the river Godāvarī with a view to plucking flowers. This became an obstacle to a woman of loose character in the matter of meeting with her beloved in this lonely and secluded place. Now it is in order to prevent that pious man from paying visit to that place that the said woman has made the above utterance. The prohibition of roaming of the pious man at the bank of Godāvarī is intended to be suggested in the present verse. But the author of the *Vyaktiviveka* who has refuted the theory of *dhvani* with meticulous precision has trotted up the following plea. He holds that 'roaming in the house has been counselled owing to the death of the dog.' Because the consideration of this fact has led to the inference of the prohibition of the roaming of the pious man at the bank of the river Godāvarī due to the apprehension of the presence of the lion.¹

The position deserves elucidation. It has been affirmed in the *Vyaktiviveka* that in the verse under examination the positive injunction 'roam about with confidence' is the primary meaning. And 'do not roam about' is the inferred meaning.

KNS, p.31 (reads ⁰katthakuḍaṅga⁰ for kacchanikuḍaṅga⁰); AM, p.53 (reads ⁰kuḍaṅga⁰ for ⁰nikuḍaṅga⁰); VV, p. 399 (reads ⁰vīsaddh⁰ for ⁰vīsatt⁰, ⁰mari⁰ for ⁰malid⁰, ⁰deṇa for ⁰teṇa and ⁰kuḍaṅga⁰ for ⁰nikuḍaṅga⁰); SD, p. 226 (reads ⁰sunah⁰ for ⁰sunā, ⁰mūri⁰ for ⁰mūlid⁰, ⁰deṇa for ⁰teṇa and ⁰varīkaccha kuṇja⁰ for ⁰ṇaīkaccha nikuḍaṅga⁰).

1. RG, p. 13.

Further, the learned author has maintained that the suggested sense is secured by means of an inference. The inferential judgment as a class implies 'the knowledge of the probandum (*liṅgī*), styled major term, arising on the basis of the knowledge of the probans (*liṅga*) called middle term. And this view of the author of the *Vyaktiviveka* is liable to be expressed in logical form as indicated below : 'where there is the roaming of the coward person, it is invariably preceded by the knowledge of the absence of the cause of fear.' That is to say, 'the roaming of the coward' is the determinate concomitant (*Vyāpya*) and 'preceded by the knowledge of the absence of the cause of fear' is the determinant concomitant (*Vyāpaka*). And in the present case, the knowledge of the presence of the lion at the bank of the river Gadāvarī stands in relation of logical opposition to the determinant concomitant. Since it is obvious that the opposite to the alleged determinant concomitant, viz. 'preceded by the knowledge of the absence of the cause of fear' is 'the presence of the cause of fear'. And the apprehension¹ of the opposite to the determinant concomitant directly entails the negation of the determinant concomitant which ultimately entails the negation of the determinate concomitant. To be more explicit. The determinant concomitant has been stated as 'preceded by the knowledge of the absence of the cause of fear' The opposite to it is 'the presence of the cause of fear' So the apprehension of this opposite, that is, 'the presence of the cause of fear' entails the negation of the determinant concomitant,

1. See *Nyāyavindu* of Dharmakīrti for elaborate discussion. "Vyāpaka Viruddhopalabdhir yathā n'atra tuṣṭrasparsas vahner iti" *Nyāyavindu*; 2, 38.

viz. 'preceded by the knowledge of the absence of the cause of fear' And the negation of the determinant concomitant entails the negation of the determinate concomitant, which has been stated as 'the roaming of the coward'.¹

Now the chain of arguments put forward by Mahima Bhaṭṭa may be expressed in strict syllogistic form: 'The bower at the bank of the river Godāvarī is not fit for roaming of a person afraid of a dog. Because there is the presence of the lion'. But this inference is not a legitimate one. Since it is vitiated by logical fallacies which nullify its probative force. First, even a coward person who becomes frightened at the sight of a dog may roam in a place despite the presence of the cause of fear in obedience to the directions of his master or preceptor, or out of attachment to his beloved. Thus there is a clear case of the fallacy of inference called 'non-concomitant probans(*vyabhicārī*)'. This type of fallacy occurs when there is the presence of the probans, but there is the absence of the probandum. For it demonstrates the lack of invariable concomitance (*vyāpti*) between the probans and the probandum, which is the foundational basis of inference. So in the inference under critical examination, the probans, namely, 'there is the presence of the lion,' is not invariably followed by 'the absence of roaming of a person afraid of a dog.'²

In the second place this inference has been rendered illegitimate due to its involving the fallacy of inference termed

1. RG. p. 13

2. *Ibid.*

'contradicted probans (*viruddha*).' The position stands in need of elucidation. A person may be afraid of touching a dog on the ground of the production of a notion of impurity in his mind. But he may not be frightened even by the presence of a lion for his extraordinary bravery. The consideration of this fact renders the fallacy of inference styled 'the contradicted probans' inevitable. Moreover, this inference stands exposed to the fallacy of inference entitled 'non-existent probans (*asiddha*).' Since the presence of the lion which is the probans has not been determined to exist in the logical subject (*pakṣa*), that is, the bower at the bank of the river Godāvarī with absolute certitude. For it is obvious that the accredited organs of cognition, namely, perception, inference and the like have not produced unwavering assurance regarding the existence of the probans in the subject or minor term of the present inference. But conversely, the existence of the probans, viz. 'the presence of the lion' in the subject, i. e., 'the bower at the bank of the river Godāvarī' has been asserted by a woman of loose character. And consequently this fact detracts from the probative value of the inferential judgment due to the lack of its stable basis.¹

So it is evident that the probans, i. e., 'there is the presence of the lion' in the inference under critical examination is vitiated by the three different types of fallacies. They are (1) fallacy of inference called non-concomitant probans, (2) the fallacy of inference designated 'contradicted probans' and (3) the fallacy of inference styled 'non-existent probans.' And consequently it has been rendered incompetent to prove the

1. *Ibid.*

existence of the probandum, namely, 'the prohibition of roaming of the pious man' in the logical subject, viz. 'in the bower at the bank of the river Godāvarī.' The probans is invariably employed to establish the existence of the probandum in the subject (minor term) on the basis of the relation of universal concomitance (*vyāpti*) holding between them. And if it fails to achieve the objective due to the inherent defect, it is bound to forfeit its probative force. So it is manifest that the endeavour of Mahima Bhaṭṭa to subsume the superior suggested sense within the fold of inferred meaning by means of inference is inspired by a mere carping spirit and parochial outlook.¹

Now a formidable objection has been raised against the cogency of the theory of *dhvani*. The protagonists of *dhvani* theory also have banked upon the present verse in order to exemplify their own standpoint. They have affirmed that 'the prohibition of roaming of the pious man on the bank of the river Govāvarī' is the suggested sense of this verse. And it has been revealed by the utterance of the courtesan. But the proponents themselves have repudiated the authenticity of courtesan's statement. Certainly they are not warranted to place credence on an unauthentic utterance with a view to proving their own contention. The proponents argue in defence that in the theory of *dhvani* there is absolutely no necessity for the verification of the truth or falsity of the statement concerning the presence of the lion. Since in the act of suggestion the question of authenticity and unauthenticity of the suggester (*vyāñjaka*) or its invariability with reference to the suggested sense is entirely irrelevant. On the contrary, it is the funda-

1 RG, p. 13

mental condition of inference that the probans must remain immune from the infiltration of these defects which undermine its authenticity.¹

In an identical manner, Ānanda Vardhanācārya has observed that even the non-concomitant, that is, unauthentic and doubtful suggester like the presence of the lion may serve as a ground for the emergence of the suggested sense.² And in the verse under consideration, the suggested sense is : 'the prohibition of roaming of the pious man on the bank of the river Godāvārī.'³ So the endeavour of Appaya Dīkṣita to institute a relation of invariable concomitance between the suggester and the suggested sense is in direct conflict with the observation of the author of the *Dhvanyāloka* whose supreme authority is not liable to be questioned specially by one who professes to be an adherent of the *dhvani* school. It deserves mention that the authors of classical treatises on Sanskrit poetics have unanimously stated that the suggesters may be variable and non-concomitant with the suggested sense. And so the author of the *Citramīmāṃsā* has made only a barren and abortive attempt to prove the existence of invariable and infallible concomitancy between the suggester and the suggested sense.⁴

It may be contended that the recognition of even the non-concomitant suggesters in the act of suggestion by the older rhetoricians proves *a fortiori* their tacit approval of the efficiency of the suggesters which stand in a relation of invariable

1 *Ibid.*

2 *Vide DL, chap. I for its elucidation.*

3 *Vide supra, p. 15*

4 *RG, p. 13*

concomitance with the suggested sense. Consequently the interpretation¹ of this verse as offered by Appaya Dīkṣita cannot be considered as militating against the viewpoints set forth by the previous writers on poetics. To be more explicit, the older rhetoricians consider both the concomitant (*asādhāraṇa*) and the non-concomitant (*sādhāraṇa*) suggesters as capable of indicating the intended suggested sense. And in conformity with it, Appaya Dīkṣita has laid exclusive emphasis on the concomitancy of the suggesters with reference to the suggested sense. This exhibits that there is a difference of opinion only concerning the efficacy of the non-concomitant suggesters serving as the truest ground in the matter of the comprehension of the suggested sense. On the face of this issue the fresh objection has been put forth by the author of the *Rasagaṅgādhara* in order to exhibit the incompatibility of the above interpretation² to logical sense.³

Further, what purpose will be served by making the intermediate sentences, namely, 'sandal-paste has entirely vanished and so forth' as the determinate concomitant with reference to the suggested sense by means of excluding the fact of bathing in the pond⁴? It cannot be argued in defence that it has been made with a view to securing the above suggested sense, that is, 'you have gone to that very person in order to indulge in the amorous enjoyment with him.' Since the exclusive and uncommon character of the suggester is not

1 *Vide ut supra*, pp. 6-12

2 *Vide supra*, pp. 6-12

3 RG, p. 13

4 *Ibid*, p. 14

essential to make it an organ for the apprehension of the suggested sense. That is to say, the relation of the invariable concomitance is not necessary to be instituted between the suggester and the suggested sense. Let it be elucidated by a concrete instance: 'O friend ! it is due to the ill luck of mine that sleeplessness, weakness, anxiety, indolence and heavy sigh have overcome even you.'¹ In the present context what is suggested is that the lady friend who was acting as a go-between to unite the two separated beloveds has herself indulged in the amorous enjoyment with the lover of her friend².

Now in the verse ' O friend ! *et. seq*³ 'the physical effects described are such as may be produced by disease, amorous enjoyment and separation alike. So these effects in the absence of the relation of invariable concomitance between them cannot claim to be regarded as the determinate concomitant (*vyāpya*) of the aforementioned suggested sense. Since the plurality of causes will debar the determination of the relation of invariable concomitance with the effects alluded to above. But in spite of the absence of the relation of invariable concomitance between them, sleeplessness and so forth play the role of suggesters of this particular sense on the basis of the distinctive traits of the speaker and the person spoken to. It has been brought home that the relation of invariable concomitance between the suggester and the suggested sense has not even the slightest utility in the sphere of suggestion. It has

1 KP, p. 73(presents the reading of *alasattanām* for *alasantanām*, *ahaha parihavai* for *paribhavai*)

2 RG, p. 14

3 *Vide supra*, p. 21

been repeatedly emphasized that the suggester even in the absence of invariable concomitance is competent to suggest the suggested sense. But conversely, the exclusive co-association which is synonymous with the invariable concomitance (*vyāpti*) is conducive to the act of inference and consequently non-conducive to that of suggestion. The position may be rendered clear. The invariable concomitance (*vyāpti*) is universally recognised as the *raison d'être* of the inference. The assertion of the opponent of the exclusive co-association between the suggester and the suggested sense is tantamount to the admission of the existence of the relation of the invariable concomitance (*vyāpti*) between them. So in the verse beginning with 'sandal-paste *et. seq.*¹ 'the effects, viz. the effacement of sandal paste and so forth will come in a position to be treated as the valid probans for the inference of the probandum, i. e., the amorous enjoyment. And as a sequel of it, the very scope of the function of suggestion will be liable to be subsumed under inference.'²

A pertinent poser arises. It is true that the meanings of the sentences, viz. 'the sandal paste has entirely vanished from the foreparts of your breasts and so forth' are syntactically united with the meanings of the expressions 'foreparts and the like.' This syntactical union is intended to invest these effects with the status of the determinate concomitant by the opponent. Since the syntactical integration of the epithet 'foreparts' is capable of excluding the possibility of the effacement of sandal-paste and the like by means of the act of ba-

1 see *ut sup.*, p.5

2 RG, p. 14

thing in the pond. And so it is manifest that there exists the relation of exclusive co-association *qua* invariable concomitance between the effacement of the sandal-paste and the like and the amorous enjoyment. But this line of argument is liable to be regarded as bereft of probative force. And the reason is this. The effects, namely, the effacement of sandal paste and the rest may possibly be produced by their being rubbed off with the cloth drenched with water. So the plurality of causes will operate as a barrier to the existence of exclusive co-association *qua* invariable concomitance between the effacement of sandal-paste and the like and the amorous enjoyment. Consequently, these effects *qua* suggester and the amorous enjoyment *qua* suggested sense cannot serve as a valid ground for the emergence of inference. And the alleged viewpoints of Appaya Dīkṣita remain immune from the objections raised by the proponent.¹

But this mode of defence cannot withstand the impact of the smashing criticism of the proponent. Since what useful purpose can be expected to be achieved by the opponent by means of the preclusion of the fact of bathing in the pond? It demands an appropriate answer. The undesirable consequence which is entailed by an individual non-concomitant probans is equally entailed by an increased number of them. The question of numerical inferiority and superiority of the non-concomitant probans cannot be accounted as a redeeming feature in the present context. The opponent has sedulously endeavoured to shut out the bathing in the pond. He has resorted to

1 Ibid.

it to ward off nonconcomitancy of the probans enumerated above. Now he has himself referred to the rubbing of soaked cloth as the possible cause of the effacement of sandal-paste and the like. So in the face of this plurality of causes, the exclusion of only bathing in the pond as the probable cause of the effacement of sandal-paste and so forth cannot guarantee the concomitancy of the alleged probans. And this operates as a stumbling block to the materialization of inference. The net result is that what is antagonistic to inference is conducive to suggestion.¹

Another plea has been put forward by the opponent. The author of the *Kūvyāprakāśa* in course of explaining this verse has asserted the form of the suggested sense in the way as follows 'you have gone to that very person in order to indulge in the amorous enjoyment with him.' It has also been highlighted that this suggested sense occupies the predominant position and has been suggested by the word 'wretched (*adhama*)' occurring in the verse under review. It is worthy of note that the meaning of the word 'wretched (*adhama*)' has been regarded by Mammaṭa Bhaṭṭa also as exclusively capable of suggesting this intended suggested meaning. Since the form of the above suggested sense contains within its body 'very (*eva*)'² which makes the suggester as exclusive in its essential nature. And it is equivalent to the existence of the relation of invariable concomitance between the suggester and the suggested sense. And it is this very fact that has been endorsed by the opponent by means of the exclusion of the act of bathing in the pond. And as such this renders it evident that

1 Ibid

2 Cf. " *atra tad āntikam eva gatā'sīti prādhānyénādhamā padena vyajyate* " *KP*, p. 20

the opponent has not arbitrarily introduced a novelty in direct defiance of the authority of his predecessors.¹

But the above plea cannot withstand scrutiny. Since the averment, 'you have gone to that very person in order to indulge in the amorous enjoyment with him' is the form in which the suggested sense has found its expression. It has two constituent parts : (1) the act of going to him and (2) the indulgence in amorous enjoyment with him. The second part is the resultant consequence of the first part, i. e., the act of going to him. Now the suggestedness of the first part will be extremely difficult to be shown in the event of adherence to the view of the author of the *Citramīmāṃsā*. For the meanings of the subordinate sentences, namely, sandal-paste has entirely vanished from the foreparts of your breasts and so forth 'stand incompatible with the directly expressed meaning, that is, 'you have gone from here to bathe in the pond and not to him.' Since Appaya Dīkṣita has already observed that the effacement of sandal-paste from the foreparts of the breasts and the like can take place exclusively by means of the amorous enjoyment. So these effects cannot be held to be produced from the act of bathing in the pond. Consequently this directly expressed meaning is bound to be superseded by a meaning diametrically opposite to it.²

The consecutive stages involved in it deserve elucidation. The directly expressed meaning in the present case consists of two expressions (1) have gone and (2) have not gone. They

1 RG, P. 14

2 Ibid

signify the sense of affirmation and negation in their respective order. It is remarkable that these two expressions are the constitutive elements of the principal meaning of the sentence, that is, 'you have gone from here to bathe in the pond and have not gone to that wretched person'. And this principal meaning due to its incompatibility with the meanings of the subordinate sentences paves the way for the indirect indication of the negation in the place of affirmation and *vice versa* by means of secondary function conveying the meaning diametrically opposite to the primary meaning' (*Viparīta*¹ *lakṣaṇā*). To be more explicit, the expression 'have gone' will involve the meaning 'have not gone' and the expression 'hāve not gone' will involve the meaning 'have gone' in the present context. So the directly expressed meaning, that is, 'you have gone from here to bathe in the pond and have not gone to that wretched person' will get itself transformed into the meaning, viz. 'you have gone from here to that wretched person and have not gone to bathe in the pond'. And as a consequence of it, the first part of the sense as above referred to² becomes comprehended by 'secondary function conveying the meaning diametrically opposite to the primary meaning', which is distinct from the function of suggestion. So this part has forfeited its right to be recognised as apprehended by the function of suggestion. Since it has been indicated by another independent function belonging to the word. But the suggestion of the alleged part, i. e., 'the act of going to him' will easily be possible

1 Cf. 'abhidheyena sāmīpyāt sūrūpyāt samavāyataḥ vaiparītyāt kriyāyogāt lakṣaṇā pañcadhāmatā" DL (Locana), p. 28

2 Vide *supra*, p. 25

in the view of Jagannātha. Since he has not admitted the existence of the relation of invariable concomitance between the aforesaid suggesters and the suggested sense. Consequently, the effacement of sandal-paste and the like can be produced from the act of bathing, the amorous enjoyment and other conditions alike. And as such the meanings of the above subordinate sentences cannot become inconsistent with the act of bathing standing as directly expressed. So it (the directly expressed meaning) will remain beyond the purview of the secondary function conveying the meaning diametrically opposite to the primary meaning (*viparīta lakṣaṇā*). And as a result of it, the suggestion of the first part of the alleged sense will take place without encountering any hindrance.¹

It cannot be contended that the part, viz. 'the act of going' may be secured by means of suggestion, although it is undeniable that it has already been comprehended by the 'secondary function conveying the meaning diametrically opposite to the primary meaning' (*viparīta lakṣaṇā*); for, it is an indisputable fact that the meaning which is yielded due to the obvious incompatibility of the primary meaning cannot be expected to be suggested by the function of suggestion. This view can be confirmed by a concrete illustration : 'Oh ! this lake is full (of water) in which turning over and over the people take their bath.' In this instance the adjectival phrase 'turning over and over' which is the adjective of the subject, namely, 'people' cannot stand compatible with the fullness of the lake with water. And as such owing to the active operation of 'the secondary function conveying the meaning diametrically opposite to the

primary meaning', the negation of fullness, i. e., 'unfullness' as its meaning has been conveyed in an indirect manner. So this meaning 'unfullness' becomes debarred from its being suggested by the function of suggestion. The consideration of this fact renders it obvious that the first part of the sense repeatedly referred to above can under no circumstances become suggested by the act of suggestion. And its reason has already been shown¹ in the preceding paragraph.²

It has already been indicated that the suggested meaning takes the following form : 'you have gone to that very person in order to indulge in the amorous enjoyment with him'. It is possessed of two constituent parts : (1) the act of going to him and (2) the indulgence in the amorous enjoyment with him.³ So far the comprehension of the first part is concerned, the function of suggestion as a possible means to it is excluded due to the emergence of the secondary function conveying the meaning diametrically opposite to the primary meaning.' But the second part, namely, the indulgence in amorous enjoyment with him which is the resultant consequence of the first part may be suggested by the function of suggestion without encountering any impediments. For the suggestion of the second part can be possible on the basis of power subsisting in 'the secondary function conveying the meaning diametrically opposite to the primary meaning' (*viparīta lakṣaṇā*). The position stands in need of clarification. It is a universally acknowledged fact that the secondary function belonging to the word '*lakṣaṇā*' comes into play either on the basis of usage or for some speci-

1 *Vide supra*, p. 25, p. 27

2 RG, p. 14

3 *Vide supra*, p. 25

fic purpose.¹ 'When it is based on the usage it appears dissociated from the suggested sense. But when it is brought into operation for some specific purpose, it is bound to be associated with a suggested sense. And this specific purpose of the secondary function belonging to the word is purveyed exclusively by means of the function of suggestion. In the case under examination, 'the act of going to him' has been indicated by 'the secondary function conveying the meaning diametrically opposite to the primary meaning' (*viparīta lakṣaṇā*). And it (*Viparīta lakṣaṇā*) assuredly involves some specific purpose. This purpose will be nothing but the elicitation of the fact of 'indulgence in amorous enjoyment with him.' And as a matter of fact, it is identical with the second part of the intended suggested sense. It deserves to be stressed that the apprehension of this part falls within the sphere of the function of suggestion. Since it is bound to conform to the procedures normally involved in the emergence of the secondary function belonging to the word. And this suggested sense, viz 'the indulgence in amorous enjoyment with him' has really transcended the directly expressed meaning of the verse under review. So the position of the opponent remains unassailed on the ground that the result of the first part of the suggested sense, that is, 'the indulgence in amorous enjoyment with him' is secured exclusively by the service of the function of suggestion.²

But even this device of the opponent is not competent to achieve the objective. Since the very observation of the oppo-

1 Cf. KP, p. 43 and p. 55 for a detailed discussion of this problem.

2 RG, p. 15

ment betrays inherent inconsistency. And it may be quoted *ipse dixit* to substantiate the allegation of the proponent. Wretchedness signifies inferiority. It may arise either by birth or by conduct. A cultured lady cannot mention about the inferiority of her beloved arising out of his lineage'.¹ By this and by similar other passages the opponent has clearly indicated that the inferiority of the beloved will be produced due to the commission of some misdeed. And this misdeed in its turn can be nothing but the amorous enjoyment of the panderess. But it is notable that the comprehension of this heinous act, that is, 'the amorous enjoyment of the panderess with him' will evidently be secured by means of implication (*arthāpatti*).² Since the two facts,

1 Vide supra, p. 6

2 It will not be out of place to elucidate the essential nature of implication (*arthāpatti*). The expression '*arthāpatti*' signifies the comprehension of a fact from other facts. 'When two facts either seen or heard remain mutually incompatible and consequently lead to the assumption of another distinct fact as the solvent of the dead lock, it is designated 'implication' (*arthāpatti*). The classical example of implication is this. 'Bulky Devadatta does not take food during the daytime'. In this illustration the fact of being bulky and abstinence from taking food during daytime are mutually incompatible. Consequently this obvious incompatibility acts as the ground for the assumption of another distinct fact, that is, taking of meal by Devadatta at night.' Cf. *Vedāntaparibhāṣā* pp. 195—201. It is remarkable that the Mīmāṃsists recognise implication as an independent organ of cognition. The monistic Vedāntins have also given the seal of approval to it. But the adherents of the Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika, Sāṅkhya and other rival systems of thought have denied its independent status and subsumed it

viz. (1) vilifying him as wretched and (2) the sending of the panderess by her ownself to him remain mutually incompatible in the opinion of Appaya Dīkṣita. Consequently, this palpable incompatibility culminates in the assumption of another distinct fact, that is, his amorous enjoyment with the panderess. And it is too obvious to mention that this assumed fact is competent to dissolve the mutual incompatibility as above indicated. So even this part of the sense, that is, the indulgence in amorous enjoyment with him yielded by implication will be deprived of its claim to be suggested by the function of suggestion.¹

The opponent puts forth a fresh rejoinder. It is true that the fact, namely, the indulgence in amorous enjoyment with him has been comprehended by means of implication. And despite this, it will not entail the forfeiture of its right of getting itself suggested by the function of suggestion. But this is absolutely untenable. Since the meaning, which has already become known by means of an independent cognitive organ like perception or inference, cannot again be purveyed by the word. To put it the other way round, what is not yielded by means of the other cognitive organs is afforded by the verbal testimony (*śabda pramāṇa*). In the present context the part of the sense, that is, the indulgence in amorous enjoyment with him becomes apprehended on the basis of implication which is an independent organ of cognition. So it cannot legitimately claim the status of the suggested sense, suggestible by the function of suggestion.²

1 RG, p. 15

2 *Ibid*

Another doubt crops up. Implication (*arthāpatti*) is not universally avowed as an independent organ of cognition. Since it has been subsumed under inference by the Naiyāyikas and others. So the part of the sense, namely, the indulgence in amorous enjoyment with him may get itself suggested without facing any obstacles. Consequently the position of the opponent remains immune from the objections of the proponent. But even this line of argument is devoid of substance. Granted that the indulgence in amorous enjoyment with him has been suggested by the function of suggestion, even then the cherished objective of the opponent cannot be achieved. Because the directly expressed meanings such as 'sandal-paste has entirely vanished from the foreparts of your breasts and so forth' and 'wretchedness' are bound to remain unrealised in accordance with the viewpoints of Appaya Dīkṣita. For the act of bathing in the pond which is directly expressed is too incompetent to establish the fact of being wretched and the effacement of sandal-paste from the foreparts of the breasts and the like. And on the other hand it is only by means of the comprehension of the suggested sense, that is, 'the amorous enjoyment with the beloved of the lady concerned' that the facts, viz. the effacement of sandal-paste and so forth and wretchedness become substantiated in a reasonable manner. So the verse under examination cannot be regarded as a genuine example of *dhvani*. On the contrary, it is entitled to be considered as an authentic illustration of poetry of subordinate suggestion¹. Because it is a patent fact that where the suggested sense serves as a ground for the establishment of the directly expressed meaning, it is admittedly an instance

1 *Vide infra*, P. 41

of poetry of subordinate suggestion, pure and simple¹. So it follows that the interpretation of this verse as put forth by the author of the *Citramīmāṃsā* is characterised by the lack of consistency. And the reason is manifest. This verse has been cited by him as an authentic instance of *dhvani*. But he has elucidated it as a case of poetry of subordinate suggestion².

In this way the incompatibility of the alleged interpretation of this verse has been rendered evident by the chain of arguments adduced by the author of the *Rasaṅgādhara*. So it stands substantiated that the meanings of the subordinate sentences, viz. 'the sandal paste has entirely vanished and so forth' as uttered by the cultured and talented lady should be common and non-concomitant with reference to the suggested sense. That is to say, the effacement of sandal-paste and so forth deserve to be regarded as the possible effects of the act of bathing in the pond, the amorous enjoyment and other conditions alike. Since only in such a case, the effects, namely, the effacement of sandal paste and the like can successfully be thwarted from becoming the determinate concomitant of the amorous enjoyment, which stands suggested by the function of suggestion. And it is but appropriate for a cultured and talented lady that her speech should remain syntactically linked in common with both the directly expressed meaning and the suggested sense³.

Now Jagannātha with a view to substantiating the amorous enjoyment as suggested by the function of suggestion offers the following explanation. 'Oh you, unaware of the

1 *Vide infra*, P. 42

2 RG, P. 15

3 RG, P. 15

occurrence of your friend's pain ! Oh self-centred one ! you in apprehension of the passing over of the bathing-time did not go either to my beloved or to the river. You have gone from the close quarters of mine to the pond for taking your own bath. But you did not go to him who is wretched on account of giving pains to others. The fact is that he has not even the least concern for others' sufferings. The position deserves elucidation. The lady in question has been in separation from her beloved. She is bitterly afflicted by mental agony due to the presumption that her beloved may have fallen in love with another lady. So he is intentionally neglecting her. She has taken the panderess in her own confidence and sent her to him for the fulfilment of her cherished objective. But she (panderess) has gone directly to take her bath in the near-by pond. So she has been addressed as self-centred one and so forth¹.

It is worth noting that the fact of bathing in the pond stands established by the meanings of the subordinate sentences, viz. 'sandal-paste has entirely vanished from the foreparts of your breasts and the like'. Since it is only the foreparts of her breasts and not the surface of the entire chest that have been completely obliterated of the sandal paste. The fact is this. The panderess gets herself overpowered by a sense of modesty arising from the presence of many a youth in the pond. Consequently she holds the pair of her creeper-like arms in crosswise posture and places them fully upon the two shoulders. She takes her bath in such a posture of her body. The net result is that it is only the foreparts of her breasts which, on account of their protuberance, receive the persistent friction

with the arms. So the complete effacement of sandal-paste is visible exclusively from the foreparts of the breasts. Again the redness of her upper lip is not completely wiped out. The reason is that it has not been properly washed off due to her haste. But the lower lip in comparison with the upper lip exhibits excessive rubbing of the fingers employed in cleansing her teeth. And it has also frequently come into contact with water intended for gargling. So it is only the redness of her lower lip that has been completely wiped out by the act of bathing in the pond. Further her eyes have not been carefully washed off. So it is only their exterior portion (*dñram*) that has been rendered destitute of collyrium. And it is due to the contact with water alone to the preclusion of rubbing by fingers. Her body bristled owing to its catching cold as well as slimness. So in the way indicated above, the utterance of the talented lady must admittedly be pregnant with deep import. Otherwise the allegation of the lack of talentedness against her becomes inevitable¹.

In this way the meanings of the subordinate sentences have their linkage in common with both the directly expressed meaning, namely, the bathing in the pond and the suggested sense, that is, the amorous enjoyment with the panderess. And consequently the comprehension of the primary meaning, that is, 'you have gone to bathe in the pond, etc.,' will take place without involving any incompatibility with the meanings of the subordinate sentences. So the ultimate import of the present verse cannot be speedily comprehended. And the result is that the secondary function belonging to the word will be denied its

sphere of operation. The position deserves further clarification. The incompatibility of the primary meaning of a sentence is the condition precedent to bringing into operation the secondary function belonging to the word. Since in that eventuality, an inquisitiveness arises in the mind for the apprehension of the ultimate import of it. But the case is reverse in the function of suggestion. It comes into play when the ultimate import is in a concealed state incomprehensible by the other functions belonging to the word. And it has already been indicated that the present verse falls beyond the purview of the secondary function belonging to the word¹.

Now the function of suggestion is requisitioned in order to secure the ultimate import of the verse under review. The consecutive stages involved in it are unfolded in the following fashion. In the initial stage thorough comprehension of the primary meaning of this verse takes place without engendering any complexity. In the succeeding state the distinctive characteristics of the speaker (the lady in question), the person addressed to (the panderess), the lover concerned and other things like intonation, etc., become apprehended by a sympathetic critic of poetry. Afterwards the word, 'wretched' plays a prominent role in the matter of getting the ultimate import of this verse suggested by the function of suggestion. Its connotation is the attribute which is of the nature of the fact of giving pains without any cause. This attribute is the character of the wretched as a class. Further this connotation of the word 'wretched' in the state of its direct expression, is of the nature of giving pains by means of other lapses excluding the present lapse, namely,

the amorous enjoyment of the panderess. And afterwards it has enlisted the service of the function of suggestion. The result is that it has culminated in the apprehension of the ultimate import, that is, his indulgence in amorous enjoyment with the panderess. And this is the gist of the conclusion reached by the rhetoricians¹.

Moreover the present interpretation of this verse offered by the author of the *Rasagaṅgādhara* brings home the absurdity of the explanation of the word wretched as given by Appaya Dīkṣita. The word wretched has been explained in his *Citramīmāṃsā* as follows : 'wretchedness signifies inferiority.-It may arise either by birth or by conduct. A cultured lady cannot mention the inferiority of her beloved arising out of his lineage. Nor can she speak of the inferiority-the inferiority engendered by his shortcomings and back-sliding-other than this particular heinous act, that is, his amorous enjoyment with the panderess. Since the disclosure of his other lapses and aberrations will betray the inherent drawbacks in his character. And a lady of noble birth is not able to endure the unwarranted censure of her own sweetheart. But this misdeed, that is, his amorous enjoyment with the panderess in spite of its offensive character may somewhat be liable to disclosure. Consequently all other misconducts of her lover prior to his amorous enjoyment with the panderess have apparently been tolerated. And as such they do not deserve their disclosure. In this way by the exclusion of other misdeeds, it ultimately culminates in revealing this heinous act, that is, 'the amorous enjoyment with the panderess.'²

1 *Ibid.* P. 16

2 *Vide supra*, PP. 6-7; RG, P. 16

Now this observation of the author of the *Citramīmāṃsā* is absolutely untenable. Since it is highly inappropriate on the part of a talented and cultured lady to divulge openly the moral lapse of her beloved involving the amorous enjoyment of her friend entrusted with the duty of a messenger. So the misdeed intended to be disclosed by the lady must be other than the amorous enjoyment of her beloved with the panderess. And the present allegation must refer to some of his prior misdeeds which have already been tolerated by her. Since the continued indifference towards her by her beloved has resulted in injuring her feeling. As a sequel of it, even the previously tolerated misdeeds of her beloved have grown intolerable to her. The result is that she has lost the balance of her mind and dubbed him as wretched with a view to getting some tolerated misdeeds divulged. So the ground obtained by means of opponent's explanation of the wretched can in no way be regarded as exclusive and uncommon in character with reference to the acquirement of the ultimate import, that is, the amorous enjoyment with the panderess. Consequently it becomes untenable in the light of the novel interpretation offered by Jagannātha, And this has given a fresh orientation to the interpretation of the verse under review¹.

Chapter II

The definition of poetry of subordinate suggestion has been formulated in the following fashion : where the suggested sense has not transcended the primary meaning, that is to say, it is either on a *par* with or inferior to the primary meaning, it is designated the poetry of subordinate suggestion (*gunābhīta vyāṅgya*)¹. It may be illustrated by the following verse : May Hari protect you, while embracing the milk-maid with her body adorned with the cluster of hairs standing on their ends² who (milk-maid) has signified her dejection and languor due to her futile stay by the circumlocutory address in the form of O Acyuta: I am going back; for, can there be the production of gratification only by looking at you ? Rather if we remain together in such a deserted place, the wretched people will think it otherwise³. In this verse the round about way of address 'O Acyuta I am going back, etc.,' serves the basis for the suggestion of the intended import. And this suggested import is 'I have waited there so long for the enactment of my amorous sport with you. But it has not been realised'. This suggested sense in its turn acts as contributory to the understanding

1 *Vide supra*, P. I

2 Pulaka = Erection or bristling of the hairs of the body (considered to be occasioned by delight or rapture rather than by fear)

A Sanskrit-English Dictionary, MMW, p. 638

3 KP., P. 207 (reads °tanuḥ for °tanum); Kuv., P. 172 (reads kim c'aivam for kim tv'evam and °tanuḥ for °tanum); SR, P. 24, st. 154 (reads vrthāprasthāna° for vrthāvasthāna° and pulakāṅkurāṅcitavapuḥ for pulakotkarāṅcitanum),

of the directly expressed meaning, viz. 'the act of signifying her dejection and languor due to her futile stay through the medium of circumlocutory address'. The situation demands further clarification. Granted that the directly expressed meaning of this verse has been comprehended by the primary function belonging to the word. But a subtle analysis of it renders it evident that the primary meaning 'O Acyuta ! I am going back, etc.' stands completely incompatible with the act of signifying her dejection and languor *et seq.* which also is equally directly expressed. And the apprehension of the suggested sense 'I have waited there *et seq.*' drives home the mutual incompatibility subsisting between these two parts of the directly expressed meaning. So it is clear that the suggested sense has failed to transcend over the primary meaning in the matter of producing literary excellence. For it has been relegated to an inferior position in comparison with the directly expressed meaning due to its becoming ancillary to the understanding of the above primary meaning in totality. It is owing to this reason that the present example has been regarded as an authentic case of poetry of subordinate suggestion. ¹

Another instance of poetry of subordinate suggestion may be cited in the following manner. 'The young lady with a flow of tears trickling down on the face prevents her beloved from his intended journey for the country to be reached within

1. CM, P. 4

Cf. 'atra ca yāvat vyañgyārtho na pratisandhīyate tāvat ity' āmantranēty' ādivākyārthaḥ pratiyamānōpi pratisandhānāt anupapadyamānatayaiva bhāṣate vyañgyārtha rūpū bhaṅgiḥ tu pratītū tadanupapattinirāsakṛta' Kāvyaaprakāśa with Maheśwara's commentary, Calcutta SS, 1936, Chap. 5, P. 230

hundred days by means of persuasive address 'Are you to come back here, O beloved ! after a lapse of three hours or within midday or even after that or after the expiry of the whole day ? ¹ In this verse the suggested sense is: 'one complete day is the farthest limit. After that I cannot hold my life.' It acts as subservient to the establishment of the directly expressed meaning in the shape of 'the prevention of her beloved's contemplated journey'. Since her beloved has been convinced by this suggested sense that his sweetheart cannot remain alive after the elapsion of one complete day during separation. And he has dropped the idea of departing from his beloved. So the suggested sense has become ancillary to the establishment of the act of prevention which remains directly expressed. Consequently in the present case also the suggested sense cannot transcend over the primary meaning. Therefore it deserves to be comprehended within the compass of poetry of subordinate suggestion. ²

Now the contention of Appaya Dīkṣita that this verse is an instance of poetry of subordinate suggestion has been subjected to severe criticism by Jagannātha. The author of the *Rasagāṅgādhara* has asserted that the very address of the young lady in the shape of 'are you to come back here, O beloved ! after a lapse of three hours or within midday *et seq.*, is competent to act as an accessory to the establishment of the directly expressed meaning. To be more explicit, this address

1. AMS; śl. 12 (reads *pareṇa vā* for *pare' thavā*); SR, P. 329, śl. 11 (reads *pareṇa vā* for *pare' thavā*, *yūte py ahni* for *yāte vā' hni* and *oghalajjjhalaiḥ* for *ogalajjjalaiḥ*); SM, P. 30 (reads *vālā vākyaiḥ* *savāṣpa ghalajjjhalaiḥ* for *bālā' tūpaiḥ savāṣpa ghalajjjalaiḥ*).

is exclusively conducive to the accomplishment of the directly expressed meaning in the form of the forbiddance of the contemplated departure of her beloved. It has been rendered more appealing by the flow of tears trickling down on her face during the utterances of these sentences. So the suggested import, viz. 'One complete day is the farthest limit, after that I cannot hold my life' cannot operate as an accessory in respect of the accomplishment of the expressed meaning in the form indicated above. And consequently this suggested sense cannot be assigned an inferior position in relation to the forbiddance of the impending journey of her beloved which is directly expressed in the verse under review. Thus it becomes conspicuous that the present verse cannot be an authentic instance of poetry of subordinate suggestion as has been exemplified in the *Citramīmāṃsā*. Besides, the expression, viz. 'by means of the address' (*ālāpaiḥ*) has been used in the third case-endings. And the meaning of this expression will be the most effective instrument to accomplish the act of prevention expressed by the word 'prevents (*harati*)' as employed in the verse. So it is evident that the act of prevention is not brought into realization by means of the suggested sense as affirmed by Appaya Dīkṣita. And as a sequel of it, the present verse forfeits its claim to be regarded as a genuine instance of poetry of subordinate suggestion. ¹

An objection arises. It is true that the directly expressed meaning, namely, 'are you to come back here, O beloved ! after a lapse of three hours *et seq.* 'is admittedly conducive to the realization of the prevention of the impending journey of her beloved. But despite this, the possibility of assistance

even by the suggested sense, viz. 'one complete day is the farthest limit *et seq.*' towards the accomplishment of the prevention of the impending journey of her beloved cannot totally be ignored under any circumstances. This simple fact may account for the inferior position of the suggested sense with reference to the above directly expressed meaning. So the comprisal of this verse under the compass of poetry of subordinate suggestion may not be regarded as erroneous and illegitimate. But this is not amenable to reason. Since the acceptance of the opponent's viewpoint will entail the derogation of the verse commencing with 'niḥśeṣacyuta *et seq.*'¹ which is universally recognised as an authentic instance of the suggestive poetry (*dhvanikāvya*) to the status of poetry of subordinate suggestion. The reason is obvious. In this verse the enjoyment of the panderess with the beloved of the lady concerned is apprehensible by the function of suggestion. The fact of being wretched (*adhamatva*) stands directly expressed by the word wretched (*adhama*) as occurring in the present verse. The enjoyment of the panderess may contribute towards bringing the fact of being wretched into being in a direct way. So the suggested sense 'the enjoyment of the panderess is bound to be treated as an auxiliary with reference to the directly expressed meaning, viz. 'the fact of being wretched.' And consequently even this verse instead of becoming an instance of the suggestive poetry (*dhvanikāvya*) will fall within the range of poetry of subordinate suggestion. The consideration of this fact completely controverts the contention upheld by Appaya Dīkṣita.²

Moreover Jagannātha has introduced a novel argument with a view to getting this verse excluded from the jurisdiction of poetry of subordinate suggestion. It is undeniable that the

¹ Vide *supra*, P. 5

² RG, P. 18

suggested import, viz. 'one complete day is the farthest limit, afterwards I cannot hold my life' becomes derogated to an inferior position in relation to the directly expressed meaning in the shape of the prevention of the intending journey of her beloved. Because this suggested sense is undoubtedly contributive to the accomplishment of the present directly expressed meaning. Despite this fact, the verse under examination cannot be entitled to its inclusion within the realm of poetry of subordinate suggestion. The reason is this. The young lady will serve the purpose of excitant (*vibhāva*). Tears trickling down on her face will play the role of the ensuant (*anubhāva*). The mental agitation of the young lady in the moment of the departure of her beloved and so forth will assume the role of variant (*saṁcāribhāva*). And the cumulative effect of all these three factors will pave the way for the suggestion of the erotic sentiment in privation (*vipralambha*), as bound to be felt intensified by the beloved for the lover. This suggested erotic sentiment in privation cannot be prevented from promoting this verse to the dignity of the suggestive poetry (*dhvanikāvya*). So it is clear that the verse under review can in no way be regarded as falling under the consideration of poetry of subordinate suggestion. ¹

It will not be wide of the mark to mention that the present criticism offered by Jagannātha lacks in its probative value. The fact is this. There are two types of suggested sense: 1 intermediate and 2 the ultimate. The intermediate suggested sense has universally been admitted as the exclusive criterion for differentiating suggestive poetry of subordinate

suggestion. And in this context it has been manifested by the following way: 'One complete day is the farthest limit. After that I cannot hold my life.' It accounts for including the present verse under the realm of poetry of subordinate suggestion. On the other hand, the suggested erotic sentiment in privation (*vipralambha*) is the ultimate one in its essential nature. It has elevated this verse to the plane of the suggestive poetry. And this ultimate suggested erotic sentiment in privation has exclusively been resorted to by Jagannātha in order to controvert the viewpoints of the opponent in the verse under review. ¹

But this line of argument of the proponent is bound to entail confusion. The fact is that the verse commencing with '*grāmataruṇam et seq*'; ² has been asserted as the instance of poetry of subordinate suggestion by the author of the *Kāvya-aprakāśa* and other rhetoricians. It may be rendered into English: 'The lustre of the face of the young lady becomes extremely gloomy while she views over and again the youth of the village with a bunch of fresh *vañjula* flowers in hand'. In this verse the suggested sense is: 'you had promised to enjoy my company in the *vañjula* bower, but did not go to that place'. It (the suggested sense) fails to transcend over the primary meaning, that is, the fact of becoming extremely gloomy in the matter of begetting poetic charm. So it is regarded as an example of poetry of subordinate suggestion. It is remarkable that the above suggested sense ultimately culminates in the suggestion of the semblance of erotic sentiment in

1 RG, p. 19

2 KP, 1-3

privation (*vipralambhābhāsa*) in the verse mentioned above. The ground is transparent. The youth of the village with the bunch of vañjula flowers in hand plays the role of both the types of excitant (*vibhūva*). Extreme gloom as discernible on the face of the young lady acts as ensuant (*anubhāva*). Her anxiety and so forth perform the function of transitory feeling (*sañcār*). And the cumulative effect of all these factors consummates in the development of erotic sentiment in privation which is appreciated by the sympathetic critics.

Now the expression, that is, 'the youth of the village' indicates that the lover as suitable to the ladies is one and alone in the village. His association is passionately desired by many a young lady. So this erotic sentiment in privation cannot claim to be genuine in its essential nature. But conversely, it is merely a semblance of erotic sentiment in privation. If the ultimate suggested sense is insisted as the criterion for according the status of suggestive poetry, then the present verse will claim its inclusion under it (suggestive poetry). Since the ultimate suggested sense in the verse, viz. *grāma-taruṇa et seq.* is the semblance of erotic sentiment in privation (*vipralambhābhāsa*). And this will involve direct conflict with the view of Mammaṭa and other adherents of *dhvani* school who consider it as an instance of poetry of subordinate suggestion. Therefore the criticism of Jagannātha is absolutely unwarrantable and is bereft of cogency.



THE CLASSIFICATION OF THE THIRD VARIETY OF *BELLES-LETTRES*

The third variety of *belles-lettres* designated *citra-kāvya* ¹ is that which is striking although characterized by the absence of the suggested sense. ² It admits of three fold

1 *Vide supra*, P. 1

2. According to Mammata the expression *citra* means the figure of speech and literary excellence. So the *belles-lettres* which is endowed with figure of speech and the literary excellence is styled *citra*. It is bifurcated into two varieties: (1) *śabda citra* and (2) *artha citra*. Cf. '*Citram iti guṇālaṃkāra yuktam śabda citram vācya-citram avyāṅg-yam tvāvaram smṛtam*' KP, P. 22. It is also essential to explain the expression *citra* for the correct understanding of the third variety of *belles-lettres* entitled *citra*. Ānandavardhana has elaborately expounded the essential nature of *citra* in the third chapter of the *Dhvanyāloka*. He has observed that the superiority and the inferiority of the suggested sense account for the emergence of two varieties of *belles-lettres* bearing the title of (1) suggestive poetry and (2) poetry of subordinate suggestion respectively. The third variety of *belles-lettres*, viz. *citra* is distinct from the two varieties of it as mentioned above. The type of *belles-lettres* styled *citra* is conspicuous by the absence of the power of revealing the suggested sense of specific nature. It (*citra-kāvya*) emerges out on the basis of the strikingness pertaining to the word and the meaning. So it is sheer representation of poetry.

It deserves mention that this third variety of *belles-lettres* cannot claim to be the prototype and original in its essential nature. On the contrary it is mere limitation of poetry absolutely bereft of reality. Figures of speech belonging to the word such as alliteration, *yamaka* (the repetition of identical group of letters with difference of mean-

classification : (1) where the figure of speech pertaining to the word is predominant (*śabdacitra*), (2) where the figure of speech pertaining to the meaning is predominant (*arthacitra*) and (3) where the figure of speech pertaining to the word and the meaning is predominant (*ubhaya citra*). The first variety of the *citrakāvya*, viz. *śabdacitra* may be substantiated by the instance as follows : 'He (Hari) for the first time felt the advent of the spring which was fragrant by the bunches of flowers and in which the forest of palāśa trees was adorned with fresh leaves, the lotuses were full blown and pervaded with pollen and the new leaves had faded a little owing to their tenderness'. ¹ In this instance the recurrence of three letters after the first two letters of each and every foot has paved the way for the emergence of the figure *yamaka*. That is to say, the recurrence of three letters, viz. *pa, lā, śa, pa, rā, ga, la, tā*,

ing in the event of its possibility) and similar others are included under the compass of the first variety of the *citrakāvya*. The figures of speech pertaining to the meaning, namely, poetic conception and so forth are subsumed under the second variety of it technically termed *arthacitra*. The figure of speech pertaining to the word and the meaning constitutes the third variety which is entitled *ubhaya citra*. It is worth of note that this third variety of the *citrakāvya* has not been explicitly mentioned in the *Dhvanyāloka*. DL, PP. 494—495.

¹ SV, canto 6, śl. 2; SR, P. 332, śl 58; AM, P. 216

nta, and *ra*, *bhīm*, *su* has taken place in all the four feet of it in their respective order. ¹ Again the present instance is not possessed of the word which can reveal any specific type of suggested sense. Further the figure of speech entitled *yamaka* obviously causes manifestation of the strikingness inhering in the word. So this instance is entitled to be considered as an accredited case of the first variety of the *citrakāvya*. ²

The second variety of the *citrakāvya*, viz. 'where the figure of speech pertaining to the meaning is predominant' has been exemplified in the following fashion: 'The dust which has been severed from its source by (the flow of) blood and fanned by the wind above that blood shone like the smoke formerly risen from the fire with the charcoal as its only remnant.' ³ In this case the dust severed from its source by the blood and fanned by the wind upon that blood has been similesed with the smoke formerly risen from the fire with the charcoal as its only remnant. And it is this *similis* that has been occasioned strikingness and poetic elegance in the present instance. It is too obvious to attest that the meaning of the present instance is not endowed with the power of suggesting the suggested sense of any specific type. So it has been comprehended in the orbit of the second variety of the *citrakāvya* as indicated above. The example of the third variety of the

1 Cf. the observation of Mallinātha 'Iha pratīpadam prathamāksaradvayāt parato'kṣara trayā vṛtti rūpa yamaka prakramāt caturthapade' pi tad eva yamakam'- SV, canto 6, śl. 2

2 CM, P. 5

3 RV, canto 7; śl. 43; SR, P. 128, śl. 29

citrakāvya may be cited as follows: 'May the Boar-incarnation afford good fortune to you all, who at the termination of the cycle carried out earth by agitating the water of the ocean and who, by means of shattering the summits of the mountain named kula by the strokes of his hoofs, evidently created the auspicious sound of the drum produced from crores of rolling slabs of stones.' 'In the first half of this instance the figure 'alliteration' takes up its rise on the basis of the recurrence of the letters like *nva*, *da*, etc. It has apparently engendered the strikingness belonging to the word. On the other hand, the primary meaning of the second half of it has consummated in creating the vivid picture of the auspicious sound of the drum produced from crores of rolling slabs of stones. And as a sequel of it, both the strikingness belonging to the word and the strikingness belonging to the meaning have apparently been generated by this solitary instance. It is needless to reiterate that neither the meaning nor the word of it is competent to convey the suggested sense in any conceivable way. So it has got the claim to be an authentic instance of the third variety of the *citrakāvya*.¹

In accordance with the viewpoint of Jagannātha, this verse should not be cited as an instance of any type of poetry. Since its meaning is contaminated by several literary defects. The position may be rendered clear. In the first half of this verse both the sentences, viz. (1) 'may the Boar incarnation afford good fortune to you all' and (2) 'who at the termination of cycle carried out the earth by agitating the water of the ocean' have been completed by the two principal verbs, viz.

(1) may afford (*vitratu*) and (2) carried out (*udavahat*) as have been referred to above. And consequently these two sentences have been rendered completely devoid of the requirement (*ākāṅkṣā*) of any other word for the completion of their meaning. In such a case, the sentence which constitutes the body of the second half of this verse and is introduced as the adjective of Boar incarnation, remains deprived of its association with its own substantive i. e., Boar incarnation. So the employment of the additional term, viz. who (*yat*) becomes indispensable in order to get sentence *qua* adjective syntactically linked with its own substantive, namely, the Boar-incarnation. And this employment of the additional term facilitates the ground for the emergence of the literary defect designated as reaffirmation of the completed predication ¹ (*samāptapunarāttatva*). ²

Moreover the ludicrous sense, viz. *apadasthapadatva* is involved in the signification of the present verse. It bears close resemblance to the event of the beating of the drum when the marriage ceremony is already over. In the present instance the carrying out of the earth by agitating the water of the ocean, which is really an extraordinary feat, has already been brought into completion by the Boar-incarnation. And afterwards the auspicious sound of the drum as produced from crores of rolling slabs of stones has been depicted in the case under

1 compare *Bālābodhini* “*vṛkṣe samāpte punastadanvayi śabdopādānam yatre’ti bhāvaḥ*”

review. And consequently its meaning is bound to appear ludicrous and ultimately entailing a depreciation in its literary value. It is worthy of remark that in this instance the earth has been obviously raised upwards from the water of the ocean. And as a result of it, the range of the mountains is bound to appear with its summits as facing upwards. In such a case how is it possible for the god Boar to strike those summits with his hoofs when he is standing below. So this verse is vitiated by contradiction in meaning (*vyāhatārthatva*). Further the one half of the present instance consists of more than one verb, viz (1) may afford and (2) has carried out. And it stands in need of the employment of an additional word, viz. who (*yat*) for the completion of its own meaning. These two glaring facts render the meaning of this verse as completely devoid of charmingness. Not only these, even other several defects of these types have assuredly crept into the present verse ¹

It may be argued in defence that this verse is an example of an inferior variety of poetry. So even the assumption of presence of thousand defects in it cannot form a ground of severe impropriety. But this is absolutely untenable. Since, according to the criterion ordained by the rhetoricians, the verse of this nature cannot be an instance of any type of poetry under any circumstances. This has also been a great default on the part of the poet and the generous critic that this verse has not been restated in a distinct form by the transposition of the former and the latter half of it. That is to

say, the second half of it should have been substituted for the first half of it and *vice versa*. To be more explicit, the English rendition of this verse should have run into the following form : 'By means of shattering the summits of the mountain named kula by the strokes of his hoofs and so evidently causing the production of the auspicious sound of the drum from crores of rolling slabs of stones, the Boar-incarnation may afford good fortune to you all, who at the termination of the cycle, carried out the earth by agitating the water of the ocean'. But notwithstanding this fact even this reshuffled verse is not exempt from the charge of possession of more than one verb in it and the employment of the word who (yat) which requires to be added for the completion of its predication. And these two facts deprive the instance of the element of charmingness. So even this reconstituted example faces depletion of its elegance. In this way the exemplification of the present case with a view to substantiating the third variety of the *citrakāvya* has been shown to be entirely inappropriate in the course of this elaborate criticism of *Jagannātha*.

In this way the three types of *belles-lettres* have already been elaborated and exemplified by the author of the *Citramīmāṃsā*. The elucidation of two varieties of *belles-lettres*, viz. (1) suggestive poetry and (2) poetry of subordinate suggestion has been made by him in his other work entitled *Vṛttivūrtika*. The first of the three varieties of the *citra*

kāvya is generally found as destitute of poetic sentiment (*rasa*) and the other like suggested sense. And consequently it has not been accorded much importance by the older rhetoricians. Nor is it possessed of any merit which may deserve its close consideration. So the author of the *Citramīmāṃsā* has left aside the subtle analysis of the type of the *citrakāvya* representing the figure of speech belonging to the word in the present treatise. And he commences a critique of the figure of speech belonging to the meaning in a lucid manner. It is manifest that the third variety of the *citrakāvya* has been subsumed in the remaining two varieties of it by many rhetoricians. So Appaya Dīkṣita has intentionally avoided the elucidation of it in the present work. The following averment sums up the theme which has been treated of in the present work. 'The verse of older rhetoricians are generally mentioned with a view to illustrating the definable entity (*lakṣya*) and the defining character (*lakṣaṇa*) of different varieties of figures of speech belonging to the meaning which are to be considered in the present treatise'. Thus concludes the initial portion of the work, which is to offer the critical consideration of the figures of speech pertaining to the meaning.

THE *SIMILIS* SERVING AS THE BACKGROUND OF RHETORICAL FIGURES

The author of the *Citramīmāṃsā* has laid bare the universal aspect of the figure *similis* by the verse as follows 'This one and unique *similis* appears like the actress who by adopting the diverse roles and dancing on the stage of poetic composition delights the mind of those who are acquainted with it'. So far the essential feature of *similis* is concerned it consists in the delineation of similarity subsisting between the two numerically distinct objects. 'Your face is like the moon' is a relevant instance of the figure *similis*. Since the face and the moon which are depicted as the object and the standard of comparison are numerically distinct in their essential nature. ¹ And this very *similis* assumes the status of several distinct figures of speech due to the differentiation in its mode of expression. The position can be rendered clear by concrete illustrations. (1) 'Your face is like (*iva*) the moon and the moon is like (*iva*) your face' is an accredited example of reciprocal simile. Since the moon and the face are the avowed standard and the object of comparison. But they have alternately been depicted as the object and the standard of comparison in the two rotations of the present instance. So it has been credited with the right of being regarded as a case of reciprocal simile. ² It is evident that the two *ivas* as

¹ Cf. the definition of *similis* as has been formulated in the *Kāvya prakāśa* : 'sādharmyaṁ upamābheda' op, cit. P. 540, vide *infra* P. 72, P. 78, P. 128

² Compare . *viparyāsa' upameyopamā tayoh* (*tayoh that is, upamānopameyayoh*)' KP, P. 583. And also *vide infra* P. 77, P. 79, P. 85, P. 91, p. 122.

expressive of similitude assert the existence of similarity between the alleged standard and the object of comparison which are numerically different to each other. So it is the figure *similis* which has been transferred into reciprocal simile through the medium of transposition. (CM, P. 6)

(2) 'Your face is like your face' is an illustration of the figure self-comparison. The fact is that the self-same entity, viz. the face has been delineated as both the standard and the object of comparison. Furthermore, the present instance is possessed of only one term 'like' as the expressive of similitude. So it is entitled to claim to be a valid case of self-comparison¹. It deserves to be stressed that the word 'like' occurring in the example signifies the element of similarity subsisting between the face *qua* standard of comparison and the face *qua* object of comparison. So even this figure of speech is proved to be an accredited variety of *similis* grounded on the peculiar manner of depiction. (3) 'The moon is like your face' is a relevant illustration of converse (*pratīpa*). Because the moon is universally acknowledged as the

1. The *Kāvyaprakāśa* of Mammaṭa has introduced the definition of self-comparison in the following fashion : 'Upamāṇopameyatve ekasyaiva' kavākyage ananvayaḥ'. *op. cit.* P. 581,

standard of comparison in relation to the face. But it has been represented as the object of comparison in respect of the face depicted as the standard of comparison in the present example¹. It is too obvious to underline the existence of similarity between the moon and the face which are distinct from each other. So the presence of the figure *similis* can under no circumstances be denied of even in the case under review. (CM, P. 6)

(4) 'By seeing the moon, I recollect your face' is an illustration of the figure reminiscence *qua* poetic figure. In this instance the two distinct objects, viz. (1) the face and (2) the moon have been considered as similar. For they are equally endowed with the capacity of delighting the people at large. And the result is that the recollection of the face has taken up its rise on the basis of the observation of the moon. So it becomes a genuine case of the figure reminiscence². It is needless to repeat that the figure *similis* constitutes the *elan vital* of even this figure of speech called reminiscence.

(5) 'The moon is identical with your face' is a valid case of the figure metaphor³. It stands substantiated that

1. Confer the following definition of the figure converse as formulated in the *kuvalayānanda* of Appaya Dīkṣita 'Pratīpam upamānasy'opameyatva prakalpanam'. *Op. cit.* P. II;

2. Confer the definition of reminiscence which runs in the *Alaṅkāra Sarvasva* of Ruṣya : 'Sadṛṣānubhāvād vastvantara smṛtiḥ smaraṇam'

Op. cit. P. 40.

3. Cp. 'tadrūpakm abhedoya upamānpa meyayoh—Kp, P. 593

the similarity and dissimilarity between the face and the moon account for the implicit existence of the figure *similis* even in the case of metaphor.

(6) 'By your face-moon, the heat of passion is cooled' is an authentic illustration of the figure commutation (*pariṇāma*). The reason is not far to seek. The moon standing for the standard of comparison gets itself identified with the face in order to serve some specific purpose. And this purpose is answered by cooling down the heat of passion. So it illustrates the figure commutation (*pariṇāma*)¹. It will be a seer reiteration to aver that the element of similarity and dissimilarity between the moon and the face is responsible for the existence of *similis* even in the figure under review. (CM, P. 6)

(7) 'Is this your face or is this the moon ?' is an accredited instance of the figure poetic doubt. This figure is based on the doubt that has cropped up with reference to the moon and the face as the two competing alternatives. It is worthy of remark that the closer resemblance between these two distinct entities has paved the way for the arousal of the doubt referred to above². And it is this resemblance that acts as *raison d'être* of the figure *similis* even in the present figure of speech. (8) 'Thinking it to be the moon, cakora

1. Compare the definition of the figure *pariṇāma* which runs as follows : ' *Pariṇāmaṁ kriyārthāśced viṣayī viṣayātmanā.*' Kuv., P. 20.

2. Cf. ' *Sasāṁdehas tu bhedoktau tadānuktānca saṁśayaḥ*' KP, P, 588,

birds are flying towards your face' is a case of illusion *qua* rhetorical figure. The cakora birds view the face of a lady which is perfectly similar to the moon. And consequently they considering it to be the moon due to illusion are flying towards it. So the present sentence is a genuine example of the figure poetic illusion (*bhrāntimān*)¹. It is not out of place to mention that the same numerical-similarity and difference between the face and the moon have served the ground for the existence of the figure *similis* even in the rhetorical figure under analysis. (9) 'The cakora bird and the bee rejoice at the sight of your face, taking it for the moon and the lotus respectively' is an example of the rhetorical figure styled representation (*ullekha*). The ground is this. The face which stands for the object of comparison is one and unique in the present instance. It has been imagined as standing for the standards of comparison, viz. the moon and the lotus by the cakora bird and the bee. Since the face bears the close likeness to both the moon and the lotus. So this is entitled to be the genuine case of representation (*ullekha*)². It deserves mention that even this figure

1. Compare : ' *Bhrāntimāna anyasamvittattullyadarśane*' I bid P. 733

2. Appaya Dīkṣita has defined and illustrated the figure representation (*ullekha*) in his *Kuvalayānanda* by the way as follows: "*Bahubhir bahudhullekḥād ekasyullekha eṣyate.*

Strībhiḥ kano'rthibhiḥ svaśruḥ kālāḥ śatrubhir aikṣi saḥ Op. cit. P. 21

of speech is grounded on the likeness and unlikeness which pertain to the face and the other two things, viz. the moon and the lotus. So even in this variety of the figure of speech the underlying *similis* is clearly discernible. (C M, P. 6)

(10) 'This is the moon and not your face' is an example of the rhetorical figure concealment. This figure of speech arises when the relevant is portrayed to be unreal and the irrelevant is affirmed as real¹. In the present instance the face which is relevant has been depicted as bereft of reality. And the irrelevant, that is, the moon has been affirmed as a real entity. The denial of the relevant is *ipso facto* tantamount to its concealment. And it furnishes the ground for conferring this significant epithet to the

1. It is essential to mention in the beginning that the expression 'relevant' has been used as an equivalent to the terms like *prakṛta*, *varṇya* and so forth. These words are synonymous in the realm of rhetorics. They are employed to indicate the contextual thing which is under actual description. And they are usually resorted to represent the object of comparison (*upameya*). The word 'irrelevant' stands for '*aprakṛta*', '*avarṇya*' and similar other terms. They are universally used to signify the standard of comparison. Since they are denotative of the thing which falls beyond the sphere of the context. We are conscious that serious objection may be raised against the employment of these two terms. But we have reluctantly adopted them due to our inability of finding out better ones.

specific variety of figure of speech¹. It is remarkable that the present instance cannot stand as exclusively disassociated from the element of likeness and unlikeness which has acted as *raison d'être* of the figure *similis* even in it.

(11) 'This may be the moon' is an example of poetic conception. The term 'this' signifies the face. So it is relevant. The moon as standing for the standard of comparison is obviously the 'irrelevant.' And in this instance the relevant has been presumed as identical with the irrelevant. So it belongs to the figure poetic conception². It is notable that this presumed identification between the face and the moon attests the existence of similarity and dissimilarity between them. So the presence of *similis* can in no way be denied even in the figure of speech styled poetic conception. (C M, P. 6)

(12) 'This is the moon' is a genuine case of the figure hyperbole. Since in this instance the relevant, that is, the face has been delineated as if swallowed up by the irrelevant, viz. the moon. So it has a claim to be an accredited example of hyperbole³. It may be stressed that the same

1. Compare "Prakṛtaṁ yaṁ niśidhya'nyat sādhyate sā tu' apahnutiḥ"

KP., P. 606

2. Confer the definition of poetic conception which runs as follows, "Sambhāvanam athotprekṣā prakṛtasya samena yat." KP, P. 584

3. The *Kāvyaṭīkā* of Maṇḍana has offered the following definition of hyperbole: "Nigirya'dhyavasānamtu prakṛtasya pareṇa

similarity and dissimilarity provide the ground for the swallowing up of the face by the moon in the case under review. So even this poetic figure cannot arrogate its entity as completely independent of *similis*. (13) 'The moon and the lotus have been vanquished by your face' is an example of the figure of speech depicting similar things together (*tulyayogitā*). This figure emerges out in the case where a quality or an action belonging to either relevants or irrelevants has been portrayed only for once. In this instance the moon and the lotus are irrelevants. The fact of being vanquished has been depicted as equally shared by them. And it has been mentioned only once in the present instance. So it pertains to the rhetorical figure depicting similar things together (*tulya yogitā*)¹. Further the face avowedly resembles the moon and the lotus. For it is endowed with beauty and grace perceivable in them. On the other hand it differs *toto caelo* from them in all other respects. So the presence of the element of similarity and dissimilarity testifies to the fact that it is a

yat.....vijñeyā'tiśayoktiḥ sā." It is needless to point out that the present instance is comprised in the first variety of hyperbole. *op. cit.* P. 628. vide infra, P. 102.

1. Cp. the *kārikā* along with its *vṛtti* on the figure *tulyayogitā* which runs as follows. 'Niyatānām sakṛddharmaḥ sā punas' tulya yogitā.

Niyatānām prākaraṇikānām'eva aprākaraṇikānām'eva vā,
KP, PP. 642-43.

case of *similis* in disguise. (CM, P. 6)

(14) 'At night the moon and your face feel delighted' is an authentic instance of the figure illuminator (*dīpaka*). In this example the face is relevant and the moon is irrelevant. And both of them are syntactically linked with one and identical property in the shape of an action, that is, the act of feeling delight. So it exemplifies the figure illuminator¹. It is worthy of mention that even the present instance cannot dispense with similarity and dissimilarity which vouch for the existence of *similis*. It is obvious that they cannot feel delight simultaneously if they are not endowed with the common attribute. (15) 'I am delighted by your face alone and the cakora bird is delighted only by the moon' is a valid case of the figure typical comparison (*prativastūpamā*). This instance is constituted of two independent sentences. They are (1) 'I am delighted by your face alone' (2) 'The cakora bird is delighted only by the moon'. The first sentence portrays the object of comparison with reference to the second one which portrays the standard of comparison. The common property, that is, getting delighted is one and identical in respect of the object and the standard of comparison depicted by these two sentences. In fine the self-same property stands affirmed

1. The author of the *kuvalayānanda* has defined the figure illuminator in the following fashion. "Vadanti Varṇyāvārṇyanam dharmaikyam dīpakam budhaḥ" Op. cit. P. 51.

twice by means of the above two sentences. So this is an apposite example of typical comparison (*prativastūpamā*)¹. It is too apparent to elucidate that this instance ultimately brings home the existence of *similis* in the following manner: 'As the cakora bird is delighted only by the moon so I feel delighted by your face alone'. So it is really the case of *similis* expressed in the garb of the figure typical comparison. (C M, P. 6)

(16) 'In the sky the moon and on the earth your face' is an illustration of the figure exemplification (*dr̥ṣṭānta*). In this instance the earth and sky, the face and moon and the charmingness and brightness have been depicted as standing in 'the relation of reflection and reflected'. And this is owing to the close resemblance between the two members constituting each distinct pair alluded to above. So it is in conformity with the condition of the definition of exemplification². Further the existence of 'the relation of reflection and reflected' operates as indubitable evidence of the presence of the figure *similis* even in the case under analysis. And it may be exhibited in the following manner. 'As the moon looks bright in the sky so is your face charming upon the earth' (17) 'Your face possesses the grace of the moon' is an accredited example

1. Compare : "Prativastūpamiātu sã / Sãmānyasya dvir'ekasya yatra vākyaadvaye sthitiḥ KP, P. 634.

2. CP : "Dr̥ṣṭāntaḥ punar eteṣām sarveṣām pratibimbanam, KP, P. 636.

of the figure illustration (*nidarśanā*) In this instance the face has been delineated as possessing the grace of the moon. But how is it probable that the face of a lady can actually bear the grace of the moon¹ ? It is not amenable to reason. It can be only accounted for by admitting the existence of *similis* in the following way 'your face possesses the grace resembling the grace of the moon.' So it is a valid case of illustration (*nidarśanā*)¹. (18) 'Your spotless face surpasses the moon' is an apposite example of the figure *vyatireka*. The moon is universally acknowledged as the standard of comparison with reference to the face which is usually depicted as the object of comparison. In this instance the face is undoubtedly the other than the standard of comparison. Despite this, it has been represented as surpassing the moon in the matter of gladdening and the like. So it has a legitimate right to belong to the figure *Vyatireka*². It will be *adrum* to reiterate that this figure of speech too is based on the element of similarity and dissimilarity. So the implicit presence of the figure *similis* in it stands proved to the hilt. (CM, P. 6)

1. Confer the definition of *nidarśanā* as has been formulated in the *kāvyaprakāśa*. "*Nidarśanā, abhavan vastusambandha upamāparikalpakāḥ* /" It is needless to point out that the present instance is an accredited example of *Padārtha nidarśanā* *Op. Cit.* P. 613.

2. The *Kāvyaprakāśa* of Mammaṭa has offered the following definition of *vyatireka* : "*upamānād yad anyasya vyatirekaḥ sa eva saḥ* /" *Op. Cit.* P. 645 And also compare : "*Anyasy'opameyasya vyatirekaḥ ādhikyam* /" *Loc. cit.* P. 645.

(19) 'The moon along with your face rejoices at night' is an instance of the figure connected description (*sahokti*). 'The fact of rejoicing at night' is the exclusive property of the moon which is distinct from the face. But it is attributed to the face by the inherent power of the expression *along with* (*saha*) as employed in the example. So it is a valid case of the figure connected description (*sahokti*)¹. It transpires on scrutiny that the moon and the face are undoubtedly possessed with a common attribute, namely, extraordinary lustre. So the *similis* obviously serves as the background of the present figure of speech. (20) 'Your face is beautified with the spot of black eyes and adorned by the beam of smile' is an accredited instance of the figure model metaphor (*samāsokti*). In this instance the face is relevant. It cannot mean the moon in a direct manner. But it (face) has been accompanied by two adjectives. They are : (1) beautified with the spot of black eyes and (2) adorned by the beam of smile. And both of these adjectives are applicable to both the relevant and the irrelevant, viz. the face and the moon with equal propriety. So the face with the cooperation of these adjectives paves the way for the suggestion of the irrelevant, that is, the moon. And the meaning of the instance ultimately culminates in the form of *similis* mentioned below Your face like the moon is

1. Cf. *Sā sahoktiḥ sahārthasya balādekaṁ dvivācakam* ["KP, P. 672.

beautified with the spot of black eyes and adorned by the beam of smile. So it is an illustration of model metaphor¹. It is needless to repeat that this poetic figure too is a distinct type of *similis* depicted in a circuitous way. (CM, P.6)

(21) 'Your face is similar to the lotus in which the power (of blooming) has been infused and like the moon in which the power (of shining) has been infused by the sun' is an example of paronomasia. In this instance there is the pun on the word *abja* which signifies the lotus and the moon. Both of them are universally recognised as the standard of comparison in respect of the word face standing for the object of comparison. The adjective, viz. *Harīṇahitaśaktinā* is conformable to both the lotus and the moon in the way above indicated. And consequently the present instance is capable to convey multiple meanings without involving any contradiction. So it is entitled to exemplify the figure paronomasia². It deserves to be inculcated that the instance of this poetic figure too cannot remain precluded from the domain of the

1. The definition of model metaphor has been offered in the following manner "Paroktir'bhadakaiḥ śliṣṭaiḥ samāsoktiḥ ||" KP, P. 611.

2. Confer the *kārikā* along with its *Vṛtti* as has been mentioned in the *kāvyaaprakāśa* : 'Śleṣaḥ sa vākya ekasmin yatr'ānekārthatā bhavet / Ekārtha pratipādakānām'eva śabdānām yatrā nekārthatḥ sa śleṣaḥ' // OP, cit, P. 609.

figure *similis* as it is possessed of the term similar (*saḍṛśa*) expressive of similitude. (22). 'The moon is rendered listless in front of the face' is a genuine case of the figure vicarious praise (*aprastuta praśaṁsā*). Since the meaning of this instance narrates the irrelevant. It ultimately suggests the portraiture of the relevant in the way stated below : 'Even the cupid has been surpassed by the beauty of your face'. This occurs due to the fact that the present instance may have been uttered by some one in order to speak highly of the majesty of a king. So the suggestion of the relevant has taken place on the basis of the depiction of the irrelevant in the case under review. Consequently it has got a claim to belong to the figure vicarious praise¹. It is notable that 'the elation-of-reflection and reflected' has provided the ground for the emergence of the suggestion as referred to above. And it bears out the existence of the *similis* even in the present poetic figure. (CM, P.6)

But according to Jagannātha the citation of this sentence, viz. 'the moon is rendered listless in front of the face' as an authentic instance of vicarious praise (*aprastuta praśaṁsā*) betrays his immatured knowledge of the aphorism of grammar. The plain fact is this. The word

1. Compare : "Aprastutapraśaṁsā yā sā saiva prastutāśrayā ।"
And also cf. the *Vṛtti* 'Aprākaraṇikasy'ābhidhānena prākaraṇikasy'-
ākṣepo'prastutapraśaṁsā ।' KP, P. 618,

purataḥ occurs in it and signifies 'in front of' in it. It transpires on scrutiny that this word is formed by the nominal suffix *tas* as affixed to the nominal base *pura* which invariably conveys the sense of *nagara* (city). In such a case, the alleged instance is liable to be expressed in the following form: 'The moon is rendered listless by the city of the face'. And it admittedly involves the charge of improbability. It deserves to be stressed that the word '*pura*' expressing the meaning of 'in front of' cannot be discovered in the existing vocabulary of sanskrit literature. The word '*pūrva*' signifies 'in front of' and takes the suffix '*as*' after it. And due to its association with '*as*' it becomes supplanted by *pur* ending in '*r*' in compliance with the dictum of pāṇini, viz. *Pūrvādharaṇāvarāṇāmasi-puradharascaiṣām* 5. 3. 39¹. Accordingly, the complete word ought to be *purataḥ* and this is capable of expressing the meaning intended to be understood by Appaya Dīkṣita. So the word under context cannot be *purataḥ*. And its usage in the above sense is obviously a case of misappropriation. It is in deference to this fact that the great poet kālīdāsa has used the word *purataḥ* instead of *purataḥ* in the verse mentioned below" *Amum purataḥ paśyasi Devadārum* (Do you see this divine tree in front of yours?)

1. Cf. the vṛtti of this aphorism which is mentioned below :

Ebhyaḥstātyarthe 'si pratyayaḥ syāt tadyoge c'aiṣām kramāt pur, adh, av
ityādeṣāḥ syuḥ /' Ibid.

et. seq¹'. So it is clear that the word *purataḥ* as used in the sense of 'in front of' by Appaya Dīkṣita only proves his ignorance of grammatical norm².

Moreover the instance, which follows, equally shares the same blame. It runs: This one with his beauty, youth, loveliness and more attractive form behaves himself like one bearing the arrows of flowers in front of the ladies possessed with the deer-like eyes'. It has been cited by Appaya Dīkṣita as an instance of *similis* with the ellipsis of words expressive of similitude and the object of comparison. In this instance also the word *purataḥ* has been used with the same purpose of securing the meaning 'in front of'. And the grammatical inconsistency of this word with reference to this meaning has already been laid bare in an exhaustive manner. So this verse of Appaya Dīkṣita stands infected by its association with the word *purataḥ* which is grammatically incorrect. Further the eminent grammarians have categorically asserted that the expression *purataḥ* employed in these following phrases is downright error due to its non-compliance with the rules of grammar. And these phrases are: (1) *Patyā purataḥ parataḥ* (*in front of and behind the husband*), (2)

1. Rv, canto 2, śl. 36. And also confer the commentary of Mallinātha upon this line : "*puro'grato'mum Devadārum paśyasi iti. kākūḥ* /" Ibid.

2. RG. PP, 171-172,

Ātmīyam caraṇam dadhāti purataḥ (places one's own foot in front of) and (3) *purataḥ sudatī samāgataṁ mām* (the lady with fine teeth comes in front of me after my arrival) and so forth. It is too obvious to elaborate that all these phrases are constructed with the word *purataḥ* which is expressive of the meaning 'in front of' in them. So these are the outcome of the ignorance of grammatical principle¹.

In this way this unique figure of speech styled *similis* undergoes manifold transformations in the shape of different figures of speech². "As the knowledge of Brahman

1. RG. PP. 171-72

2. It is a pleasant surprise to find that John Stuart Mill in his system of Logic has thrown a flood of light on the concept of likeness which constitutes the vital element of *similis*. A critical reflection reveals that a very minute difference is discernible in the different grades of likeness. The resemblance of a portrait or a landscape to its original induces a feeling of likeness. But it differs from the notion of likeness when one person mimics another. The relation in which Priam stood to Hector, namely, that of father and son, resembles the relation in which Philip stood to Alexander. Undeniably this feeling of likeness differs *totocaelo* from the two cases of likeness referred to above. But it is shocking to find that all of them pass under the name of likeness. Besides it is a felt fact that likeness between two things admits of different degrees. When it exists in the highest degree of all, amounting to undistinguishableness, it is often called identity, and the two similar things are said to be the same. I do not want to multiply instances. The learned logician has made a reference to it in a different context,

results in the knowledge of this varied universe so the knowledge of the figure *similis* culminates in the knowledge of the world of poetic figure, and so this poetic figure along with all its varieties is considered *ad initium*".

The vast variety of likeness has been emphasised with persuasive eloquence by him. I refer to PP 45, 46 of the above mentioned work for further light on the present topic.

An Exposition Of The Citramīmāṃsā

CHAPTER III

Definitions of *similis* propounded by the predecessors of Appaya Dīkṣita criticised.

SECTION I

The definition of the figure *similis* has been framed by the older rhetorician in the following fashion: 'The common property which is charming and subsisting in the two entities which possess the capacity of standing for the standard and the object of comparison accounts for calling it the figure *similis* by the *literati* who know the essence of poetry'¹. The present definition has placed emphasis upon the compliance of two conditions. They are: (1) The two entities should invariably possess the capacity of standing for the object and the standard of comparison in conformity with the acknowledged poetic convention and (2) the common property depicted as abiding in them must be elegant in its essential nature. Now the common property residing in the entities which are

1. Confer the definition of the figure *similis* as has been set forth in the *Kāvya-lakṣaṇa Saṁgraha* of Udbhaṭa. It is stated 'Yāccetohārisādharmyam upamānopameyayoh |
Mitho vibhinna kālādibhādayor upamā tu tat' ||

bereft of the capacity as alluded to above cannot constitute *similis qua* poetic figure. So the averment, viz. 'your face is graceful like the lily' and so forth cannot be the valid instance of the figure *similis*. Since the two entities lily and the face, lack the capacity of being depicted as the standard and the object of comparison in conformity with the established poetic convention. And consequently the common property portrayed as abiding in them cannot serve the basis of the figure *similis*. (CM, P. 7).

Furthermore, it is possible that the alleged two entities may be endowed with the capacity of standing for the standard and the object of comparison. Despite this, the common property belonging to them may be rendered unfascinating by the portrayal of 'the fact of being brute matter of fact', substancehood and the like. And it can in no way be employed as the ground of the figure *similis* due to its non-compliance with the second condition. On the contrary, the common property which is elegant and capable to inspire gratification can alone make the emergence of the figure *similis* possible. Since all rhetorical figures are bound to conform to the universally admitted poetic convention. Consequently they can reach the status of embellishments only when they are competent to render poetry sublime and graceful. So (1) the description 'the gayal (*gavaya*)¹ resembles the

1. The word *gavaya* means the Gayal (a species of ox, *Bos-gavaeus*, erroneously classed by Hindu writers as a species of deer; cf. go-

cow' is not a case of *similis qua* poetic figure. Because the common property depicted as subsisting in the cow and the gayal may partake the character of either 'the fact of being the brute matter of fact' or substancehood. So it is obviously devoid of charmingness. And this fact debars its inclusion under the realm of the figure *similis*. (2) The statement 'the *vāhika*¹ is an ox' is not an example of the figure metaphor. For both are substances, pure and simple. And the common property serving as the ground of their assumed identification is necessarily bereft of poetic delicacy. So it cannot promote the instance to the rank of a recognised rhetorical figure. (CM, P. 7)

(3) The depiction 'Is it a tree stump or a person?' cannot be an illustration of poetic doubt. Since the doubt arising at the sight of these two substances is unfascina-

mṛga); the female gayal, cf, the vārtika 'Yopadhapratieṣḍhe haya gavaya mukaya manuṣyamatsyānām apratiṣedhaḥ' under the aphorism of Pāṇini *Jāter astrī viṣayād ayopadhāt*, 4, 1, 63." It also signifies the monkey-chief, "Koṭīśatavṛtau c'āpi gajo gavaya eva ca / Vānarendrau mahāvīryau pṛthak pṛthag adṛśyatam" //

Mbh. 3,267,3

1. Cf. "Pañcānam sindhuṣaṣṭhūnām nādinām ye'ntarāśritāḥ /

Tān dharmabāhyān aśucān vātīkān api varjayet" //

Karṇa Chap, 44 śl. 7. And also Vide "Vahīś ca nāma
aśuś ca pipāsāyām piśācakaḥ /

Gayor apatyam vāhikā nai'sā sṛṣṭiḥ Prajāpateḥ" //

Ibid, śl. 41 cd-42 ab.

ting in character. So it is not entitled to be accounted as an instance of poetic doubt. (4) The assertion based on illusory perception, namely, 'It is silver' is not a case of the figure illusion. Since the illusory perception of silver has been engendered with reference to a real piece of shell. And undeniably both the silver and the shell are mere substances in their intrinsic worth. So the portraiture of this illusion cannot confer grace and beauty upon the instance elevating it to the status of an embellishment. (5) The depiction 'This is not serpent' is not an illustration of the figure concealment. Since it portrays the concealment of only the brute matter of fact. So it has failed to bestow the poetic elegance on the instance referred to above. (6) The statement 'Fatty Devadatta does not eat during day time' cannot be an example of the figure periphrasis¹ Fattiness and abstention from taking food are apparently incompatible. So it is intended to be described that Devadatta takes food during night. This circumlocutory mode of expression conveys only the brute matter of fact. It is absolutely destitute of the strikingness. So it has forfeited its right to be called the figure periphrasis. (7) The assertive sentence

1. Mammaṭa has set forth the definition of periphrasis in the *kāvyaprakāśa* as mentioned below : “*Pāryāyoktaṁ vinā vācyavācakatvena yadvacaḥ*” //

'The hill contains fire' is not an illustration¹ of the figure inference. This figure of speech is constituted by the depiction of two entities standing in the relation of the probans and the probandum. This instance cannot pretend to be considered as an authentic case of the figure inference. For it is not endowed with grace and elegance which constitute the inmost nature of an embellishment. (CM, P. 7)

(8) The statement 'He is Devadatta' is not an instance of the figure reminiscence. The recollection of Devadatta takes place at the sight of another person who is similar to him. Its claim to be accounted as an example of the figure reminiscence is liable to be summarily dismissed. Since there is depiction of only 'the brute matter of fact' in it. It is bereft of charmingness and as such falls beyond the sphere of an embellishment.

(9) The ordainment, viz. '*Tas, thas, tha* and *mip* are substituted by *tām, tam, ta* and *am* (Pāṇ. sū. 3, 4, 101)' is not an illustration of the figure symmetrical². In this case both the groups of affixes have been set forth in a definite order. But it fails to produce delicate beauty which is the veritable soul of an embellishment.

1. Compare "Anumānam tad uktaṁ yat sādhyasāadhanayor-
vacah /" KP, P. 696.

2. The definition of the figure symmetrical runs as follows.
'yathāsaṁkhyāṁ krameṇ'aiva kramikānāṁ samanvayaḥ /'

(10) The statement 'The father has arrived *along with* the son' is not an illustration of the figure connected description. In this instance the act of arriving is exclusively connected with the father. But by the inherent power of the expression *along with* this act of arriving has been accomplished by both the father and the son. Despite this, it is not entitled to bear the designation of the figure connected description. For it is conspicuous by the absence of elegance which is the essence of an embellishment. (11) The assertion 'He went without that person' cannot be an example of private description (*vinokti*)¹. Since there is the description of 'the brute matter of fact' in it. So it is entirely devoid of the poetic charm which is the vital element of an embellishment. (CM, P. 7)

(12) The description "*śveto dhāvati*" is not an instance of the figure double entendre. It expresses two meanings (1) the leper washes and (2) the dog runs from here. These two meanings arise due to the presence of pun upon both the words of the present instance. The position deserves elucidation. The word *śvetaḥ* may be disjoined as follows '*śva itaḥ*'. It means 'the dog from here'. If the word is not split up, it signifies a leper. The word *dhāvati* means (1) washes (2) runs. So it apparently appears an instance of the figure double entendre. But it is excluded from its scope due to the absence

1. Compare : 'Vinoktīḥ sā vinā'nyena yatra'anyaḥ saṁ na n'etraḥ /' KP, P, 673,

of charmingness. Other similar instances are to be deducible in the way indicated above. (CM, P.7)

Criticism of the present definition of the figure *similis*

In the present context the following issue deserves close examination. It may be asked "what is the utility of the adjectival phrase 'in the two entities' as occurring in the body of the definition"? The opponent may put forward the plausible plea that it has been employed with a view to excluding the figure self-comparison from the scope of *similis*. Since this figure consists in the description of similarity of an object with its own self. And as such in this specific type of figure of speech, the common property is portrayed as residing in the self-same entity. But the present definition of *similis* requires two entities as the substrata of the common property. So by means of the exclusion of self-comparison, the alleged adjectival phrase warrants its employment. But even then this definition is vitiated due to its 'over-extension' to the figures of speech styled converse and reciprocal *simile*. The position stands in need of elaboration. The figure converse occurs in the case where the standard of comparison is imagined as the object of comparison. And the figure reciprocal simile consists in delineating the two entities as the objects of comparison by succession. Both these rhetorical

figures hinge upon the two entities for residence of the common property serving as the ground of similarity. So their exclusion cannot be achieved even by the insertion of the adjectival phrase referred to above. Consequently the charge of over-extension remains unobviated. (CM, P.7)

It cannot be contended that *similis* is competent to include within its range the two preceding rhetorical figures due to the delineation of similarity in both of them. Since in such a case, even the figure self-comparison will claim its comprisal in its fold on identical ground. So the adjectival phrase 'in two entities' is rendered as devoid of utility. Now in the light of the present discourse it is transparent that the definition of *similis* as propounded by the author of the *Kāvyaprakāśa* shares the same fate. Since the learned author has affirmed that the essential nature of the figure *similis* implies similarity effected by the common property subsisting in two numerically different entities. And according to the view of the author, the employment of the expression 'in two numerically different entities' entails the exclusion of self-comparison from the purview of this definition of *similis*. But the delineation of similarity has already been indicated as the ground of inclusion of the figures converse and reciprocal simile under the domain of *similis*. And in this eventuality the definition of *similis* propounded in the *kāvyaprakāśa* will comprehend even the figure self-comparison. For this figure will also claim to be based on similarity effected

by the common property. Consequently the charge of over-extension against the definition of *similis* framed in the *Kāvyaprakāśa* will be inevitable. So the expression in 'two numerically different entities' foisted in Mammaṭa's definition of *similis* is without avail. (CM, P. 7)

A fresh plea has been put forward by the opponent. The figure *similis* takes place only in the event of the delineation of the common property which is possible to all intents and purposes. And the figure self-comparison stands precluded on the ground that it is bereft of such a common property. Since common property necessitates the presence of two entities standing for the standard and the object of comparison. But in self-comparison the one and identical entity is depicted as both the standard and the object of comparison. So there is not the slightest possibility of the incidence of common property in it. And as a result, it will check its illegitimate inclusion under the compass of *similis*. Besides, it will equally prevent the unwarranted comprehension of converse and reciprocal simile in it. And the reason is not far to seek. Firstly, 'the moon is like your face' is an instance of converse. In it the moon has been assumed as an object of comparison. But it is an avowed standard of comparison due to its superiority in comparison to the face. So the common property supposed to reside in them is manifestly devoid of the element of possibility. And analogous is the case with reciprocal simile. It demands elucidation. 'Your

face is like the moon and the moon is like your face.' It may be bisected into two rotations. They are. (1) your face is like the moon and (2) the moon is like your face. The two entities (1) the moon and (2) the face have alternately been depicted as the standard and the object of comparison in the first and the second rotation. So the common property portrayed as subsisting in them is purely imaginary in character. It cannot claim to be factually possible in its own right. The net result may be summed up as follows. The exclusion of these three rhetorical figures from the domain of *similis* will be secured by resorting to the amendment elaborated above. (C M, P. 8)

But this advocacy cannot be the solvent of the present *impasse*. Because the introduction of the possible common property in place of imaginary one will make the confusion worse confounded. The reason is obvious. The definition of *similis* is narrowed down to such an extent that it fails to include '*similis* based on the common property imagined by the poet' To take a concrete instance of it. 'Your fame white like the female swan immerses in the heavenly Ganges'. In this instance two entities (1) the fame and (2) the female swan have been depicted as the object and the standard of comparison. The common property in the shape of whiteness is delineated as subsisting in them. It is exclusively the product of the flight of the poetic imagination. It cannot be a possibility in any conceivable ways. So its non-inclusion will amount to the forfeiture of its right to be called the figure *similis*. (CM, P. 8)

Moreover the definition of *similis* will be vitiated due to its 'over-extension' to the cases of defective *similis*. It occurs in the event of difference in gender and number between the object and the standard of comparison. One concrete instance will bring home the present allegation.

'The moon (*candraḥ*) is white like the female swan (*hamsī*) and the sky (*nabhaḥ*) is clear like lakes (*sarāṃsi*)'. Admittedly this verse is competent to comply with the two conditions as prescribed in the alleged definition of *similis*. It is bifurcated into two parts. They are (1) the moon is white like the female swan and (2) the sky is clear like lakes. The pairs of entities depicted in the two parts possess the capacity of standing for the standards and the objects of comparison. The common properties in the shape of (1) whiteness and (2) clearness are also charming beyond the shadow of doubt. But in the first part, the moon (*candraḥ*) which is the object of comparison has been used in the masculine gender. And the female swan (*hamsī*) which is the standard of comparison has been employed in the feminine gender as is evident from the present verse. In the second part the sky (*nabhaḥ*) which is the object of comparison is in singular number. The word lakes (*sarāṃsi*) is in plural number and this has been depicted as the standard of comparison. Therefore it involves comparison between two entities which are different in number. The upshot

of the above discussion is this. The illegitimate inclusion of these types of defective *similis* within the sweep of the present definition cannot be prevented by the terms employed in it. So the definition under review suffers from the charge of 'over extension' with reference to these instances. (*CM*, P. 8)

Further the suggested *similis qua dhvani* which will be exemplified later on is liable to be illegally comprised in the present definition of *similis*. Since the instance of this type of *similis* conforms to all the conditions as laid down in this definition. So its illegitimate inclusion is bound to expose this definition to the allegation of unwarranted extension. It cannot be contended that the suggested *similis qua dhvani* stands on a par with pure embellishment. Since it is the objective of embellishment, that is, something to be embellished by an embellishment. The suggested *similis qua dhvani* bears the designation of the embellishment. But it is not unexceptionable. Because it is the objective of embellishment. And in comparison to an embellishment it occupies a superior position. Therefore designate *similis* which is a simple embellishment as *dhvani* involves palpable contradiction. And consequently the traditional maxim styled Brāhmaṇa śramaṇa is called into requisition to evade this predicament. The word śramaṇa means a Buddhist monk. A Brahmin after his ordination to the order of the Buddhist monks ceases to be called as such. Subsequently to call him a Brāhmaṇa śramaṇa amounts to

a palpable contradiction. But this is made in order to lay emphasis upon his previous social status¹. Analogous is the case with the suggested *similis qua dhvani*. The conferment of the designation of *dhvani* on *similis* serves to bring into prominence its original character in the form of mere embellishment. But in reality *similis* as a simple embellishment differs *toto caelo* from the suggested *similis qua dhvani* (CM, P. 8)

Now the opponent makes a plea that the aforesaid definition of *similis* is universal in character. And as a result of this, the defective *similis*, the faultless *similis*, the objective of embellishment and the embellishment itself will usually be comprised within the scope of it. Thus he takes recourse to this defensive argument for the purpose to avoid the charge of over-extension against this definition. But in such a case the two predicaments, viz. (1) capacity of two entities stand-

1. Compare "Tatra pratīyamānasya tavad dvau bhedaḥ laukikāḥ kāvyaṇṭarāika gocaraḥ ce'ti | Laukiko yaḥ śvaśabda vācyaṭaṁ kadāci dadhiṣete, sa ca vidhiṣedhādyaneka prakāro vastu śabden'ocyate | So'pi dviṣṭiḥ-yaḥ pūrvam kvāpi vākyārthe'laṅkārabhāvam upamādi rūpatayā'nvabhūṭ, idānīm tv'analāṅkāra rūpa'ev'ānyatra guṇibhāvābhāvāt, sa pūrva pratyabhijñānabalād alaṅkāra dhvanir iti vyapadiśyate Brāhmaṇa śramaṇa nyāyena." DL, Locana, PP. 50-51 And also cf "Yathā kaścana prathamato Brāhmaṇobhūtvā'nantaraṁ śramaṇatvam (Bauddha saṁnyāsi-tvaṁ) prāpto'pi bhūta pūrvasaṁjñānusāreṇa Brāhmaṇaiti vyapadiśyate, tathā prakṛte'pi pūrvam ayam alaṅkāra āsīd ity'etāvata alaṅkāra vyapa-
deśa iti bhāvah." Ibid.

ing for the standard and the object of comparison and (2) charmingness of the common property as introduced in the above definition of *similis* would be entirely superfluous. Since even the *similis* which is defective due to its no-conforming to the accredited poetic convention and the rest would be included within the terms of the definition of *similis*. So the present definition of *similis* has been controverted in the way above indicated. (CM, P. 8)

SECTION II

A critique of definition of *similis* set forth by Vidyānātha

The definition of *similis* as has been propounded by Vidyānātha in his *Pratāparudrayaśobhūṣaṇa* is exposed to serious objections. This definition may be reproduced *verbatim*: 'When the resemblance of the relevant (i. e. under portrayal) with the other (i. e. the irrelevant) which is self-subsistent, distinct (from the relevant) and complying with (accredited poetic convention) is depicted only once by means of common property and standing as directly expressed, it is designated the figure *similis*¹ In this definition of *similis* the expression 'self-subsistent' is employed in order to exclude the figure poetic conception from the scope of its operation. Since in this figure of speech the irrelevant, i. e. the standard of comparison owes its existence to the imagination of the poet. So it is

1. Vide PR, 254.

destitute of the element of self-subsistence. The adjective 'distinct' is inserted in order to rule out the figure self-comparison. Since in this figure of speech the standard and the object of comparison are one and identical in their essential nature. So they cannot claim to be distinct from each other. The expression 'complying with' is intended to preclude the different varieties of defective *similis*. To make an elaboration. This expression shuts out all types of *similis* which are defective due to the presence of inherent blemishes. They are : (1) non-compliance with the poetic convention and (2) the difference between the standard and the object of comparison in respect of gender and number. And this position has already been elucidated in the preceding section of the present chapter. (CM, P. 8)

The proviso 'by means of common property' excludes the figure double entendre from the sphere of this definition. To cite an instance of it. 'This city which is with indistinct noise (*sa-kalakala*) has now become like the disc of the moon which is complete with all its digits (*sakala-kala*)¹. In this instance and also in similar others, the word 'like' expresses only the verbal resemblance. It does not express the resemblance as based on the common

1, KP, P 521; AM. 223; AK, P. 14, P. 245.

property in the shape of quality and action. As a result of this, this illustration cannot conform to the condition, namely, 'by means of common property' as laid down by Vidyānātha in the definition of *similis*. So the present instance cannot be included under the terms of the alleged definition of *similis*. The expression, that is, 'the resemblance of the relevant with the irrelevant' shuts out the figure converse (*pratīpa*) from the domain of *similis*. Since in converse there is the delineation of resemblance of the irrelevant with the relevant. But the case is reverse in *similis*. The phrase, namely, 'the resemblance depicted only once' has been inserted with a view to precluding the figure reciprocal *similis* from the range of *similis*. For in reciprocal simile, the resemblance is not depicted only once but in succession. The caveat 'resemblance standing as directly expressed' is intended to exclude the suggested *similis* from the jurisdiction of the figure *similis*. Because in a case of suggested *similis*, the resemblance remains directly unexpressed. It becomes apprehended by the function of suggestion. So the lack of direct expressibility debars its inclusion within the compass of *similis*¹. (CM, PP. 8-9)

1. Cp Vācyam ity'anena pratīyamānaupamyānām rūpaka saṁdēha bhraṇ-
timadullekhāpahnava-tulyayogitā dīpaka prativastūpamā dṛṣṭānta saḥokti vyati-
reka nidarśanānām vailakṣaṇyam. Tathāhi rūpake samānādhiparānyathā'-
nūpāpatīyā sādṛśyam lakṣyate iti n'opamā kintu rūpakah. Saṁdēhe mukha
candrayohi parasparābheda pratīteḥ saṁdēha nibandhanānyathā'nūpāpatīyā

But this definition stands assailed by an array of unanswerable objections. In the above definition of *similis* 'the adjective' self-subsistent' is inserted with a view to ruling out the figure poetic conception. But it is entirely out of point. Since in poetic conception the use of the term like (*iva*) serves the purpose of indicating the possibility of identity, etc. of the object and the standard of comparison. And in such a case the resemblance is not intended to be expressed. This fact alone renders the exclusion of poetic conception from the terms of the propounded definition of *similis*. In order to validate the above argument, the viewpoint of Cakravartī is put forward thus : "when this part, i. e., the standard of comparison is brought into being from popular notion, then it is the case of pure *similis* as in this context the word 'like' is the expressive of similitude. Again when this standard of comparison is not substantiated by popular notion and has been brought to pass by poet's imagination, then it is the case of poetic conception pure and simple, for in it the word 'like' imports possibility (of identity)¹. Even in common parlance the word 'like' is found as signifying possibility

sādrśyam ākṣīpyate tataḥ saṁdehaḥ. Bhrāntimati mukhe candrabuddhiḥ candraśādrśyaṁ vina na sambhavati iti sādrśyākṣepāt bhrāntimat. Mukhe candra kamala padārthatāropāḥ sādrśyādṛte na sambhavati iti sādrśyākālpanād ullekhalāṁkāra ity'ādiḥ". PR. PP. 256-57.

1. AK, P. 11.

of identity. To take an illustration. 'He standing at a distance appears like Devadatta'. In this example the word 'like' is indicative of possibility of identity of the person with Devadatta. The sum and substance is this. The preclusion of poetic conception from the scope of the present definition of *similis* has been made possible by other means above indicated. So the adjective self-subsistent employed for the self-same purpose is rendered completely inappropriate (CM, P. 9)

Moreover how can it be possible that poetic conception will be shut out from the range of the propounded definition of *similis* by the expression 'self-subsistent' ? Since in the very illustration of poetic conception as cited by the opponent (Vidyānātha), the standard of comparison, that is, the moon is self-subsistent in character. Let it be confirmed by a concrete example.' May the young king named kakatindra shine gladdening the people in the world by his own brilliance like the moon who as if by forsaking the sky has descended down upon the surface of the earth on the plea that there was no permanent fullness¹. There is no shadow of doubt that the moon portrayed as the standard of comparison is self-subsistent in its essential nature. So the expression 'self-subsistent' fails to exclude this instance and is evidently laid open to the objection of superfluity. The opponent may put forward a fresh plea in his defence. In the instance under reference there is a clear case of poetic

But even the above plea cannot defend the position of the opponent. Since the present definition of *similis* will involve the fallacy of 'non-extension' with reference to the instance of *similis per impossibility* (*asambhāvitopamā*). Let it be elucidated by a concrete illustration. 'The harsh speech issuing from this month is, as it were, the poison from the orbit of the moon and fire from the sandal-paste and so it is designated *similis per impossibility*². In this example the expression 'issuance of harsh speech from this mouth' has been depicted as the object of comparison. The expressions, namely, (1) the immanation of poison from the orbit of the moon and (2) that of fire from the sandal-paste have been portrayed as the standards of comparison. It is remarkable that the poison and the fire are self subsistent in character. But the immanation from the orbit of the moon and the sandal-paste have

2. *Vide* KD. Chap.2, Śl. 39. (reads *pāvakaḥ* for *Cānalah*); A.K., P. 11.

exclusively been brought to pass by the *fiat* of poetic imagination. So the allegation in question becomes substantiated on the ground that the present illustration is divested of its legitimate inclusion under the compass of the above definition of *similis*. Further the figure *similis* in which the standard of comparison exists only in poets' imagination will entirely be excluded from the jurisdiction of *similis*. To cite a relevant illustration. 'If both the streams of the Heavenly Ganges in distinction were to pour out in the sky, then alone his chest blue like the Tamāla (*leaves*) and wearing the necklace of pearls can be similised with it (*the sky*)¹. In this instance the standard of comparison, namely, 'the sky in the event of the pouring out of the two distinct streams of Heavenly Ganges into it' stands purely as an image of poet's imagination. Consequently the present instance is bound to be ruled out by the adjective self-subsistent as employed in the definition under review. So the insertion of this adjective is rendered devoid of utility (C M, P. 9)

Inappropriateness of the insertion of the expression 'distinct'

Now even the employment of the adjective 'distinct' in this definition with a view to ruling out self-comparison is obviously inappropriate. Because the scope of it is bound to remain inadequate to comprehend unitary *similis* (*upapādakopamā*) within it. Let it be elucidated by

1. SV, Canto 3, śl 8; SKB, P. 50, P. 413 (reads *tad opamīyeta* for *ten'opamīyeta*); KNS, P. 296; AM, P. 192; AK, P. 12; KRS, 4.3. 10

an apt illustration. 'Snow has not effaced the glory of that which is the source of innumerable jewels, for one defect becomes submerged in the aggregation of merits like the black spot in the rays of the moon'. In this instance the expression 'one defect in the aggregation of merits' has been portrayed as the object of comparison. The black spot in the rays of the moon has been delineated as the standard of comparison. The common property, namely, 'the fact of being sub-merged' is depicted as residing in them. It deserves mention that the object of comparison is 'the defect and merits' which have a universal reference. The standard of comparison, viz. 'the black spot in the rays of the moon' refers to individual defect and merits. That is to say, the black spot represents defect and the rays of the moon represent merits. And the individual is bound to be subsumed in the universal in normal circumstances. Consequently the standard of comparison, namely, the black spot in the rays of the moon' cannot claim to be distinct from the object of comparison, viz. one defect in the aggregation of merits,' So the inclusion of this instance under the domain of *similis* is obviously thwarted by the use of the adjective distinct in the present definition. And the charge of 'non-extension' against this definition is rendered inevitable. (CM, pp. 9-10)

1. KS, canto 1, śl. 3; AS, P. 140; KUV., P. 144; RG, P. 215; AK, P. 13, P. 320.

Now the opponent trots up the plea that the fact of being the standard of comparison stands determined by the determinant of the standard of comparison. It (*the determinant of the standard of comparison*) differs from the determinant of the object of comparison. To be more precise. It is indisputable that the standard and the object of comparison are identical due to referring to the individual and universal character respectively. But the determinant of the standard of comparison maintains its distinctness from the determinant of the object of comparison. And this provides the ground of difference between the standard and the object of comparison. So the charge of too narrowness against the definition under review is inspired by a captious spirit. (C M, P. 10)

But even this emendation of the opponent is not tenable. Since the definition under review will be vitiated due to its non-extension to the girdle simile. To take an example of it. '(*Oking* !)' your hand being filled up with water-drops used in making a continuous gift of gold to the hosts of supplicants waiting on as waves, your mind is like the word, the action is like the mind and the fame is extremely pure like the action'. The dissection of this instance results in the emergence of three categories. They are : (1) 'your mind is like the speech;' (2) 'the action is like the mind' and (3) 'the fame is extremely pure like the action'. The mind has been depicted as the standard and the object of

1. KP, P. 580. (reads *jalalavabhṛta* for *dhṛtajalalava*); AK, P. 13.

comparison in the second and the first category. The action has been portrayed as the standard and the object of comparison in the third and the second category. The result is that the determinants of the standard of comparison, namely, the fact of being the mind and the like cannot claim to be distinct from the determinants of the object of comparison, viz. 'the fact of being the mind and the like'. So the alleged charge of non-extension against the above definition of *similis* with reference to it remains unanswered. (CM, P. 10)

Further in the figure reciprocal simile, the two determinants of the standard of comparison are not distinct from the two determinants of the objects of comparison. Since even in a case of reciprocal simile the two entities are reciprocally depicted as the standard and the object of comparison. One concrete instance will bring home the complexity of the situation. 'Your face is like the moon and the moon is like your face'. It is obvious that the fact of being the moon and the fact of being the face are not distinct from the fact of being the moon and the fact of being the face. And consequently the very adjective distinct is competent to shut out the figure reciprocal simile from the scope of the propounded definition of *similis*. So the condition, viz. 'depicted only once' as inserted in it for the same purpose is totally redundant. Moreover the figure mutual simile (*parasparopamā*) which is to be exemplified in the context of reciprocal simile cannot be comprised within the fold of the present definition of *similis*. And its

non-comprisal will expose it to the charge of 'non-inclusiveness'. To take a relevant illustration of it. 'By the mass of dust produced by chariots and with the elephants resembling clouds, the sky is being made like the surface of the earth and the surface of the earth like the sky'. In this instance the two entities, namely, the surface of the earth and the sky are alternately portrayed as the standard and the object of comparison in the two rotations of it. So the two determinants of the standard of comparison will not display any mark of distinction from the two determinants of the objects of comparison even in the case under review. And consequently the present instance too is deprived of its legitimate inclusion under the domain of *similis*. (CM, P. 10)

The opponent offers a novel argument to vindicate his standpoint. The standard of comparison is determined by the property which differs *toto caelo* from the determinant of its own object of comparison. And such a standard of comparison really maintains its distinctness from the object of comparison. The position stands in need of elucidation. In the case of girdle simile as exhibited above, the standard of comparison, viz. the mind

1 RV. canto 4, §1. 29; SKR, P. 553. (reads *turagotkīṛṇair* for *syanda-*
~~*maṇḍair*~~); RG, P. 201; AM, P. 331. reads *turagotkīṛṇair* for *syandan-*
~~*maṇḍair*~~ AK, P. 19, P. 176, P. 177,

is determined by the property, that is, the fact of being the mind. It assuredly differs from the determinant of its own object of comparison, namely, the fact of being the action as portrayed in the second category of the above instance. And this standard of comparison, viz. the mind is obviously distinct from the mind depicted as the object of comparison in relation to the speech standing for the standard of comparison in the first category of it. Analogous is the case with reciprocal simile and mutual simile. And it does not require a further elaboration. The result is that the examples of girdle simile and mutual simile are not divested of their legal inclusion within the sphere of *Similis*. And the figure reciprocal simile cannot be precluded from the scope of the alleged definition of *similis* by the adjective distinct as referred to above (C M, P. 10)

But even this amendment will not effect any improvement in the present situation. Since even then, the above definition of *similis* fails to extend itself to the cases of *similis* where the standard of comparison as well as the object of comparison are obviously identical (*abhinnadharmikopamā*). Let us take the illustrations.(1) 'The thousand rayed (sun) bore the novel umbrella constructed by the maker of the divine implements (*tvaṣṭṛ*) for the sake of him (Hara); and he (Hara) on his part with his crest in proximity to the very linen cloth of it (umbrella) shone as it were, with his head upon which the Ganges was

rushing down.” (2) ‘The begger wandering from door to door does not beg for alms but teaches :’ without giving anything do not become myself but by making gift, be like yourself.²” In the first example the great god (Hara) is depicted as both the standard and the object of comparison. Consequently the determinant of the standard of comparison, viz. the fact of being the great god stands numerically identical with the determinant of its own object of comparison, that is, the fact of being the great god. To be more explicit, this standard of comparison cannot claim to be determined by the property which differs from the determinant of its own object of comparison. Similar is the position of the entity ‘the person instructed’ portrayed as both the standard and the object of comparison in the second instance. So the cases of this type of *similis* are bound to be shut out by the insertion of the adjective distinct in the definition under review. And the charge of non-extension against the propounded definition of *similis* remains finally unanswered. (C M, PP. 10-11)

**Smashing criticism of the proviso ‘by means
of common property’**

Now the expression ‘by means of common property’ is employed in the definition under review in order to exclude the figure double entendre from the scope of it. But it is doomed to futility. Since in the illustration of double entendre cited above, the term ‘like’ does not

1. KS, conto 7, §1 41; AK, P. 13. (reads *svayam* for *navam*)

2. SRN, P. 71, §1. 25, AK, P. 13

express; only the verbal resemblance. It also signifies resemblance based on quality. So the exclusion of this instance of double entendre from the scope of *similis* cannot be made possible even by the presence of this term. The opponent adopts a new line of argument. The expression *sakalakalatra* in the context of the city refers to its association with indistinct noise. And the same expression when considered with reference to the disc of the moon signifies 'fullness with all its digits. So there is no one common property residing in both the entities, namely, the city and the disc of the moon delineated as the object and the standard of comparison. Consequently the exclusion of this illustration from the purview of this definition of *similis* can be effected by the said term without encountering any obstacle. (CM, P. 11)

But even this amended plea is ineffectual to effect an improvement. Because the commonness of property can be gained in the way indicated below. There is pun upon the word *sakalakala* which means (1) with the indistinct noise and (2) full with all its digits. These two meanings are different from each other. They are bound to entail a splitting up of the word expressive of them. That is to say, the two meanings mentioned above have been expressed by two numerically different words instead of one. And these two words are assumed as identical in the rhetorical figure called double entendre. This assumed identity serves as the ground upon which the figure hyperbole takes its rise. This figure of speech consists in the portrayal of

identity of two things which are numerically different from each other (*bhede'bhedaḥ*)¹ This assumption of identity between these two meanings confers upon them the status of common property. And this is shared by the object and the standard of comparison in the present case. (CM, P. 11.)

1. It is not out of place to mention that the portrayal of identity of two things which are numerically different from each other (*bhede'bhedaḥ*) constitutes the first variety of the rhetorical figure styled hyperbole. This variety of hyperbole consists in the portraiture of the relevant, that is, the object of comparison as swallowed up by the irrelevant, namely, the standard of comparison. That is to say, the object of comparison is not directly expressed by the word occurring in an instance of it. So there is secured a notion of complete identity between the relevant and the irrelevant in it. To be more explicit, it is constituted by the portrayal of the identity of two things which are numerically different from each other

It has been exemplified by the verse as follows. "*Kamalam anambhasi Kamale ca kuvalaye tāni kanakalatikāyām / sā ca sukumārasubhage'ty' utpāta paramparā k'eyam* // KP, P. 629. In this verse (1) *Kamala*, (2) *Kuvalaya* and (3) *Kanakalatikā* are irrelevants. The entities, viz. (1) *mukha* (2) *netra* and (3) *kāntā* are relevant. They are represented as swallowed up by the irrelevants. That is to say, the relevant is not signified by words expressive of them. Thus the irrelevants (1) *Kamala*, (2) *kuvalaya* and (3) *kanakalatikā* although numerically different from relevant *mukha*, *netra* and *kāntā* respectively, have been portrayed as completely identical with them. So it obviously exemplifies the first variety of the figure hyperbole bearing the title *bhede'bheda*.

The opponent puts forward another argument in his defence. The figure *similis* takes place only on the basis of the principal common property residing in the object and the standard of comparison. In the instance beginning with 'this city *et. seq.*' the common property is obtained by means of hyperbole in the way above indicated. So it cannot claim to be principal in its intrinsic worth. And consequently the expression 'by means of common property' may warrant its employment by shutting out this instance from the scope of the present definition of *similis*. But even this advocacy will cut no ice with the proponent. Since the figure *similis* is found effected even by the common property secured through the medium of the relation-of-reflection and reflected, Let us elucidate the position by means of a concrete illustration. 'The king of Pāṇḍu (*Pāṇḍya*) with the shoulder bearing a pendant necklace and getting his limbs anointed with yellow sandal-paste shines like the Lord of mountains (*Himālaya*) with a flowing spring and with its redges reddened by the rising sun rays¹'. In this instance the similarity subsists between the two entities, viz. (1, King of Pāṇḍu and (2) Lord of mountains depicted as the object and the standard of comparison. The fact of being the common property is portrayed as existing in yellow sandal-paste and morning sun rays on the one hand and in pendant necklace and flowing

1. Rv, canto, 6 §1. 60 (reads *hari* for *nava*) KRS, 4,2,3, SKB, P. 407 (reads *hari* for *nava*); Kuv, P. 197; Ak, P. 14.

spring on the other. And its existence in them is made possible only by means of 'the relation of reflection and 'reflected' holding between these two pairs of adjectives. It is evident that even the common property obtained in an indirect manner has served the ground of the figure *similis* in the case under review. The result is that the instance commencing with 'this city *et. seg.*' cannot be ruled out from the jurisdiction of *similis* by the term under examination. (CM, P. 11).

The opponent adopts a new line of argument. Granted that the instance, viz. 'this city *et. seg.*' too has got a legitimate right of inclusion within the scope of the alleged definition of *similis*. Since it exhibits the resemblance in respect of quality obtained indirectly in the way above indicated. Despite this, the counter illustration of this definition with reference to its term 'by means of common property' may be the case of double entendre which will afford only verbal resemblance. But it is absolutely untenable. Because what is the ground for ruling out the present instance from the jurisdiction of *similis* if it displays the verbal resemblance to the total elimination of the resemblance based on quality? For it is not indispensable that the resemblance grounded on quality and so forth in entire banishment of the verbal resemblance is the exclusive basis for emergence of the figure *similis*. And on the contrary the verbal resemblance cannot serve the

ground to effect this figure of speech under any circumstances. One concrete instance will bring home the complexity of the situation. 'As the candra (moon) is so called owing to its delighting quality and the tapana (sun) for its excessive scorching' so in that very way that *raja* (the king Raghu) became significant to its true meaning due to felicitating the subjects¹. In this instance the entity *raja* (king) has been depicted as the object of comparison. The objects, viz. (1) *candra* (moon) and (2) *tapana* (sun) have been portrayed as the standards of comparison. The common property in the shape of the fact of being the significant epithet is delineated as residing in them. It is notable that the fact of being the significant epithet is nothing but the form of verbal resemblance pure and simple. And it has been clinched as the basis for operation of the poetic figure styled *similis*. So the opponent cannot cite even the instance grounded exclusively upon the verbal resemblance as the counter-illustration of the figure *similis* (CM, P. 11)

A poser has been raised in the present context. The instance like 'this city *et seq.*' and similar others have been considered as valid cases of the figure *similis* even in the event of exhibiting only the verbal resemblance. So the figure double entendre is rendered bereft of the distinct sphere of its own and dissociated from other rhetorical

1. RV, canto. 4, śl. 12., Kuv, P. 200., AK, P. 14, P. 247

figures. The result is that the figure double entendre has come to possess superior strength and will act as a prevention to other figures of speech. So in like situation, the rhetoricians like Mañkhaka and others hold that even in the case of apprehension of *similis* the figure double entendre will be there acting as a ground of the awareness of it, that is, *similis*. And assuredly there will be no case of *similis*. Now it is evident that on the occurrence of the awareness of *similis* on the basis of verbal resemblance, the figures double entendre will undoubtedly act as a barrier of it in the instance commencing with 'this city *et seq.*' as above alluded to. So in identical way the figure double entendre can act as a hindrance to the figure *similis* in the self-same instance even in the event of the apprehension of the *similis* resting solely on the similitude of qualities (in the form of identity) due to the superimposition of identity based on paronomasia belonging to the word *sakalakala*. And consequently in the aforementioned instance, viz. 'this city, etc.' the element of the resemblance of quality is not required to be dispensed with out of deference to the figure double entendre. The gist of the elaborate discussion is mentioned as follows. The expression, viz. by means of common property as employed in the body of the alleged definition of *similis* is rendered devoid of utility. Since it was inserted in order to exclude the instance, that is, 'this city, *et seq.*' due to exhibiting only the verbal resemblance. Whereas it is proved to be the case of the figure double entendre which affords the resemblance of quality in the way above indicated. (CM, PP. 11-12).

Now it deserves mention in the present context that Rudraṭa the eminent rhetorician with a view to supporting the figure *similis* in the illustration, namely, 'this city with indistinct noise etc.' has mentioned the following verse: These two figures *similis* and conjunction are apparently ideal figures of speech; but in the present case (*This city with indistinct noise, etc.*) there is also the possibility of common property on the basis of only the verbal resemblance¹ The shows that he has laid emphasis on only the verbal resemblance in the instance under reference. And consequently the proponent has failed to warrant his position in the present situation. But this cannot bear scrutiny. Since the mention of verbal resemblance in the present verse is liable to be taken in the light that the figure *similis* may be supported even merely on the basis of the verbal resemblance. And certainly not that the similarity of quality cannot possibly be obtained even through the superimposition of identity in the way above indicated in the present instance. Since all rhetoricians have resorted to unity effected by the superimposition of identity even in the equivocal attributes in other poetic figures. And so for this ground the figure double entendre cannot be excluded from the purview of the propounded definition of *similis* by the proviso by means of common property. In fact the illustrations like 'this city with indistinct noise' and others

1. KA, P. 48; Kp, P. 521, AM, 223

are exclusively the cases of the figure *similis* and as such the above predicament, namely, 'by means of common property' is entirely redundant. The objectives of the figure double entendre as entirely excluded from the compass of other rhetorical figures will be exhibited in its own context. (CM, P. 12)

Further even the mode of argumentation that the figure double entendre in absence of the distinct sphere of its own operation will act as an impediment to other figures of speech is entirely inappropriate. Because the simple existence of the relevant cases of double entendre will act as a cancellation of the barrier to its operation and, as a result of this, the figure double entendre will not stand in need of its own exclusive sphere to the exclusion of other rhetorical figures. There is no common place usage in respect of ordinary ornaments that it must be said to have its distinct sphere of reference. Since though the unbored jewels have not their separate bases save and except gold, yet they, being exclusively set in it, receive the designation of an independent ornament owing to their becoming the source of grace. Otherwise the unbored jewels set up on gold-ornament on account of the absence of their own sphere would have prevented the consideration of gold-ornament which serves as their base and is already possessed of its own sphere. (CM, P. 12)

Neither this rule has been recognised by the Mīmāṃsists even in connection with the interpretation of

scriptures. To be more elaborate. There is the scriptural injunction that 'oblations should be offered in the *Āhavanīya* fire'. Apparently the imperativeness and universal applicability of this prescript is not liable to dispute. But it has also been emphatically enjoined that in the course of the performance of the *Aśvamedha* sacrifice oblations should be offered at the feet of the horse. Now in the face of the preceding injunction this succeeding injunction stands deprived of its sphere of operation. And consequently it appears plausible that the succeeding injunction should be considered as an exceptional one. That is to say, it deserves to be invested with the power of superseding the preceding injunction directing the offering of oblation in the *Āhavanīya* fire. But this seeming inconsistency has been reconciled by the Mīmāṃsists: The specific directive laying down the offering of oblation at the feet of the horse will be effectual by remaining exclusively confined to its delimited sphere of operation. consequently there is not even the slightest possibility of the supersession of the preceding injunction by the succeeding one. And analogous is the case with the injunction, namely, the oblations should be offered in the northern part of the *Āhavanīya* fire. This special ordainment also will not countermand the general injunction prescribing the offering of the oblation in the *Āhavanīya* fire. It is true that it cannot claim an exclusive sphere of operation of its own to the entire exclusion of the preceding injunction. It will be effectual

with reference to the sphere of operation allotted to it.
(CM, P. 12)

Moreover this rule does not exclusively pertain to the scripture alone. Since figures like connected description and others even in spite of the absence of esoteric sphere to the exclusion of hyperbole and the like get the designation of distinct rhetorical figures by acting as a non-prevention of the basic figures (namely, hyperbole and so forth). And thus this absence of conflict is also equally apparent as is in the case of the scripture. So the consideration of these facts puts it into clear perspective that it is absolutely absurd to say that the present illustration, viz. 'this city with indistinct noise *et seq.*' is the case of the figure double entendre serving as a basis of the awareness of *similis*. Rather it is the *similis* which is the ground of the apprehension of double entendre in the illustration under reference. Since in the context of description of the city, the adjective, namely, with indistinct noise (*sa-kalakala*) in the event of the absence of mention of *similis*, that is, like the orbit of the moon cannot give rise to the understanding of another meaning, namely, 'complete with all its digits' (*skala-kala*). So it has been laid bare that the instance, viz. 'this city *et seq.*' is on apposite case of the figure *similis*. And consequently the proviso 'by means of common property as inserted in the body of the alleged definition stands completely controverted. (CM, P. 12-13)

**A trenchant criticism of the expression 'the
resemblance of the relevant with the other'**

Now in the expression 'resemblance of the relevant with the other, that is, the irrelevant' employed in the definition of *similis* with a view to excluding the figure converse (*pratīpa*), the term 'with the other' is entirely superfluous. Since the expression 'with the other' will involve tautology with the adjective distinct inserted in the same definition A novel interpretation of the term 'with the other' has been put forth to avoid this charge of tautology. The expression 'with the other' means with the irrelevant as distinct from the object of description, that is, the relevant. And this will succeed to evade the charge of tautology cited above. But this amendment is bound to fail to effect the improvement of the situation. Since this will not make the above definition possible to include conjunctive *similis* (*samuccitopamā*)- And as a sequel of this, it will make the charge of 'non-extended definition inevitable.' A concrete illustration will substantiate the allegation. 'Even other demons fell (*and died*) on the crores of monkeys, like the dusts aroused during the battle fell (*and vanished*) in the river of blood of those demons'. In this verse the dusts are admittedly the indivisible part of the battle. So their falling into the river of blood will also claim to be the object

of description, that is, relevant like the narration of the battle itself. As a sequel of this, there is not the slightest possibility of the distinctness of the irrelevant from the relevant. And as such it is bound to remain beyond and beside the scope of the alleged definition of *similis*. So this interpretation is rendered as devoid of substance (CM, P. 13).

The opponent again contends that the other, that is, 'the standard of comparison' must be distinct irrespective of its distinctness either from the relevant or from the irrelevant. The distinctness of the standard of comparison should be insisted upon as an indispensable factor. The sole criterion is that the distinctness of the standard of comparison should remain intact. And as a result of this amendment, the charge of non-extension against the definition will be rendered ineffective. Since in the present instance the standard of comparison succeeded to retain its distinctness from the object of comparison beyond the shadow of doubt. But despite this emendation, the above definition will be vitiated due to its 'unwarrantable extension' (*ativyāpti*) to the specific type of the accredited figure entitled converse. For in this type of converse, the thing which has been imagined as the fact of being the standard of comparison cannot adapt itself to the rank of it (standard of comparison) owing to the overwhelming superiority of attributes over all others. A concrete illustration will make clear the contention. 'O friend poison !

don't be arrogant with the following idea : 'I am alone the deadliest of all dreadful things', for verily there exist in this world the mischievous person's utterances in large numbers which are just like yourself¹. In this verse the utterances of the mischievous are described as relevant, i. e., the object of comparison. This relevant has been similized with the poison portrayed as the standard of comparison. And it (the standard of comparison) due to possessing the excessive superiority in respect of deadliness is about to thwart the status of the standard of comparison. So it is a case of the figure receiving the designation of the specific type of converse. Now in the present act of comparison as conceivable in converse, it is evident that the standard of comparison, namely, poison maintains its distinctness from the object of comparison, namely, 'the utterances of the mischievous' which is relevant (object of comparison). And as a consequence of this, even this final amendment put forth by the opponent remains exposed to the charge of over-extension. CM, P. 13).

Now in the present context it is worthy of note that the term '(resemblance) of the relevant' is absolutely out of point. Since the above definition will involve the charge of non-comprehensiveness (*avyāpti* with reference to the figure, namely, '*similis* commixed with vicarious praise'.

1. SR, P. 59. §1 204, SM, P. 60, KNS P. 322, AS P. 210, KUV, P. 13, KP, P. 738, AM, P. 320,

Let us take an example of it. 'In the presence of your fame the moon-light appears as it were obscured by darkness'. In this instance the fame has become the actual object of description and so the moon-light will necessarily be taken as irrelevant. Thus the irrelevant has been compared with the relevant instead of the relevant being compared with the irrelevant as is required for compliance with the term of this definition of *similis*. (CM, P. 13)

Moreover what is denoted by the whole expression, namely 'the resemblance of the relevant with the other, that is, the irrelevant (*the standard of comparison*) which is expressed?' A close scrutiny shows only three courses possible. Should the similitude which is intended to be expressed abide exclusively in the relevant, that is, the object of comparison with other things as its counter-term? Or should the same expressed similitude stand as determined by both the relevant as well as irrelevant, namely, the object of comparison and the standard of comparison respectively in some way or other? Or should the similitude be expressed residing in the relevant, that is, the object of comparison? The first alternative is manifestly untenable. Since in the instance, namely, 'the lotus and this face of her are alike and so cause delight in the mind,' the similarity rests with reference to both the relevant and the irrelevant and thus make the charge of non-comprehensiveness inescapable. It is obviously needless to observe that similarity does not find its culmination *apropos* of the relevant alone, that is,

the object of comparison as conceivable in the first variety of the possible course indicated above. If with a view to avoiding the alleged objection reliance is placed on the second alternative by affirming the similarity as subsisting in respect of both the relevant and the irrelevant alike, it will undoubtedly succeed to achieve its objective. But it will entail the charge of unwarranted extension in connection with the figure converse (*pratīpa*). Since in it the similarity abides in both the irrelevant and the relevant in an identical manner. Now if in pursuance of the third alternative, the locus of the similitude is held to be the relevant, that is, the object of comparison, then 'the similitude of the relevant' as set forth in the definition will be conducive to the apprehension of the intended sense. And the inevitable consequence will be that the term 'with the other' as the component part of the definition of *similis* will be rendered futile and superfluous. (CM, PP- 13-14)

Redundancy of the adjective 'depicted only once'

Now even the adjective 'depicted only once' employed in the definition of *similis* is completely inappropriate and beside the point. It is undeniable that the employment of this will avoid the charge of 'over extension' against the above definition in connection with reciprocal simile with the similarity occurring by rotation. To take an instance of it. 'Water is like the sky and the sky is like the water *et seq.*' In this instance the similarity does not occur simultaneously but by turn. So it cannot claim

inclusion under the fold of the definition of *similis*. But the allegation of unwarrantable extension cannot be evaded with reference to the figure reciprocal simile in which the similitude occurs synchronously. A concrete illustration will establish the contention. 'By the handsome and simultaneous opening, the two objects are mutually held in the balance in the identical unit of the time, namely, your eyes with their unsteady and tender pupils in interior as well as the lotus with its moving black bees'. In this illustration the similarity is portrayed to occur simultaneously with reference to the two objects, namely, the eyes together with their unsteady pupils and the lotus along with its moving black bees. And so even the expression 'depicted only once' put in as a device to evade the present allegation is rendered incapable to serve the purpose. (CM, P. 14)

Moreover in like manner the definition of *similis* will be rendered defective due to its non-extension (*avyāpti*) to the recognised figure, namely, 'garland of *similis* in which the common property admits of wide variation.' Let it be substantiated by an apt illustration. 'The lady with beautiful hips is a delight to the eyes like the moonlight, a source of intoxication like wine and like sovereignty attracting all the people (to herself)².' In

1. RV, canto 5, śl. 68; RG, P. 200; AK, P. 18

2. SR, P. 251, śl. 14; KNS, P. 295; KP, P. 579; AK,

this instance similarity has not been expressed simultaneously but by turn. And as such the insertion of the above expression 'depicted only once' has resulted in exclusion of this example from the compass of the definition of *similis*. It cannot be contended that garland of *similis* is not a solitary figure of speech but is constituted by the combination of numerous *similis* and as such the definition of *similis* under review extends to them in their individual character. For the reciprocal simile also is the *defacto* blending of *similis* and converse (*pratīpa*) and as such the comprisal of other adjective, namely, 'depicted only once' with a view to excluding this figure will be deprived of utility (CM, P 14)

The opponent may argue that the figure garland of *similis* has a legitimate claim of its inclusion under the terms of the definition of *similis*. For it has been constituted by the combination of numerous *similis*. It is further contended that this figure cannot be considered either a case of poetic figure, namely, collocation (*saṃśṛṣṭi*) or commixture (*saṅkara*) as it has been mentioned separately by the authors of rhetorics. But the case is not identical with reciprocal simile which is the mingling of the *similis* and converse. And so this figure can reasonably be subsumed under collocation or commixture. Thus when it has lost its independent status owing to its being merged into them, then the figure reciprocal simile has been divested of its right to be the counter-illustration of the above definition. But this defence of the opponent lacks probative value. For even the reciprocal simile should be placed on equal footing

with the garland of *similis* on the ground that it has also been mentioned separately by the celebrated authors of rhetorics. And thus the charge of over-extension remains unanswered. In like manner by the employment of the proviso 'depicted only once' the above definition of *similis* will fail to cover the mutual simile within its own compass. It will be exemplified in the context of reciprocal simile by the following illustration : 'By dusts produced by chariots, etc. The non-inclusion of this instance rests on the ground that the similarity exhibited herein takes place not synchronously but alternately. So the charge of non-extension against this definition of *similis* with reference to it remains finally unanswered. (CM, P. 14).

**The use of the term 'expressed' stands
unwarranted**

Further even the word 'expressed' which is inserted in order to rule out the suggested *similis* from the range of the operation of *similis* evidently lacks cogency. Since it will expose the definition of *similis* to the charge of non-comprehensiveness (*avyāpti*) with reference to the figure of speech designated as *similis* based upon 'the assertion of facts' (*tattvākhyānopamā*). Let it be exposed by a relevant illustration. 'This is not the lotus but is actually the face, and these are not the black bees but the eyes; and thus by manifest resemblance this figure is exclusively called *similis* based upon the assertion of facts'. In this

instance the similarity is apprehended not as expressed but implied and so the ground of the present allegation stands indubitably substantiated. Further due to the insertion of the word 'expressed' the definition will be liable to the charge of non-inclusiveness (*avyāpti*) in respect of the recognised figure called sentence *similis*. In this figure the similitude subsisting in adjectives and the like is not directly expressed but implied by the similarity belonging to the circumscribed substantives. A concrete illustration will render the position clear. 'Your face with the restless eyes and having the lustre of its teeth manifested, shines like the lotus with moving black bees and indistinctly perceived filament¹.' In this illustration the similarity apprehended in the adjectives, namely, between the restless eyes and the moving black bees on the one hand and between the lustre of the teeth and filament on the other is indirectly conveyed by the similitude subsisting between the circumscribed substantives, namely, the face and the lotus. So this instance failing to comply with the present predicament employed in the alleged definition will be bound to remain beyond and beside the domain of the figure *similis*. And consequently the charge of non-extension (*avyāpti*) against this definition becomes deep-rooted with reference to it. (CM., PP. 14-15).

Besides the scope of the definition of *similis* will be too narrow to include even *similis* if

word expressive of similitude be omitted from it (*vācaka luptopamā*).' To take a relevant instance of it. 'A lady with elegant limbs is like one possessed with weapon (*śastri śyāmā*)'. In this instance the similitude belonging to the terms of comparison is not expressed but implied owing to the absence of the word 'like' denotative of similarity. Further the definition will fall short even to include 'the *similis* possessed with the word indirectly indicating similitude.' Let us take an example of it. 'The face is the friend of the moon (*candra suhṛnmukham*)'. In this illustration the primary sense of the word 'friend' is incompatible with reference to both the face and the moon. And so it has become indirectly indicative of the similitude in the instance under review. It is remarkable that the preceding cases of the figure *similis* can under no circumstances be included under the jurisdiction of the figure *similis*. Since in theme the similitude portrayed as subsisting between the factors of comparison has not been expressed in a direct manner. So the definition under review cannot escape the charge of non-extension as above indicated. (CM, P. 15)

Moreover what is denoted by the expression 'similitude to be expressed'? Is the similitude to be expressed predicatively? or is it intended to be the subject of predication? If the first hypothesis is held to be true, then the definition of the *similis* will be exclusively applicable to the illustration mentioned below: 'He (Raghu) leading on the vast army advancing

towards the eastern sea resembling the Ganges rushing down from the matted hair of Hara appeared like Bhagīratha.¹ In this instance similitude has been portrayed as subsisting between Raghu and Bhagīratha standing for the object and the standard of comparison. And it stands as directly expressed in the form of predication. So it will be in conformity with the former supposition. Consequently it is entitled to its inclusion in the domain of the figure *similis*. But the definition will not comprise the accredited illustration like the following:— 'At first he (Raghu) like Indra proceeded towards the eastern direction with the banners fluttered by the wind, as it were, threatening his enemies².' In this illustration the similitude belonging to Raghu and Indra has not been expressed predicatively. That is to say, the similitude has not found its expression in the shape of a predicate. But on the contrary it has been stated as an established fact and as such has been invested with the status of the subject. So this instance by failing to agree with the first hypothesis will lose its legitimate claim of inclusion under the compass of the present definition of *similis*. (CM, P. 15).

Now the second supposition is also equally untenable. Since the definition will be rendered defective due to its

1. RV, canto. 4, śl. 32 reads *senām mahatīm Karṣan* for *Karṣan mahatīm senām*; AK, P. 20

2. RV, canto 8, śl. 28, AK, P. 20

over-extension (*ativyāpti*) even to the specific variety of *vyatireka* in which the similitude has been accorded the status of the subject with the ultimate purpose of making its negation. Let it be substantiated by a concrete illustration. 'The moon is not equal with your spotless face' In this instance the word *samaḥ* (*equal*) expressing similitude between the moon and the face has been used as the subject in order to make its negation possible. And as a result of this, it will make the illegitimate claim of its inclusion under the terms of the definition of *similis*. (*CM*, P. 15)

It cannot be contended that the similitude which has been supposed to be expressed in the form of a subject should be qualified by the caveat, namely, 'the fact of being the non-counter-term of the negation'. And as such in the immediately preceding instance the similitude which is directly expressed as the subject has also been stated as the counter-term of the negation. So the alleged charge of over-extension levelled against this definition has been obviated in respect of the present instance. But in spite of this amendment the definition will be susceptible to the same charge of unwarrantable extension with reference to the poetic figure *vyatireka*. To take a relevant instance of it. 'This person endowed with extraordinary patience in the matter of vanquishing the host of adversaries even having the sword alone as his helper does not become proud like other ordinary

persons¹. In this illustration similitude expressed by the suffix 'vat' cannot assume the status of the counter-term of negation as it is only the fact of becoming proud (*sagarva*) which has been directly negated. And as a consequence of this, the illegitimate inclusion of the present instance under the compass of the definition of *similis* becomes unavoidable. So the alleged definition of *similis* cannot evade the charge of over-extension in respect of the instance under reference. (*CM*, P. 15).

It cannot be further argued in this connexion that the similitude which is to be expressed subjectively should be limited by the proviso 'as not being included within the fold of the counter-term of the negation'. And as a result of this novel emendation, the aforecited illustration will become immune from the possibility of over-extension of the present definition of *similis*. Because in the alleged instance the similitude expressed as a subject stands on the same predicament with the counter-term of negation. But even this modified amendment will fail to effect an improvement of the situation. For the scope of the above definition of *similis* will be unable to cover *similis* with its standard of comparison as obviously left out. To cite a relevant instance of it. '(O black bee ! Why do you roam in vain here and there in the interior of the forest ?

1. KNS, P. 333,. AM, P. 276 (reads *sahāyasya* for *sahāyo'pi* and *Anyatucchajanasy' eva na smayo'sya mahādhr̥teḥ* for *n'aivānyatucchajanavat sagarvo'yaṁ mahādyutiḥ*); KP, 647

Because in no where you can obtain one like the Mālatī flower even by wandering (*withoul rest*).’ It does not stand in need of elucidation that the present verse is distinctly marked out by the absence of the standard of comparison. The expression ‘in no where you can obtain one like the Mālatī flower ’ clearly exhibits the omission of it. In this instance the similitude which is expressed should exclusively be considered as included within the compass of the counter-term of negation. Since it is evident that the very obtainment of one like the Mālatī flower has been directly negated. And as a sequel of this, the present instance failing to comply with the condition laid out before will necessarily be losing its claim of inclusion under the above terms of the definition of *similis*. And so for this very ground the definition of *similis* as propounded by Vidyānātha has been proved futile and superfluous. (CM, P. 15)

SECTION III.

The definitions of the figure *similis* as formulated in the *Sarasvatīkaṇṭhābharaṇa* and the *Alaṃkārasarvasva* critically examined

Now the definition of *similis* as has been set forth in the *Sarasvatīkaṇṭhābharaṇa* of Bhoja runs as follows. ‘In conformity with the poetic convention, the accompaniment of the common components in prolific number in the two entities, namely, the standard and the object of comparison in reciprocity is considered the *similis* in the present

of the beloved of the young lady of the Hūṇa clan with the distinct marks of the advanced pregnancy and which is tawny like the full-grown body of the lotus illumines at first the setting place of viṣṇu (i. e., sky) by the foreparts of its rays¹.’ And to cite another instance. ‘This orange is vying with the chin of the intoxicated Hūṇa, which has been presently shaved.’ In these two illustrations the similarity is delineated to subsist between the orbit of the moon and the appearance of the breasts and the orange and the chin of the intoxicated Hūṇa in their respective manner. But it is remarkable that the appearance of the breasts of the young lady of the Hūṇa clan and the presently shaved chin of the intoxicated Hūṇa portrayed as the standards of comparison cannot claim to possess the seal of approval in the circle of poets and rhetoricians. And as a consequence of this, the alleged charge of non-comprehensiveness (*avyṭpti*) regarding the above definition of *similis* stands unanswered. (CM. P. 16)

Further what has been contended regarding the intrinsic character of the figure *similis* by the author of the

1. KRS, 4, 2, 2 (reads *bhugnonnati* for *bhagnonnati* and *gaurer* for *etad*),; SKB, P. 135 (reads *gaurair* for *etad*),; SR, P. 301. śl. 69., AM, P. 244 (reads *bhugnonnati* for *bhagnonnati* and *gaurair* for *etad*),; AK, P. 21 (reads *samam* for *nibham* and *gaurair* for *etad*)

Alaṅkārasarvasva shares the same fate. The learned author has observed that ‘*similis* consists in the similarity between the standard and the object of comparison in the event of the difference and identity standing on equal footing¹.’ Similarity admits of three fold manifestation, viz. (1) superiority of difference which occurs in poetic figures like illuminator, equal pairing (*tulyayogitā*), exemplification, typical comparison (*prativastūpamā*), connected description (*sahokti*), dissimilitude (*vyatireka*) and the like; (2) superiority of identity as is exhibited in figures like metaphor, commutation (*poriṇāma*), poetic illusion (*bhrāntimāna* representation (*ullekha*) and the like, (3) equipollence of both the difference and identity as is illustrated in the instance of the figure *similis*. Since in the instance of the figure *similis* there is numerical difference between the standard of comparison and the object of comparison so far their generic features are concerned and there is also the identity through the medium of common property. And as a consequence of this, these two factors of comparison are clearly equipollent in every respect. Thus the instance like ‘your face is like the moon’ and similar others are entitled to inclusion under the range of operation of the figure *similis*. But the invocation to this amendment cannot be competent to resolve the *impasse*. *Albeit* it will succeed to bring the instance of

1. As, P. 31 ‘reads *upamānopameyayohḥ Sadharmye bhedabheda tūlyatve upamā*),

similis within its compass, still it cannot evade the charge of over-extension *apropos* of the poetic figure. Let it be brought home by a concrete illustration. 'The moon is like your face' is a recognised instance of converse (*prā-tīpa*). The present illustration of converse too like that of an accredited case of *similis* indisputably complies with all the three conditions, namely, superiority of difference, superiority of identity, and equipollence of both the difference and identity as already referred to. And as a consequence of this, the alleged charge of over-extension stands unrefuted. So it has been held that the definition of *similis* is too hard to be formulated. (CM, P. 16).

CHAPTER IV

Appaya Dīkṣita's Definition of similis And Its critical Examination

SECTION I

The author of the *citra-mīmāṃsā* puts forth his own definition of *similis*: 'If the function styled similisation is intended to endure until the accomplishment of the action, then it is designated the figure *similis*. Now the function of similisation is nothing but the function which brings into completion the act of similisation and this finds its expression in the description of similarity. If this function is purported to last upto the completion of the act of similisation, then it is considered as *similis qua* poetic figure. Now if the definition of *similis* is formulated in this way, then it will stand immune from the charge of its over-extension with reference to the poetic figure dissimilitude (*vyatireka*). The position stands in need of elaboration. The instances of the figure dissimilitude (*vyatireka*) have been cited as follows: (1) The moon is not equal to your spotless face, etc. and (2) 'This person endowed with extraordinary patience does not become proud like other ordinary persons *et seq.* 'It is apparent that these two illustrations of dissimilitude (*vyatireka*) admittedly possess the element of the description of similarity which is indicated by the word 'like' employed in both the instances. But it is remarkable

that in the first instance the very similarity itself has been negated directly by the use of the term 'not'. And in the second instance there is the prohibition of the property conducive to the occasioning of similarity. As an inevitable consequence of this, in both the instances the act of *similisation* remains unaccomplished. Therefore the alleged charge of over-extension against the definition of *similis* of Vidyānātha has been successfully evaded by the adoption of the present definition of *similis* (CM, PP. 16-17).

Moreover the present definition of *similis* is not liable to be vitiated by its over-extension to the recognised instances of the figure self-comparison like 'your face is like your face itself' and so forth. In this illustration of self-comparison the description of the similarity of the face with its own self has been made as an instrument for the exclusion of all other things which may be similar to this face. An identical case is furnished in Eulogium (*arthavāda*) of the vedic text. In it the weeping of Rudra and carving out of the fat of Prajāpati by himself have been narrated with a view to expressing censure and commendation respectively. And it is obviously needless to observe that these two facts referred to above are figment of imagination. But in spite of their unreality they effectively bring home the idea of censure and commendation¹. And a

1 cf. So 'rodid ityatrā'pi rajatasya patitāśrurupatvād rajata-
 — grā'pi rodana prasangād arhiṣi rajatam' na deyam (Tai, 1, 5, 1, 2)

critical consideration renders it manifest that the act of similisation remains unfulfilled by the mere description of similarity exemplified in the aforementioned case of self-comparison. Otherwise in the event of the accomplishment of the act of comparison of an object with its own self, the ultimate result of its peerlessness in all imaginable ways cannot be expected to be secured despite the exclusion of all other things resembling to it. (CM, P.17)

Furthermore this very result of it has been categorically affirmed by the rhetoricians like Bhāmaha and others in the following way : 'The figure in which the property of becoming the standard and the object of comparison of an object with its own self takes place with the purport of importing its peerlessness, is called the figure self-comparison.¹ And so on the basis of this fact the author of the *Alaṃkārasarvasva* and others have laid down the etymological sense of the expression *ananvaya* (self-comparison) to the effect that notwithstanding the delineation of the similarity of an entity with its own self, it cannot be syntactically synthetised. It stands to reason that in the instance, viz. 'your face is like the moon' the expression

Tanniṣedhena vidher vidheḥ stutiḥ sampādyate" And also compare: 'yāḥ prajākāmāḥ paśūkāmāḥ syāt sa' etaṁ prajāpatiḥ ajam tūparam ālabheta (Tai. sam. 2, 1, 1, 4—5) ity'ayam vidheḥ prajāpati vapotkhedena stūyate/ tūpara guṇasya vādo'tra vivakṣitaḥ "RG, Bh., P. 29

I K.V. Chap. 3. §l. 45 (reads *tan ity'āhur ananvayam* for *vadanti tam ananvayam*)

moon is the counter-term of the resemblance *qua* relation and the face is the locus of it. Now this resemblance *qua* relation can subsist only in the event of the numerical difference of the two entities, namely, the moon and the face and not in any other conceivable manner. This apparent fact places it beyond dispute that even the description of similarity of an entity with its own self as is usually made in the accredited figure self-comparison cannot be entitled to claim syntactical unit. And this has been laid bare by the author of the *Alaṃkārasarvasva* and other celebrated rhetoricians. Let the position be elucidated by a concrete illustration. The dust of kataka if mixed up with water, it purges the water from other sorts of dusts and gets itself dissolved into it. And as a result, the water in its turn becomes exclusively free from filthiness.¹ Likewise in the classical example of the figure self-comparison like 'the clash between Rāma and Rāvaṇa is like the clash between Rāma and Rāvaṇa and so forth, the delineation of similarity of the clash between Rāma and Rāvaṇa with its own

I This norm is popularly known *jalakatakareṇunyāya*. Manu refers to it "*Phalaṃ kataka vrkṣasya yadyapy' ambu prasādakam na nāma grahaṇād eva tasyavāri pyasīdati*," "Manu 6, 67 In the *lauk-ānyāya sangraha*, this norm is explained as follows "*yathā hi sapa-
-jale nikṣiptaḥ katakasy'auśadhi viśeṣasya reṇavo rajāmsi tasmāj-
-at pañkam vilāpya svayam eva vilīyante tath. tattva jñānaṃ savil-*

self culminates in the exclusion of all other clashes comparable to it. Therefore it becomes transparent on scrutiny that in reality there is not the slightest possibility of comparison even with its own self in the instance under review. And as a sequel of this, the portrayal of the peerlessness of the clash between Rāma and Rāvaṇa appears to be the only objective of the endeavour of the poet. Now it is evident that there is absolutely no scope for the possibility of the above charge of the over-extension against the present definition of *similis* with reference to the accredited instance of the figure self-comparison due to the non-fulfilment of the act of similitisation. (CM, P. 17)

In an analogous way even the figure converse (pratīpa) in which the act of similitisation is not brought into completion will enjoy absolute immunity from the overlapping *ativyāpti* of the definition of the figure *similis*. Let it be brought home by a relevant illustration. 'Hear, O lotus eyed (lady) ! this reproach that the moon is compared with your face by the rustics on this earth¹'. This genuine instance of converse is conspicuous by the absence of the completion of the act of similitisation. Since it is the unsophisticated rustics alone who are in a habit of indulging in their uncultured and unrefined taste of comparing the moon with the face of the lady in question. To tell the truth, such an act of comparison

deserves unqualified repudiation. It is manifest that the act of comparison cannot take place in any rational manner. And this fact operates as a decisive factor to preclude it from the purview of the definition of *similis*. Whereas the special cases of the figure converse and the accredited instances of reciprocal simile in which the act of similitude is infallibly accomplished are legitimately entitled to their inclusion within the compass of the definition of *similis*. And as such the extension of the definition of *similis* in those cases cannot be condemned as its defect. Let us take the following examples to make the position clear : (1) 'What for, O noble lady ! bear this unbearable pride by the pair of your eyes ? Because there are undoubtedly found such blue lotuses in lakes in all directions.' (2) 'The moon is like your face and your face is like the moon.' In the present context the former is the instance of converse whereas the latter is a case of reciprocal simile. Now the instance of converse together with the reciprocal simile is admittedly a specific variety of *similis*. (CM, PP. 17-18)

It is notable that there is no scope of the occurrence of any other distinct rhetoric figure even in the event of the comparison of irrelevant with the relevant as is exhibited in the preceding illustration. There is scarcely

I KA, P. 115; As, P. 209; KP, 737 (reads *mugdhe* for *madre*), SKB, P. 436 (reads *mugdhe* for *bhadre*). Kuv., P. 12, *ENS*, P. 322, AK, P. 23

any justification in the stereotyped conventional idea that *similis* takes place only when the relevant is compared with the irrelevant and not conversely. An analogous instance is furnished by the poetic figures like reminiscence, metaphor, poetic doubt, illusion *qua* poetic figure, representations, concealment, poetic conception, illustration (*nīdurāṇā*), transition (*arthāntara-nyāsa*) and similar others. Otherwise even these figures viz. reminiscence, metaphor, poetic doubt, illusion *qua* poetic figure, representations, concealment, poetic conception, illustration, transition and similar others can claim to be endowed with the property of being the recognised rhetorical figures only when they are exclusively linked with the relevant. And consequently it is bound to lead the supposition that if they take up their rise on the basis of the irrelevant, they will cease to have the status of the accredited rhetoric figures. The figures like reminiscence and others have nothing but legitimate right to hold the designation of embellishment irrespective of the fact that they have taken place on the basis of the irrelevant like that of the relevant. And this will be exemplified in their respective context. (CM, P.15)

It is not the conventional rule in respect of *similis* that it (*similis*) should uniformly be of the nature of the portrayal of similarity of the relevant with the irrelevant. Since in the illustrations of conjoint *similis* and like others even the description of similarity between the two relevants or the two irrelevants has been vested the rank of *similis*. In the same way it is entirely appropriate to

hold that even the delineation of the resemblance of the irrelevant with the relevant is *ipsofacto* a pure *similis*. Besides in an identical manner even reciprocal simile cannot enjoy the status of a distinct rhetorical figure on the score of its being constituted by two *similis* occurring on the basis of the relevants and the irrelevant as its objective references. The validity of this proposition is not liable to be called in question. Otherwise the *similis* per rotation (*parasparopamā*) which is to be exemplified in the context of reciprocal simile will also claim to be ranked as an independent rhetorical figure other than *similis*. Besides, even the depiction of the mutual error and so forth will come to be regarded as a novel variety of poetic figure debarring its acceptance in the current and conventional sense. (CM, P. 18)

Now an allegation has been raised. It is an unimpeachable fact that so far self-comparison, converse and reciprocal simile are taken into account where the portrayal of similarity between the object of comparison and the standard of comparison and the distinctive reference to the object and the standard of comparison are equally present. And as such there is absolutely no warrant to exclude self-comparison from the domain of *similis* and to include the other two, namely, converse and reciprocal simile within the fold of it. But this is the outcome of a partial appraisal of the proponent's position. Since the word *similis* will have the basis of its operation only in the illustrations in which the act of similitude can be brought into com-

pletion and conversely it (*similis*) will fail to take up its rise in the case where the act of comparison remains unaccomplished. And this clearly exhibits the inequality between self-comparison and the other two, namely, converse and reciprocal simile. It is out of deep appreciation of this salient feature that in the definitions of *similis* put forth in the treatises like the *kāvya prakāśa*¹ and others the attempt has been made for the preclusion of self-comparison from the scope of the definition of *similis* and not for the exclusion of the figures like reciprocal simile and so forth. It deserves mentioning that *albeit* the figures like reciprocal simile and others stand as completely subsumed under the realm of *similis*, still their enumeration as independent poetic figures owes its existence to the distinct variety of the colourful experience produced by their becoming the object of suggestion and as such there is no possibility of incompatibility. This is clearly borne out to the cases of metaphor and commutation. Let us elaborate the position by concrete illustrations. 'By your face-moon, the heat of passion is cooled down'. This example of commutation, in spite of its legitimate inclusion within the fold of metaphor like 'your face-moon', is assuredly exhibiting an additional strikingness justifying its status of independent rhetoric figure. (CM, PP. 18-19).

Now it is evident that the non-extension of the present definition of *similis* to the illustration of the figure

similis in which the standard of comparison is solely imagined by the poet, namely, 'if both the distinct currents of the Heavenly Ganges pour into the sky *et seq*' cannot be regarded as a drawback of the definition. Because had there been the currents of the Heavenly Ganges of that type, then alone, the act of similisation could have been treated as fully accomplished. But such kind of currents is not possible and as such it (chest) cannot be compared with any thing. Now the consideration of these facts renders it apparent that the figure in the aforecited illustration is in reality another synonym of the universally recognised *similis*. Because in the instance referred to above the act of similisation is not brought into a state of completion. And if, in the face of this glaring non-fulfilment of the conditions of *similis*, it is regarded as a case of genuine *similis*, then the expression *similis* in the instance under consideration will be mere technical, lacking its coventional sense. But the instance under examination belongs to the third specific variety of hyperbole¹.

I Now we propose to expatiate upon this point which is indispensable for the clear understanding of the line of argument adopted by the author of the *citramīmāṃsā*. He has explicitly referred to the utterances of the author of the *Kāvyaaprakāśa* to strengthen his own findings. The author of the *Kāvyaaprakāśa* has enunciated that the rhetorical figure hyperbole admits of fourfold classification in the following order, (1) When the irrelevant or the standard of comparison completely absorbs the relevant or

This third type of hyperbole finds its expression either in the portrayal of the presence of a relation between two things even in the absence of it (relation) between them or conversely in the representation of the absence of relation between them known to be correlated in normal circumstances. A subtle analysis of the concrete illustration of this third kind of hyperbole will lay bare the truth of this contention. 'If the body of the nectar rayed one (moon) be free from stain in the full-moon-night, then her face would suffer the defeat of its being equalled¹.' In the first half of the present verse a relation has been imagined between the full-moon and the absence of stain, albeit there is no perceivable relation between them. To tell the truth, there is the absence of relation of the absence of stain in the full-moon as indisputable fact. And in the second half of it, the absence of likeness *qua* relation between the face and the moon has been indicated by the

the object of comparison resulting in an assumed identity between them, (2) When the object of comparison is portrayed as distinct from a thing with reference to which there is clear lack of distinction (3) when there is a hypothetical assumption of imaginary ideas occasioned by the employment of the expressions signifying the meaning of 'if', and lastly (4) When the law of priority holding between the cause and effect are delineated in a contrary order. We refrain from dilating upon the first two varieties of hyperbole indicated above as they are beside and beyond the scope of our present enquiry.

employment of the term 'defeat' in spite of the obvious possibility of it (likeness *qua* relation) between them. So it has been unfolded beyond the shadow of doubt that the non-extension of the definition of *similis* to the instance, viz. if both the distinct currents of the Heavenly Ganges pour into the sky, etc.' cannot operate as its defect and drawback. (CM, P. 19)

It is also equally worthy of note that the figure imagined *similis* in which the standard of comparison is brought to pass by the poet's imagination has been illustrated by the following verse: 'If the lotus flower be united with its new leaf and the pearl be set in the expanded coral, then it would imitate her bright smile with its splendour diffused on the red lips¹.' In this illustration the standard of comparison, namely, the lotus flower united with its new leaf or the pearl set in the expanded coral' has been instituted solely by the poet's imagination. Now if this imagined standard of comparison be possibly existent, then the act of similisation will undoubtedly be accomplished by it (the standard of comparison). And as such the present definition of *similis* will easily be applicable to this illustration of imagined *similis*, thus avoiding the charge of non-comprehensiveness in its own right. It cannot be argued that the definition of *similis* is still exposed to the

¹ Ks, canto I, śl. 44 (reads *tasyah* for *tasya*) ·, AS, P. 86, SKB, P. 607, SR, P. 261, śl. 148

charge of inadequacy (*avyāpti*) in respect of impossible *similis* which occurs in the verse like 'Poison produced, as it were, from the orbit of the moon, etc.' Since in this example the poet intends the act of *similisation* to be accomplished even by the standard of comparison which is uniformly impossible. And as such it is beyond dispute that the act of *similisation* is evidently present in accordance with the contemplated purport of the poet without encountering any impediment. It should be borne in mind that the definition of *similis* has not been formulated to the effect that '*similis* consists in the fulfilment of the act of *similisation* brought about by the things which are factually existent'. But, on the other hand, it rests solely on 'contemplated purport of the poet.' It is owing to this fact that the adjective, namely, 'intended' warrants its insertion as a condition in the body of the definition of *similis*. Otherwise even the stock-in-trade example of *similis*, namely, 'your face is like the moon' will remain beyond the purview of the definition of *similis*. For the excessive lustre inherent in the moon is not really abiding in the face and consequently without laying hold upon the contemplated purport of the poet, the act of *similisation* is bound to remain unrealized. (CM, P. 19)

Further, the oftquoted instance of *similis* like 'your face is white like the moon' and similar others will remain entirely excluded from the range of the definition of *similis* in all conceivable ways. Because there is not

even the slightest trace of whiteness in fame in normal state. It cannot be contended that even in the figure self-comparison, there is every possibility of the accomplishment of the function of similisation by the similarity of the thing with its own 'self' on the basis of the same contemplated purport of the poet. Since the endeavour of the poet has been directed to exhibit its peerlessness in all imaginable ways. And as an inevitable consequence of it, the question of such contemplated purport of the poet cannot occur in the case of self-comparison. Now in the familiar instance of *similis*, viz. 'O black bee ! why do you roam in vain, etc.' and like others, notwithstanding the fact that the standard of comparison has been omitted, there is evidently the fulfilment of the act of similisation making it immune from the charge of non-extension of the definition of *similis*. It is an undeniable fact that the assertion of the non-apprehension of the loci of similarity have resulted in the 'negation of similarity in respect of those which are amenable to perception. But the similarity belonging to the unperceivable loci of it has been acknowledged as shared by the flower *Mālatī* and consequently the act of similisation takes place in relation to them. It is on this score that there has occurred a case of the omission of the standard of comparison due to the absence of the specific reference to the loci of similarity. (CM, P. 20)

Now the definition of *similis* may be formulated in the following way- 'If the similarity (*of the thing*) which

culminate in laying hold upon the negation of its own self it is called *similis*'. Besides, the definition of *similis* in a rather general way may be propounded in the following two fold order : (1) "*similis* consists in that delineation of similarity which brings the act of similisation into completion;' and (2) 'the description of similarity (of a thing which does not result in the negation of its own self is entitled *similis*'. These two definitions are of commonplace occurrences in the normal course of work-a-day-life. And this very definition of *similis* with the insertion of the proviso 'absence of fault and the suggestive element' will be accorded the rank of the rhetorical embellishment. It deserves specific mention that in the authentic instances of similarity belonging to the circumscribed substantives' as alluded to before, similarities abiding in the adjectives like the restless eyes and moving black bees and so forth are not expressed but suggested by the function of suggestion. And as such they operate as subservient to the realisation of the similarity belonging to the circumscribed substantives like the face and the lotus which is directly expressed in its intrinsic nature. So it is manifest that the similarities belonging to the adjectives have forfeited their right to claim the status of poetic embellishment. Since they come to be included within the fold of the subordinated suggestion which consists in becoming instrumental to the accomplishment of the directly expressed sense in the shape of similarity belonging to the two substantives,

And as a consequence of this, the non-extension of the definition of *similis* to the instances of similarity belonging to the circumscribed substantives (*viśiṣṭopamā*) cannot be regarded as defect of definition. (*CM*, P. 20)

Further the instance like 'this is not lotus but your face alone, etc' is not a genuine case of the figure *similis*. But in this illustration the figure, viz. illusion *qua* poetic figure taking its place on the possibility suggested on the basis of negation and *similis* which serve as a constitutive element of it (illusion *qua* poetic figure) is brought into existence by the function of suggestion. To elucidate the position The negation of the lotus and the affirmation of the face in its place conclusively demonstrate that an illusion has occurred. Otherwise the negation is bound to remain unexplained and unaccounted for. And it is also equally attested by the verdict of uniform experience that illusion takes its rise only on the basis of similarity existing between the object and the locus of illusion. And it is needless to mention that this very similarity operates as a *raison d'être* of the figure *similis*. But in spite of this obvious fact, the eminent rhetorician Daṇḍin has enumerated illusion *qua* poetic figure and so forth within the figure *similis* on the score of occurring merely on the basis of similarity. And likewise, he has called this present instance as a case of *similis* based upon the assertion of facts (*tattvakhyānopamā*). But in reality this is an authentic case of suggested *similis* and as such the

present definition of *similis* cannot be alleged as exposed to the charge of non-extension, if it fails to cover the instance under review. So these definitions of *similis* as conceived by the author of the present treatise stand immune from those defects which crept into those formulated by his predecessors particularly Vidyānātha and the author of the *sarasvatikanṭhābharāṇa*. (CM, P. 20.)

SECTION II

Jagannātha has succinctly introduced the definitions of *similis* as offered by Appaya Dīkṣita and afterwards refuted them vehemently at great length. The definitions of *similis* framed in the *Citramīmāṃsā* have been stated by Jagannātha with a slight modification. (1) If the depiction of similarity has brought the function of similization into completion and stands as faultless and possessed with the fact of non-suggestedness, it is designated the figure *similis* and (2) the depiction of similarity (of a thing) which does not result in the negation of its own self is styled *similis* or definition of this type and so forth. But these definitions are not unexceptionable. Since the depiction of similarity either appears in the garb of distinctive words or culminates in a specific type of awareness. But in the present occasion, the depiction of similarity is not possessed with the fact of being directly expressed with the word. So it becomes debarred from holding the rank of a rhetorical figure pertaining to the meaning. Moreover, the present depiction is invariably characterised by the absence of the fact of suggestedness. Since the bare distinctive words or a specific type of awareness cannot be the subject of the function of suggestion. And as a consequence of it, the adjective, viz. 'possessed with the fact of non-suggestedness' as occurring

in the first definition is rendered entirely redundant.¹

The opponent contends that the definition under review can be made perfect with a slight modification. It may be formulated as follows: 'Where the similarity of the aforementioned type becomes itself the subject-matter of depiction, it is called the figure *similis*.' In such a case, the similarity being itself the subject-matter of depiction cannot partake the character of either the distinctive words or a specific type of awareness. On the other hand, this similarity becomes comprehensible either through the medium of those distinctive words or by the specific type of awareness. And as a result of it, the position of the proponent becomes completely saved and secured. But the adoption of such a definition will engender a fresh difficulty. Because this definition will unwarrantedly include even the instance like 'As the cow so the gayal' within its own sweep. The ground is obvious. The similarity subsisting between the gayal and the cow has brought the function of similitisation into completion. It stands as faultless and unsuggested and, at the same time, it is the subject-matter of depiction. So it is clear that even this crude case of similarity will pretend to be an accredited instance of the figure *similis*.²

1 RG, P. 161

2, *ibid*

Further the aphorism of Pāṇini, viz. '*Kālopa-sarjane ca tulyam* 1, 2, 57' will also claim to be a valid instance of the figure *similis*. The simple meaning of it is this: "*aśiṣyatva* (non-ordainableness) is equal even in respect of *kāla* (time) and *upasarjana* (adjective)". The position may be clarified by adverting to the other aphorism of Pāṇini, viz. *pradhāna pratyayārtha vacanam arthasy'anya pramaṇatvāt* 1, 2, 56'. It may be rendered into English: "The injunction that the meaning of the suffix is principal in respect of the meaning of the base is non-ordainable (*aśiṣya*), since the superiority of the meaning of the suffix is known by the other sources of knowledge. In the present occasion the expression, viz. *Kālopasarjane* (time and adjective) may stand for the object of comparison. The term *tulyam* (equal) is the word expressive of similitude. The part of the other aphorism viz., *pradhāna pratyayārthavacanam* (the injunction that the meaning of the suffix is principal in respect of meaning of the base) assumes the position of the standard of comparison. And finally the expression, that is, *aśiṣyatva* (non-ordainableness) and so forth may take the shape of the common property residing in the present object and the standard of comparison. In this way the similarity between the expression, viz., *pradhānapratyayārtha vacana* (the injunction that the meaning of the suffix is principal in comparison to the meaning of the base) and the expression, namely, *kālopasarjane* (the time and the adjective) introduced as the standard and the object of comparison may fulfil the condition as laid down in this revised definition of similarity. And as a

sequel of it, even this gross similarity will arrogate to its inclusion within the fold of the definition under review.¹

The opponent falls back upon a new line of defence. The object of comparison, namely, *kālopasarjane* (time and adjective) has been used in dual number. The expression, viz. *pradhāna pratyayārthavacanam* (the injunction that the meaning of the suffix is principal in comparison to the meaning of the base), the supposed standard of comparison, has been employed in singular number. And consequently the present case of similarity is obviously exposed to the fault of difference in number. So the adjective, viz. the fact of being faultless occurring as one of the components of this definition, is competent to exclude this case of similarity from the jurisdiction of the figure *similis*. But the present plea is based on the flimsy ground. Since this sentence of similarity, viz. '*kālopasarjane pradhāna pratyayārthavacanam tulyam aśiṣyatvāt* (non-ordainableness holds good with equal propriety in respect of the injunction that the meaning of the suffix is principal in comparison with the meaning of the base and in respect of the time and the adjective) is in a position to engender the assumption of the other distinct assertion, namely, *kālaśca upasarjanañca pradhānapratyayārtha vacana tulyam aśiṣyatvāt* (non-ordain-

ableness holds good with equal propriety in respect of the injunction that the meaning of the suffix is principal in comparison with the meaning of the base and in respect of the time and adjective). This assumption of similarity is evidently possessed of two independent objects of comparison, namely, (1) *kāla* (time) and (2) *upasarjana* (adjective). The remaining three factors of comparison occurring in this assumed similarity can easily be linked with each of these two objects of comparison by giving rise to two individual cases of similarity. And these two cases of similarity are too obvious to require further bifurcation. Thus each of these two cases of similarity containing one object of comparison becomes capable to escape from the fault of difference in number in respect of its object and the standard of comparison. Since both the object and the standard of comparison of each of these two cases of similarity will be susceptible of being used in singular number. And consequently each of these two cases of similarity with one and single object of comparison will claim its illegitimate inclusion within the scope of even this revised definition of *similis*.¹

An objection arises. It is true that the function of similitization has been brought into completion in this case of similarity. Notwithstanding this fact, this case of similarity cannot be regarded as the appropriate

1. Ibid

subject-matter of depiction. Because the facts of this similarity are not competent to generate strikingness. There are cases of similarity which are admittedly striking in their essential nature. And the act of depiction by the poet is considered as such which is strictly confined to the objects which occasion a sense of sublime in the mind of the generous critics. In this way the present case of similarity mentioned above will be precluded from the fold of this definition. But this will engender another difficulty. Because in such a case the insertion of a novel adjective, viz. the fact of being striking will be unavoidable for alleviation of the imperfections in the present definition. And consequently the other adjective, namely, which has brought the function of similization into completion will be rendered completely redundant. The fact is transparent. The similarity which is apprehended as apparently unaccomplished cannot form a ground of producing strikingness. So this novel adjective will render sterile the utility of the pre-employed adjective mentioned above.¹

Moreover even in the second definition of *similis*, the adjective, viz. which does not result in the negation of its own self will be made devoid of significance. Since this adjective is solely intended to exclude the instances of the rhetorical figures, viz. (1) dissimilitude (*vyatireka*)

and (2) self-comparison from the domain of the figure *similis*. The concrete instance of dissimilitude (*vyatireka*) may be cited in the following way : 'How may the lotus bear resemblance with your face? *et seq.*' In this instance the similarity is assumed to subsist between the lotus and the face depicted as the standard and the object of comparison. And it is exclusively the negation of this similarity which becomes capable of inducing strikingness in the present situation. So it is for the apprehension of the strikingness in negation of this similarity that the poet has endeavoured to establish this similarity by means of delineating the lotus as the counter-term of it (the similarity). The present similarity is obviously designed to culminate in its own negation for generating strikingness. So it cannot claim to have the function of similization brought into completion. Thus the present instance remains shut out from the province of *similis* by the adjective, viz. 'which has brought the function of similization into completion.' As a consequence of it, the adjective, that is, 'which does not result in the negation of its own self' employed for the same purpose becomes entirely abortive. Analogous is the position of the figure, self-comparison. In the instance of it, viz. 'the sky is like the sky itself *et seq.*', the similarity of the sky with its own self is intended to culminate in its total negation. Since it is this resultant negation of similarity which alone is proficient to engender strikingness in the present occasion. So it is clear that even this proposed

similarity of the sky with its own self which has failed to bring the function of similization into completion, will become excluded on the very ground above indicated. And consequently the other adjective inserted for this purpose in the second definition deserves unqualified repudiation. And this has been unambiguously stated by the eminent rhetoricians.¹

Moreover the definition under consideration will be exposed to the charge of its over-extension with reference to the case of similarity which is not styled a poetic figure. It may be exemplified by the following verse: 'The curling tress of hairs hanging from her cheek upon the surface of the breasts shines like the snake illuminated by the moon as hanging on the summit of the mountain, viz. Meru.' In this instance the similarity is supposed to exist between the curling tress of hairs and the snake, the cheek of the lady and the moon and lastly the surface of breasts and the Meru. The whole meaning of the present verse is nothing but this similarity. So there is no room for doubt that it is the principal meaning of the sentence constituting the present verse. As a result of it, there is nothing left to be embellished by this similarity. This renders it manifest that the definition under review will unwarrantedly include even this case of similarity within its own sweep. And the fact is self-evident. The depiction of this similarity has brought the function of

similization into completion. It is assuredly faultless and non-suggested in its nature. Thus the similarity exhibited in the present verse answers all the provisos of the definition under reference. And consequently even this verse will claim to be an authentic instance of the figure *similis*.¹

The opponent retorts that the verse under review may be an accredited example of the figure entitled poetic conception (*utprekṣā*). Since in poetic conception the element of identity between the object and the standard of comparison is conspicuously predominant. And this feature is equally present even in this case of similarity. But this is not entertainable. Since in that event the figure imagined *similis* (*kalpitopāmā*) will be totally denied of its recognised sphere of operation. To put it the other way round, in the instance of imagined *similis*, viz. 'If both the streams of the Heavenly Ganges *et seq.*' the standard of comparison appears exclusively imagined by the poet. It is bereft of reality. And despite this, it is so delineated in order to exhibit the beauty of the object of comparison as peerless in its nature. So it is clear that the element of identity between the object and the standard of comparison is predominant even in the cases of imagined *similis*. And as a consequence of it, all the instances of imagined *similis* will be comprehended

in the realm of poetic conception. The long and short of this discussion lies in the fact that the present case of similarity is not susceptible of inclusion under the domain of poetic conception in any conceivable ways.¹

It cannot be contended that the present case of similarity is entitled to be an authentic instance of *similis qua* poetic figure. Since in such a case, the endeavour of Appaya Dīkṣita for shutting out the instance of suggested *similis* from the province of the figure *similis* is bound to become futile. The reason is apparent. In the absence of a criterion for distinguishing the valid cases of the figure *similis* from the invalid ones, even the instances of the suggested *similis* will possibly be treated as the authentic instances of the figure *Similis*. Further the definition of *similis qua* poetic figure propounded by the opponent himself will be rendered completely inconsistent. This definition has already been expressed by the following form . ‘If the function styled similitude is intended to endure until the accomplishment of the action, then it is designated the figure *similis*.¹ The objective (*lakṣya*) of this definition is clearly stated to be the figure *similis* in total exclusion of the other varieties of *similis*. In this given situation, the counterfeit cases of similarity will become entitled to be the genuine objectives of this definition. Over and above, Appaya

Dīksita has separately formulated two definitions of *similis* which convey only the idea of similarity and are not accounted as a rhetorical figure. And he has made them (these two definitions) a perfect definition of *similis qua* poetic figure by insertion of additional provisos, viz. absence of fault and that of suggestive element in them. But the last definition of *similis qua* rhetorical figure also shares the same blame. Since even the instances of the suggested *similis* will pretend to be the genuine cases of *similis qua* poetic figure. The outcome of this digression is that the present case of similarity depicted in the verse commencing with *stanābhoge et seq.* cannot be accorded the rank of a poetic figure. The fact is obvious. The meaning of the complete verse is indicated in the form of the similarity existing between the objects and the standards of comparison. And besides this, no meaning is left which may claim to be embellished by this form of similarity¹.

Moreover, the adjective, viz. 'of similarity' employed in the alleged definition of *similis* may be shown as bereft of utility. Since the ultimate purpose of this adjective can easily be served by means of the abridged definition stated below 'The depiction which has brought the function of similitude into completion, is styled the figure *similis*'. Over and above, the adjective, viz. 'the fact of being non-suggested inserted in the same definition

1. RG, P. 162.

is also devoid of utility. Because there is not even the slightest incompatibility between the fact of being suggested and the fact of becoming a rhetorical figure. That is to say, no contradiction occurs if the former assumes the status of the latter and *vice versa*. So the endeavour for the exclusion of the instances of suggested *similis* in general from the realm of the figure *similis* stands completely frustrated. A doubt arises. There are instances of suggested *similis* in which the suggested element becomes predominant in its essential nature. In these cases there exists incompatibility between the fact of being a predominant thing and the fact of being an embellishment. Since the predominant thing signified by a concrete instance is invariably the object of embellishment (*alaṅkārya*). And it cannot be degraded to the status of an embellishment which is exclusively intended to embellish the former. So the definition of *similis qua* poetic figure cannot be dissociated from the adjective, viz. 'the fact of being non-suggested'. Because in that event, it will unwarrantedly include even the instances of the suggested *similis* in which the suggested element has become predominant. But this is the outcome of partial appraisement of the fact. The definition of *similis qua* poetic figure should become characterized by the adjective, viz. 'the fact of being embellisher.' This novel adjective is too powerful to banish the element of incompatibility as immediately indicated. For the suggested

similarity which has become predominant cannot assume the role of an embellisher. And consequently this suggested case of similarity is debarred from entering into the realm of *similis qua* poetic figure due to the presence of this adjective.¹

But it is remarkable that this definition cannot be associated with the adjective, that is, 'the fact of being non-suggested' as has been set forth by Appaya Dīkṣita. Since the employment of this adjective will expose the present definition to the charge of non-inclusiveness (*avyāpti*). The reason is apparent. It will fail to include the instance of suggested *similis qua* poetic figure within its compass. The position may be elucidated by a relevant instance: 'why do you rejoice, O moon! by thinking your own self as peerless with your lustre? or by whom, O block headed! this universe has been surveyed with special care.?' The present verse has been addressed to the moon by a certain sojourner at abroad who is in a state of getting himself scorched by the rays of the moon. It has assuredly suggested the import which may be indicated in the following form: 'There is undoubtedly my sweetheart who has never come out from her own apartment. So she is still unobserved even by your own self. And her face is similar to you.' In this suggested import the expression, viz. 'her face is similar

to you' is an instance of suggested *similis*. And despite this, even a sense of censure with reference to the moon is being suggested by the word block-headed (*mūḍha*) occurring in the present verse. It is notable that this case of suggested *similis* is employed as conducive to the emergence of the suggested sense of censure. And consequently this suggested sense comes in a position to embellish the suggested sense of censure which is admittedly predominant. So the verse under examination has a legitimate right to be reckoned as an authentic instance of suggested *similis* qua poetic figure. It deserves to be stressed that the present instance cannot answer the condition, viz. the fact of being non-suggested which has been laid down in the definition of the figure *similis* by Appaya Dīkṣita. On the contrary, it obviously complies with the adjective, viz. the fact of being embellisher as contemplated by Jagannātha. A serious probe into these facts shows that the alleged definition in its original state is exposed to the charge of non-inclusion (*avyāpti*) with reference to the present instance whereas the condition in its modified form exempts this definition from the above allegation¹.

The opponent puts forward a fresh plea in defence of his position. The instance of similarity belonging to substantives circumscribed by adjectives (*viśiṣṭopamā*)

can in no way be considered as an authentic example of *similis qua* poetic figure. The situation requires clarification. 'your face with the restless eyes and having the lustre of teeth manifested, shines like the lotus with the moving black bees and indistinctly perceived filament¹. In this instance the similarity supposed to subsist between the adjectives, viz. the restless eyes and the moving black bees on the one hand and the lustre of the teeth and the indistinctly perceived filament on the other is not directly expressed by any word expressive of it. On the other hand, it becomes apprehended by the function of suggestion taking its rise on the basis of similarity existing between the substantives circumscribed by adjectives, namely, the face and the moon. It is note worthy that this suggested similarity acts as subservient to the accomplishment of similarity subsisting between these two substantives which is directly expressed by the term *iva* (like) expressive of it. So this suggested similarity has been pushed back to a subordinate position in comparison with the directly expressed similarity residing in the two substantives. And consequently the present instance is bound to be a genuine case of poetry of subordinate suggestion.

Now this instance will illegitimately fall under the province of *similis qua* poetic figure. Since the adje-

1. *Ibid*, P, 180

ctive, viz, 'the fact of being non-suggested' has been substituted by the adjective, namely, 'the fact of being embellisher' in the definition forming the subject matter of dispute. And this suggested similarity is competent to embellish the directly expressed similarity which is predominant in its nature. But this contention is devoid of substance. Because this suggested similarity does not embellish the meaning which is an accomplished thing. On the contrary, it embellishes the directly expressed similarity which is not accomplished in its nature and as such is of opposite nature in comparison with the former. So it (the suggested similarity) cannot be accorded the rank of an embellishment. And consequently the definition of *similis qua* poetic figure offered by Jagannātha stands immune from incongruity in all respects. In this way the definitions of *similis qua* poetic figure propounded by Appaya Dīkṣita stand demolished by the present smashing criticism of Jagannātha.¹

1. *Ibid*

CHAPTER V

Elaboration and Classification of Complete

Similis

The figure *similis* is of two kinds : (1) complete, (2) elliptical. If there is the assertion of these four, viz.

1) the standard of comparison, (2) the object of comparison, (3) the common property and (4) the words expressive of similitude, it will be the case of complete *similis*, and if there is the omission of one or two or three of these factors, it will be called elliptical. In some cases of complete *similis*, the common property has been delineated as abiding in the object and the standard of comparison.

Somewhere it has been depicted through relatedness *quarastu* and *prativastu*'. In some other instances it is demonstrated by the relation of reflection and the reflected. In some of the examples of complete *similis* it has been indicated through the medium of paronomasia.

In other cases it is displayed by means of the figurative expression. Somewhere it is conveyed by laying hold upon the different varieties of compound. In some examples it is imported by the fusion of these aforecited mediums of expression of common property as is dictated by the exigency of the situation. In elliptical *similis*, these varieties are not possible. Since in this variety

similis the common property should be invariably and uniformly abiding in the object and the standard of comparison. The reason is obvious. In the absence of

any factor of comparison indicated above, it is only the apprehension of the common property that alone can serve the basis of its being considered as *similis*. But its subvarieties will be exhibited in a different manner.

(CM, P. 21)

But the contention of Appaya Dīkṣita regarding the impossibility of the aforementioned varieties of complete *similis* in respect of the elliptical *similis* has been rendered sterile by the devastating criticism offered by the author of the *Rasaṅgādhara*. Jagannātha has set forth the following instance for the vindication of his position: 'Pāṇḍu is like the Malaya in the world and Dhṛtarāṣṭra is like the ant-hill upon this earth.' The present instance is constituted of two independent *similis*. They are (1) Pāṇḍu is like the Malaya and (2) Dhṛtarāṣṭra is like the ant-hill. They are the apposite instances of elliptical *similis* with the ellipse of the common properties comprehensible through the medium of 'the relation of-reflection and reflected.' It is true that each of these two instances is possessed of its object and the standard of comparison and the word 'like' (*iva*) expressive of similitude. But the common property has assuredly been left out in each of these two instances.¹

It is worthy of attention that the common property which has been left out cannot be apprehensible as invariably abiding in the object and the standard comparison occurring in these two instances. And the fact is simple. The objects of comparison are (1) Pāṇḍu and (2) Dhṛtarāṣṭra and the standards of comparison

rison are : (1) the Malaya and (2) the ant-hill. And these objects and the standards of comparison occurring in these two cases are extremely dissimilar in nature. Therefore no property can be discerned as uniformly abiding in them. The gist is that no abiding property (*anugomīdharmā*) has been left out in any of these two instances. But on the other hand it is through the medium of 'the relation-of-reflection and reflected' that the abidance of the common property can be made possible in respect of Pārḍu and the Malaya in the first instance, and Dhṛtarāṣṭra and the ant-hill in the second one. And this 'relation-of-reflection and reflected' takes up its rise on the basis of Pārḍavas and the sandal-woods in the first instance and Duryodhana and others and snakes in the second one. The position stands in need of elaboration. The Pārḍavas and sandal-woods are the properties pertaining to Pārḍu and the Malaya depicted as the object and the standard of comparison. And these properties, although basically distinct from each other, are imagined as one and identical due to their mutual resemblance in the present instance. Analogous is the case of the second instance and as such it dispenses with the further amplification. It has already been mentioned that these two common properties have been left out in these two instances. So these two examples actually belong to elliptical *similis* with the objects of common properties comprehensible by means of 'the relation of reflection and reflected'.¹

The opponent adopts a new line of defensive argument. He holds that 'the relation-of-reflection and reflected' is bound to fail to take up its rise on the basis of the properties which are not (*śrauta*) explicitly mentioned in any instance. So Pāṇḍavas and sandal-woods in the first instance and Duryodhana and others and snakes in the second one cannot form the appropriate ground for the emergence of 'the relation-of-reflection and reflected'. Since they are not directly expressed by words occurring in these instances. On the contrary, they stand implied by the meaning of them. And as a consequence of it, the instances under reference cannot be characterised by the ellipsis of the common properties comprehensible by means of 'the relation-of-reflection and reflected'.¹.

But even this argument is devoid of substance. Because 'the relation-of-reflection and reflected' also admits of two fold classification : (1) directly expressed (*śrauta*) and (2) implied (*ārtha*). And in implied 'relation-of-reflection and reflected', the properties serving as the basis of its emergence do not stand as directly expressed. But on the other hand, it is only the implied properties which pave the way for coming into existence 'the relation-of-reflection and reflected'. And this is the only fact which makes it possible for the vicarious praise

1. *Ibid*

(*aprastuta praśamsā*) to include all genuine instances of it without any hitch. Since in this figure the assertion of the irrelevants culminates in the suggestion of the relevants. The meaning of the sentence containing the assertion of irrelevants becomes directly expressed. Whereas the meaning of the sentence indicative of the relevants stands suggested by the function of suggestion. Both these meanings are linked together on the ground of similarity resting on 'the relation-of-reflection and reflected'. The *fundamentum* of this 'relation-of-reflection and reflected' is constituted by the component parts of these two meanings¹.

The position may be rendered clear by a concrete instance: 'The moon is made pale by the presence of your face'. The direct meaning of this sentence is expressive of irrelevants. It may ultimately culminate in the suggestion of the relevants in the way as follows: 'O king ! even the great king Raghu has been surpassed by means of your munificence'. The component parts of these two meanings to which has been referred the credit of constituting the foundation of 'the relation-of-reflection and reflected' may be arranged in the order indicated below:

- 1) her face and his munificence (2) the moon and Raghu
- and (3) is made pale and has been surpassed. So the present instance is able to assert its legitimate inclusion

under the definition of the figure vicarious praise. It is manifest that the admission of the implied 'relation-of-reflection and reflected' is indispensable for the materialization of the figure vicarious praise. The upshot of this lengthy disquisition is this. The above two instances under review are entitled to be the valid cases of elliptical *similis* with the ellipsis of the common properties comprehensible by means of the implied 'relation-of-reflection and reflected'. And consequently the facts relied upon by Appaya Dīkṣita to exhibit the impossibility of the above varieties of complete *similis* with reference to elliptical *similis* stands completely controverted by the smashing criticism of the author of the *Rasagāṅgādhara*.¹

Now the above mentioned varieties of complete *similis* are illustrated in their serial order. The example of complete *similis* conspicuous by the abidance of common properties may be substantiated by the following verse : 'I pay obeisance to Pārvatī and supreme God, the parents of the universe united eternally like the word and its meaning²' in order to obtain the knowledge of the word and its meaning. It has been authoritatively laid down in the *Mīmāṃsā sūtra*³ of Jaimini that the relation of the word

1. RG, P. 181

2. RV. canto 1, śl, 1; SKB, P. 55, P. 492; AM, P. 12

3. Cf. "Autpattikas tu śabdasy'ārthenasambandhas tasyajñāna-
upadeśo vyatirekaś cārthe'nupalabdhe tatpramāṇaṁ Bādarāyaṇ-
napakṣatvāt/" Jaiminīya sūtra, 1, 1, 5.

with its meaning is eternal in its essential nature'. And consequently the eternally relatedness of the word with its meaning has become universally accepted. And similar is the position of Pārvatī and Parameśvara. It cannot be regarded as distinct from the relation of the word with its meaning. Since it has been universally acknowledged that the relation between Pārvatī and Parameśvara is perfectly similar to the relation of the moon and its light¹. That is to say, Pārvatī and Parameśvara cannot be separated from each other under any circumstances. Their relation is permanent and eternal. So in the instance under review the common property in the shape of eternally relatedness has been depicted as perpetually abiding in the object and the standard of comparison, namely, Pārvatī and Parameśvara in one hand and the word and its meaning on the other. It is too obvious to indicate that this instance is possessed of the word 'like' (*iva*) as expressive of similitude. So it is entitled to illustrate the variety of complete *similis* in which the common property has been delineated as abiding in the object and the standard of comparison. It is worthy of mention that in this instance by the depiction of eternally relatedness between Pārvatī and Parameśvara as between the word and its meaning, the unsurpassable mutual love and immense majesty, etc. belonging to them have been suggested by the function of suggestion. But in spite of this apparent fact there is absolutely no possibility of its being accorded to the status of either a poetry of superior or subordinate suggestion.

-
- I. The maxim of the moon and its light (*candra candrikā nyāya*) is used to indicate the intrinsic character of two inseparable things. The following observation of Ānandagiri as recorded in the *Śaṅkara vijaya* will shed a flood of light upon the present issue. "*Ataḥ sarvadeva kṛāṇasya rudrasya yā śaktiḥ candra candrikā nyāyena tadud-bodharūpiṇī svādhīna vallabhe'ti prasiddhā s'aiva bhavāni*" OP. Cit. P. 124

Since in the verse under consideration, the sense of elegance is not exclusively found to be resting on the awareness of its association with suggestion but also from the experience of the colourful varieties belonging to the directly expressed meaning. And it is for this reason that in the present illustration of *similis*, the possibility of the presence of suggestion of sentiment and the like or the other rhetorical figures have been almost ignored as the matter of exemplification. And it is in total disregard of these incidental issues that the distinct rhetorical figures like the present one have been exemplified. (CM, P. 21)

Now the mention of the numerically identical attribute in its dual role owing to the difference of its substrata which are *de facto* its counter-terms is technically called 'relatedness *qua vastu* and *prati vastu*'.¹ It cannot possibly exist in a pure and unassociated manner. But on the other hand, it finds its expression in the form of either adjective or substantive as intermingled with 'the relation-of-reflection and reflected' in all its cases. And where the two really distinct attributes are superimposed as one and identical due to reciprocal resemblance and affirmed twice, there occurs the relation commonly called 'the relation-of-reflection and reflected'². Let us take an illustration in

1. 'ekasy'aiva dharmasya sambandhi bhedenā dvir upādānam
vastuprativastubhāvaḥ | ' : CM, P. 21

2. Vastuto bhinnayor dharmayoḥ paraspara sādṛśyād abhinna-
tayā'dhyavasitayor dvir upādānam bimbapratibimba bhāvaḥ,

which 'the relatedness *qua vastu* and *prativastu*' has found its expression in the form of adjective : 'The lady (Mālatī) with her eyes with the thick eye-lashes, while proceeding on bearing a face with its neck turned back over and again resembling the hundred petalled lotus with its (stalk) reverted, pierced deeply, as it were, in my heart her side glance smeared with the nectar and the poison'¹. In this verse the two objects, viz. (1) the neck and (2) the stalk have undoubtedly been linked together by means of 'the relation-of-reflection and reflected.' Since they are possessed with two attributes which are basically distinct from each other. These two attributes have been imposed as one and identical due to their mutual resemblance and affirmed twice through the medium of the mention of the neck and the stalk in the instance under review. Thereafter 'relatedness *qua vastu* and *prativastu* has come into being by laying hold upon the attribute expressed by the two expressions, viz. (1) turned back and (2) reverted. The fact is that this attribute is one and unique in its essential nature. And it becomes asserted in its two fold character due to the difference of its substrata, namely, the neck and the stalk standing as directly expressed. It is notable that 'relatedness *qua vastu* and *prativastu*' appears in the form of an adjective in relation to 'the relation-of-reflection and reflected' in the present instance. Since both the expe-

3. MM, Chap. 1, śl. 32; AM, P. 91; SKB, P. 572; AS, P. 33;
SR, P. 278, śl. 51

sions (1) turned back (*valita*) and (2) reverted (*āvṛtta*) occur as two constitutive components of the two compound-words associated by the attributive compounds'. So it is entitled to exemplify the variety of complete *similis* in which the common property has been depicted through 'relatedness *qua vastu* and *prativastu* appearing in the form of an adjective. (CM, PP. 21-22)

The instance belonging to 'relatedness *qua vastu* and *prativastu* finding its expression in the shape of a substantive has been exemplified by the following verse: 'That chaste lady trembling with a sudden fright was seized by him like a wind-tossed creeper by an inordinately fickle

-
1. The situation may be rendered clear by expounding the two compound words occurring in the instance under context. They are: (1) *Valita kandharam* and (2) *āvṛttavṛntaśatapattranibham*. They signify the meanings (1) (the ace) with its neck turned back (over and again) and (2) resembling the hundred petalled lotus with its stalk reverted. These compound-words are splitted up (*Valita kandhara yasya tat* (2) *āvṛttam vṛntam yasya tat āvṛttavṛntam; tat śatapattram.* ' *tasya nibham*). It is rendered conspicuous that both the expressions, viz. (1) turned back (*valitam*) and (2) reverted (*āvṛttam*) occur as the components of attributive compounds (*vahuvrīhi samāsa*). And it is too obvious to elaborate that the whole attributive compound is bound to act as subordinate in connection with something else. That is to say, the word compounded by *vahuvrīhi* will admittedly be the adjective of some other substantive. Compare : '*Aṅga padārthapradhānaḥ vahuvrīhiḥ*'

monkey'. In this instance the fright and the wind have been brought into linkage through the medium of the relation-of reflection and reflected' by the way indicated in the preceding paragraph. The relatedness *qua vastu* and *prativastu* takes its rise on the basis of one and single attribute signified by the expressions (1) trembling (*kampitā*) and (2) tossed (*ādhūtā*) as occurring in the present instance. This fact too dispenses with the further elaboration. It is notable that relatedness *qua vastu* and *prativastu*' plays the role of a substantive in connection with 'the relation of-reflection and reflected' in the case under review. Since the attribute acting as the *raison d'être* of 'relatedness *qua vastu* and *prativastu* has been indicated by the expressions (1) trembling (*kampitā*) and tossed (*ādhūtā*). And these two expressions are the last members of the determinative compounds (*tatpuruṣa samāsa*)¹. The result is that the present attribute will assuredly be predominant in its essential nature. So it is obvious that the common property belonging to the object and the standard of comparison has been conveyed by means of 'relatedness *qua vastu* and *prativastu*' appearing in the shape of a substantive with reference to 'the relation of reflection and reflected' in the

-
1. The compounp-words are : (1) *sādhvasa kampitā* (trembling with fight) and (2) *Vātādhutā* (wind-tossed). They are susceptible to be expounded : (1) *sādhvasena kampitā* and *vatena ādhūtā*. And also compare the significance of the determinative compounds (*tatpuruṣa samāsa*) ; ' *Uttarapadārtha pradhānas tatpuruṣaḥ*' |

case under review. Now the variety of complete *similis* with the common property imported 'by the relation-of-reflection and reflected' has already been substantiated by the instance commencing with 'the king of Pāṇḍu *et seq*'. In this context the yellow sandal-past and the morning sun-rays on the one hand and the pendant necklace and the flowing spring on the other have been exhibited as linked by means of 'the relation of reflection and reflected' in its pure and unique character. So the common property associated with the king of Pāṇḍu and Lord of mountains portrayed as the object and the standard of comparison has been brought into relief by 'the relation-of-reflection and reflected'. (CM, P. 22)

Let us take an example in which the common property has been brought into prominence by means of paronomasia : O protector of the earth ! the lion among the people ! the entire host of your enemy too being deprived of its own place assumes the likeness of the ocean which contains Acyuta (*viṣṇu*) as sleeping¹. In this verse the common property abiding in the object and the standard of comparison, viz. 'the entire host of your enemy' and 'the ocean' has been manifested by the expression, viz. 'being deprived of its own place and contains Acyuta as

1. AK, P. 31 (reads *sarvo'pyari gaṇas* for *samasto'pi ripus* and P. 47 (reads *sarvo'py'arigaṇas* for the same.)

sleeping' (*svapadacyutaḥ*)¹ through the medium of paronomasia. Further the instance of complete *similis* in which the common property has been rendered obvious by means of superimposition is cited as follows : 'Afterwards the people with their own fully expanded (*vikaca*) eyes resembling the full-blown (*vikaca*) lotuses, gazed at the prince in wonder appearing like the sun rising from the mountain of gold with its rays augmented².' In this verse the primary meaning of the expression '*vikaca*' is full-blown and its figurative sense is expansion. It is worthy of note that the primary meaning is an exclusive property of the flower. And as such it has been superimposed in the eyes which are the object of comparison in relation to the lotuses depicted as the standard of comparison. And it is by means of this figurative sense, namely, 'expansion' that the common property pertaining to the object and the standard of comparison has been brought into relief. Again the example of complete *similis* in which the common property has been demonstrated by means of the different varieties of compound is illustrated by the following verse : 'Śiva, brought into contact (with her ownself) by the maiden (*Parvatī*) with the augmented lustre of her moon-like face, came to possess water-like cheerful mind and lily like fully opened eyes, resembling people in the season of

1. This compounded-word '*svapadacyutaḥ*' is split'ed up in the following order : '*svapadāt cyutaḥ* and *svapan Acyutaḥ yasmin* ;

2. A K, P, 29

autumn with the augmented lustre of its face as moon¹. In this instance the two entities, viz. (1) the goddess Pārvatī and (2) the autumn have been portrayed as the object and the standard of comparison. The adjective, i. e., *vivṛddhānanacandrakāntyā* occurring in the instance has equally been applicable to both these entities. Since it comes to signify the meanings, namely, (1) with the augmented lustre of her moon-like face and (2) with the augmented lustre of its face as moon owing to the difference of compounds. That is to say, it is capable to be treated as an accredited case of two distinct varieties of compounds, viz. (1) *upamiti* and (2) *rūpaka*². So the common property belonging to Pārvatī and autumn depicted as the object and the standard of comparison has been rendered conspicuous by expounding the word *Vivṛddhānanacandrakāntyā* in conformity with the two varieties of compounds indicated above. (CM, P. 22).

Now the complete *similis* taking place on the possible mixture of the aforecited mediums of expression of

1. KS canto 7, śl. 74 (reads *pravṛddhānana* for *vivṛddhānana*);
2. The expression, viz. *ānanacandra* is the component of the compound-word, that is, *vivṛddhānanacandrakāntyā*. The existence of two different types of compounds, namely, (1) *upamiti* and (2) *rūpaka* can be rendered discernible by splitting up the expression *ānanacandra* into two distinct ways ! (1) *ānanam candra iva* (the face-like moon) and (2) *ānanam eva candraḥ* (the face as moon). In the first case it will be the instance of *upamiti* and in the second one it is entitled to be the example of *rūpaka*.

common property may be stated in the following manner : (1) First of all, the mixture of the abidance of property and 'the relation-of-reflection and reflected' is illustrated by the verse as follows : 'He (Dilīpa) became unapproachable and approachable to his dependents by the terrific and elegant kingly merits like the sea by the possession of aquatic animals and jewels.'¹ In this instance the attributes, namely, unapproachability and approachability have been delegated the status of the common property in respect of the king Dilīpa and the sea described as the object and the standard of comparison. Since they are depicted as abiding in both these factors of comparison. And as such they have been brought into being on the basis of the relation-of-reflection and reflected instituted between the terrific and elegant kingly merits on the one hand and aquatic animals and jewels on the other. So this example is an apposite case of the variety of complete *similis* in which the common property is indicated by means of the mixture of the abidance of property and 'the relation-of-reflection and reflected.'

(2) The mixture of the abidance of the property and paronomasia is exemplified by the following verse 'My son ! after the passing away of your brother, our great lunar lineage does not look bright due to its not finding a son (saṁtāna) for long like the water of the ocean

1. RV canta 1, śl. 16

before its being churned off by Hari¹ In this context the property, viz. unbrightness has been indicated as abiding in (1) the great lunar lineage and (2) the water of the ocean depicted as the object and the standard of comparison. And as such paronomasia has been effected by the word *san t̄na* which is impregnated with two meanings, namely, (1) the son and (2) the coral tree (Pārijāta). These two meanings manifested by paronomasia are competent to elevate the property unbrightness to the dignity of the common property in connection with the alleged object and the standard of comparison. So it is rendered palpable that the common property has been brought into prominence by the mixture of the abidance of the property and paronomasia. CM, PP. 22-23)

(3) Further, the mixture of the abidance of the property and super-imposition has been made conspicuous by the following instance : 'Uttara observing the army of the king Kuru with its shining weapon resembling the flash of lightening was embraced by the trembling fright like the darling bearing the water of perspiration'. In this example the property, viz. tremblingness has been portrayed as abiding in the object and the standard of comparison, namely, the fright and the darling. And it is by remaining pendant upon it that the elegance has been acquired by the nominative of the act of embracing.

The result is that the fact of becoming the nominative of the act of embracing has ultimately been imposed upon fright. It is obviously needless to observe that the status of the nominative of the act of embracing does not actually belong to fright in normal circumstances. It has been alienated upon it by the fiat of Imagination. So it is rendered evident that the common property in the shape of 'the act of embracing' has been brought into relief by the mixture of the abidance of the property and the superimposition in the case under review. (*CM*, P. 23)

4. Again, the mixture of the abidance of property and the different varieties of compound is demonstrated by the following verse : 'The quarters filled with dusts having the wings of the hawk as their grey tresses of hair and with the evening clouds as their blood-soaked garments did not become worthy of observation like the ladies with monthly course (with her grey tresses of hair like the wings of the hawk and wearing the blood-soaked garments like the evening clouds)'¹. In this instance 'unworthiness of observation' is the property which has been delineated as abiding in the two factors of comparison. They are : (1) quarters filled with dusts and (2) ladies with monthly

RV, canto 11, śl. 60. Mallinātha has furnished the ground as to why the quarters filled with dusts and the ladies with monthly course are not worth-viewing, while he was discussing the verse under context. And it is indicated in the way as follows ; "*Ekatra dr̥ṣṭa doṣād aparatra śāstradoṣāt*" Ibid

course described as the object and the standard of comparison. The said property has been appropriately based on the common applicability of the adjectives like ‘*śyenapakṣaparidhūsarālakāḥ*’ and so forth to the alleged substantives by resorting to the different types of compounds¹. And consequently the property, viz- unworthiness of observation becomes promoted to the dignity of the common property by sustaining the enhanced charmingness in the case under review. (5) Moreover, the mixture of ‘relatedness *qua vastu* and *prativastu*’ and ‘the relation-of-reflection and reflected’ is furnished by the following instance: ‘Those (kings), with their exasperation suppressed by the (ostensible) signs of satisfaction² and so appearing like the clear lakes with their crocodiles concealed within, after bidding farewell to the king of Vidarbha (Bhoja) returned his homage by the pretext of presents and started

- 1 The compound-word, viz *śyenapakṣa paridhūsarālakāḥ* may be expounded by the ways as follows : (1) ‘*śyenapakṣāḥ eva paridhūsarāḥ alakāḥ yāsām* and (2) *śyenapakṣāḥ iva paridhūsarāḥ atakāḥ yāsām*.’ The first is the attributive compound *bahuvrīhi* possessing the rūpaka compound in interior and the second is the attributive compound possessing *upamiti* in interior. They signify the meanings, namely, (1) having the wings of the hawk as their grey tresses of hair and (2) with her grey tresses of hair like the wings of the hawk. The first meaning is concordant with the quarters filled with dusts and the second one is in agreement with the ladies with monthly course depicted as the object and the standard of comparison,

off !¹ In this example the kings and the lakes stand for the object and the standard of comparison. The exasperation and the crocodile have been obviously set in 'the relation-of-reflection and reflected'. And as such the one and single property, namely, concealment belonging to them (exasperation and crocodile) is stated by two different words, viz. suppressed and concealed. So this property appears in 'relatedness *qua vastu* and *prativastu*' standing compounded with 'the relation-of-reflection and reflected.' Besides it is notable that the signs of satisfaction and the clearness of lakes have been introduced as remaining in 'the relation-of-reflection and reflected' which is pure and unblended in its essential nature. And the situation does not require its further elucidation. For this issue has already been discussed in the present chapter. So the common property, that is, 'with their exasperation (suppressed by the (ostensible) signs of satisfaction and appearing clear with their crocodiles concealed within' has obviously been brought into being by the mixture of 'relatedness *qua vastu* and *prativastu*' and 'the relation-of-reflection and reflected' in the present instance. (CM,P. 23)

Further, the mixture of paronomasia and 'the relation-of-reflection and reflected' has been rendered conspicuous by the following instance: 'The sons of the king being (internally) contented by the destruction of Pārtha and with their pain (outwardly) unassuaged shed tears like

the lakes with the water of the upper surface boiled by the rays of the sun (as if vapourized) and possessing the cold water in its interior'. In this illustration the sons of the king and the lakes have been introduced as the object and the standard of comparison. The word *vaṣpa* occurring in the verse is paronomastic in character.- For it is denotative of two meanings : (1) tear and (2) vapour. And this paronomasia has been rendered fascinating owing to its close association with 'the relation-of-reflection and reflected' instituted between the adjectives of the sons of the king on the one hand and those of the lakes on the other. Since it is the institution of 'the relation-of-reflection and reflected' between these two sets of adjectives that both the meanings of the word *bāṣpa* have become united in a very reasonable manner. And consequently the meanings of the two sets of adjectives together with the meanings of the word *bāṣpa* are made competent to hold the status of the common property in respect of the alleged object and the standard of comparison. So the common property has apparently been brought into being by the mixture of paronomasia and 'the relation-of-reflection and reflected.'
(CM, PP. 23 – 24)

(7) Moreover, the mixture of the superimposition and 'the relation-of-reflection and reflected' is exhibited by the following instance : 'that wrathful lady (*kaikeyī*) verily being consoled by her husband vomited out the two boons promised by him like the earth watered by Indra (did

vomit) the pair of the serpents sunk in its own hole'¹. In this context 'the relation-of-reflection and reflected' has been instituted between 'being consoled and watered on the one hand and the two boons and the pair of serpents on the other.' And it is by entirely banking upon it that the act of vomiting has been figuratively attributed to both the object of comparison and the standard of comparison, namely, the lady and the earth. Since the primary meaning of the expression 'vomiting' cannot possibly be connected with any of the above factors of *similis*, viz. the object of comparison and the standard of comparison. The apparent reason of impossibility is this- The lady is competent to be the subject of the act of vomiting. But the boons which are incorporeal in character cannot claim to be the appropriate object of it. And it is also lying bare that even the earth which has been regarded as the nominative of the act of vomiting will fail to execute that function owing to its being purely inanimate in character. Besides, the expression 'act of vomiting' is bound to appear rustic if taken in its primary sense. And this fact has been authoritatively confirmed by Daṇḍin, the celebrated author of the *Kāvyaḍarśa* as follows : 'spitting, expectorating, vomiting and so forth when rest on the secondary function of the meaning are really very charming and on other places (understood in their primary meanings) become rustic in

1. Rv, canto 12, śl. 5

nature'.¹ So it is conspicuous that the superimposition of the act of vomiting has taken place with reference to both the object and the standard of comparison on the basis of the relation-of-reflection and reflected. And consequently the common property in the shape of the act of vomiting has been rendered discernible by means of the mixture of superimposition and 'the relation-of-reflection and reflected' in the instance under review. In this way even the cases other than this enumerated mixture of the two mediums of expression of common property should be conjectured in conformity with the specific nature of every instance. (CM, P.24)

Now the mixture of the three modes of the expression of the common property is being enumerated in the following fashion : (1) The mixture of the abidance of property, 'the relation of reflection and reflected' and invocation to the different varieties of compound, is illustrated as follows 'The lady (Indumatī) with her navel handsome like the whirlpool and destined to become the wife of the other (i. e., of Aja) passed by the king in the same way as the river with the whirlpool for its handsome navel and advancing to unite with the sea (passes by) the holder of the earth (the mountain) encountered due to its situation on the path' ². In this

1. KD, chap. 1. śl. 95.

2. Rv, canto 6, śl. 52

illustration 'the act of passing by' is considered as the property abiding in the object and the standard of comparison, namely, the lady (Indumatī) and the river. And 'destined to become the wife of the other' and 'advancing to unite with the sea' have been represented in 'the relation of reflection and reflected'. And thereafter the different varieties of compound have been resorted to in order to render the expression '*āvartamanojñānābhīḥ*'¹ equally significant with reference to the object and the standard of comparison as already mentioned. Thus the mixture of these three elements has successfully brought the common property into prominence in the present instance. (CM, P. 24).

Further, the mixture of the abidance of the property, paronomasia and the superimposition, has been brought into relief by the following instance : 'This springtime has arrived with its lovely kesara flowers delicately tossed by the breeze, with the disc of the bright Lord of stars (moon) as taking the lead and looked upon by the dam-

1. The compound-word *āvartamanojñānābhīḥ* is susceptible to be splitted up in the following way '(1) *āvarta iva manojñā* and *āvartamanojñā nābhīḥ yasyāḥ* and (2) *āvarta eva manojñānābhīḥ yasyāḥ*.' The first is attributive compound with the appositional compound in interior. It is denotative of the meaning as mentioned below 'With her navel handsome like the whirlpool ' The second is attributive compound with the Rūpaka compound in interior. It signifies 'with the whirlpool for its handsome navel.'

sels in separation with their afflicted eyes like Hanumāna with his handsome mane kissed by the wind-god, the leader in the kingdom of the delighted husband of Tārā (sugrīva) and looked upon by Rāma separated (from his wife) with his afflicted eyes¹. In this verse the expression 'looked upon with the afflicted eyes' has assumed the status of the property abiding in the object and the standard of comparison, viz. the spring-time and Hanumana. And paronomasia pertaining to the word takes up its rise in connection with the words like Rāma, kesara and Tārādhīpa which are the denotative of the double meaning, namely, Rāma, the son of Daśaratha and the damsel, kesara as a flower and the mane and Tārādhīpa standing for the moon and sugrīva respectively. Thereafter the meaning of the word *cumbita*, namely, the 'act of kissing' has been figuratively scribed to the breeze with reference to the context of the springtime. Thus the mixture of these three elements has taken place in the present illustration. So it is rendered manifest that the common property, has been demonstrated by the mixture of the abidance of property, paronomasia and the superimposition in the case under review. In an identical way one should discover even other different illustrations in connexion with the mixture of this type according to one's own initiative. (CM, P. 24).

-
1. HN, chap. 6 śl. 35 (reads *tato* for *asau* and *samāgataḥ Śrī Hanumāna vasantavat* for *vasanta kālō Hauumīna iv'āgataḥ*); KP, P. 311; SR, P. 331, śl. 15; SM, P. 206; KNS, P. 210; AM, P. 151

Now it is worthy of note that the illustrations in which the common property is demonstrated by means of 'the relation-of-reflection and reflected' are verily possessed with some specific characteristics. In some cases 'the relation-of-reflection and reflected' takes place with reference to the two clearly felt properties due to their universal acknowledgement in the realm of poetics. And the oftquoted instance of it is the verse beginning with 'this king of Pāṇḍu with his shoulder bearing the pendant necklace, etc.' In this verse the two properties abiding in the pendant necklace and the flowing spring and so forth are indisputably avowed in the sphere of poetry. So they are self-evident in character. And they assume the status of the common property in respect of the king of Pāṇḍu and the Lord of mountains by means of 'the relation-of-reflection and reflected.' In some other cases the property does not stand in conformity with the acknowledged poetic convention. And as a consequence of this, 'the relation-of-reflection and reflected' is instituted between the properties which are taken hold upon by any means whatsoever. And it has already been elucidated in the instance like, 'Śiva brought into contact by the maiden Pārvatī with the augmented lustre of her moon like face, etc.' In this context the common property expected as belonging to the season of autumn and Pārvatī lacks recognition in the normal circumstances. And as a result of this, an appeal to the distinct varieties of compound was made

with a view to rendering the expression '*Vivṛaddhānana candrakāntyā*' as expressive of the properties belonging to them. And this has culminated in exhibiting 'the relation-of-reflection and reflected' as based on the properties possessed by Pārvatī and the season of autumn. The result is that the alleged properties become capable to assume the status of the common property with reference to the object and the standard of comparison in the manner indicated above. Thus it has been made abundantly clear that 'the relation-of-reflection and reflected' can never take place in the absence of apprehension of the resembling properties in some way or other. (CM, PP. 24-25)

Now what is the way of the adjustment of the figure reverse *similis* ? An illustration will drive home the complexity of the problem. 'As you are endowed with merits so is your rival completely devoid of merits and thus this form of similitude is called reverse *similis*.' In this context 'you' and the rival have been depicted as the object and the standard of comparison. They are possessed of the two properties (1) meritoriousness and (2) meritlessness which are diametrically opposed to each other. So there is not even the slightest possibility of the apprehension of resemblance between them either by means of directly expressed or suggested attribute. And consequently these two properties cannot serve the basis of the emergence of 'the relation-of-reflection and reflected' which in its turn may elevate them to the status of the

common property. But this cannot withstand scrutiny. Since there is assuredly the apprehension of resemblance between the properties belonging to the alleged object and the standard of comparison. The fact is this. The attribute in the shape of excessiveness and naturalness and the like becomes suggested in the present situation. It undoubtedly paves the way for the apprehension of resemblance between the properties as above referred to. And 'the relation-of-reflection and reflected' will take its rise on the basis of the said properties without encountering any impediments. The result is that the two properties are capable to assume the role of the common properties serving as the ground of similarity depicted in the present illustration. If such is not the case, the similarity signified by the word 'as' (*yatha*) will obviously be devoid of any objective reference. Thus the instances of the complete *similis* have been exemplified as conducive to indicate its line of development. (C M, P. 25)

CHAPTER VI

Classification of Elliptical *Similis*

SECTION I

Its Eightfold Division Elucidated

The elliptical *similis* admits of eightfold classification: (1) ellipsis of the word expressive of similitude, (2) ellipsis of the common property, (3) ellipsis of the standard of comparison, (4) ellipsis of the word expressive of similitude and the standard of comparison, (5) ellipsis of the common property and the standard of comparison, (6) ellipsis of the common property and the word expressive of similitude, (7) ellipsis of the word expressive of similitude and the object of comparison and (8) ellipsis of the common property, the standard of comparison and the word expressive of similitude. The examples of these eight sub-varieties of elliptical *Similis* are being cited in due sequence, “Know me kumbhodara by name, equal (in rank) to Nikumbha and the eight formed god’s attendant with the back purified by the favour of placing of the foot of one desirous of mounting on the kailāśa-white bull”¹. In this instance (1) the ellipsis of the word expressive of similitude has taken place in

1. Rv, canto 2. śl. 35 (reads *Nikumbhamitram* for *Nikumbhatulyam*)

connexion with the expression, namely, *kailāśa*-white (*kailāśa-gauram*)- Since it is a compound-word and signifies *kailāśa* like white (*Kailāśa iva gaurah*) when it is expounded. And the word like (*iva*) expressive of similitude has been deleted in the case under analysis. So it is entitled to exemplify the elliptical *similis* with the ellipsis of the word expressive of similitude. (2) In the expression 'equal to *Nikumbha* (*Nikumbhatulyam*), *Kumbhodara* and *Nikumbha* stand for the object and the standard of comparison. The word equal (*tulya*) is the expressive of similitude. And the common property, viz. the possession of rank has not been explicitly mentioned in it. So the present expression is a valid instance of elliptical *similis* with the ellipsis of word expressive of similitude. (C M, P. 25)

Now it should be borne in mind that the ellipsis of words expressive of similitude is occasioned in all cases in conformity with the grammatical aphorism which enjoins the compound. Since the sense to be conveyed by words expressive of similitude has been revealed by the very compound itself. And as a sequel of this, their employment has been dispensed with in the face of gross superfluity. But the ellipsis of the common property takes place at the entire discretion of the poet. For even in this very expression, namely, 'equal to *Nikumbha*' the common property may be expressed through the medium of majesty and the like. (CM, P. 25)

‘That the arrival of the thieves and of him (of Devadatta) and the murder of him (of Devadatta) committed by them (i. e. thieves) all these occurred all on a sudden like the coincidence in connexion with the crow and the palm-fruit (*kākaīālīyam*),¹. In this context the two words, namely, the crow and the palm-fruit in the process of compounding are denotative of the action inhering in them, viz. the crow and the palm-fruit respectively. And consequently the compound-word, namely, *kākatālam* is usually expounded in the following way: ‘like (*iva*) the approach of the crow and like (*iva*) the fall of the palm-fruit’. It is notable that the *taddhita* suffix *cha* has been enjoined after the word *kākatālam* by Pāṇini’s aphorism “*samāsacca tadviṣayāt* 5, 3, 106”. Now the suffix *cha* has been authoritatively laid down to be affixed after a compound-word conveying the meaning of the particle *iva* (like) signifying similarity. The term of the present aphorism is unmistakably indicative of the fact that the presence of the compound form is absolutely indispensable in connexion with the addition of the *taddhita* suffix *cha*. So in conformity with this rule the nominal compound in the sense of similarity has taken place in the word *kākatālam* forming the focal point of critical reflection. And it is led to occur by the aphorism of Pāṇini “*supa* 2, 1, 4”. (CM, PP. 25-26)

-
1. The maxim of the crow and the palm-fruit is used to exemplify a startling and purely accidental occurrence. It has been

Now the arrival of Devadatta and the sudden attack of the thieves are to be understood as the objects of comparison with reference to the standards of comparison, viz. like the approach of the crow and the fall of the palm-fruit respectively. And as a consequence of this, the meaning of the above expression *kākatālam* assumes its final shape in the following way: 'The arrival of Devadatta and of thieves is similar to coincidence of the crow and the palm-fruit'. And in the succeeding stage the word *kākatālīyam* denotes *kākatālam iva* 'like the crow-cum-palm-fruit'. And it is in this second meaning of similarity directly expressed by the particle *eva* (like) that the nominal suffix *cha* has been affixed after the compound-word *kākatālam* in compliance with the aphorism "*saṃāsācca tad viśayāt* 5, 3, 106" already alluded to in the present context. The complete meaning of the word *kākatālīyam* may be evoked in the following manner:

explained in the *kāśikā* of Vāmana Jayāditya on the aphorism of Pāṇini "*Samāsācca tadviśayāt* 5, 3, 106" in the following manner;
 "Kākatālīyam | Ajākṛpāñīyam | Andhakavarthakīyam | Atarkitopanātam
 citrīkaraṇaṁ ucyate | Talkatham? Kākasya āgamanam yādṛccchikam |
 Tālasypatanam ca. tena tālena patatā kākasya vadhaḥ kṛtoḥ |
 Evameva devadattasya tatrāgamaram, dasyūnāṁ sa samāgamaḥ
 sa kākatāla samāgamasadṛśa ity'eka upamārthaḥ | Atāśca Devadatta-
 sya vadhaḥ, sa kākatālavadhasadṛśa iti
 dviīya upamārthaḥ |" And also compare "*Ayathāvastuvijñānāt
 phalaṁ labhyata īpsitam | Kākatālīyataḥ so'yaṁ samvādi bhrama
 ucyate*"

‘As the killing of the crow was brought about by the falling of palm-fruit so the murder of Devadatta was committed by suddenly approaching thieves’. (CM, P. 26.).

And this has been observed by the most revered scholiast Pātaṅjali in the course of his commentation on the aforecited Pāṇini’s aphorism: So in this case these two meanings ... like the approach of the crow and like the fall of the palm-fruit are conveyed by the word *kākatālam*; and like the incident associated with the crow-cum-palm-fruit is indicated by the word *kākatālīyam*¹. And this has been explained by the celebrated commentator kaiyaṭa in the way as follows: ‘with reference to the interpretation of the expression *kākatālīyam*, the approach of the crow is the standard of comparison in relation to the arrival of Devadatta and the fall of the palm-fruit in relation to sudden attack of the thieves; and that the killing of the crow by the palm-fruit is the standard of comparison with reference to the murder of Devadatta committed by the thieves. And as such the accidental coincidence is the common property to link

-
1. Confer the interpretation of “*saṃsacca tad viṣayāt Pān sū, 5, 3, 106*” as is found in the *Mahābhāṣya* of Patañjali. It is mentioned below “*Evaṃ tarhi dvāv’ivārtthau| Katham? kākāgamanam iva tālapatanam iva kākatālam, kākatālam iva kākatālīyam||*” It is found distorted in the *Cītramīmāṃsā* which reads *dvāv’imāvarthau* for *dvāv’ivārtthau*.

these distinct objects and the standards of comparison. The *vyatikāra* has rendered the expression *kākatālīyam* clear in the manner indicated below: 'And so the word *kākatālīyam* signifies the sense of the sudden occurrence of bewilderment'. (CM, P. 26)

Now it deserves mention that the standards of comparison, viz. the approach of the crow and the fall of the palm-fruit on the one hand and the killing of the crow by the fall of the palm-fruit on the other are admittedly omitted in the expression, viz. *Kākatālīyam*. And this fact is responsible for bringing about a subtle distinction between the two types of similarity afforded by the nominal suffix *cha* and the nominal compound. The similarity denoted by the nominal suffix *cha* exhibits the ellipsis of the standard of comparison. Since the very suffix *cha* is expressive of similitude in the expression under context. And the similarity which is yielded by the nominal compound (*kākatāla*) is conspicuous by the ellipsis of the standard of comparison and the word expressive of similitude. So the instance as cited above has provided the varieties of elliptical *similis* styled (3) the elliptical *similis* with the ellipsis of the standard of comparison and (4) elliptical *similis* with the ellipsis of the word expressive of similitude and the standard of comparison. And again in the event of the substitution of the third foot of the verse, namely, 'all these occurred all on a sudden' by 'what do we speak these' it will assuredly entail a material alteration. That is to say' the ellipsis of the common property and the standard of

comparison will take up its rise on similarity yielded as the meaning of the nominal suffix in the word *kākatāḷyam*. And the ellipsis of the common property, the standard of comparison and word expressive of similitude is brought into prominence in the similarity secured as the meaning of the nominal compound in the compound-word *kākatāḷa*. So the types of elliptical *similis* designated (5) the elliptical *similis* with the ellipsis of the common property and the standard of comparison and (8) the elliptical *similis* with the ellipsis of the common property, the standard of comparison and the word expressive of similitude are secured by the instance with this modified reading. It is not irrelevant to remark that the ellipsis of common property alone is such as can claim to be discretionary in nature in the instance under consideration. (CM, P. 26).

Now the variety of elliptical *similis* with (6) the ellipsis of common property and the word expressive of similitude is illustrated by the verse as follows : 'O tiger like Rāghava (*Rāghava śārdūla*) ! may that virtue undoubtedly protect you which (virtue) you observe by your conduct as well as by your solemn vow'. In this verse the compounded expression, viz. *Rāghava śārdūla* means Rāghava like tiger. And in this derivative sense the act of appositional compounding is enjoined by Paṇini's aphorism '*upamitam vyāghrādibhiḥ sāmānyāprayoge* 2, 1, 56'. The meaning of the aphorism may be stated as follows 'the object of comparison is compounded with the word

tiger and so forth expressive of standard of comparison in the absence of the mention of the common property'. Thus in accordance with the terms of this aphorism the word *Raghavaśardūle* has become a genuine case of the ellipsis of the common property and the word expressive of similitude. It is worth mentioning that in this context even the ellipsis of the common property, namely, courage, etc. like that of the word expressive of similitude has taken place in strict compliance with the dictum of grammar. Since the present aphorism prescribes the rules of this compound only in the case where the common property has been left out¹. (CM, PP. 26-27).

But in the event of the ellipsis of the common property and word expressive of similitude, the omission of the common property can also possibly occur at the discretion of the poet. Let the position be rendered clear by the concrete illustration : 'Even this world plays the role (similar) to the emancipation to the people (who are) engaged in worshipping the god containing the digit of the moon (Śiva) the mortal not paying adoration to him (Śiva) is like the man of straw in this world'.²

Confer : *Samānyāprayoge kim ? puruṣo vyāghra iva śūrah/Vide Siddh.* under the context of *Upamitam et seq.* Pāṇ Sū. 2, 1, 56
And also cf *Bal. Loc. cit* 'Bhāṣyābdiḥ Kvātigambhīrah itī kaiyaṭa prayogas tu muyāravayamsakāditvāt somādheyah/Bhāṣyam ev'ābdir itī rūpakam vā/'

In this context the nominal verb *apavargati* means plays the role similar to the emancipation. It is to be noted that the substantive, namely, *apavarga* has taken the suffix *Kvip* which is elided in its entirety. And it is due to the omission of it that even the ellipsis of the common property takes place like that of word expressive of similitude. Again the word *cañcā* signifies 'like the man of straw' And in this sense the suffix *kan* has been enjoined to the word *cañcā* by Pāṇini's aphorism 'ive pratiktau 5, 3, 96'. Thereafter the suffix *kan* has been elided in accordance with Pāṇini's aphorism *Lummanuṣye*.; 5, 3, 98. And consequently the ellipsis of the common property and that of word expressive of similitude has taken place on the basis of the ellipsis of the suffix *Kan* which is the only denotative of the common property and similitude in the word *cañcā* cited above. Thus it is rendered obvious that the ellipsis of both the common property and word expressive of similitude with reference to the words *apavargati* and *cañcā* has been brought into prominence in compliance with the ordination of the grammar. (C M, P. 27)

But this verse may be modified by adopting the altered reading in the following manner ! Even this world due to

- I. Bālaṃanōramā offers its interpretation as follows : "*ivārthaḥ-upa-
natvañ/ tadvaṭi vārtamānāt pratipadikāt kan syāt pratikṛtibh-
upāmeṣe iti phalitam*"
2. The vṛtti of this aphorism runs as follows : *Samjñāyām ce'ti vihitā-
kano lupasyām manuṣye vācye||*"

its being filled with happiness plays the role similar to the emancipation to the devotees of the god Śiva . . . the mortal not paying adoration to him is verily like a man of straw due to the non-fulfilment of the welfare of his own self. There is the possibility of the factual presence of common properties with reference to both the expressions, viz. (1) *apavargati* (plays the role similar to the emancipation and (2) *cañcā* (like a man of straw) in this revised reading of the preceding verse. They may be (1) *sukhamayaḥ* (due to its being filled with happiness) in connection with the first expression and (2) *abhajan* (not paying adoration to Śiva) in respect of the second one. It is needless to repeat that both the expressions *apavargati* and *cañcā* have been shown as the cases of the ellipsis of both the common property and the word expressive of similitude. And in them even the ellipsis of the common properties have been indicated as occurring in conformity with the ordainment of grammar. So it is rendered evident that in the event of the ellipsis of the common property and the word expressive of similitude, the ellipsis of common property takes place at the entire option of the poet. (CM, P. 27.)

Jagannatha's criticism

The author of the *Rasagāgādhara* has critically examined the contention of Appaya Dikṣita regarding the verse beginning with '*nṛṇāṃ et seq.*' His contention may be summed up as follows. The two suffixes, namely, 1) *kuip* and (2) *kan* added to the nominal bases 1) *apavarga* (emancipation) and (2) *cañcā* (a man of straw) are the only expedients to secure the senses

of similitude and the common property as belonging to the two expressions (1) *apavargati* (plays the role similar to the emancipation) and (2) *cañcā* (like a man of straw occurring in the present verse. And as such each of these two suffixes becomes elided with all its components. So these two expressions are characterised by the ellipsis of both the common property and the word expressive of similitude. But Jagannātha holds that this viewpoint of Appaya Dīkṣita is exposed to serious objection. It is true that the suffix *kan* affixed to the base *cañcā* (a man of straw) expresses similitude. And this suffix has been deleted in obedience to Pāṇini's aphorism, viz. "*Lummanuṣye* 5, 3, 98". But despite this, the expression *cancā* (like a man of straw) is not bereft of the common property which will form the basis of similarity of the mortal with it. In the present case the common property may be indicated in the shape of the absence of paying adoration to the god containing the digit of the moon. And it is expressed by means of the expression, viz. not paying adoration to the god containing the digit of the moon as occurring in the verse under review. So the common property belonging to *cañcā* (like the man of straw) and *martya* (the mortal) stands as explicitly mentioned in this particular occasion. Therefore the contention of Appaya Dīkṣita regarding the ellipsis of even the common property in the expression *cañcā* (like a man of straw) is obviously absurd.¹

The opponent lays his hand upon a new line of argument. The common property, viz. the absence of paying adoration to the god containing the digit of the moon is

actually stated as the exclusive adjective of the word *martya* (mortal, which has been depicted as the object of comparison. So it cannot be syntactically linked with the expression *cañcā* which itself stands as the adjective of similitude. And consequently, the present common property cannot serve the real basis of the similarity existing between these two factors of comparison¹.

But this view of the opponent will be irreconcilable with his own utterances. He himself has envisaged the modification of this verse in the way as follows: Even this world due to its being filled with happiness plays the role similar to the emancipation to the devotees of God *Śiva* ... the mortal not paying adoration to him is verily like a man of straw due to the non-fulfilment of the welfare of his own self'. In this modified verse he has averred that even each of these two expressions, viz. (1) *apavargati* (plays the role similar to the emancipation) and (2) *cañcā* (like a man of straw) is obviously possessed of its own common property. And as such this assertion of the opponent lacks propriety. Since in the expression, viz. *apavargati*, the base *apavarga* (emancipation) has been depicted as the standard of comparison in relation to the word standing for the object of comparison. And the expression, viz. *sukhamaya* (due to its being filled with happiness) is expected to play the role of the

common property as belonging to them. But in reality this expected common property stands explicitly mentioned as the adjective of only the object of comparison in the expression under examination. So the property *sukhamayatva* (the fact of being filled with happiness) cannot be syntactically linked with the nominal base *apavarga* which in its turn is the adjective of similitude. And consequently this property exclusively pertaining to the object of comparison cannot partake the character of the common property as is expected by the opponent. The sum and substance of the present discussion is this. The expression *cañcā* (like a man of straw) cannot become characterized by the ellipsis of the common property as has been demonstrated by Appaya Dīkṣita under the elucidation of the verse commencing with “*nṛṇām et seq*”. Another poser is raised by the opponent. In an accredited case of the figure *similis* the supposed common property may belong to either the object or the standard of comparison. And it may come in a position to establish the verbal linkage with both the object and the standard of comparison with equal degree of propriety. In spite of this, it will not be empowered to partake the character of the common property in real sense of the term. But in fact it is only the comprehension of this property as residing in both the object and the standard of comparison that confers upon it the dignity of the common property. In the present context the property, *sukhamayatva* (the fact of being filled with happiness) is,

in reality, syntactically linked with *samsāra* (the world) depicted as the object of comparison. It is also in a state to establish verbal linkage with the base *apavarga* (emancipation) standing for the standard of comparison. Besides, this property stands obviously comprehended as residing in both the object and the standard of comparison in the expression under review. So it becomes competent to discharge the function of the common property in all respects. On the contrary the supposed common property, that is, the absence of paying adoration to the god containing the digit of the moon is not apprehended as abiding in *cañcā* (the man of straw) portrayed as the standard of comparison in the expression *cañcā*. The result is that it is liable to be a valid case of the type of elliptical *similis* as has been contended by Appaya Dikṣita¹.

But this plea is exposed to its own inherent weakness. Since the expression *cañcā* evidently stands on a par with the present expression. And the property, viz: the absence of paying adoration to the god containing the digit of the moon is in a position to fulfil all the conditions necessary for becoming the common property as laid down by the opponent. So this property too deserves to receive the same treatment of the opponent as has been extended to the other common property. If such is the case, this property too is empowered to partake the character of the common property in respect of the object and the stan-

dard of comparison in the expression *cañcū* (like a man of straw). As a result of which the position of the opponent remains open to the same charge of inconsistency. The opponent lays hold upon a fresh plea to vindicate his standpoint. The property, viz. the absence of paying adoration to the god containing the digit of the moon is intended by him as exclusively and syntactically linked with the determinant of the object of comparison, that is, the fact of being mortal in the expression *cañcū* (like a man of straw). The common property forming the basis of the similarity subsisting between the mortal and the man of straw should be indicated in the form of non-fulfilment of the welfare of one's own self in the present expression. And this common property although mentioned in the modified form of this verse stands obviously deleted in its original reading. In this way the author of the *Citramīmāṃsā* expects to controvert all the objections raised by Jagannātha in the situation under review. If the opponent adheres to the propriety of his presumably unreasonable contention with unyielding tenacity even at the risk of taking an oath, then the proponent will be ready to make the concession that the objection raised against the opponent stands warded off. And the opponent may remain content with it.¹

(7) The variety of elliptical *similis* with the ellipsis of word expressive of similitude and the object of comparison may be exemplified as follows: 'This

1, Ibid,

one with his beauty, youth, loveliness and more attractive form behaves himself like one bearing the arrows of flowers in front of the ladies possessed with the deer-like eyes'. In this instance the subject 'this one' owing to the power of its own adjectives, namely, with his beauty, youth and so forth implies the sense in the shape of 'behaves himself like one bearing the arrows of flowers'. And it is entirely pendant upon the awareness of this suggested sense that the nominal verb *puṣṭyudhīyati* (behaves himself like one bearing the arrows of flowers) has been regarded as a case of elliptical *similis* with the ellipsis of word expressive of similitude and the object of comparison. The word like expressive of similitude and the object of comparison, that is, himself (*ātmānam*) in relation to 'one bearing the arrows of flowers' (*puṣṭyudham*) stand apparently deleted in the expression under review. It deserves specific mention that the ellipsis of this object of comparison is brought into prominence at the complete option of the poet. It cannot be contended that the expression 'this one' will have a right to claim the status of the object of comparison. Because the lack of case-ending indicant of the objective case is evident in it. So it is forced to forfeit its right to stand as the object of comparison in respect of 'one bearing the arrows of flowers'

(*Puṣpāyudha*) which is admittedly used in the objective case in the form of the aforecited nominal verb. (*CM*, P. 27). Further (8) the word *Harīṇākṣiṇām* is a genuine case of the *ellipsis* of the common property, the standard of comparison and the word expressive of similitude. Since this compounded word is susceptible to be expounded in the meaning as follows : 'the ladies who possess the eyes as large as the eyes of the deer.' In this expounded sense, first of all, the word *harīṇākṣiṇī* is formed by means of the sixth variety of the determinative compound, that is, *ṣaṣṭhītat-puruṣa*. Afterwards the formation of the word *harīṇākṣiṇām* takes place in accordance with the *vārtika saptamyupamā-napūrvapādasya et seq.* The meaning of this *vārtika* follows in this way : "That which has got its preceding word either ending in the locative case or indicant of the standard of comparison is compounded with another distinct word and the subsequent word of the former part of the expounding sentence is left out." Now according to the terms of the present *vārtika*, the word *ākṣiṇī* of *harīṇākṣiṇī*, the indicative of the standard of comparison has been elided. And as a result of this, in the present instance the *ellipsis* of all these factors, viz. the common property, the standard of comparison and word expressive of similitude has been brought into relief in strict compliance with the dictums of grammar. But it is worthy of note in this context that in the event of *ellipsis* of tripartite factors of comparison, the omission of the common property can also possibly occur in accordance

with the intention of the poet—a fact already demonstrated in the second reading of the verse beginning with *yoccorāṇm et seq.* in the case where the *similis* is delivered as the directly expressed sense by the nominal compound ‘*kākatālam.*’ In this way the eight varieties of the elliptical *similis* have been elaborately presented.
(CM, P. 27)

SECTION II

The classification of elliptical *similis* adopted by older rhetoricians briefly narrated

It is to be observed that the author of the *kāvya-prakāśa* and others have exhibited the six varieties of complete *similis*. And in the case of elliptical *similis*, some rhetoricians have mentioned nineteen varieties of it on the strength of its intermediate division resting on the ellipsis of the common property and so forth. Others have classified it into twenty varieties. Now this is the systematic way of the classification of it. So far the varieties of complete *similis* are concerned, it admits of twofold arrangement (1) directly expressed (2) implied. Directly expressed *similis* contains the words like *iva yathā* and so forth which are the expressive of pure similitude. Implied *similis* finds its expression by means of the words, viz. *tulya sadṛśa* and *saṃkūśa* and the like conveying the notion of the locus determined by similitude. Even each of these two varieties of complete *similis* occurring in a sentence, compound and nominal suffix gives rise to the six sub-varieties. They are : (1) directly expressed *similis* occurring in a sentence; (2) directly expressed *similis* occurring in a compound, and (3) directly expressed *similis* occurring in a nominal suffix, (4) implied *similis* occurring in a sentence; (5) implied *similis* occurring in a compound and (6) implied *similis* occurring in a nominal suffix. (CM, P, 28)

Now let us sum up the subvarieties of elliptical *similis*. The ellipsis of the common property also admits of the classification similar to that of complete *similis*. But the difference lies in it that directly expressed *similis* cannot occur in a nominal suffix. Thus these five kinds of elliptical *similis* resting on ellipsis of the common property may be stated in the following order (1) directly expressed *similis* with the ellipsis of the common property occurring in a sentence and (2) directly expressed *similis* occurring in a compound, (3) implied *similis* with the ellipsis of common property occurring in a sentence, (4) implied *similis* with the ellipsis of common property occurring in a compound and (5) implied *similis* with the ellipsis common property occurring in a nominal suffix. Further the elliptical *similis* with the ellipsis of word expressive of similitude is capable of being arranged into the seven subvarieties. They are : (1) implied *similis* with the ellipsis of word expressive of similitude occurring in *ṇamul* affixed to the root having accusative as *upapada*, (2) implied *similis* with the ellipsis of word expressive of similitude occurring in *ṇamul* affixed to the root having the nominative as *upapada*, 3)impleid *similis* with the ellipsis of word expressive of similitude appearing in the affix *Kyac* added to the word in the objective case, (4) implied *similis* with the ellipsis of word expressive of similitude appearing in the affix *kyac* added to the word in the locative case, (5) implied *similis* with the ellipsis of word expressive of similitude

occurring in the suffix *Kyan*, (6) implied *similis* with ellipsis of word expressive of similitude occurring in the affix *ni* and (7) implied *similis* with the ellipsis of word expressive of similitude occurring in a compound. It deserves mention that this type of elliptical *similis* can never take place in a sentence. Since the sentences like *mukham candrah kaṣate* (the face the moon shines), and so forth with the omission of word expressive of similitude will utterly fail to signify similarity. Nor it can have any claim to be included within the fold of the directly expressed *similis*. The plain reason is that it is the basis of the factual presence of *ita* and so forth that the *similis* can be known as directly expressed. The elliptical *similis* with the ellipsis of the standard of comparison is divided into two types. They are : (1) implied *similis* with the ellipsis of the standard of comparison occurring in a sentence and (2) implied *similis* with the ellipsis of the standard of comparison occurring in a compound. The elliptical *similis* with the ellipsis of common property and word expressive of similitude admits of two fold arrangements : (1) implied *similis* with the ellipsis of the common property and word expressive of similitude occurring in the suffix *kvip* and (2) implied *similis* with the ellipsis of the common property and word expressive of similitude occurring in a compound. Elliptical *similis* with ellipsis of the common property and the standard of comparison may be classified thus : (1) implied *similis* with the ellipsis of the common property and the standard of

comparison occurring in a sentence and (2) implied *similis* with the ellipsis of the common property and standard of comparison occurring in a compound. Elliptical *similis* with the ellipsis of the object of comparison and word expressive of similitude is of only one type. It is styled implied *similis* with the ellipsis of the object of comparison and word expressive of similitude occurring in the suffix *kyac*. And lastly the elliptical *similis* with the ellipsis of common property, word expressive of similitude and the standard of comparison also admits of only one type which is implied and appears only in a compound (CM, P. 28).

Now the above classification of *similis* propounded by different authors may be succinctly presented in the following way. 'That *similis* is of two kinds: (1) complete (2) elliptical; again each of them is distinctly divided into directly expressed and implied; the first of them, namely, complete *similis* in respect of these two will occur in a sentence, in a compound and in a nominal suffix'. 'In like manner even the elliptical *similis* is in the ellipsis of the common property, but it does not occur in a nominal suffix when directly expressed'. 'In the event of the ellipsis of word *iva* and so forth, it appears in twofold character of both the affixes, viz. (1) *namul* and *kyac*, in the affix *kyan*, in the affix *nin* and in the compound, and thus these seven subvarieties were enumerated'. 'In the ellipsis of the standard of comparison, it

finds its expression in two varieties, viz. (1) in a sentence and (2) in a compound'. 'Even in the case of the ellipsis of *iva* and so forth and the common property, it (elliptical *similis*) appearing in the suffix *kvip* and in a compound admits of twofold classification; in the event of the ellipsis of the common property and the standard of comparison, it occurs in a sentence and in a compound. 'In the event of the ellipsis of both, viz. (1) the terms like *eva* and so forth and (2) the object of comparison, the *similis* appears in the affix *kyac*; on the omission of *iva* and so forth, the common property and the standard of comparison, this elliptical *similis* takes place only in a compound. (CM, P. 28)

Now the illustrations which are in consonance with their viewpoints and collected together are going to be committed to writing. 'Salutation to that Śiva whose body is as bright as the moon, whose command is carried out by hosts of gods with their heads like the garland, who releases men by fettering them like beasts, whose wealth resembles cloud, who being conducive to delight like treasure is adored at heart by the fortunate ones and who is similitised with the essence of bliss.' In this single verse all the six varieties of complete *similis* have been illustrated. Among these, the first sentence, namely, 'whose command is carried out by hosts of gods with their heads like the garland' is an accredited instance of directly expressed *similis* occurring in a

sentence. Since the word *yathā* expresses similitude directly in it. And it has not been compounded with the garland (*mālīkā*) which is the standard of comparison in relation to the command portrayed as object of comparison.

(2) The directly expressed *similis* appearing in a compound finds its expression in the second sentence, viz. 'who releases men by fettering them like the beasts'. Because in this sentence the term *iva* (like) denotes similitude in a direct manner. And it has been compounded with the word *paśūn* (beasts) standing as the standard of comparison in pursuance of the *vṛtika* '*ivana nityasamāso vibhaktyalopah pūrvāda prakṛti svaratvaḥ*'. (CM, P. 29)

(3) The directly expressed complete *similis* occurring in a nominal suffix is demonstrated in the third sentence, namely, 'whose wealth resembles cloud.' In this sentence wealth and cloud have been portrayed as the object and the standard of comparison. The expression *abhravat* (resembling cloud) is formed by the nominal suffix *vat*. It is affixed in the sense of *iva* (similarity) to the word *abhra* with the case-endings indicative of the possessive case by Pāṇini's aphorism "*Tatra tasy'eva* 5, 1, 116." It denotes the meaning as follows. "the suffix *vat* in the sense of *iva* (similarity) is added to the words possessed with the possessive or the locative case-endings." So this sentence has a legitimate claim to be a genuine case of the third type of complete *similis* as above indicated.

(4) Implied complete *similis* occurring in a sentence is

exemplified as follows. 'Who being conducive to delight like treasure is adored at heart by the fortunate ones.' In this sentence the entities, viz. Śiva and treasure are delineated as the object and the standard of comparison. The expression 'conducive to delight' is the common property as pertaining to them. The similarity stands implied by the term *samam* (like) which is employed in this sentence. Lastly this term has not been compounded with the present standard of comparison. So it illustrates the alleged variety of complete *similis*. (CM. P. 29)

(5) Implied complete *similis* occurring in a compound may be illustrated by the sentence as mentioned below: 'who is similised with the essence of bliss (*ānanda sārōṣamam*)'. In this context Śiva and essence of bliss are introduced as the object and the standard of comparison. The word *upamam* (original word being *upamā*) implying similarity is evidently compounded in the sentence under review. It is remarkable that the adjective 'conducive to delight (*hṛdyam*) occurring in the verse is urgently required to be syntactically linked even with the present instance. For it will play the role of the common property in respect of both the object and the standard of comparison. Otherwise this instance will fall within the category of the subvariety of elliptical *similis* with the ellipsis of the common property. And it will be deprived of its claim as pertaining to complete *similis* which admittedly necessitates the presence of all the four factors of comparison in it. (6) Implied complete

similis occurring in a nominal suffix has been fully exhibited in the sentence, that is, 'whose body is as bright as the moon.' In the occasion the body of Śiva and the moon are the entities standing for the object and the standard of comparison. Brightness is the common property as related with them. The nominal suffix *vat* indicating similarity has been affixed to the word *śaśinā* terminating in the third case-ending. It is enjoined to be added by the aphorism of Pāṇini "Tena tulyam kriyā cedvatiḥ 3, 1,115" which expresses the meaning as follows. 'The suffix *vat* is added to the word with the instrumental case-endings in the sense of *tulya* (similarity) identical with the action'. So this sentence is entitled to exemplify the variety of *similis* as above referred to. (CM, P. 29)

Now in the succeeding verse all the five types of elliptical *similis* resting on the ellipsis of the common property have been evidently illustrated: 'May this monarch of all the gods abide in my heart, whose body is like the fresh nectar, the splendour of whose throat resembles the gem named Indranīla, whose matted hairs are extremely similar to the flashes of lightening and you with your eyes resembling the conch-shell, whose foot is like gold and may be verily called the lotus.' In this verse the sentence, namely, 'whose body is like the fresh nectar' has been a valid case of the directly expressed *similis* with the ellipsis of the common property occurring in a sentence. For in this instance the entities, viz. the body and

fresh nectar have been described as the object and the standard of comparison. And the term *yathā* (like) expressing similarity in a direct way has been left uncompounded, (2) Directly expressed *similis* with the ellipsis of the common property occurring in a compound takes place in the sentence, viz. 'the splendour of whose throat resembles the gem named Indranīla.' It occurs due to the fact that the word *iva*, the expressive of similitude, is compounded with the word *maṇi* (gem) as the standard of comparison. It is notable that in the event of the employment of the verb *bhāti* (shines) that very verb will operate as a common property in both the instances under reference. And the omission of the common property will be entirely impossible in them. So this consideration accounts for its non-employment in the verse under context. It is remarkable in this connection that directly expressed *similis* with the ellipsis of the common property cannot possibly take place in the nominal suffix. Since the nominal suffix *vat* normally affixed in the sense of *iva* (similarity) has been enjoined to be added to the words terminating either in the genitive or in the locative case-endings in compliance with the aphorism *tatratasyeva* 5, 1, 116' as alluded to above ¹. And it is due to this fact

-
1. It is not out of place to mention the illustrations of the aphorism 'tatra tasy'eva, 5, 1, 116' in the particular occasion. They are :
 (1) *mathurāvat srughe prakāraḥ* and (2) *caitravan maitrasya*

that without the clear mention of the common property in an instance of it, the awareness of the syntactical synthesis cannot be immune from cumbrousness and complexity. (CM, P. 29)

It may be contended that the nominal suffixes which are ordained to occur in the sense of *iva* (*similitude*) in the context of *Pāṇini's* aphorism " *Iva Pratikṛtau* 5, 3, 16 " do not require the explicit mention of the common property for their syntactical connexion with their bases. And the expressions, viz. the intellect similar to the point of *kuśa* grass

bhāvāḥ. The expressions (1) *mathurāvat* implies *mathurāyam iva* and (2) *caitravat* signifies *caitrasya iva*. In the first instance the entities *mathurāyam* and *srughe* are introduced as the standard and the object of comparison. The presence of *prākara* is the common property belonging to them. The suffix *vat* is added to the word *mathurāyam* in the sense of *iva* (*similarity*) signified in a direct manner. Similar is the position of the second example. A close study of the present situation renders it evident that the mention of the common property is essential to preserve the syntactical unity between the alleged standard and the object of comparison. So its omission is bound to entail the impossibility of directly expressed *similis* with the ellipsis of the common property occurring in a nominal suffix. If the component parts of the present rule are split up into two parts, then it will assume the form that *vat* is added to indicate *tatra iva tasya iva*. The meanings of these two expressions have been clearly stated in the course of expounding the rule *tatra tasy'eva*, 5, 1, 116'

(*kuṣāgrīvābuddhiḥ*), curd similar to the rock (*śaileyam dadhi*) and the face similar to the lotus (*Paunḍarikāṁ mukham*) are competent to justify the present contention. Since they are grammatically formed by adding the nominal suffixes like *cha*, *ḍhaḥ* and *aṇa* in conformity with the aphorisms, viz. 'kuṣāgrācchaḥ 5, 3, 105', *Śilāyūḥ ḍhaḥ* 5, 3 102' and 'śarkarādibhyon 5, 3, 107'. These instances are assuredly possessed of three factors of comparison, namely, the object and the standard of comparison and the word signifying similarity. And they dispense with further elaboration. It is notable that none of the present instances stands characterised by the explicit mention of the ~~common~~ property. And as such they exhibit no irrelevance in their syntactical unity even in the ellipsis of the common property. So it is transparent on scrutiny that these instances should have a legitimate claim to be the valid cases of directly expressed *similis* with the ellipsis of the common property occurring in a nominal suffix. (CM, P. 30)

But the above contention cannot bear scrutiny. Since the nominal suffixes prescribed to occur within the sphere of operation of the aphorism 'Ive prati-

1. Vide Siddha, and confer : *Kuṣāgram iva kuṣāgrīyā buddhiḥ* |
śilāyā iti yogavibhāgād dhañ apī'hy'eka | *śileva śileyam* |, *śaileyam*
śarkareva śarkaram |

kṛtau 5, 3, 96 are exclusively laid down in the sense of similar to (*tulyārtha*) and not in the sense of similitude (*ivārtha*) as has been pleaded by the opponent. And this expression 'similar to' (*tulya*) conveys the meaning which is manifestly distinct from pure similitude. The expression 'similar to' not only signifies similitude but 'the thing endowed with the similitude.' An illustration will make the position clear. It runs as follows: 'your face is similar to the moon.' In this proposition the expression 'similar to' signifies not only the similitude existing between the face and the moon but it culminates in conveying the idea of the face bearing similitude existing between them. Now if the authenticity of this patent fact is not accepted without reservation and insistence is made to take them (suffixes like *cha* and so forth) as signifying the pure similitude, then these nominal suffixes will hopelessly fail to transport the sense of 'the thing endowed with similitude.' As a consequence of this, in the instances like 'intellect similar to the point of kuśa grass (*kuśāgrīyā buddhiḥ*) and similar others, there will not be even the least possibility of the employment of identical case-endings in both the object and the standard of comparison. And the ultimate comprehension of the intellect (*buddhiḥ*) *qua* object of comparison endowed with similitude conceived as existing between them cannot be achieved in any

imaginable ways. So an unbiassed consideration of this fact clinches the issue to the effect that even the pure similitude apparently purported to be expressed by the suffixes *cha* and so forth is bound to result in the sense of similar to. The reason for the adoption of this line of interpretation has already been stated, namely, that there is complete agreement in the case-ending between the intellect and the point of *kuśa* grass standing for the object and the standard of comparison in the instance, viz. 'intellect similar to the point of *kuśa* grass (*kuśāgrīyā buddhiḥ*). Identical is the case with the other two instances. Now it has been rendered evident that there is no contradiction involved although the word *iva* occurring as the component part of the aphorism '*Ive pratikṛtau* 5, 3, 96' is taken to signify 'similar to' instead of pure similitude. The sum and substance of the above discussion is this. The directly expressed *similis* with the ellipsis of the common property cannot occur in a nominal suffix. (CM, P. 30)

Then the succeeding three sentences, viz. (1) whose matted hairs are extremely similar to the flashes of lightning, (2) whose foot is like gold and (3) it may be verily called lotus, are the valid cases of implied *similis* with the ellipsis of the common property occurring in (1) a sentence, (2) in a compound and (3) in a nominal suffix. In the first sentence the matted hairs and the flashes of lightning are depicted as the object and the standard of comparison.

And the word *susadr̥śaḥ* (similar to) conveying the sense of similarity have not been compounded with the standard of comparison, viz. flashes of lightening (*taḍidbhiḥ*). So it is entitled to exemplify implied *similis* with the ellipsis of the common property occurring in a sentence. In the second sentence the foot and the gold stand for the object and the standard of comparison. And the word *nibham* (like) expressive of similitude stands compounded with the standard of comparison, viz. gold (*kāñcana*). So it is an accredited instance of implied *similis* with the ellipsis of the common property occurring in a compound. In the third sentence the entities, viz. the foot and the lotus (*abja*) are portrayed as the object and the standard of comparison. The word *abja* is the nominal base of the nominal suffix *deśya* indicating similarity. It deserves mention that the nominal suffix *deśya* is ordained to be affixed in the sense of slightly incomplete (*īśadasamāpti*) in accordance with Pāṇini's aphorism 'īśadasamāptau *kalpabdeśya deśīyarah* 5, 3, 67'. Now *albeit* the suffix

1. The plain meaning of the present aphorism is this. The nominal suffixes *kalpab*, *deśya* and *deśīyar* are proclaimed to be added to the nouns in the sense of 'slightly incomplete'. *Bāl* interprets this aphorism together with its illustrations in the way as follows :
'Iśad asamāpti viśiṣṭe'rthe vidyamānat subantat svarthe kalpabdeśya deśīyar iti pratyayaḥ syur ety'arthah | Vidvaddkalpa iti īśannyaṇa vaiduṣyavān ityarthah | Yaśaskalpam iti | Asampūrṇam yasyaitiyarthah | Vidvadddeśya iti | Asampūrṇavaiduṣya-vānityarthah evam vidvadddeśīyah |'

deśya is enjoined to exhibit the sense of 'slightly incomplete', it is purposely affixed here in order to convey the meaning of similitude. But it really culminates in the sense 'similar to' instead of signifying similitude. The obvious reason is that there is also complete agreement of case-endings used after the words 'the lotus' and 'the foot' in the expression, viz. *Abjadeśyam padam*.

(CM, P. 30)

Now it may be argued under this reference that in the employment of the words like similar to and so forth in a sentence, it has a legitimate claim to be considered as a valid case of implied *similis*. The reason is plain. The expression similar to ultimately culminates in the sense of the thing endowed with similitude. But in what category the instance will fall when it is possessed with the words like similitude and others ? Will it be considered either a case of directly expressed *similis* or a case of implied one ? An apt illustration may be cited to bring the issues involved in clear limelight : 'Both (Dilīpa and Sudakṣiṇā) observing the similitude of their reciprocal eyes in the pairs of the deer who having deserted the road nearby had fixed up their sight in the chariot.'¹ The answer to the above question is that the instances of this

-
1. Rv, canto 1, śl. 40 Mallinātha observes '*dvandvaśabdasūmarthyān mṛgīṣu sudakṣiṇā'kṣisūdrīyam Dilīpo Dilīpakṣisūdrīyam ca mṛgeṣu sudakṣiṇ'ety' evaṁ vevaktavyam*'

type are exclusively the authentic cases of directly expressed *similis*. Since in this instance *albeit* the base of the nominal suffix, namely, the word *sadṛśa* denotes the meaning of 'similar to' as conveying the sense of 'the thing endowed with similitude', yet the nominal suffix *śyañ* added to the word *sadṛśa* signifies similitude. And it (*śyañ*) at the same time predominates over its base (*sadṛśa*) on the basis of the dictum laid down by the author of the *Mahābhāṣya*. And as a consequence of it, the similitude as directly delivered by it finds the syntactical synthesis in the body of the meaning of the sentence *qua* verbal judgment. (CM, P. 30)

'I pay worship to him, by viewing whom like the lamp, that cupid perished instantaneously like the death of the worm, who takes the inmost recess of the heart of one engaged in the excessive meditation as his residence of the inner apartment and quickly treats him (devotee) like *kumāra* (*skanda*); who stands like the foundation pillar in the origination of the three worlds; and to whom the lady speaking like the cuckoo and the *kalpa* creeper appearing as dark as the blue lotus take their *resort*'. In this verse all the seven varieties of elliptical *similis* with the ellipsis of word expressive of similitude have been clearly exemplified. In the present context the expression 'viewing whom like the lamp (*yam paśyan dīpa darśam*) is an illustration of (1) implied *similis* with the ellipsis of word expressive of similitude occurring in

the suffix *ṇamul* added to the root having accusative as its *upapada*. Since the word *dīṣadaśam*¹ (viewing like the lamp) is formed by the suffix *ṇamul* affixed to the root *dṛś* having *dīpam* with the accusative case-ending as its own *upapada*. It is needless to elaborate that the entities like *dīṣam* (lamp) and the god (yam) are introduced as the standard and the object of comparison. The act of viewing is the common property belonging to them. And the word 'like' expressive of similitude stands deleted in the instance exemplified. (2) The implied *similis* with the ellipsis of word expressive of similitude occurring in the suffix *ṇamul* having its nominative as its *upapada* finds its expression in the sentence, namely, 'That cupid perished instantaneously like the death of the worm': For in this sentence the word '*kīṭanāśam*'² is completed with the suffix *ṇamul* which has been applied to the root *naś* with the preceding word *kīṭaḥ* as the nominative *upapada*. It is obvious that cupid and *kīṭa* (worm) are depicted as the object and the standard of comparison. Perishability is the common property pertaining to them. These factors of comparison have been mentioned in the present instance. But the word 'like', the expressive of similitude, has clearly been dropped down from it. (CM, P. 30)

1. See Pāṇini's aphorism "*upamāṇe karmaṇi ca 3, 4, 45 Bāl offers its*". meaning as follows: '*karmaṇi kartari ca upamāṇe upapade dhātor ṇamul* ity' arthaḥ/'

2. *Ibid*

(3) Implied *similis* with the ellipsis of word expressive of similitude occurring in the suffix *kyac* denoting the sense of the locative case is exemplified by the expression 'who takes the inmost recess of the heart of one engaged in the excessive meditation as his residence of the inner apartment.' This variety of *similis* takes its rise exclusively on the basis of the nominal verb *antaḥpurīyati*¹ inserted in the body of the present expression. In this context the expressions (1) *svānte* and (3) *antaḥpure* are portrayed as the object and the standard of comparison. The act of taking (*ācarati*) plays the role of the common property in connexion with them. And finally the word 'as', the expressive of similitude, has been left out in the present expression- (4) Implied *similis* with the ellipsis of word expressive of similitude occurring in the suffix *kyac* denoting the objective case is exemplified by the expression *kumārīyati* (who treats him the devotee like *kumāra*). Since the nominal verb *kumārīyati* is formed by the suffix *kyac* added to the word *kumāram* in conformity with the aphorism '*upamānād'ācare*' 3, 1. 10.' (5) Implied *similis* with the ellipsis of word expressive of similitude occurring in the suffix *kyañ* is obviously demonstrated in the expression 'who stands like the foundation pillar in the origination of the three worlds.' Since in this expression the word *mūlastambhā-*

1. The leading *vārtika* is '*Adhikaraṇācce'ti vaktavyam*', It falls under the jurisdiction of the aphorism, viz. '*upamānād'ācare* 3, 1, 10,'.

yate has been formed by the suffix *kyañ*¹ ordained to be added to the noun *mālastambha* with the nominative case-ending standing for the standard of comparison. (6) The expression 'speaking like the cuckoo (*kokilōṭ pinī*), belongs to implied with *similis* the ellipsis of word expressive of similitude appearing in the suffix *ṇin* on the ground that the suffix *ṇin* has been affixed to the root *lap* with the prefix *ā*. (7) Implied *similis* with the ellipsis of word expressive of similitude occurring in a compound is illustrated by the expression 'appearing as dark as the blue lotus' (*kuvalayaśyāmalā*): Since in this expression the entities like *kalpa* creeper and blue lotus (*kuvalaya*) stand for the object and the standard of comparison. The word dark (*śyāmalā*) partakes the character of the common property in respect of them. It is notable that the word *kuvalaya* (blue lotus) has been compounded with *śyāmalā* (dark) by the aphorism '*uḥ c m̐ n̐ n̐ s̐ m̐ ṇya varanaiḥ* 2, 1, 55.' So it is competent to illustrate the variety of elliptical *similis* as indicated above. (CM, P. 31)

Now both the sub-varieties of elliptical *similis* with the ellipsis of the standard of comparison have been illustrated by the following verse : May the worship of the enemy of *pura* (i. e. *śiva*) enlighten my mind by removing other sorts of fickleness, no dear and benign in comparison to which is found nor similar to which is even

1. The aphorism of Pāṇini is '*kartuḥkyañ salopaś ca* 3, 1, 11

heard.' In this context the sentence, viz. 'no dear and benign in comparison to which (*yatsmam*) is found' is a genuine case of implied elliptical *similis* with the ellipsis of the standard of comparison occurring in a compound. For in the expression 'in comparison to which' (*yatsmam*), the term *samam* has been compounded with the word 'yat' standing for the object of comparison. It is too obvious to elucidate that the present instance is possessed of the three factors of comparison, namely, the object of comparison, the common property and the term *Samam* as the expressive of similitude, (2) Implied elliptical *similis* with the ellipsis of the standard of comparison occurring in a sentence has been illustrated by the sentence, namely, 'nor dear and benign as similar to which *yenasamam* is even heard' on the ground that the word *sama* has been left uncompounded. (C M, P. 31)

'Alas! my mind roves in vain despite the presence of the great God (i.e. Śiva); who is heard as equal to him or who is remembered as equal to him ? Let this (mind) always behave like the sixfooted bee on both his lotus like feet and act like the cakorabird as fixed towards his face with the splendour like that of the moon.' In this verse the remaining six kinds of elliptical *similis* also have been illustrated.. Now in the second foot of the verse, namely, 'who is heard as equal to him or who is remembered as equal to him' ? the two accredited instances of elliptical *similis* with the ellipsis of

the common property occurring (1) in a sentence and (2) in a compound have been respectively exhibited. Since in the first expression 'who is heard as equal to him' the act of compounding does not take place between the words *sama* 'as equal to' and *tena* (him). It is evident that the word *tena* (him) signifies 'Śiva. So it is relevant and invested with the status of the object of comparison. It is needless to elaborate that this sentence stands characterised by the absence of the standard of comparison and the common property. In the second expression, viz. 'who is remembered as equal to him?', the term *sama* is obviously compounded with the word *tena* used in an instrumental case. So it is entitled to exemplify the above variety of elliptical *similis*. In the third foot of the verse, namely, 'let this mind act always like the six-footed bee on both his lotus like feet', the expression 'śaḍaṅghrayatu' is a valid case of implied *similis* with the ellipsis of the common property and word expressive of similitude occurring in the suffix *kṛip*. Implied *similis* with the ellipsis of common property and word expressive of similitude occurring in a compound takes place in the expression 'on both his lotus like feet *tadaṅghripaṅkajadrave*' on the basis that the act of *upamiti* compounding has occurred between the words *aṅghri* and *paṅkaja* in pursuance of the dictum? *upamitam vyāghrādibhiḥ sāmānyāprayoge* 2, 1, 56'.

(C M, P, 31)

The expression 'may act itself like the cakora-bird (*Cakorakīyatu*)' is an accredited instance of implied *similis* with the ellipsis of the word expressive of similitude and the object of comparison. It is susceptible to be elucidated.' *cakorakam iva ātmānam ācaratu* (may act itself like the cakora-bird). In this context the suffix *kyac* is added to the word *cakorakam* with the accusative case-ending standing for the standard of comparison by the aphorism 'upamānādācāre 3, 1, 10'. The word *ātmānam* (itself) is introduced as the object of comparison. And it along with the term *iva* (like) has been clearly omitted in the expression under review. So it illustrates the present variety of elliptical *similis*. And lastly implied elliptical *similis* with the ellipsis of the common property, the standard of comparison and the word expressive of similitude is brought into prominence in the expression 'his face with the splendour like the splendour of the moon (*tadānane śaṣiprabhe*)'. In this context the splendour belonging to the moon depicted as the standard of comparison stands obviously deleted. Since the word *śaṣiprabham* is expounded in the way as follows : "śaṣiprabhā iva (*manohārīṇī*) *prabhā yasya tat*." It is completed by means of *bahuvrīhi* compound. The word *prabhā* (splendour belonging to the face) is compounded with the word *śaṣiprabhā*. The subsequent word of this compound, that is to say, the word *prabhā* of the word *śaṣiprabhā* has been omitted. All this occurs in strict compliance with the *vārtika* "saptamyupamāna pūrvagadasy'

ottaropada loṣaś'ca" which falls under the sphere of operation of the aphorism of Fāṇini, viz. "*anekam anyatādūrthe* 2. 2, 24." It is too obvious to reiterate that the omission of the standard of comparison has caused the elision of even the common property and the word expressive of similitude in conformity with this *vṛtika*. In this way the remaining six varieties of elliptical *similis* have been ascertained in their respective manner, (CM, P. 31)

SECTION III

The Evaluation of the classification of Elliptical *Similis*

Now the above classification of the figure *similis* into the complete and elliptical *similis* pertaining to the specific subvariety of the sentence, compound and the suffix has got only ostensible objective of demonstrating adaptation relating to the formation of the words in compliance with the science of grammar. And it is worthy of remark that this meticulous ramification cannot be entitled to an excessively elaborate treatment in the rhetorical discipline. Nor this division of the elliptical *Similis* has been exhibited in its entirety. Let the position be rendered clear. 'Elliptical *similis* with the ellipsis of the common property has been shown as occurring in a sentence, in a compound and in a nominal suffix. But it is found as taking place even in the case of reduplication. An instance may be cited on the point. 'Devadatta behaving like proficient (*paṭupatūr Devadattah*).' In this context the word *paṭu* proficient denotative of merit has been reduplicated in the sense of similitude by Pāṇini's aphorism *Prk. regu 3.1. racanasya* 8, 1, 12.' Now 'like the proficient' is the simple

Cf. the elucidation of the aphorism '*prakāre guṇavacanasya* 8, 1, 12' as occurs in the *Siddhanta kaumudī* '*sādrśye dyotyē guṇavacanasya doḥ ślas tac ca karmadhārayavat| Karmadhārayavaduttare. u* 8, 1, 11 *ity'adhikārat| Tena pūrvabhāgasya pūrvad bhāvah, samāsasya* 6, 1, 223 *ity'antodattatvam ca|*'

meaning of the word *paṭupaṭuḥ*. That is to say, the person who lacking proficiency in the śāstras behaves like a proficient is designated as *paṭupaṭuḥ*. This instance cannot be considered as elliptical *similis* with the ellipsis of the common property occurring in a sentence. Since this reduplicated word, viz, *paṭupaṭuḥ* has been ordained as plausible instance of *Karmadhāraya* compound in compliance with the dictum, viz: *Karmadhārayavaduttareṣu* 8, 1, 11.' And as such the present expression has failed to be consisting of more than one word out of deference to the intrinsic nature of the compound which implies the numerical unity of its constitutive members. And as a result of this it is debarred from holding the status of a sentence. For a sentence is admittedly constituted of more than one word. And it is due to its being a plausible case of the *Karmadhāraya* (appositional compound) that the expression, viz. Devadatta behaving like proficient' *paṭupaṭur* Devadattaḥ) has lost its claim to belong to elliptical *similis* with the ellipsis of the common property occurring in a compound. For the appositional compound does not actually take place in this sentence. But it has been only assumed here to facilitate the operation of other aphorisms essential for its formation. Thus it is indisputably a case of implied elliptical *similis* with the ellipsis of the common property occurring in reduplication. (CM, PP, 31-32)

Jagannātha's appraisalment

Jagannātha critically examines the above facts serving as the basis of the emergence of the novel variety

of elliptical *similis* with the ellipsis of the common property occurring in reduplication (*dvitthāva*). The instance of this variety has been cited by Appaya Dīkṣita by means of the following sentence 'Paṭipāṭur Devadattaḥ' (Devadatta is behaving like proficient). It is beyond dispute that the present sentence along with the ellipsis of the common property exhibits also the ellipsis of the word expressive of similitude. So it should have been exemplified as a case of the additional variety of elliptical *similis* with the ellipsis of common property and the word expressive of similitude (*vācaka dharma luptā*) occurring in reduplication. But it cannot be an appropriate illustration of elliptical *similis* with the ellipsis of only the common property occurring in reduplication as has been intended to be understood by the author of the *Citramīmāṃsā*. Since the expression, viz. *dharma lupta* (elliptical *similis* with the ellipsis of the common property) is designed to indicate in a different way by Mammata and others. That is to say, this expression has been used in a restrictive sense, namely, *dharma mitra lupta* (elliptical *similis* with the ellipsis of exclusively the common property). Otherwise the variety of elliptical *similis* with the ellipsis of three factors of comparison and the varieties of elliptical *similis* with the ellipsis of two factors of comparison will be liable to be presumed under the compass of the types of elliptical *similis* with the ellipsis of one factor of comparison. To put it the other way round, the varieties of elliptical

similis, viz. (1) with the ellipsis of common property, (2) with the ellipses of word expressive of similitude and (3) with the ellipsis of the standard of comparison will come in a position to include the other varieties of elliptical *similis* with the ellipsis of either two or three factors of comparison. And consequently the distinct mention of the varieties of elliptical *similis* with the ellipsis of two factors of comparison and the variety of elliptical *similis* with the ellipsis of three factors of comparison will be unreasonable. So the instance under examination cannot illustrate the type of elliptical *similis* as has been exemplified by the author of the *citramīmāṃsā*¹.

It may be urged in defence that the instance, viz. *pa'upaṭur Devadattaḥ* (Devadatta is behaving like proficient) is distinctly marked with the presence of reduplication which evidently plays the role of the word expressive of similitude. And the fact is simple. The word *paṭu* (proficient) signifying quality has been reduplicated in the sense of similitude in obedience to the aphorism of Pāṇini, viz. *prakāre guṇa vacanasya* 8, 1, 12. So this sentence obviously lacks in the ellipsis of word expressive of similitude. As a result of it, this sentence can claim to be a genuine instance of elliptical *similis* with the ellipsis of only the common property occurring in reduplication².

1. RG, P. 170

2. *Ibid*

But this advocacy cannot carry conviction. Since under no condition the reduplication can partake the character of the word expressive of similitude. For it will involve a direct conflict with the *Mahābhāṣya* and the observations of Kaiyaṭa and others. The aphorism of Pāṇini, viz, '*Prakāre guṇavacanasya*, 8, 1, 12 has been explained in the *Mahābhāṣya* of patañjali. Kaiyaṭa, the celebrated exponent of the *Mahābhāṣya* has shed a flood of light by a specific reference to the context '*siddhantu*' as occurring in it. The explanation offered by Kaiyaṭa is as follows. "In this occasion the word *paṭu* (proficient) is the exclusive sphere of reduplication. So this word is actually reduplicated. And as a result of it, it is not similarity (*prakāra*) but the meaning of the word *paṭu* which will be invested with the status of the substantive. That is to say, the expression, viz. *paṭupaṭuḥ* is bound to convey the meaning 'like-proficient' in opposition to the meaning 'proficient-like.' The ground is obvious. *Prakāra* (similarity) is something signifying quality (*guṇa*). If the similarity is assigned the status of the substantive in the event of reduplication, the employment of the expression, viz. *guṇavacana* (the word signifying quality) in this aphorism would be rendered redundant. Since the words signifying similarity are nothing but the words signifying quality. So no words which are other than signifying quality can fall under the jurisdiction of this aphorism even in the deletion of the expression *guṇavacana* from it. That is to say, there is

not the possibility of any breach regarding the applicability of this aphorism which may justify the presence of this proviso in it. But notwithstanding this fact Pāṇini has inserted it in the present aphorism. The consideration of this fact renders it imperative that the meaning of this aphorism should be stated in the way as follows.' The word which is uniformly known as signifying quality becomes reduplicated if there is the indication of similitude.'¹

A deeper probe into the above facts puts it into clear perspective that the word *dvirbhāva* (reduplication) is but the suggester (*dyotaka*) of similitude. And it can in no way be the expressive (*vācaka*) of similitude. So the sentence under examination is manifestly marked by even the ellipsis of the word expressive of similitude. And as a result of it, it has a legitimate claim to be considered as the instance of elliptical *similis* with the ellipsis of word expressive of similitude and the common property occurring in reduplication. But under no circumstances it can be an authentic instance of elliptical *similis* with the ellipsis of only the common property occurring in reduplication. If the expression *dyotaka* (suggester) of similitude were stressed to be equivalent with the expression *vācaka* (expressive) of similitude in the present context, then the author of the *Citramīmāṃsā* may remain

content with his own position. For even this concession will not enable the opponent to retrieve his position smashed by the impact of devastating criticism'.

Further the six varieties of elliptical *similis* with the ellipsis of word expressive of similitude without occurring in the suffix *nin* have been demonstrated by some rhetoricians¹. And others have included the suffix *nin* thus assigning to it the seventh place in the order of classification conceived by them. But not only this, it is also illustrated as occurring in the suffix *kvip* and in the nominal suffix. Let it be rendered clear by a concrete illustration. 'Even this world plays the role similar to the emancipation due to its being filled with happiness to the devotees of the god Śiva..... the mortal not paying adoration to him is verily a man of straw due to the non-fulfilment of the welfare of his own self.' This has already been referred to and elaborated. In the present context the nominal verb *apavargati* 'playing the role similar to the emancipation' has become a valid case of elliptical *similis* with the ellipsis of word expressive of similitude occurring in the suffix *kvip*. Since in this instance the complete elision of the suffix *kvip* affixed to the word *apavarga* takes place by entailing upon the ellipsis of the word *iva* expressive of similitude. Consequently, it deserves to be considered as elliptical *similis* with the ellipsis of word expressive of

1. *Ibid*

similitude occurring in the suffix *kvip*. Further the word *cañcā* employed in the same verse signifying like the man of straw has been an accredited instance of elliptical *similis* with the ellipsis of word expressive of similitude occurring in a nominal suffix. The obvious reason is this. The nominal suffix *kan* in the sense of similitude affixed to the word *cancā* has been elided with the result that the ellipsis of the word *iva* expressive of similitude takes place without any impediment in the present instance. (CM, P. 32)

Now the elliptical *similis* with the ellipsis of the standard of comparison has already been illustrated as occurring (1) in a sentence and (2) in a compound. But this variety of elliptical *similis* is found as taking place even in the nominal suffix in the expression, namely, 'all these occurred all on a sudden like the coincidence in connexion with the crow-cum-palm-fruit'. It has been employed in the verse beginning with *yaccorāṇām*, etc. as elucidated above. In this connexion, the word *kākatālīyam* is formed with the nominal suffix *cha* added to the compound word *kākatālam* in the sense of similitude. And consequently, the two words, viz. *kākatālam* and *kākatālīyam* are expounded in the following manner: 'like the approach of the crow and the fall of the palm-fruit' is conveyed by the word *kākatālam*; and 'like the coincidence in connexion with the crow-cum-palm-fruit' is indicated by the word *kākatālīyam*. The complete meaning of the expression *kākatālīyam* may be exhibited as follows: 'As

the killing of the crow was brought about by the falling of the palm-fruit so the murder of Devadatta was committed by suddenly approaching thieves'. Now it is obvious that the standards of comparison, viz. the approach of the crow and the fall of the palm-fruit on the one hand and the killing of the crow by the fall of the palm-fruit on the other have undoubtedly been omitted in the instance under consideration. It has been highlighted, that in the event of the factual presence of the nominal suffix *cha* in the instance *kṛkatālīyam*, the *similis* denoted by the nominal suffix *cha* is conspicuous by the ellipsis of only the standard of comparison. So it is entitled to be a valid case of the third variety of elliptical *similis* with the ellipsis of the standard of comparison occurring in a nominal suffix. It is needless to observe that this specific variety of elliptical *similis* with the ellipsis of the standard of comparison occurring in a nominal suffix does not figure in the stereotyped scheme of its classification adopted by the ancient rhetoricians. It is also worthy of mention that an authentic variety of elliptical *similis* with the ellipsis of word expressive of similitude and the standard of comparison has really been ignored to be illustrated. But even this type of elliptical *similis* occurring in a compound can easily be discerned in the compound-word *kākatālam* which is the base of the suffix *cha* in the word *kākatālīyam*. Since in the expression *kākatālam* there is the complete absence

of the suffix *cha*, the expressive of similitude and of the standards of comparison, viz. 'the approach of the crow and the fall of the palm-fruit on the one hand and the killing of the crow by the fall of the palm-fruit on the other. (CM, P 32)

Further, the elliptical *similis* with the ellipsis of the common property and the standard of comparison is discerned as occurring even in the nominal suffix. And it has found its expression in the word *kākatālīyam* in the event of the substitution of the third foot of the verse beginning with *yaccorūṇm*, etc. namely, 'all these occurred all on a sudden' by 'what do we speak these.' Since in this context the ellipsis of the common property and the standard of comparison resting on the *similis* secured as the expressed meaning of the nominal suffix *cha* in the word *kākatālīyam* serves as the surest basis of this variety of elliptical *similis* with the ellipsis of the common property and the standard of comparison occurring in the nominal suffix. But even this type of elliptical *similis* has been ignored by older rhetoricians. Again the elliptical *similis* with the ellipsis of the common property and word expressive of similitude has already been illustrated as occurring in the suffix *kvip* and in a compound by Mammata and others. But it is found as occurring even in a nominal suffix. Now this last subvariety of it may be fully exemplified in the expression, namely, 'the mortal not paying adoration to the god containing the digit of the moon is

like the man of straw in this world' which has already been explained. In this context the word *cañcā* 'like the man of straw' is constituted by the nominal suffix *Kan* in the sense of similitude. And it is elided with all its component parts. Thus as an inevitable consequence of it, the elision of the suffix *kān*, the only denotative of the common property and similitude, stands as an unrefutable ground of the ellipsis of the common property and word expressive of similitude. And it validates the right of the word *cañcā* to be considered as a case of elliptical *similis* with the ellipsis of the common property and word expressive of similitude occurring in a nominal suffix. (CM, P. 32) ;

So it has been laid bare that in respect of the division of elliptical *similis*, the present classification put forward by the anterior rhetoricians is merely illustrative and not exhaustive in its character. Those other varieties enumerated in the *Kāvyaśloka* and so forth are to be seen and ascertained in those very treatises. A succinct representation of them has been made in the present work also in connexion with the consideration of the definition of *similis*. And some other varieties of this rhetorical figure would be shown in the chapter dealing with the figure metaphor. (CM, P. 32)

CHAPTER VII

A succinct classification of *Similis* and its criticism

Moreover the figure *similis* has been succinctly represented into three-fold classification. (1) In some cases it culminates merely in revealing its own striking beauty. A relevant illustration of this type of *similis* may be exhibited in the verse beginning with *saccinnamūlah et seq.*, which has already been elucidated. The plain meaning of it may be restated as follows : 'The dust which has been severed from its source by (the flow of) blood and fanned by the wind above that blood shone like the smoke formerly risen from the fire with the charcoal as its only remnant.' In this verse, *similis* abiding in the blood and the charcoal on the one hand and the dust with its connection severed and the formerly risen smoke on the other, ultimately consummates in the manifestation of strikingness exclusively residing in its own unique self. So it illustrates the first type of *similis* as above indicated.

(C M, P. 32)

In some other cases it acts as elucidative of what has already been narrated. A concrete illustration of this specific-type of *similis* is found in the verse beginning with 'Ananta ratna', etc.

which has already been cited and expatiated upon. The English rendition may be reproduced in order to facilitate the reader. 'Snow h̄s not effaced the glory of that which is the source of innumerable jewels, for one defect becomes submerged in aggregation of merits like the black spot in the rays of the moon.' In this instance it is through the medium of *similis* that the preceding narrated fact, namely, 'snow has not effaced the glory of that which is the source of innumerable jewels' has been established and confirmed by the form of *similis*, namely, 'one defect becomes submerged in aggregation of merits like the black spot in the rays of the moon'. Or the instance: 'The crime of the murder of the trusted committed by the wicked person results in his own destruction by inciting the wrath of the hero like the sound of the wild tree broken by the elephant which robs the sleep of the lion'. In this verse the fact, that is, 'the crime of the murder of the trusted, etc.' depicted by the first part of the instance has been universally known and recognised. And it is being confirmed by means of *similis* expressed in the sentence, namely, like the sound of the wild tree broken by the elephant which robs the sleep of the lion.' So these examples fall under the second category of the figure *similis*. (CM, P. 32)

(3) In some other instances it is predominant in its suggested character. And this specific variety of *similis* is susceptible to three fold assortment on the basis of the three fold classification of the suggested sense, namely, (1) the matter of fact, (2) the poetic figure and (3) the poetic sentiment (*rasa*). Now the suggestion of the matter of fact may be illustrated by the following instance : 'In whose hand the sword was observed by the heroes in battle like the side-glance of *kālī* with its splendour reddened excessively by wrath, for it (the sword) shone red with deeply applied thick blood due to its entrance into the iron like wide surface of the forehead of the redolent elephants (*gandhogaja*) blinded with intoxication'.¹ In this instance the similarity subsists between the sword shining red with deeply applied thick blood and the side glance of *kālī* with its splendour reddened excessively by wrath. And the depiction of this similarity culminates in the suggestion of the matter of fact, that is, the whole army of the enemy would be massacred in an instant.' It is needless to elaborate that this suggested matter of fact is predominant in its intrinsic worth. So it exemplifies the type of *similis* as referred to above. (CM, P. 33)

The suggestion of an embellishment is rendered prominent by the following instance : 'O king ! this sky in the face of your expanding fame white like the lustre of

1. KP, P. 137 (reads 'śociḥ for' *rocīḥ*) SR, P. 125, §1. 6; AM, P. 109 (reads 'saṁkrāṇta for *saṁkrāṇti* and 'śociḥ for' *rocīḥ*).

the rays of the cold rayed (i. e., moon) appears like a black bee on the lotus.' In this verse the figure *similis* takes place between the fame and the lotus on the one hand and the sky and the black bee on the other. It culminates in the apprehension of the expansion of the fame in resemblance to the lotus and in the smallness of the sky in comparison to the black bee. This inconformity in respect of the containers, viz. the expanded fame and the lotus on the one hand and the contents (*ādheya*), namely, the sky and the black bee on the other paves the way for the suggestion of the poetic figure entitled *adhika*.¹ The suggestion of the poetic sentiment *rasa* stands illustrated by the verse beginning with '*vāgarthāviva, etc.*' which has already been explained. The simple meaning of the verse may be restated for the sake of convenience : 'I pay obeisance to Pārvatī and Supreme Lord, the parents of the universe united eternally like the word and its meaning in order to obtain the knowledge of the word and its meaning.' In this verse the poetic sentiment (*rasa*), viz. the unsurpassable mutual love abiding in Pārvatī and Supreme Lord has been clearly suggested by means

1. Campare "mahator yan mahīyāmsāv" - āśritāśrayayoh kramāt /
 Āśrayaśrayiṇau syātām tanutve'py'adhikaṁ tu tat ||
 Āśritaṁ adheyam āśrayas tadā dharaḥ tayoṛ mahator api viṣaye
 tadapekṣayā tanū apy' āśrayāśrayiṇau prastuta vastu prakarsaviva-
 kṣayā yathākramam yat adhikataratām vrajataḥ tad idaṁ dvividhām
 adhikaṁ nāma 'v/ KP, PP.723-24

of depiction of the similitude instituted between the word and its meaning and 'Tārvatī and Supreme Lord' which stand in relation of the standard and the object of comparison. (CM, P. 33)

Further, all the three kinds of the suggested sense, viz. (1) the matter of fact (2) a poetic figure and (3) poetic sentiment are found to be exemplified in one and the same verse. 'Behold, in this lotus-leaf the crane appears like a pearl-oyster carefully placed on the vessel made of emerald.' In this context a secret lover intends to ask as to what will be their appointed place of union. But he has not asked this in presence of other people. And as such the cultured lady-love understood the secret intention of her paramour by his gesture. Afterwards she utters these words with a view to indicating the contemplated place of their meeting. Now in this verse the similitude has been represented as abiding in the crane sitting on the lotus-leaf and the pearl-oyster placed in the vessel made of emerald. It is through the portrayal of the present similitude that the motionlessness of the crane like that of the pearl-oyster has been fully apprehended and thereby the equanimity and confidence of the crane has been suggested. And this suggested confidence resulted in suggesting the complete seclusion of the place which is recognised as a matter of fact. In the event of the presence of a person in that place cannot be expected to remain in a fixed posture indicative of its lack of fear and anxiety. Afterwards, that is, the appointed place of their union has been clearly disclosed

And as such the disclosure of this subtle meaning paves the way for the suggestion of a rhetoric figure entitled subtle (*sūkṣma*)¹ in the very context. In this way the description consistent with the intention of the paramour results in the suggestion of the mutual erotic sentiment and as such it is accorded the status of the suggestion of poetic sentiment (*rasadhvani*) in the realm of poetry. (CM, PP. 33-34)

A pertinent question arises. In the case of the suggestion of poetic sentiment and so forth, the convention is prevalent to the effect that the order of sequence subsisting between the poetic sentiment (*rasa*) on the one hand and its excitants, ensuants and so forth on the other is entirely imperceptible. So in what way is it possible to represent the poetic sentiment *rasa* as suggested by way of *anuprāṇa*, that is to say, in imitation of jingling sound of the bell thus rendering the order of sequence perceptible between the poetic sentiment on the one hand and its excitants and so forth on the other. But this is not tenable since the imperceptible order of sequence takes place only in the case where the manifestation of the poetic sentiment *rasa* is being experienced instantaneously by means of the power of its excitants, ensuants and so forth. In other cases even in the suggestion of poetic sentiment and so forth, the order of sequence is clearly

— “*Kuto'pi lakṣitaḥ sūkṣmā'py'artho'nyasmāi prakā'yate | Dharmas-
tenacid yatra tat sūkṣmāṁ paricakṣate ||*” KP, P. 71 §

perceptible. And this stands confirmed by the observation of the celebrated rhetorician *Abhinavaguptapāda* as follows*: ‘*Albeit* the poetic sentiment, latent emotion and such other things are invariably susceptible to the act of suggestion and in no case they can assume the form of the expressed meaning, yet all of them cannot claim to be the exclusive object of the suggestion in which the order of sequence is totally imperceptible. And so on this very ground even the pioneer of *dhvani* school has illustrated the transitory feeling, viz bashfulness by way of *anuraṇana*, that is to say, in imitation of the jingling sound of bell by the following verse : ‘when the godly seer spoke like this, Pārvatī with her face directed downward began to count the petals of the lotuses intended for sport by the side of her father.¹ In this verse the gradual development of bashfulness of Pārvatī has been suggested by way of *Anuraṇana* which is usually placed on a par with the jingling sound of the bell thus indicating the perceptibility of its own sequence. (CM, P. 34)

Jagannātha's criticism

Jagannātha has not failed to offer his trenchant criticism of the classification of the figure *similis* as has been set forth under three heads by the author of the *Citramīmāṃsā*. These three varieties of the figure *similis*

1. KS, Canto 6, 4.. 84; DL, P. 176; SKB, P. 586; KNS, P. 108; RG, P. 107; A. M, P. 80

are: (1) In some cases it culminates exclusively in revealing its own strikingness. (2) In some other cases it acts as elucidative of what has been narrated and (3) in some other instances it is predominant in its suggested character. And they have been exemplified by Appaya Dīkṣita at considerable length. But the author of the *Rasagaṅgādhara* holds that the present classification is not founded on solid basis. Since it fails to take stalk of the type of *similis* which embellishes the matter of fact appearing as directly expressed. It may be elucidated by a concrete instance: 'your face resembling the autumnal moon may cool my eyes *et seq*'. In this example the similarity existing between her face and the autumnal moon is exclusively aimed at embellishing the act of cooling of the eyes which is a matter of fact in its essential nature. And as such it becomes directly expressed by the expression 'may cool' (*śiśirīkarotu*) as employed in the present instance¹.

It deserves mention that in the present case, the alleged similarity cannot culminate in exclusively revealing its own strikingness. Since it is not principal in its essential quality. On the contrary, it has been employed to answer other purposes, namely, that of lending charm to the act of cooling which stands directly expressed. So it is bound to play the role of a subordinate in relation to

the act of cooling which in fact is the principal. And it is beyond dispute that the subordinate cannot enjoy autonomy in the vicinity of the principal. So the instance under review cannot be subsumed under the fold of the first variety of the figure *similis* above indicated. Nor is there any accredited norm that an embellishment remains uniformly reserved for embellishing only the fact which has been suggested. If it be the case, the present similarity will not be accorded the status of an embellishment. For it is designed to embellish the fact, that is, the act of cooling which is not suggested but directly expressed in the instance under reference. Consequently, this instance cannot become deprived of its right to be an authentic case of *similis qua* poetic figure. It is too conspicuous to elaborate that this instance cannot be included under the remaining two varieties of the figure *similis* bifurcated by Appaya Dīkṣita. So the classification evolved by the opponent remains exposed to the charge of non-comprehensiveness¹.

Jagannātha raises another objection. The opponent has set forth the present classification of *similis* with a view to comprehending the instance of *similis* with the similarity culminating exclusively in revealing its own strikingness. Further he has endeavoured hard to preclude the cases of the suggested *similis* from the sphere of operation

of *similis qua* poetic figure. And for this purpose he has laid undue emphasis on the employment of the adjective, viz. possessed with the fact of non-suggestedness in the definition of *similis qua* poetic figure. This is bound to entail an absurd consequence. Since the similarity culminating in revealing its own strikingness stands on a par with the suggested *similis* so far the question of their relative supremacy is concerned. So the attempt for the inclusion of the former and that for the exclusion of the latter has become abortive.

Moreover the arbitrary exclusion of that which ought to be included and conversely the inclusion of that which ought to be excluded has occasioned preposterous predicament. It stands in need of elaboration. The present classification is inclusive of the instance of *similis* with the similarity culminating in exclusively revealing its own strikingness which in reality cannot be an authentic instance of *similis qua* poetic figure. Since this similarity without holding the status of the principal cannot culminate exclusively in revealing its own strikingness. So it cannot be invested with the rank of an embellishment in the instance under review. Over and above, the definition of the figure *similis* framed by the opponent is not comprehensive of an accredited instance of suggested *similis qua* poetic figure. And the charge of non-comprehensiveness against this definition in connection with suggested *similis*

qua poetic figure has already been substantiated by means of the verse beginning with 'why do you rejoice *et seq*'.

It is remarkable that the ancient rhetoricians have formulated the definition of *similis* without referring to its specific characteristics. Such definition is capable of including the *similis* which is directly expressed like the *similis* which stands suggested. So even the subsumption of *similis* culminating exclusively in revealing its own strikingness under the province of the figure *similis* cannot be regarded as unjustified in the light of the observations of the ancients. And as such they are diametrically opposite to the view held by the opponent in the matter of the formulation of the definition of the figure *similis*. The situation demands clarification. The opponent by means of his effort has succeeded in excluding the cases of the suggested *similis* from the jurisdiction of the figure *similis*. And he has proclaimed in distinct voice to have formulated the definition of the figure *similis* in total preclusion of the other varieties of similarity. The overall consequence is that he has hopelessly failed to comprise an instance of *similis* with the similarity culminating exclusively in revealing its own strikingness under the province of the figure *similis*. Since this similarity due to its principal position cannot be

placed in the rank of an embellishment.¹

The opponent makes a desperate bid to defend his position. He holds that in the instance forming the subject-matter of dispute the *similis* subsists between the two entities, viz. (1) 'the dust severed from its source by the blood and fanned by the wind above that blood' and (2) the smoke formerly risen from the fire with the charcoal as its only remnant'. And this similarity may be considered as embellishing the fact, that is, ferocious fight which stands as the suggested import of the complete verse. But this is absolutely untenable. Since the opponent has himself averred that this similarity culminates exclusively in revealing its own strikingness. And this averment involves contradiction due to the fact that this similarity by discharging the function of the principal cannot act as the embellisher of the other.²

Jagannātha exposes the glaring impropriety of the opponent even in regard to the type of *similis* falling under the second head of the present classification. This type of *similis* has been illustrated by the verse commencing with '*Ananta ratna et seq*'. The English rendition of the verse may be reproduced for the sake of convenience: 'Snow has not effaced the glory of that

1. RG, P. 180

2. Ibid

which is the source of innumerable jewels, for one defect becomes submerged in the aggregation of merits like the black spot in the rays of the moon.' In this instance the general statement, viz. 'one defect is not counted as the actual fault abiding in the same locus together with the assemblage of merits' acts as confirmatory of the meaning expressed by the former half of the present verse. And this general statement cannot correctly be understood without referring to a specific instance analogous to it. So the poet has exemplified it in the way as follows: 'like the black spot in the rays of the moon.' In this particular instance the black spot, though really a fault, is not considered as such due to its co-existence with the rays of the moon in the self-same locus. But this ultimate part of this verse, i. e. 'like the black spot in the rays of the moon' has not been represented as the standard of comparison in relation to the general statement, viz. (one fault becomes submerged in the assemblage of merits).¹

It is an avowed fact that there cannot be any basic difference between the particular and the general. In the present instance the expression, viz. 'like the black spot in the rays of the moon' is really a particular assertion with reference to the expression, viz. one fault becomes sub-merged in the assemblage of merits which on the other hand is a general assertion in its essential nature. So the former cannot claim to be basically

distinct from the latter. And the absence of distinction between these supposed object and the standard of comparison accounts for non-accomplishment of the function of similisation in the case under review. So under no circumstances, the present instance can be an authentic case of *similis qua* rhetorical figure. On the other hand, it falls under the range of operation of an additional specific type of rhetorical figure termed exemplification (*ud-haraṇa*). The position deserves clarification. In the present context, Jagannātha cites the aphorism of Paṇini viz. *Iko'yaṇaci* 6, 1, 77' as an instance exactly similar to the case under examination. The simple meaning of it is this. 'Ika, namely, the letters *i u ṛ* and *ṛ* followed by *ac*, viz. the letters *a, i, u, ṛ, l, e, o, ai*, and *au* is substituted by *yaṇ*, viz. the letters *y, r, l* and *v* in coalescence. This meaning expressed through the medium of the sentence is a general assertion. And a particular assertion in agreement to it is cited out in order to grasp the real significance of it. This is indicated by another distinct sentence : 'like the letter, *i*, followed by the letter *u* occurring as the constitutive element of the expression (*dadhyudaka*), that is, *dadhi udaka* (water of the curd) is substituted by the letter, *y*. This particular assertion is made with a view to ratifying the meaning of the present aphorism which is general in its essential nature. But it cannot occupy the status of the standard of comparison although placed before *iva*, the expressive of similitude,

Similar is the case even with the instance under critical analysis. And its implication has been above elucidated. The elaboration of the viewpoints of Jagannātha with reference to this instance is to be found in his *Rasagaṅgā-dhara* in connection with the consideration of the figure exemplification.¹

A subtle analysis of the suggestion of the figure *similis*

Now the suggestions of the figure *similis* arising from the context of the possibility of the suggestedness of *similis* are being analysed and illustrated. Among them, the suggestion of *similis* arising from the power of words is exemplified by the following verse: 'This is nothing but the very capability of these (the students) that in the event of the impartation of the series of more perspicuous speech to them (the students) endowed with a sharp mind by one (the preceptor) standing as a treasure of learnings in accordance with his own will, some of them acquire knowledge and others do not (appears like the very nature of those flowers that in the event of the scattering of the assemblage of the shining rays over the flowers by the treasure of the digits, i. e. the moon, only a few of them do flower and others do not)'. In this context *albeit* the students in general receive instructions from one and the same preceptor, still only a few of them acquire efficiency and others do not. And this discrimi-

nation in their knowledge is not produced by the difference in the mode of teachings imparted to them by the preceptor who teaches. But it is all due to their own natural propensity of mind that only a few of them are able to achieve distinction in the field of learnings. (CM, P. 34)

Now in relation to this meaning of the verse which is relevant (*prakṛta*) to all intents and purposes, the irrelevant (*aprahṛta*) meaning of this verse indicated above is assumed as endowed with the attribute of standing for the standard of comparison. And as a consequence of this, the rhetorical figure *similis* stands in this context as exclusively suggested by the way as follows: 'As notwithstanding the fact that the moon scatters without any partiality the assemblage of its rays upon all varieties of flowers, only a few of them, viz. lily and so forth get themselves bloomed and others, viz. the lotus and so forth do not. And as such this marked difference in the act of their flowering rests solely on the specific nature of the different species of the flowers and is not effected by the partial attribute on the part of the rays of the moon. Similarly although the one and the same preceptor delivers lectures on scriptures towards all his students without any predilection towards any of them yet a clear distinction in the matter of their knowledge and ignorance becomes visible in them. And this distinction too is brought about by the very nature of those disciples who are endowed with the distinct natural faculties. (CM, P. 34)

Now it is worthy of mention that the words *go*, *sumanaś* and *kalānidhi* which are the principal factors for substantiating the suggestion of the figure *similis*, are clearly paronomastic in character. And consequently, these three words denote the double meanings, viz. speech and rays, one with sharp mind and flowers and the treasure of learnings and the treasure of digits in their respective order. Thus the consideration of the above facts puts it into a clear perspective that the figure *similis* has not been suggested here in one sweep but in a gradual unfoldment of the senses of the verse. That is to say, its suggestion has occurred in the manner of *anuraṇana* resembling the jingling sound of the bell. Besides, this suggestion of *similis* is effected exclusively by the power of the paronomastic words. Since the words like *go*, *sumanaś* and *kalānidhi* considered as the chief ground of the suggestion of *similis* cannot bear their alteration by their own synonyms like *vāk* (speech) and so forth in the present context. The plain argument of it is that their synonyms, viz. *vāk* and so forth will fail to convey the two meanings, viz. the speech and the rays in all conceivable ways. So this instance is entitled to illustrate the suggestion of the figure *similis* arising from the power of words. (CM, PP. 34-35)

Moreover, the suggestion of the figure *similis* brought about by the matter of fact based on the power of the meaning is exemplified by the following verse: 'O wind! blow on where the lady-love lives;

after touching her, I had a touch even to me; since the contact of my body is with you and the union of my eyes will be with the moon'. In this context the figure *similis* resting on the similitude of the face of Sītā with the moon has been suggested by the expression, namely, 'the union of my eyes will be with the moon' which is purely a matter of fact in its nature. The distinctive feature of the power of the meaning from that of the word serving as the basis of the suggestion may be laid bare by the following fact. The suggestion of *similis* will encounter no obstruction in the matter of its awareness although the words are substituted by their synonyms. But the case is entirely different with the power of word where the substitution by synonyms will prove fatal. (CM, P. 35)

Further the suggestion of the figure *similis* by an independent rhetorical figure may be apprehended in the following instance.' 'In the battle, you while slaying your adversaries are seen by whom (your enemies) with your forehead wounded due to the stroke of the barbed missile (*prāsa*) and with your forehead reddened with the flow of the thick blood, afterwards whose (of those enemies) curiosity set at rest in the enemy of Tripura (i. e. Śiva) who is excessively bright with the assemblage of the flame of the fire of the eyes begot in course of burning the body of cupid (*Kāma*) which grew intolerable' In this verse the third variety of the *acoreḍi-*

ted rhetorical figure entitled 'extraordinary (*viśeṣa*) has been obviously discernible. It may be defined as follows : 'when a person represented as engaged in the performance of a distinct work is again represented as engaging himself to the performance of a different work which cannot be performed by the same effort, it receives the designation of the figure extraordinary.'¹ Now the figure is conspicuously present in the assertion that his enemies, represented as viewing him (the king) in the form already delineated in the verse, could see the enemy of Tripura (i. e. Śiva) with his adjective as narrated in the present illustration. It cannot be contended that the act of viewing as explicitly mentioned in this verse has no connexion with the act of performing a work which is laid down as an element of the body of the definition of the figure extraordinary. Since the verb 'to perform a work' is universal in character. So its existence is assuredly admitted in the act of viewing which is particular in its nature. It is true that the act of viewing *darśana* is not directly expressed by the expression 'set at rest (*astamgatam*) employed in the latter half of the verse owing to their lacking identity. But still it will produce no incompatibility

1. Confer : ' *vinā prasiddham ādhāram ādheyasya vyavasthitiḥ* | *Ekam yugapadvṛttir ekasyā'nekagocarā* || *Anyat prakurvataḥ kāryam aśāśāḥ āvyavastunah* | *Tathaiva karaṇam ceti viśeṣas trividhaḥ smṛtaḥ* - KP, P. 741

in the matter of the materialization of the figure extraordinary in the present case. Since the sense of the act of viewing has been suggested by the meaning of the full expression, viz. curiosity set at rest in him (i. e. Śiva) as employed in the instance. Now by means of this figure extraordinary elucidated by the immediately preceding lines, the figure *similis* is palpably suggested by the expression as follows: 'you, at that time, in the form already narrated were standing like the enemy of *Tripura* (i. e. Śiva)'. In this way the mode of the classification of *similis* has been indicated.

CHAPTER VIII

A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE DEFECTS OF *SIMILIS*

SECTION I

Now the author of *Citramīmāṃsā* addresses himself to an elaborate consideration of the defects of the figure *similis*. The defects deserving enumeration are six in number : (1) inferiority of the standard of comparison ; (2) excessive superiority of the standard of comparison debarring the possibility of similitude with the object of comparison ; (3) difference in gender ; (4) difference in number (5) dissimilarity and (6) impossibility.

(1) The defect entitled inferiority of the standard of comparison occurs due to the lowering down of the standard of comparison than the object of comparison. (2) The defect styled excessive superiority of the standard of comparison debarring the possibility of similitude with the object of comparison is produced by the inordinate exaggeration of the standard of comparison than the object of comparison. Again each of these two types of defects admits of three-fold subdivision on the basis of (1) birth (2) infringement of the authoritative pre-convention and (3) attribute. In respect of these subvarieties (1) the defect of inferiority of the standard of comparison based on birth is exemplified in the following way : 'you displayed great heroism like a

candālas'.¹ In this context the standard of comparison, viz. '*candālas*' has been lowered down than its object of comparison due to their low birth. (2) Inferiority of the standard of comparison based on the infringement of the authoritative poetic convention is exhibited in the following instance : 'This sun shines like a spark of fire'.² Here the spark of fire represented as the standard of comparison is inferior to an excessive degree in comparison to 'the sun' which is the object of comparison. And such mode of expression directly militates against the recognised convention prevalent in the world of litterateur. (CM, P. 35)

(3) The defect of excessive superiority of the standard of comparison debarring the possibility of similitude with the object of comparison based on birth may be exemplified as follows : 'This *cakravāka* sitting in a brooding posture appears like the Lord Creator desirous to create peoples in the beginning of *yuga*.'³ In this verse Lord Creator depicted as the standard of comparison in relation to *Cakrvāka* appears excessively superior to him in connexion with his birth. This fact makes the instance a victim to the charge of excessive

1. KRS, 4, 2, 9; KP, 773; AM, P. 334 AK, P.¹⁴⁹

2. KRS, 4, 2; KP, P. 773

3. KṚ, chap. 2, §1 55 (reads *Brahmā* for *Vedhā*); SKB, P. 42 (reads *Brahmā* for *Vedhā*); KP, P. 773; KNS, P. 200 (reads *Brahmā* as *Vedhā*), AM, P. 334

self-comparison in the shape of their exclusion cannot be obtained from this instance in any conceivable ways. Again in the self-same way, the other instance too is bound to share the same fate. And it has already been exhibited by the verse as follows. 'The thousand rayed (i. e. the sun) bore the novel umbrella constructed by the maker of divine implements (*tvastṛ*) for the sake of him (Hara), and he (Hara) on his part with his crest in proximity to the very linen cloth of it (umbrella) appeared, as it were, with the head upon which the Ganges was falling down.' Even in this instance, the only one entity, viz. Hara has been clearly portrayed as possessed with the fact of becoming the standard and the object of comparison under the domain of one *similis*. But it is not treated as a valid case of self-comparison. (CM, P. 48)

Now the opponent raises a poser. It is obvious that in none of these three preceding instances the only one entity *qua* substantive has been introduced as endowed with the fact of becoming the standard and the object of comparison. The reason lies in the fact that in the first example, the fact of becoming the standard and the object of comparison is accorded to Raghupati's treatment towards virtue and so forth and his treatment towards his younger brothers. In the second instance the two factors, viz. (1) the forsaking of the earth and (2) the forsaking of Sītā have been invested with the status of the standard and the object of

superiority of the standard of comparison debarring the possibility of similitude with the object of comparison based on birth. (4) The defect entitled excessive superiority of the standard of comparison debarring the possibility of similitude with the object of comparison based on the infringement of the authoritative poetic convention has been manifested in the instance as follows : 'your navel appears like the nether region, your breasts resemble the two mountains and again this braid of your hairs is in similarity to the fall of the river kālindī.' In this instance there is a boundless exaggeration of the standards of comparison, namely, the nether region and so forth in relation to their objects of comparison, viz. the navel and the like at the point of the infringement of the, authoritative poetic convention. And as a result of it, there occurs a clear violation of authoritative poetic convention. Now it transpires on scrutiny that the relevant meanings of these four preceding instances have been derogated by the employment of these standards of comparison, viz, *candālas* and others. And consequently

-
1. KRS 4, 2, 11, (reads *stanau kṣītidharopamau for parvatāv'iva ca stanau*),. SR, P. 312, §1. 10, KP, P. 773 (reads *te nābhiḥ for nābhis te* and *stanau kṣītidharopamau for parvatāv'iva ca stanau* KNS, P. 200 (reads *stanau kṣītidharopamau for parvatāv'iva ca stanau*),. AM, P. 335 (reads *stanau kṣītidharopamau for parvatāv'iva ca stanau*),. AK, P. 150 (reads *stanau kṣītidharopamau for parvatāv'iva ca stanau*)

these four subvarieties of the two types of defects entitled (1) inferiority of the standard of comparison and (2) excessive superiority of the standard of comparison debarring the possibility of similitude with the object of comparison have ultimately culminated in the recognised literary defect called improper signification. (CM, PP. 35-36)

Further the remaining two subvarieties of inferiority of the standard of comparison and (2) excessive superiority of the standard of comparison debarring the possibility of similitude with the object of comparison based on attribute will be subsumed within the fold of the two accredited literary defects entitled (1) deficiency of words and (2) redundant words. Their examples may be set forth in the following order: (1) 'That seer (Nārada) bearing the woven cloth in the form of black skin of the antelope and marked by the thread of Munja grass shone like the sun embraced by the piece of the dark cloud'¹. (2) 'That kṛṣṇa with his yellow dress and bearing the bow of horn made his body both fascinating and ferocious like the cloud possessed with the flash of lightning and the rain-bow at night when it comes into contact with the moon². In the first instance the standard of comparison, namely, the sun embraced by the piece of the dark

1 KRS 4, 2, 9; KP, P. 773, AK, P. 150 (reads *maurvyā* for *mauñjyā*).

2. KV, chap. 2, śl. 58? SKB, P. 119 KP, P. 774

cloud has been represented as modified by only one attribute. Whereas its object of comparison, namely, the seer stands as associated with two attributes, viz. (1) the cloth of the black skin of the antelope and (2) the thread of Munja grass. Consequently the standard of comparison is obviously lacking in one attribute in the shape of the flash of lightning. And it ought to have been possessed by the sun in reflection of the thread of Munja grass which is an additional attribute of the object of comparison, viz. 'the seer'. Thus the defect of inferiority of the standard of comparison based on the attribute is apparent in this instance. In the second instance the object of comparison, namely, kṛṣṇa is not portrayed as possessed of the adjective, namely, 'conch-shell' and the like. So the employment of the moon as an adjective of the cloud is rendered entirely superfluous thus debarring the very possibility of similitude between the object and the standard of comparison. In this way the six sub-varieties of the two defects styled (1) inferiority of the standard of comparison and (2) excessive superiority of the standard of comparison debarring the possibility of similitude with the object of comparison have been represented and exemplified.

(C.M., P. 36)

Now the defects entitled (3) difference in gender and (4) difference in number are being exhibited in the following instances: (1) 'Even a thing kept in

hand slipped down like the thought-gem (*cintāratna*) due to the want of fortune', and (2) 'O king! I ate pure grits (*saktavaḥ*) like a virtuous wife¹.' In the first instance the standard of comparison, namely, the thought-gem (*cintāratna*) has been used in neuter gender whereas 'the thing kept in hand (*karastha*)' standing for the object of comparison is employed in the masculine gender. Again in the second instance the object of comparison, viz. grits (*saktavaḥ*) is plural and the virtuous wife represented as the standard of comparison has been used in singular number. So the defects, viz. difference in gender and difference in number in respect of the objects and the standard of comparison are rendered manifest in these two instances in their consecutive order. Now it is worthy of mention that these two types of defects have been included under the fold of the recognised defect termed 'violation of uniformity'. Since in the first instance the common property, namely 'the fact of slipping down' (*cyutatva*) can be syntactically synthetised only with the object of comparison, viz. the thing kept in hand (*karastha*) owing to their identity in gender. It cannot be linked with the standard of comparison, i. e., thought-gem (*cintāratna*) which has been employed in the neuter gender. Analogous is the case with the second instance.

For in it too the object and the standard of comparison, viz. grits (*saktavaḥ*) and the virtuous wife (*kulavadhūḥ*) have been used in plural and singular, number. And the proposed common property, namely the fact of being pure (*śuddhatva*) used as a plural is bound to be linked only with the object of comparison which is concordant with it (CM, P. 36)

A pertinent poser crops up. On what ground 'the fact of slipping down' (*cyutatva*) and the fact of being pure (*śuddhatva*) are deprived of their claim to be the common properties in respect of the objects and the standards of comparison in the above instances? The answer to this question lies in this. Between the standards and the objects of comparison as portrayed in the instances, each of these properties is entitled to be linked only with that in respect of which it agrees in gender and in number. But these two seemingly apparent common properties occurring in these two instances cannot legitimately be related with both the standard and the object of comparison as is required by the fundamental rule of *similis*. Rather, on the other hand the property, viz. 'the fact of slipping down' (*cyutatva*) is forced to be associated exclusively with *kurastha* 'the thing kept in hand' in the first instance. For both of them are employed in the same gender. In the second instance the property, viz. the fact of being pure (*śuddhatva*) is bound to be connected only with grits (*saktavaḥ*) depicted as the object of comparison. Since the words *śuddhāḥ* and *saktavaḥ* have their agreement in number. Therefore the

fact of becoming the standard of comparison or the object of comparison is obliged to rest ultimately on that entity which stands circumscribed by the adjective as has been explicitly mentioned in the instances. In the present context *karasthaḥ* (the thing kept in hand) in the first instance and *saktavaḥ* (grits) in the second one stand determined by two distinctly stated adjectives, viz. (1) *cyutaḥ* (slipped down) and (2) *śuddhaḥ* (pure) due to their concordance in gender and number. So the status of the two independent objects of comparison are exclusively conferred upon the two entities (1) *karastha* -the thing kept in hand and (2) *saktavaḥ* (grits) which stand characterized by the two adjectives as alluded to above. On the contrary the rank of the two standards of comparison are invested with the entities which are undoubtedly devoid of any adjective. The suspicion does not take place with reference to the very consideration of these two instances as pertaining to the figure *similis*. Since the figure *similis* can be accomplished in both the instances on the basis of other independent common properties as will be provided by the act of suggestion. The upshot of the present digression is summed up in the way as follows : In these two preceding instances the objects of comparison, namely, (1) *karasthaḥ* (the thing kept in hand) and (2) *saktavaḥ* (grits) are accompanied by their own adjectives, viz. (1) *cyutaḥ* (slipped down) and (2) *śuddhaḥ* (pure) respectively. But the standards of comparison, namely, *cintāratnam* (thought-gem) and *kulavadhūḥ* (the

virtuous wife) are apparently shorn of adjectives. So it is rendered sufficiently clear that there will assuredly be the violation of uniformity of adjectives in the cases where the objects and the standards of comparison are represented in different gender and number. (CM, P. 36)

So other rhetoricians have enumerated the defects as taking their rise on the basis of the difference in tense, person, the meaning of *loṭa* and so forth. Now the defect based on the difference in tense is illustrated by the following verse: 'I will forsake the daughter of Videha (i. e, Sītā) in an indifferent manner even at the point of the advent of receiving fruit in order to get it (the scandal) removed, like the earth bounded by the sea which I left before in accordance with the command of the father¹. In this context the defect entailed by the difference in tense is borne out in the fact as follows. The expression, namely, 'I will forsake' (*tyakṣyāmi*) is the form of the root *tyaj* 'to forsake' in its future tense. But it is rendered incongruous due to the violation of conformity with the intended purport of the speaker. It should be substituted by the past form, viz. *atyajam* obtained as the first person singular in *laṇ* in concordance with the expression, viz. 'like the earth bounded by the sea which I left before'. Since the

1. RV, canto 14, śl. 39

renunciation of the earth bounded by the sea occurred in the past and the act of banishment is to take place in future. Thus the present defect is rendered manifest in this instance (CM, PP. 36-37)

Now the difference in person is exemplified by the following instance : 'O king ! having bestowed wealth on worthy recipients and living only along with your body, you shine like the only remaining stalk of the wild corn (*nīvārā*) with its only products in the shape of its fruits which have already been taken away by the sages. ¹ In this instance the verb *ābhāti* (shines) a from of the root *ā + bhā* in the third person singular deserves to be grammatically related with the noun *nīvāra* which has also been used in the third person singular. But it cannot be linked with the verb *ābhāsi* ' shine ' which is formed in the second person singular from the same root. Thus the defect entailed by difference in person is laid bare in the fact that the object of comparison, viz. 'you' (*tvam*) is linked with the verb *ābhāsi* (shine) while the standard of comparison, viz. *nīvāra* (wild corn) is entitled to be associated with the verb *ābhāti* 'shines'. Further the defect of difference of injunction, good wishes or blessing and so forth is being illustrated by the following verse : 'The invocation of the divine favour other than this (the blessing of a son) is a sort of reiteration to you who

1, RV, canto 5, śl. 15.

have already attained to all your fortunes, so obtain the son after the merits of your ownself as your father got you as worthy to be honoured. ¹ In this context (*alabhata*) the form of the root *labh* 'to obtain' in its past tense (*lañ*) is fit to be grammatically connected with *bhavantam* 'you' used in an accusative case, but not (*labhasva*) 'obtain' which is formed in (*lot*) from the same root in the sense of blessing. Thus the defect of difference of the meaning of *lot* and so forth has been established in this instance. (CM, P. 37)

Now with reference to the two remaining principal defects, viz. (1) dissimilarity and (1) impossibility, it is worthy of mention that both of them have to be culminated in the form of defective *similis* entitled 'improper signification' which is general in character. Let the defect of dissimilarity be demonstrated in the following instance: 'I string together the poetry with its meanings greatly extended like the moon possessed with the rays as widely scattered'². In this instance the similarity is assumed to subsist between the poetry and the moon depicted as the object and the standard of comparison. But this type of similarity does not owe its existence to the accredited poetic convention. So the present instance is open to the charge of the defect of dissimilarity. It is notable that even the similitude as belonging to the

1. RV, canto 5, śl. 34

2. KRS, 4, 2, 16., KP, P. 783 AM, P. 336; AK, P. 151

meanings of poetry and the rays of the moon does not conform to the universally acknowledged poetic convention. If it were a universally recognised fact, it would have been employed as the surest ground for the emergence of 'the relation of reflection and reflected' as instituted between these two adjectives of the alleged object and the standard of comparison. And as a result of it, even the unlicensed similarity portrayed as belonging to the poetry and the moon could have been secured in such an indirect manner. But in fact even this case of similitude has failed to comply with the recognised poetic convention. (CM, P. 37)

Or the present defect of dissimilarity may be rendered discernible in the following instance: 'This Vindhya mountain with its waterfall adorned with the dense bower appears like *Iśvara* (i. e., Śiva) along with the swelling flame of the fire sparkling in the eye of his forehead.'¹ Even in this example both the similarities presumed to belong to the mountain Vindhya and *Iśvara* on the one hand and their adjectives, namely, 'with the waterfall, etc.' and 'with the swelling flame, etc.' on the other have failed to achieve the seal of approval of the recognised poetic convention. Thus the defect of dissimilarity has been rendered obvious even in the present context, The defect entitled (6)

1. PR, P. 229 (reads *kuñjoccalita* for *kuñjollasita* and *phālekṣaṇa* for *bhālekṣaṇa*)

'impossibility' may be exhibited by the illustration as follows: 'the glittering arrows were falling as if from his mouth remaining in the midst of the circumference of the bow like the blazing shower of rain from the orbit of the sun which has entered into midday.'¹ In this instance the similarity is depicted as residing in the expressions (1) 'the glittering arrows as falling from the mouth' and (2) 'the blazing shower of rain as issuing from the orbit of the sun.' They are introduced as the object and the standard of comparison. But it is notable that the blazing shower of rain represented as issuing from the orbit of the sun is entirely impossible. So this type of similarity terminates into the case of impossibility which is actually a defect in its intrinsic worth. It deserves specific mention that the meanings of all the instances are rendered completely derogated by the portrayal of such defective forms of similarity as above referred to. So these two types of defects are bound to consummate into the sort of defect styled improper signification.' (CM, P. 37)

Some other rhetoricians have stated the unfamiliarity of the standard of comparison as an independent defect. Let us take an instance of it. 'The face of the young lady with the eyes soiled by tears appears like the lotus of a river with its petals moistened by snow.' In this context

1. KV, chap. 2, śl. 47, KP, P. 183, AM, P. 336

the similarity is delineated as residing in the face and the lotus portrayed as the object and the standard of comparison. But this form of similarity is not prevalent in the circle of rhetoricians. It is true that both these entities are associated with their own adjectives in the case under review. They are : (1) with the eyes soiled by tears and (2) with the petals moistened by snow. They are liable to be linked through the medium of 'the relation of reflection and reflected' which in its turn may serve the basis of the similarity subsisting between the entities, namely, the face and the moon. But the representation of the lotus as the standard of comparison with reference to the face standing for the object of comparison is entirely unfamiliar in the realm of poetics. So it entails the defect designated 'unfamiliarity of the standard of comparison' as above referred to. In this way all the six varieties of the defects of the figure *similis* along with this one have been elucidated by the author of the *Citramīmāṃsā*. (CM, P. 38)

SECTION II

Exceptions to the Defects of *similis* Enumerated

Moreover the exceptions to the defects enumerated above are shown as far as practicable. The defects entitled (1) inferiority of the standard of comparison based on birth (2) excessive superiority of the standard of comparison debarring the possibility of similitude with the object of comparison based on birth (3) inferiority of the standard of comparison based on the infringement of authoritative poetic convention and (4) excessive superiority of the standard of comparison debarring the possibility of similitude with the object of comparison based on the infringement of authoritative poetic convention will not be considered as defects, if they are compliant with the accredited poetic convention. The exceptions to all these four defects have been exemplified in the following manner: 'The moon is like your face and your face is like the moon; the dyad is like your waist and your waist is like the dyad'. In the sentence, viz. 'the moon is like your face' the entity 'your face' represented as the standard of comparison is extremely inferior in respect of birth to its object of comparison, namely, the moon. But its meaning is not stained with any impropriety on the ground that it is in complete uniformity with the recognised poetic convention. So the defect, viz. inferiority of the standard of comparison based on birth is rendered ineffective in the case under review. (CM, P. 38

Further the sentence, namely, 'your face is like the moon' apparently falls a victim to the charge of (2) 'excessive superiority of the standard of comparison debarring the possibility of similitude with the object of comparison based on birth. For, the moon depicted as the standard of comparison is enormously superior to its object of comparison, namely, the face in point of birth. And as such this inordinate superiority of the standard of comparison, viz. the moon will debar the possibility of its similitude with the face standing as the object of comparison. But the present defect is avoided on the score that the similitude subsisting between the moon and the face owes its existence to the accredited poetic convention. Then the third defect of *similis*, viz. 'inferiority of the standard of comparison based on the infringement of authoritative poetic convention' is apparent in the sentence, viz. 'the dyad is like the waist of a woman'. The reason is obvious. The standard of comparison, viz. the waist of a woman becomes too inferior to its object of comparison, namely 'the dyad' to maintain the dignity of the authoritative poetic convention. But even the present defect will cease to be so regarding the similitude existing between this standard and the object of comparison. The fact is that similitude under reference has passed muster in the realm of poetics. Lastly the sentence 'the waist of a woman is like the dyad' will not be degraded to the position of faulty *similis* due to the inherence of the defect bearing the title of (4) excessive superiority of the standard of comparison debarring

the possibility of similitude with the object of comparison based on the infringement of authoritative poetic convention. Since the similarity as assumed to subsist between the dyad and the waist of a woman represented as the standard and the object of comparison has received recognition by an accredited poetic convention. (CM, P.38)

Moreover the two defects bearing the titles of (1) inferiority of the standard of comparison based on attribute and (2) excessive superiority of the standard of comparison debarring the possibility of similitude with the object of comparison based on attribute will cease to be the real defects under the following conditions. (1) when the assertion of the additional attribute in connexion with the object and the standard of comparison is intended for the purpose of securing more than one *similis* or (2) when it (the assertion of the additional attribute in connexion with the object and the standard of comparison) is designed with a view to making the possession of the common property possible or (3) when it (the assertion of the additional attribute in connexion with the object and the standard of comparison) is made in order to obtain a distinct form of the substratum or (4) when it (the assertion of the additional attribute in connexion with the object and the standard of comparison) is resorted to in some form or other. The fact is simple. Every one of the aforementioned conditions becomes conducive to the realisation of an additional relevant objective, And consequently the two defects

expounded above are rendered abortive under these conditions. (CM, P. 38)

Now the examples regarding the aforementioned 'conditions are being cited *seriatim* : (1) She (Pārvatī) wearing the new linen cloth and holding the new mirror shone sufficiently like the bank of the milk-ocean overflown with the mass of foams and like the autumnal night (bright) with the full-moon' ! In this instance the two adjectives, viz. (1) wearing the new linen cloth and (2) holding the new mirror have been mentioned in association with the pronoun 'she' depicted as the object of comparison. And their mention is made for the substantiātion of more than one *similis* based on every adjective in the two distinct forms. They are : (1) She wearing the new linen cloth shone like the bank of the milk-ocean overflown with the mass of foams' and (2) 'she holding the new mirror shone like the autumnal night (bright) with the full-moon. Thus the defect, viz. inferiority of the standard of comparison based on attribute which culminates in the recognised literary defect entitled 'deficiency of words' is rendered entirely ineffective in connexion with this instance. And the reason is not far to seek. The mention of the additional adjective in association with the object of comparison, viz. 'she' is intended to obtain two full-fledged *similis*

in the way indicated above. And in this way the first condition proves itself rather conducive to the realization of an additional relevant objective, that is to say, the obtainment of two cases of *similis* elucidated above. And again the condition is brought into prominence by the modified reading of this immediately preceding verse as follows : 'The bank of the milk-ocean overflown with the mass of foams and autumnal night bright with the full moon imitated her who was wearing the linen cloth and holding the mirror having the transparent lucidity.' In this instance the mention of two adjectives, viz. who was wearing linen cloth and (2) 'who was holding the mirror having the transparent lucidity with reference to the standard of comparison, viz. 'her' is intended for securing two forms of *similis* occasioned by every individual adjective. They may be expressed as follows : (1) The bank of the milk-ocean overflown with the mass of foams imitated her who was wearing the linen cloth and (2) the autumnal night bright with the full-moon imitated her who was holding the mirror having the transparent lucidity. Thus the defect, viz. excessive superiority of the standard of comparison debarring the possibility of similitude with the object of comparison based on the attribute which results into 'redundant words' ceases to be so by the force of the first condition in the present instance. (CM, P, 38)

(2) Now the instance of the second condition is being cited as follows : 'The sage (Vaśiṣṭha) having

been apprised of in this way remained only for a moment with his eyes motionless in meditation like the lake along with its sleeping fishes.¹ In this case the assertion of the additional adjective, viz. having 'been apprised of in this way' pertaining to the object of comparison, namely, the sage apparently appears to entail the literary defect entitled 'deficiency of word, in respect of the standard of comparison, viz. the lake. Because it (the lake) is accompanied by only one adjective, viz. with its sleeping fishes. Whereas the object of comparison is possessed of two adjectives : (1) having been apprised of in this way and (2) with his eyes motionless in meditation. But the present defect is rendered entirely ineffective by the assertion of this additional adjective, viz. having been apprised of in this way. Since it is this adjective which makes the conferment of the fact of being the common property upon the adjective, namely, 'with his eyes motionless in meditation' possible. And it is too obvious to require any further elaboration. So it is rendered evident that the employment of the additional adjective in association with this object of comparison has become contributory to the fulfilment of an independent objective in the way above indicated. Consequently the defect 'inferiority of the standard of comparison based on attribute which culminates in 'deficiency of words' has

failed to degrade this instance to the plane of defective *similis*. (CM, P. 39)

Again the example in connexion with this second condition is displayed by the way as follows : 'By hearing the loud sound of the bowstring of the two (Rāma and Lakṣmaṇa), Tāḍakā possessed with the colour of the night of the dark half of the month and bearing the earrings of the fickle human skulls appeared like the dense formations of cloud accompanied by cranes'.¹ In this instance the object of comparison, viz. Tāḍakā is possessed of one adjective, that is, bearing the earrings of the fickle human skulls. The standard of comparison, namely, formations of cloud has evidently held two adjectives (1) accompanied by cranes and (2) dense. So it seemingly falls a victim to the defect of excessive superiority of the standard of comparison debarring the possibility of similitude with the object of comparison based on attribute which ultimately results in the defect styled redundant word. But it ceases to be considered as such in this particular example. For, this additional adjective 'dense' serves the purpose of according the fact of being the common property to the expression, namely, possessed with the colour of the night of the dark half of the month. Otherwise it would not have equally coincided with both Tāḍakā and formations of cloud portrayed as the object and the standard of comparison. And the

1 RV, canto 11, śl. 15 (reads *atha* for *abhi*).

fact is simple. It is only the dense formations of cloud which can claim to possess the colour of the night of the dark half of the month. Thus it is made sufficiently clear that the mention of this additional adjective, viz. 'dense' in association with the standard of comparison, namely, formations of cloud is proved rather conducive to the realization of another distinct adjective in the form above indicated. And consequently the alleged defect fails to vilify the present instance under the influence of the second condition as above elucidated. (CM, P. 39)

(3) The instance in connexion with the third condition is exemplified by the following verse: 'Kumudvatī obtained the son named Atithi from kākutstha like the intellect which receives light (clarity of understanding) in the last quarter of night'. In this example the object of comparison, that is, the son is possessed of the adjective, namely, named Atithi. And the standard of comparison, viz. 'light (the clarity of understanding)' is portrayed as devoid of an adjective. So this instance appears to be victimised to the defect called inferiority of the standard of comparison (*nyunatva*) consummating in the defect styled 'deficiency of word'. But it escapes from this defect under the condition as mentioned below. The

-
1. RV, canto 17, śl. 1 (reads *prāpa* for *apa*) and compare the commentary of Malli; '*Brāhme sarveṣāṃ buddhivaiśadyaṃ bhavati*' *ti prasiddhiḥ*; KNS, P. 187, AM, P. 336 AK, P. 157

mention of this additional adjective in association with the son is made with a view to obtaining the distinct substantive in the shape of 'the son named Atithi'. So there is no shadow of doubt that the assertion of this additional adjective has been conducive to the realization of the objective in the shape of the obtainment of the present distinctive form of the substantive. And consequently the alleged defect is rendered harmless with reference to the instance under review. (CM, P. 39)

Again the instance exemplifying the third condition is cited as follows: 'As the rain falling from the celestial region and possessed of one and single taste undergoes modification in different tastes in different countries, so you, an immutable one, assume different manifestations in association with different qualities'¹. In this instance the standard of comparison, that is, rain is possessed of two adjectives (1) falling from the celestial region and (2) possessed of one and single taste, whereas the object of comparison 'you' is accompanied by only one adjective, namely, an immutable one. So it seemingly appears to be derogated by the defect, viz. excessive superiority of the standard of comparison debarring the possibility of similitude with the object of comparison based on attribute which culminates in the recognised defect designated 'redundant word.' But this defect is rendered ineffective in the case under review. Since the

1. RV, canto, 10, 41. 17

mention of the additional adjective 'falling from the celestial region' in connexion with the standard of comparison makes a provision to securing the distinct form of the substantive in the shape of 'rain falling from the celestial region'. So this additional adjective obviously results in the fulfilment of an additional relevant objective as indicated immediately above. And it renders the alleged defect as entirely ineffective in the present instance: Thus the neutralisation of the two defects under examination should be recognised even in the fulfilment of the relevant objective other than enumerated above. That is to say, if the assertion of an additional adjective in connexion with the object and the standard of comparison contributes to the integration of the topic under description and heightening of charm and the like, the repulsive character of the defect will cease to exist. (CM, P. 39)

Further in the same way there may be adjectives associated with the object and the standard of comparison even in a case of 'the relation of reflection and reflected'. They are expected to be designed with the purpose of bringing the common property into existence. And as such these adjectives may fall short of in the matter of fulfilling some additional objectives over and above the purpose within the context. Now in such a case if there is no mention of the corresponding adjectives conforming with the adjectives mentioned with reference either to the object or the standard of comparison, then

the instance will fall a victim to either of the above two defects. They are : (1) inferiority of the standard of comparison based on attribute resulting in deficiency of word and (2) excessive superiority of the standard of comparison debarring the possibility of similitude with the object of comparison based on attribute culminating in the defect styled redundant word. It is remarkable that even the presence of 'relation of reflection and reflected' will fail to operate as redeeming feature in respect of these two literary defects. (CM, P. 39)

Moreover it has already been shown that the additional adjectives are used to serve some additional purpose. Now in such a case, the assertion of the additional adjectives in association with the object and the standard of comparison will account for even a poetic excellence under the following two conditions : (1) when the additional adjective is made common with reference to both the factors of comparison by making it abiding in them and (2) when additional adjective is made common by the insertion of another corresponding adjective. Let the position be rendered clear by two concrete illustrations. (1) The illustration commencing with *Jyāninād et seq* which has already been explained may be cited to demonstrate the truth of the first condition. In this verse the additional adjective, viz. 'by hearing the loud sound of the bow-string' in association with the object of comparison, namely,

Tāḍakā is asserted in order to fulfil some additional relevant objective in the way as follows : Tāḍakā herself appears on the spot with an intention to kill Rāma. And as she makes a sudden attack upon Rāma before hand, She was slain by Rāma. Thus the fulfilment of the present additional relevant objective finds its expression in the fact that the violation of the decorum which is bound to be entailed by the slaying of a woman was completely avoided. But in spite of it (the fulfilment of the additional relevant objective) the additional adjective under review is made common to the standard of comparison, viz. 'the formation of cloud' on the basis of its abidance, in it. Since even 'the formation of cloud' are of the nature to produce the peal of thunder. And as such the present additional adjective can be made contiguous with the standard of comparison, viz. formations of cloud on the basis of this hyperbolic interpretation. Thus it is made abundantly clear that the mention of the additional adjective in association with the object and the standard of comparison will be considered a poetic excellence under the first condition. (CM, PP. 39-40)

(2) Again the fact of the second condition is being illustrated by the verse beginning with '*nṛpam tamāvarta et seq.* It has already been explained in the fifth chapter of the present work. It is true that in this verse the mention of the additional adjective, viz. '*Anyavadhūrbhavitṛi*' (destined to become the wife of the other) pertaining to

the object of comparison, viz. 'she' (Iudumatī) is intended to fulfil the additional relevant objective, namely 'the act of passing by the other kings'. But in spite of this obvious fact, it is made common with reference to the standard of comparison, namely, 'the river' by insertion of a corresponding adjective, viz. *sāgaragāminī* (advancing to unite with the sea). So it is manifest that the commonness of the present additional adjective has culminated in a distinct poetic excellence by conferring a charm to the meaning of the verse under consideration. (CM, P. 40)

Now with reference to the exceptions of the two defects, viz. (1) difference in gender and (2) difference in number, the following facts deserve consideration. There are instances where the object and the standard of comparison are characterized by variation with reference to gender and variation with reference to number. And consequently they remain exposed to the prospect of depreciation in their value. But it is remarkable that the words indicating common property of the instances may happen to possess their unalterable forms. And so they can hold good towards the object and the standard of comparison in equal degree without undergoing any modification in their forms. If such were the case, these two literary defects will cease to be considered as real defects. Since the words indicating common property are competent to establish their relation with both the object and the standard of comparison, The verse commencing with *Bhīmākāntaiḥ*

et. *seq.*¹ which has already been expounded will render the exposition clear. In this instance the object and the standard of comparison, viz. *nṛpaguṇaiḥ* (kingly merits) and *yādaratnaiḥ* aquatic animals as well as jewels account for a clear variation with reference to gender. Since the word *guṇaiḥ* which is the last member of the compound-word *nṛpaguṇaiḥ* represented as the object of comparison is invariably used in masculine gender whereas *ratnaiḥ* which is the last member of the compound-word '*yādaratnaiḥ*' depicted as the standard of comparison is usually used in neuter gender. And this difference of the object and the standard of comparison in respect of gender will entail upon the literary defect holding the name of 'difference in gender.' But the present defect is easily rectified owing to the fact that the word, viz. *Bhīmakāntaiḥ* (by terrific and elegant) expressing the common property does not suffer modification in its form in the matter of instituting its relation with both the object and the standard of comparison expressly stated above. (CM. P. 40)

The instance exhibiting the absence of the depreciating character of the defect entitled 'difference in number' is being exemplified as follows: 'Her robe worn in befitting manner and so appearing unlike to that of

1. The complete translation of the verse goes in the following way :
 'He Dilīpa became unapproachable and approachable to his dependents by the terrific and elegant kingly merits like the sea by the possession of aquatic animals and jewels'.

other ladies had possessed of extraordinary beauty like her own amorous gestures (possessed of charmingness and appearing unlike to those of other ladies had contained extraordinary beauty).¹ In this instance there is anomaly with reference to number. Since the two entities (1) *veśaḥ* (robe) and (2) *vibhramāḥ* (amorous gestures) have been depicted as the object and the standard of comparison. And the former has been used in singular number and the latter in plural one and thus exposing the instance to the defect called 'difference in number'. But in the present case the defect is made good. Because the words like *asadr̥śaḥ madhura-tābhṛtaḥ* and *dadhate sm* (unlike, worn in befitting manner and possessed of charmingness, and had possessed) indicating common property are not subject to alteration in their forms. That is to say, these words will bear the same forms in singular as well as in plural number. And consequently they do not undergo any change in respect of establishing their link with both the object and the standard of comparison as referred to above. (CM, P. 40)

Now it is noteworthy that the words indicating common property may be subject to alteration. That is to say, these words are liable to allow modification with a view to establishing their relation with the object and the standard of comparison which are mutually at variance

1. KP, P. 777, KNS, P. 187, AM, P. 336, AK, P. 157

with reference to their gender and number. But in spite of this, the difference in gender and difference in number between the object and the standard of comparison are clearly discernible in the uses of great poets. Let the position be rendered clear by two illustrations which occur in the *Raghuvamśa* of Kālidāsa.

(1) 'The noble man although the object of hatred was estimable to him (Dilīpa) like the medicine to a diseased man, and the wicked person though dear to him was to be forsaken like the finger bitten by the snake.'¹ In this verse the object of comparison, viz. *śiṣṭaḥ* (the noble man) and (2) *duṣṭaḥ* (the wicked person) have been used in masculine gender, whereas the standards of comparison, viz. (1) *auśadham* (medicine) and (2) *aṅgulī* (finger) are usually employed in neuter and feminine gender. And as such the words conveying common property, viz. (1) *sammataḥ* (estimable) and (2) *tyājyaḥ* (was to be for saken) as used in masculine gender cannot have their relation with the standards of comparison without attaining to their substituted forms, viz. *sammataṁ* and *tyājya* respectively. (2) 'The increased moon decays and so even the sea, but he (*atithi*) was like one blessed with the rise of them (of the moon and the sea) and did not become decayed like them (the moon and the sea)'. 'In this verse the object and the standard of comparison, viz.

1. RV. canto 1, śl. 28

2. RV, canto 17, śl 71 (reads *pravṛddhau* for *pravṛddhaḥ*)

saḥ (he) and *tau* (them) assuredly reveal the variation with reference to number. Since the former is used in singular and the latter in dual number. And as such the word indicating common property, namely, *kṣayī* (decayed) which is the singular form of the substantive *kṣayin* will fail to fix up its link with the standard of comparison, viz. *tau* without undergoing a change of its form. (CM, P. 40)

There is a series¹ of examples which will show variance with reference to tense and so forth. The following observation of the great critic Vāmaha is to be borne in mind : 'The variations with reference to gender and so forth' shown in the uses of great poets cease to be considered as real defects, for they owe their existence to popular notion. In this way criterion regarding the discrimination of the poetic excellence and defect lies in the keen insight of the generous critics. And so the celebrated rhetorician Daṇḍin has made the following relevant observations : (1) Neither the variation with reference to gender and

-
1. The author of the *Kavyaprakāśa* has observed *vide* KP, P. 779, that the following verse beginning with '*atithimnāma*, etc.' which has already been explained will display the variation with reference to tense. In this verse the correct expression should assume the form as follows '*cetanāprasādam āpnoti*' (like the intellect which receives clarity of understanding). That is to say, the verb *āpnoti* (receives), the form obtained in *laṭ* (present tense), is grammatically appropriate to be used in association with *cetanā* (intellect) and not *āpa* (obtained) as is intended by Kālidāsa in the present verse,

number nor even the inferiority and the superiority (of the standard of comparison) are sufficient to render *similis* defective if there is no occasion for the uneasiness of mind of the learned¹. (CM, P. 40)

The following two illustrations will elucidate the position. (1) 'This eunuch (*ṣaṇḍhaḥ*) walks like a woman (*strī*) and this woman speaks like a man (*pumān* , this man is dear to me like my vital air (*prāṇāḥ*) and the learning (*vidyā*) was earned like the wealth (*dhanam*)².

1. KD, chap. 2, §1. 51 (reads *hīnādḥikata'pi vā* for *hīnādḥikate'api*). And it is a pleasant surprise to find that before presenting an enumeration of the defects of *similis*, Daṇḍin has refuted the view of Bhāmaha. The enumeration of the defects of *Similis* as set forth by Daṇḍin runs directly counter to that propounded by Bhāmaha. It will not be out of place to mention that Bhāmaha has mentioned seven varieties of literary defects which may occur in *belles-lettres*. These defects may be stated in the following order : (1) inferiority; (2) impossibility, (3) variation with reference to gender, (4) variation with reference to number, (5) inversion, (6) numerical superiority of the standard of comparison and (7) dissimilarity with the standard of comparison.' Vide KV, chap. 2 ślo 39, 40 ab. It is further remarkable that three defects, viz. (1) impossibility, (2) inversion and (3) dissimilarity with the standard of comparison have already been refuted by the very definition of *similis* formulated by Daṇḍin in the way mentioned below
"yothākathāncit sādṛśyaṁ yat'odbhūtaṁ pratīyate| Upamā nāma sātasyaḥ prapañco'yaṁ pradarśyate KD, chap. 2 §1. 14

2. KD, chap. 2, §1. 52

In this verse the sentences like (1) this eunuch walks like a woman (2) 'this woman speaks like a man and (3) the learning was earned like the wealth are the cases of the literary defect entitled variation with reference to gender. Since the object and the standards of comparison, viz. *ṣaṇḍhaḥ* (the eunuch) and *strī* (the woman), *strī* and *pumān* and *vidyā* and *dhanam* occurring in the above three sentences respectively are apparently at variance with reference to gender. And further the third foot of the verse, viz. this man is dear to me like my vital air' falls a victim to the defect called variation with reference to number. Because the words, viz. (1) *ayam* (this man) and (2) *prāṇāḥ* (vital air) depicted as the object and the standard of comparison lack agreement concerning their number. (2) 'O king! the king of gods (Indra) shines forth like you, the king is competent to rise up to the rank (*kakṣā*)¹ of one possessed with rays (i. e. the sun) by means of glory'.² The defect called inferiority of the standard of comparison is clearly discernible in the first part of this instance. Since the king of gods represented as the object of comparison has been simlised with 'you' as an ordinary king. And the defect bearing the name of superiority of the standard of comparison is brought into being by the fact that 'the sun depicted as the standard of

1. Confer : " *Tatpadavyām padam dhatte tasya kakṣām vigāhate Tan anvety'anubadhnāti tacchīlam tanniṣedhaṭi* || KD, chap. 2, §1. 64

2. KD, chap. 2, §1. 53

comparison is too superior to its object of comparison viz. the king occurring in the latter half of the present instance. (CM, PP. 40-41)

But at the same time the neutralization of these defects has been clearly revealed by Daṇḍin himself in the first half of the verse as follows : 'The illustrations like these and similar others never forsake their charm'.¹ In some instances there is the deep concern in the mind of the grammarian as, for example, 'the moon (*candraḥ*) is white like the female swan (*hamsī*) and the sky (*nabhaḥ*) is clear like lakes (*sarāṃsi*),² the servant faithful to his master is like the dog and the glow worm shines like the sun'.³ The illustrations of this type are to be avoided and the ground of their avoidance should be reflected upon.⁴ Now the meanings of the first and the second foot of the verse beginning with 'Hamsīva' *et, seq.* are extremely repulsive under the effect of the two recognised literary defects. (1) variation with reference to gender and (2) variation with reference to number. Since the object and the standard of comparison, viz. *candraḥ* and *hamsī* used in the masculine and the feminine gender respectively lack their agreement with reference to gender. And the words, viz. (1) *nabhaḥ* and *sarāṃsi* standing as the object and the standard of comparison in the second foot of

1. KD. chap.2, §1. 54 ab.

2. KD. chap. 2, §1. 54 cd.

3. KD. chap. 2, §1. 55

4. KD. chap. §1. 56 ab

the verse are clearly at variance with reference to their numbers. And in like manner the third and the fourth foot of the verse are rendered defective due to the existence of the defects entitled (1) inferiority of the standard of comparison and (2) superiority of the standard of comparison in their respective manner. Since in the third foot of the verse, the dog (*Śvāna*) depicted as the standard of comparison is too inferior to its object of comparison, viz. the servant. And on the other hand, the sun portrayed as the standard of comparison in the fourth foot has become too superior in comparison to its object of comparison, namely, the glow worm. And as these examples occasion deep concern in the mind of the grammarian, they deserve unqualified repudiation. (CM, P. 41)

The defect bearing the designation of dissimilarity alluded to above will fail to debase the value of *similis* if it is recognised by the poetic convention. Let it be elucidated by a concrete example. 'Your fame is white like the moon' and so forth. In this instance the fame and the moon are brought into relation of the object and the standard of comparison through the medium of common property, viz. whiteness. So they are entirely dissimilar in their nature. But still the *similis* assumed to subsist between them cannot be deprived of its literary value for the reason that it has been established by the accredited poetic convention. And again if the fact of being impossible is intended to be imbued with the object of comparison, then the impossibility

of the standard of comparison will fail to be considered as any real defect. A verse may be cited to bear out the truth of it. '*Candrabimbūdiva viṣam*' etc. In this verse the fact of being impossible is ascribed to the object of comparison, viz. 'the harsh speech issuing from this mouth' for answering some special purpose. And it is due to this fact that the impossibility of the standards of comparison is not regarded as a literary defect. (CM, P. 41)

There are also other concrete illustrations of '*similis* in which the standard of comparison is exclusively imaginary in character'. And this *similis* may be constituted of the paronomastic words serving as the ground of the common property and at the same time providing a ground of delight in the mind of the generous critics. If it be so, then the impossibility of the standard of comparison will not be liable to be considered as defective. Let the position be rendered clear by the following two illustrations. (1) 'The place bearing the huge quantity of iron (*bahuloha*) shines like the intellect of the poet which is blessed with versatile reflective faculty (*bahul'oha*), possessing well placed wheel (*saghaṭita cakrā*) (shines) like the morning-hour which is associated with fascinating orbit (of the sun) (*sughaṭitacakrā*) and being resplendent (*hasantī*) with the smokeless fire (shines) like the smiling (*hasantī*) face of Hara'. This illustration of *similis*, in which all the standards of comparison, viz. (1) the intellect of the poet, (2) the morning-hour and (3) the smile of Hara are exclusively imaginary in character, falls beyond

the purview of the defect entitled unfamiliarity of the standard of comparison. Since the words indicating common property belonging to the object and the standard of comparison of the instance are apparently paronomastic in character. And consequently every one of them becomes capable of yielding its two meanings as shown in the present verse. Further it is notable that the common property exhibited by these paronomastic words is elevated to the position to exert its soothing effect in the mind of the generous critics. And cumulative effect of these has successfully removed the baneful character of the alleged defect in the present instance. (2) 'The orange stripped of branches (*munḍita*) is vying with the chin of an intoxicated Hūṇa which has been just now shaved (*munḍita*). In this instance of *similis*, the standard of comparison, viz. the chin of a Hūṇa is purely imaginary in character and as such it is associated with the adjective, viz. (*munḍita*) with reference to which there is an obvious pun. And consequently this adjective serving the purpose of the common property is in a status to produce extraordinary delight in the mind of the sympathetic *litterateur*. In this way even other varieties of exceptions to these defects should form the object of the critical reflection of the men of letters. Here ends the context of the rhetorical figure entitled *similis* in the *Citramīmāṃsā*. (CM, P. 41)

CHAPTER IX

The Definition of the Figure Reciprocal Simile set forth by the predecessor of Appaya Dīkṣita critically Examined

SECTION I

The present chapter will be devoted to a critical consideration of the accredited rhetorical figure bearing the title of reciprocal *simile*. The definition of reciprocal simile has been adduced by the predecessor of Appaya Dīkṣita in the following fashion : ‘If the fact of being the standard and the object of comparison is attributed to two entities by rotation, the rhetorical figure is designated reciprocal simile and two fold division of it has been recognised’.¹ The utility of each and every term of the definition of reciprocal simile may be brought home in the following manner. If the figure reciprocal simile consists in the delineation of any property belonging to two entities, then the definition will be vitiated due to its ‘over extension’ (*ativyāpti*) to the independent poetic figure entitled ‘equal pairing’. It is not out of place to mention that the figure equal pairing consists in the depiction of only one

-
1. Confer the definition of reciprocal *simile* as has been offered by Bhāmaha in his *kāvyaalāṅkāra* “*upamāṇapameyatvaṁ yatra paryāyate bhavet/ upameyopamāṇaṁ nāma bruvate taṁ yatho ditam*||” op. cit. chap. 3, śl. 37

asserted common property belonging to either the relevant or the irrelevant. Let the present charge be substantiated by the following instance: 'when that period (summer season) became too hard to be endured, these two, viz. the rising king (kuśa) and the rising moon, were too much endeared to the people—the former due to his competence of removing the misery (of the people) through the service of his feet and the latter due to its competence of removing heat (of the people) through the contact of its rays.'¹ In this verse the two, viz. the king and the moon, have been represented as simultaneously being linked with one and single property, 'viz. *tāpāpanoda kṣamapāda sevau* (due to his competence of removing the misery (of the people) through the service of his feet and due to its competence of removing heat (of the people) through the contact of its rays). And so this verse has become a valid instance of equal pairing. Now the alleged charge is brought into being due to the fact that the instance of equal pairing also exhibits the description of one and single property belonging to two entities, viz. the king and the moon. Thus it is with a view to avoiding the present allegation that the term 'by rotation' has been employed as a constitutive element of the definition of reciprocal *simile*. It deserves to be borne in mind that the synchronous and non - synchronous depiction of property with reference to two entities serves as the

1. Rv, canto 16, śl. 53 (reads *c'odayastau* for *c'odayastho*)

basis of equal pairing and reciprocal simile respectively.
(CM, PP. 41-42)

But still the above definition of reciprocal simile remains exposed to the same allegation of its 'overlapping' with reference to the instance mentioned below. 'On the path, the dust was converted into the state of mud and again even the mud was transformed into the state of dust due to the flow of ichor of the elephants owned by him (kuśa) and owing to the strokes of hoofs of his (of kuśa) steeds respectively.'¹ In this verse the dust and the mud have been described as alternately assuming the form of the mud and the dust respectively. That is to say, the dust became mud and the mud in its turn was converted into dust. And as a consequence of it, the present illustration by answering the two conditions of the definition of reciprocal simile will be included within the fold of it. And it is in order to obviate this objection that the expression 'the fact of being the standard and the object of comparison has been incorporated in the body of the present definition. And this successfully debars the prospect of over-extension'. Since the two entities, viz. the dust and the mud cannot claim to be endowed with the property of being the standard and the object of comparison in the instance under review.
(CM, P. 42)

Now the definition of reciprocal simile may be stated in the following form : 'Reciprocal simile consists in the

1. RV, canto 16, śl. 30 (reads *netuḥ* for *bhūyah*)

depiction of the fact of being the standard and the object of comparison as resting on two entities if this definition is characterised by the non-mention of the term 'by rotation.' But even then it is bound to fall a victim to the charge of its unwarrantable extension with reference to the figure '*similis* in which the similitude reposes on both the factors.' The position may be rendered clear by a concrete illustration : 'At that time, the unfortunate lady emaciated extremely under the misery of separation was (*samam*) simultaneously burnt and served as a means of proof.' In this instance the similitude is obviously resting on both the factors of comparison, 'viz. (1) getting herself burnt and (2) serving as a means of proof. This definition of reciprocal simile will include even this instance within its own compass. For even these two factors, viz. (1) getting herself burnt and (2) serving as a means of proof occurring in the instance are endowed with the property of being the object and standard of comparison. Consequently the charge of over-extension against the present definition becomes ineluctable with reference to this instance. (CM, P. 42)

It may be contended that there is the assertion of only the fact of being the object of comparison in the instance under examination. Since both the factors of comparison referred to above and represented as the resting ground of the similitude are in reality the exclusive substrata of it (of the similitude). So both of them are exclusively accorded the fact of becoming the objects of comparison.

Consequently neither of the two factors can claim to be possessed with the property of being the standard of comparison which on its part remains invariably identical with the fact of being the counter-term of the similitude. To be more precise, the locus of similitude is regarded as the object of comparison and the counter-term of the similitude is considered as the standard of comparison. Thus the absence of the standard of comparison in the present instance may act as a means of avoiding the alleged allegation of unwarrantable extension against the definition under reference. But this is absolutely untenable. It is true that the existence of the standard of comparison in the present instance has not been indicated directly by means of its expressive words. But it is beyond dispute that these two factors, viz. (1) getting herself burnt and (2) serving as means of proof have been conferred with the status of the standard of comparison by rotation. That is to say, that one becomes the standard of comparison of the other and *vice versa*. And this fact is evidently deducible on the basis of implication. Since the comprehension of the meaning of the instance under dissection paves the way for the emergence of this conclusion. (CM, P. 42)

It deserves to be stressed that in the definition of reciprocal simile the fact of being the standard and the object of comparison is not intended to remain uniformly as directly expressed. Since in that eventuality, the suggested reciprocal simile will be liable to remain

excluded from the sphere of the definition of reciprocal simile set forth above. This non-inclusion will be entailed on the ground that the fact of being the standard and the object of comparison in an instance of the suggested reciprocal simile can never be secured as directly expressed. But its apprehension will invariably be standing in need of the service of the function of suggestion. So it is clear that the alleged charge of 'over-extension' against the present definition remains unanswered with reference to this instance. And it is with a view to escaping from this deplorable predicament that the expression, 'by rotation' has been inserted as a constitutive element of the definition of reciprocal simile. This temendation will preclude the prospect of overlapping of this definition. Since the word 'śamam' occurring in the instance is the expressive of the sense of simultaneity. And consequently 'the fact of being the standard and the object of comparison' will lose its claim to be ascribed to these factors, viz. (1) getting herself burnt and (2) serving as a means of proof by rotation due to the presence of the term 'simultaneously (*samam*) in it. Thus the expression, viz. 'by rotation' is the (*conditio sine qua non* of the definition of reciprocal simile.' (CM, P.42)

But this definition of reciprocal simile remains vulnerable to the same charge of over-extension (*ativyāpti*) to the independent rhetorical figure designated girdle simile. The illustration of girdle simile may be cited by the following verse with its latter half beginning with

'*bhaṇitiriva matir matiriva ceṣṭā, et seq*' which has been explained above. Now the instance of girdle simile, viz. 'your mind is like the word, the action is like the mind and the fame is extremely pure like the action' is evidently satisfying both the conditions of the definition of reciprocal simile. Since the two factors, viz. (1) mind (*mati*) and (2) the action (*ceṣṭā*) occurring in the instance are represented as possessed of the property of being the standard and the object of comparison by rotation. That is to say, the word mind (*mati*) stands for the standard of comparison in respect of action (*ceṣṭā*) in the sentence 'the action is like the mind.' And it has again been depicted by rotation as the object of comparison with reference to 'word' (*bhaṇiti*) in the sentence 'your mind is like the word.' And identical is the case with 'action (*ceṣṭā*); for, it also stands for the standard of comparison in relation to 'fame' (*kīrti*) in the sentence, viz, 'the fame is extremely pure like the action.' And it is introduced by rotation as the object of comparison in respect of mind (*mati*) in the sentence 'the action is like the mind.' Thus the charge of over-extension against the definition of reciprocal simile stands substantiated in connexion with the instance of girdle simile (CM, P. 42)

But the present indictment of over-extension is liable to be avoided by the following interpretation of the term 'by rotation' as offered by the proponent. An instance of the figure reciprocal simile is admittedly

possessed of two categories. The two entities are depicted as the standard and the object of comparison by rotation in these two categories. The status of the standard of comparison is accorded to an entity in relation to another entity portrayed as the object of comparison in the preceding category. In the succeeding category the status of the object of comparison is invested with the self-same entity depicted as the standard of comparison in the preceding category. And this object of comparison is necessitated to be represented as such only in relation to that very entity which has been delineated as the object of comparison in the preceding one. If such be the case, the demand of the term 'by rotation' can be said to have been fulfilled by an instance. That is to say, the two entities maintain their identity although they are allowed to exchange their status of being the standard and the object of comparison. Let us refrain from this digression. In the first place we propose to examine the status of mind (*mati*) occurring in the aforecited instance of girdle simile. It is introduced as the standard of comparison in respect of action (*ceṣṭā*) in the rotation, viz. 'the action is like the mind'. And in the rotation 'your mind is like the word' it is accorded the status of the object of comparison in respect of different entity, viz. the word (*bhaṇiti*). Likewise the entity, viz. the action (*ceṣṭā*) is used as the standard of comparison with reference to the fame (*kīrti*) in the rotation, namely, 'the fame is extremely pure like the action

And it is represented as the object of comparison in relation to a different entity, viz. mind instead of fame in the rotation 'the action is like the mind'. So this instance of girdle simile has failed to stand in compliance with the term 'by rotation' in the way above indicated. Consequently this novel interpretation of the term 'by rotation' will prevent the subsumption of the instance of girdle simile under the fold of the definition of reciprocal simile. And the alleged charge against the definition of reciprocal simile has apparently been avoided. (CM, P. 42)

It has already been stated that reciprocal simile admits of two fold classification. This two fold classification is brought into being by (1) the commonness of property with reference to both the object and the standard of comparison and (2) by 'the relatedness *qua vastu* and *pratīvastu*'. The examples of these two varieties of reciprocal simile are set forth in due sequence. (1) 'your face which is redolent, a source of joy to the eyes and white-red¹ under the intoxication of liquor shines like the lotus and the lotus (which is redolent, a source of joy to the eyes and white-red like the colour of liquor) shines like your face'.² In this example all the three properties as stated in English reading are commonly residing in both the factors of comparison, viz. (1) the lotus and (2) the face. The factor of comparison

Cf. *Śvetaraktastu pāṭalaḥ* AMK, 1, 5, 15

2. Kv, chap. 3 śl. 38 (reads *vaktraṁ te* for *te vaktraṁ* and *asyam iva* for *vaktraṁ iva*)

'lotus' is depicted as the standard of comparison with reference to the face used as the object of comparison in the preceding rotation, viz. 'your face is like the lotus'. And it (the self-same standard of comparison, viz. the lotus) is narrated as the object of comparison in relation to the former object of comparison, viz. 'the face' in the succeeding rotation, namely, 'the lotus is like your face'. In an analogous fashion the face assumes the status of the standard of comparison in respect of the object of comparison 'lotus' in the succeeding rotation 'the lotus is like your face'. And it (the self-same standard of comparison) has been described as the object of comparison in relation to the former object of comparison, viz. the lotus in the preceding rotation, namely, 'your face is like the lotus', (CM, P. 42)

(2) 'Where the ponds bearing the lotuses with charming lustre for their faces shine like the ladies and the ladies possessing their faces with charming lustre in the form of the lotuses (shine) like the *ponds*'¹. In this verse the property belonging to the two factors of comparison, viz. (1) the ponds and (2) the ladies, is exclusively based on 'the relatedness *qua vastu* and *prativastu*'. It is further notable that 'the relatedness *qua vastu* and *prativasta* rests uniformly associated with 'the relation of reflection and reflected'. In the present context the lotuses

1. AS, P, 40, AM, P, 245

and the faces are exhibited in 'the relation of reflection and reflected'. Further 'the relatedness *qua vastu* and *prativastu* takes its rise on the basis of the attribute 'charming lustre' which is unique in its essential nature and is asserted twice due to the difference of its substrata, viz. the lotuses and the faces. Thus the properties, viz. bearing the lotuses with charming lustre for the faces' and 'possessing the faces with charming lustre in the form of the lotuses' are made possible with reference to both the factors of comparison—the ponds and the ladies—by 'the relatedness *qua vastu* and *prativastu* pervaded by 'the relation of reflection and reflected'. It is worth mentioning that the entity, viz. the ladies is invested with the status of the standard of comparison in relation to the object of comparison, viz. the ponds in the preceding rotation 'where the ponds bearing the lotuses with charming lustre for their faces shine like the ladies'. And in the succeeding rotation 'the ladies possessing the faces with charming lustre in the form of the lotuses shine like ponds' the self-same standard of comparison, viz. the ladies has been represented as the object of comparison in relation to the former object of comparison, viz. ponds. Similarly the ponds are represented as the standard of comparison in respect of the ladies as the object of comparison in the succeeding rotation, viz. 'the ladies possessing the faces with charming lustre in the form of the lotuses shine like the ponds'. And this self-same standard of comparison, viz. the ponds' is accorded the status of the object

of comparison with reference to the former object of comparison, viz. 'the ladies' in the preceding rotation, viz. 'the ponds bearing the lotuses with charming lustre for the faces shine like the ladies'. (CM, P. 43)

SECTION II

Now commences the critical consideration of the definition of reciprocal simile. It may be contended that the definition of reciprocal simile will suffer from the charge of 'non-comprehensiveness' with reference to the figure synchronous reciprocal simile (*yugapadupameyopamā*). It consists in the realisation of the similitude in one and the same construction and not in distinct rotation. It has already been illustrated by the verse beginning with '*tvadvalgunā yugapadunmiṣitena tāvat et seq.*' In this instance the two objects, viz.(1)'the eyes together with their unsteady pupils in interior' and (2) 'the lotuses with the moving black bees' are being similitised simultaneously. And this element of simultaneity in occurrence of the similitude debars its inclusion within the sphere of reciprocal simile due to the presence of the proviso 'by the rotation' in it. So the former charge against the definition is deeply rooted with reference to this instance. A doubt crops up. The present verse is not an authentic instance of reciprocal simile. On the other hand it should be regarded as the illustration of a pure *similis* resting on its both the factors, viz. the standard and the object of comparison. But this is not entertainable. Since the expression, viz. *parasparatulām* (held mutually in balance) is more than sufficient to preserve genuineness of the instance as belonging to reciprocal simile. This expression exhibits the habitation of similitude in these

two objects, viz. (1) the eyes with the unsteady pupils in interior (2) the lotuses with the moving black bees. And further the expression asserts also the property of being the counter-term as belonging to these two factors of comparison indicated antecedently. Thus these two factors of comparison occurring in the instance are capable of standing as both the locus as well as the counter-term of the similitude. So the consideration of this fact resolves the doubt of the opponent referred to above. It is not entirely out of point to mention that the dictionary meaning of the expression *parasparatūlā* is in no way distinct from the etymological significance of *upameyopamā* (reciprocal simile). That is to say, the word *parasparatūlā* signifies the act of reciprocal similization and *upameyopamā* (reciprocal simile) too, in its turn, implies the identical thing. It is rendered palpable that synchronous reciprocal simile is an accredited variety of reciprocal simile. So the non-subsumption of the present instance under the terms of the definition of reciprocal simile has given rise to the alleged charge against the definition of reciprocal simile (CM, P. 43)

Further it merits to be emphasised that the fact of becoming the counter-term subsisting by turn on the two factors of comparison and thereby assuring the presence of the element of mutuality stands implied on the basis of the comprehension of the meaning. And in spite of it the same sense has been expressed in a direct way by the

expression *paraspara* (mutually) which forms a constitutive element of the body of the instance. And this results in the preclusion of the third entity which may possibly claim to bear resemblance with them. And this is the only ultimate objective of reciprocal simile which is secured even by the instance of synchronous reciprocal simile. So its non-comprisal within the scope of reciprocal simile exposes the definition to the charge of non-comprehensiveness referred to above. (CM, P. 43)

Moreover, the definition of reciprocal simile will be vitiated due to its unwarranted extension (*ativyāpti*) to the instance of mutual simile which has already been exemplified by the verse beginning with *‘rajobhiḥ syndanodbhūtaiḥ et seq.’* The position may be rendered clear by dissecting the meaning of the verse into the following two rotations : (1) The sky by the mass of dust produced by the chariots is being made like the surface of the earth and (2) the surface of the earth with the elephants resembling the clouds is being made like the sky. It is notable that the entity ‘the surface of the earth’ is described as the standard of comparison in respect of the sky depicted as the object of comparison in the preceding rotation. And the same standard of comparison, i. e., the surface of the earth is accorded the status of the object of comparison in relation to the former object of comparison, viz. ‘the sky’ in the succeeding rotation. In an analogous fashion the sky is invested with the status of the standard of comparison with reference to the surface of the earth narrated as the object of comparison in the

succeeding rotation viz. 'the surface of the earth with the elephants resembling the clouds is being made like the sky.' And this very standard of comparison, i. e. 'the sky' has been delineated as the object of comparison in respect of the former object of comparison, viz. the surface of the earth in the preceding rotation 'the sky by the mass of dust produced by the chariots is being made like the surface of the earth.' So this instance of mutual simile by complying with the condition of the definition of reciprocal simile will claim its illegitimate inclusion under the purview of the definition thus making the charge of over-extension inevitable. It cannot be argued in defence that even the instance of mutual simile may be an authentic example of reciprocal simile. Since there is no apprehension of the exclusion of the third thing which may possibly stand as similar to them. (CM. P. 43)

Moreover, the inclusion of the instance of mutual simile within the sphere of reciprocal simile will assuredly give rise to an additional division of it. And this additional division will directly militate against the observation 'only the two fold classification of it has been recognised' as laid down in the definition of reciprocal simile. Since in this variety of reciprocal simile neither the property is common to the factors of comparison nor does it owe its existence to the relatedness *qua vastu* and *prativastu*. The sky is being similised with the surface of the earth in the rotation, viz. 'the sky by the mass

of dust produced of the chariots is being made like the surface of the earth.' In this act of similization the common property is exclusively based on the pervasion by the dust. And the similarity of the surface of the earth with the sky has been exhibited in the succeeding rotation 'the surface of the earth with the elephants resembling clouds is being made like the sky'. In this rotation the common property takes its rise on the basis of 'the relation of reflection and reflected' instituted between the elephants and the clouds. Thus the variation of the property in respect of the object and the standard of comparison has been laid bare in the two rotations of this preceding instance. It makes the present variety non-conformable within the framework of previously mentioned division of reciprocal simile. And it is due to this very fact that the preclusion of the third possible similar thing in the shape of the ultimate conclusion of reciprocal simile cannot be accomplished by this novel variety of reciprocal simile: (CM, P. 43)

It is noteworthy that the delineation of mutual similarity on the basis of a numerically identical property ultimately culminates in the fact that there is no third entity to claim its resemblance with the two factors of comparison in the sphere of one act of similization. And this positive conclusion is evidently discernible in an accredited instance of reciprocal simile. Since when the similarity of one entity is delineated with another entity, the similitude of the latter entity with the former one follows as a matter of fact. That is to say,

the truth of this fact is yielded by implication. Now in spite of this resultant realization of the similitude of the latter entity with the former one, the direct depiction of it uniformly redounds the exclusion of the possibility of the third similar entity. So it (the direct depiction) acts as a decisive ground for the achievement of the objective indicated above. It deserves mention that this ultimate end can be secured only when the property is common to both the factors, namely, the object and the standard of comparison. But it cannot be possible in the instances in which the property is variable with reference to the object and the standard of comparison. The situation may be elucidated by a concrete instance. 'Your face redolent et seq. appears like the lotus.' In this sentence one entity, viz. the face possessing the property, viz. 'redolent, etc.' is similized with another entity, i. e. the lotus. This means that even the latter entity 'the lotus' bears resemblance with the former entity, i. e. the face. And in spite of it, the direct delineation of this similitude is made by mention of another sentence, namely, 'the lotus redolent, etc. 'appears like your face.' Besides the property, viz. redolent and the like is evidently common to these factors of comparison, viz. the face and the lotus. Thus the present instance answering these two conditions is capable of yielding the objective referred to above. (CM, P. 43)

But this aim is bound to remain unrealized in the case where the properties belonging to the object and the

standard of comparison are distinct from each other. The following dissection of the instance will render the position clear. 'The sky by the mass of dust produced by the chariots is being made similar to the sky'. In this sentence the entity, viz. the sky with the property of pervasion of the dust is delineated as similar to another entity, viz. the surface of the earth. But the meaning of this sentence still fails to signify the similitude of the latter entity, viz. the surface of the earth with the former entity, viz. the sky. Since the property 'with the elephants resembling clouds' belonging to earth is entirely different from the property, that is, by pervasion of dust possessed by the sky. So the endeavour to secure the ultimate result of reciprocal simile, that is, the isolation of the third possible similar thing by mentioning the succeeding rotation, viz. the surface of the earth with the elephants resembling clouds is being made like the sky, proves itself abortive and futile. It is evident that this instance of mutual simile has been deprived of its claim in all conceivable ways to be an authentic illustration of reciprocal simile. And so the alleged charge of over extension against the definition of reciprocal simile remains unanswered in respect of the present instance.

(CM, P. 43)

Moreover the definition of reciprocal simile remains exposed to the self-same charge of over-extension with reference to the instance of *similis* which takes place on the basis of the relation of reflection and reflected instituted between the two substantives standing in an inverted

order'. It may be substantiated by the following verses: 'As verily that father (kṣemadhanvā) became one possessed of a worthy son, a son who is everdevoted to the services of his father, in the same way, that son (Devāṇīka) became one possessed of a worthy father, a father who is extremely affectionate to him (the son)'¹. In this verse both the substantives *qua* locus, viz. (1) *Putra* (the son) (2) *pitā* (the father) have been depicted as the object and the standard of comparison. It deserves to be stressed that these very two substantives *qua* locus, viz. (1) *putra* and (2) *pitā* have been mentioned in an inverted order as the constitutive elements of *putritva* (the property of becoming one possessed of a worthy son) and *pitṛmatva* (the property of becoming one possessed of a worthy father). And both of them play the role of common properties in respect of the standard and the object of comparison, namely, the father and the son respectively. That is to say, the object of comparison, viz. *putra* (the son) is introduced as an integral part of the property belonging to the father portrayed as the standard of comparison. And this standard of comparison in its turn has been asserted as an integral part of the property relating to the son which is the object of comparison. (CM, P. 44)

Furthermore worthiness (*prāśastya*) is the property which acts as a ground for the consequential entailment

1. RV, canto 18, 41. 11 (reads *ātmaja* for *adhika*)

of the commonness pertaining to *pitṛmattva* and *putritva*. And it serves the basis for the emergence of the relation of reflection and reflected as instituted between them (i. e. the property of becoming one possessed of a worthy father and the property of becoming one possessed of a worthy son). Now this *prāśastya* (worthiness) is signified by the nominal suffixes ¹ *matuṣ* and *in* affixed to the words *pitā* (the father) and *putraḥ* (the son) respectively. For these suffixes have been added to these two words in the present context in the sense of commendation. The reason for the employment of *matuṣ* and *in* in the specific sense lies in the fact as mentioned below. The account of the bare relation in the form of 'the son became one possessed of a father through the instrumentality of a father' does not deserve its mention. That is to say, this type of statement is so familiar that it is entirely destitute of literary merits. In this way the common property in the shape of *prāśastapitṛmattva*

-
1. Cf śl. vārtika "*Bhūma minda praśamsāsu, nityayoge'ti śāyane| sam-sarge'sti vivakṣāyām bhavanti matubādayaḥ :||*" under the context of Pāṇ, sū. '*Tadasyāstyasminniti matuṣ* 5, 2, 94'. The meaning of the present *śloka-vārtika* may be exhibited in the way as follows : 'In the sense of abundance, censure, praise eternal (constant) relation, superiority and relation, the nominal suffixes *matuṣ* and so forth are added to the words ending in the first case-endings in agreement with the sense of, existence.

(the property of becoming one possessed of a worthy father) and *praśasta-putravattva* (the property of becoming one possessed of a worthy son) in respect of the object and the standard of comparison, namely, the son and the father has been secured by means of the relatedness *qua vastu* and *prativastu* standing pervaded by the relation of reflection and reflected'. (CM, P. 44).

It should be underlined in the mind that the father (*pitā*) and the son (*putra*) have already been invertedly mentioned as the constitutive elements of the property belonging to the son and the father respectively. Now these two factors of comparison., viz. the father and the son, have been provided with the two adjectives, viz. (1) extremely affectionate to the son and (2) ever devoted to the service of the father in their respective order. And these adjectives have been resorted to to bring worthiness (*prāśasya*) into realisation in association with the father and the son. It is evident that the comparison takes place with reference to the two substantives *qua locus*, viz. the son (*putra*) and the father (*pitā*) described as the object and the standard of comparison. And the common property, namely, the property of becoming one possessed of a worthy father (*praśasta-pitr-mattva*) and the property of becoming one possessed of a worthy son (*praśasta-putravattva*) in respect of the object and the standard of comparison has been brought into being by the relatedness

qua vastu and *prativastu* pervaded by the relation of reflection and reflected. (CM, p. 44)

It transpires on scrutiny that the father is the standard of comparison and the son is the object of comparison. And the property of becoming one possessed of a worthy father is the property belonging to the son. Now the word father (*pitṛ*) has been mentioned as the constitutive element of the property, viz. the property of becoming one possessed of a worthy father (*pitṛmattva*) pertaining to the son which has already been stated as the object of comparison. So the father (*pitā*) stands transferred to the status of the object of comparison. This object of comparison, viz. father (*pitā*) serves as the foundation of 'the relation of reflection and reflected' which has been called into requisition in order to establish the common property, viz. the property of becoming one possessed of a worthy father (*praśasta pitṛmattva*) in respect of the former object of comparison, viz. the son. And inversely (*putra*) has also been mentioned as the constitutive element of the common property, viz. the property of becoming one possessed of a worthy son (*praśasta putravattva*) belonging to the former standard of comparison, that is, the father (*pitā*). So the status of the son has also been shifted to that of the standard of comparison. (CM. P. 44)

Now the position may be rendered clear by analysing the whole verse into the following two rotations: (1) 'As the father became one possessed of a worthy son (*praśasta*

putrī), so the son became one possessed of a worthy father (*praśasta pitṛmān*) 'and (2) 'As the son became worthy (*praśasta*) due to his ever devotedness to the service of his father, so the father became worthy due to his becoming extremely affectionate to him (the son). In the preceding rotation the father and the son are represented as the standard and the object of comparison respectively. And the common property in the shape of the property of becoming one possessed of a worthy son and the property of becoming one possessed of a worthy father has been linked with the standard and the object of comparison, namely, the father and the son by means of relatedness *qua vastu* and *prativastu* pervaded by the relation of reflection and reflected. In the succeeding rotation the same standard of comparison. viz. the father has been depicted as the object of comparison in relation to the former object of comparison, viz. the son. And the common property, that is worthiness, has been brought into realisation by the two adjectives (1) due to his becoming extremely affectionate to him (the son) and (2) due to his ever devotedness to the service of his father pertaining to the father and the son respectively. Thus the conclusion is irresistible that the definition of reciprocal simile evidently overlaps the present instance. And so the alleged charge of over extension against the definition remains inescapable. (CM. P. 44)

It cannot be argued in defence that the instance under critical examination is a genuine example of reciprocal simile. Since the above indicated first rotation is this,

‘As the father became one possessed of a worthy son, so the son became one possessed of a worthy father.’ In it the *similis* has been affirmed as taking place with reference to the two substantives *qua loci*, viz. the son and the father, standing for the object and the standard of comparison.

And it has also been laid bare that the common property in the form of the property of becoming one possessed of a worthy father (*praśasta pitṛmattva*) and the property of becoming one possessed of a worthy son (*praśasta putravattva*) has been established on the basis of ‘the relatedness *qua vastu* and *prativastu* pervaded by ‘the relation of reflection and reflected.’ Further the succeeding rotation has been expressed in the following form ‘As the son became worthy (*praśasta*) due to his ever devotedness to the service of his father, so the father became worthy (*praśvsta*) due to his becoming extremely affectionate to him (the son ,.’ In this rotation the former standard and the object of comparison, viz. the father and the son stand transferred to the status of the object and the standard of comparison respectively. It is apparent that the common property belonging to the two factors of comparison occurring in the preceding rotation are distinct from the common property pertaining to the two factors of comparison occurring in the succeeding rotation. Since the former common property belonging to the object and the standard of comparison, viz. the son and the father comes into being on the basis of ‘the relatedness *qua vastu* and

prativastu’ pervaded by ‘the relation of reflection and reflected’ And the latter common property is made abiding in the object and the standard of comparison, viz. the father and the son, by means of two adjectives associated with them (the father and the son). These two adjectives are: (1) due to his becoming extremely affectionate to him (the son) and (2) due to his ever devotedness to the service of his father. So the present instance is completely similar to the immediately preceding instance exemplified above by the verse beginning with ‘*rajobhiḥ et seq*’ And consequently even this instance like the preceding one will form a novel variety of reciprocal simile in addition to the two accredited varieties of it. CM, P. 44)

Further the figure multiplied simile (*samuccayopamā*)¹ has been invoked to obtain the intended import in the present context. By laying a hold upon it, the meaning of the succeeding rotation in addition to that of the preceding one is possibly secured in the way as follows : ‘As even the son became worthy (*praśasta*) due to his ever devotedness to the service of his father, so even the father became worthy (*praśasta*) due to his becoming affectionate to

1 Confer. with ‘*samuccayopamāpy’asti na kānty’ aiva mukhaṁ tava/ Hṛdanākhyena cānoeti karmaṇḍum enitī’ dṛṣṭī*’|| This verse may be rendered into English as follows : ‘Even multiplied simile exists, for here your face does not rival the moon only with its lustre but also by its function of producing delight’.

him (the son).’ But in spite of the attainment of this meaning, the ultimate result of reciprocalsimile in the form of the exclusion of the third possible similar thing remains unrealised. Because the pronounced distinctness between the common properties of the object and the standard of comparison suffering the mutual mutation in the above two rotations will frustrate the preclusion of the third similar entity which is the chief objective of reciprocal simile. (CM, P. 44)

It can be urged that the instance under consideration is bereft of the two rotations as endowed with the essential property of reciprocal simile. That is to say, its two rotations do not possess the words like two *ivas* (similar) and so forth. So the present instance will easily be precluded from the scope of the definition of reciprocal simile by the very adjective, viz. by rotation employed in the body of the definition. And this preclusion will culminate in the complete evasion of the alleged charge of over-extension levelled against the definition of reciprocal simile. But this is absolutely untenable. Since a critical analysis of even this instance will make the emergence of the two rotations inevitable. And this may be rendered apparent by the following two forms : (1) As the father became one possessed of a worthy son (*putri*), so the son became one possessed of a worthy father (*pitṛmāna*) and (2) ‘As the son became worthy (*praśasta*) due to his ever devotedness to the service of his father, so the father became worthy (*praśasta*) due to his becoming extremely

affectionate to him (the son). It should be rubbed in mind that the similitude of the son with the father has occurred in the preceding rotation and it has been directly expressed by the terms, viz. 'as and so' (*yathā* and *tathā*). And these have been explicitly mentioned in the instance under consideration. Besides, in the succeeding rotation, the father has been similized with the son. And this act of similization takes place on the basis of the suggested sense of the verse mentioned above. For the present instance is characterized by the factual absence of the terms like two *ivas* (the words expressive of similitude). (CM, P. 44)

Moreover, it is not intended in the present context that both of the two rotations should exclusively be in a position to express similitude in a direct way by means of the words like two independent *ivas* (similar) and so forth. And consequently the absence of the two rotations as containing the two distinctly mentioned (*ivas*) which are the expressive of similitude cannot be resorted to as an expedient calculated to evade the alleged charge of over-extension. Since this will raise other difficulties. In the event of placing emphasis on the similitude to remain as invariably expressed, this definition will fail to serve its purpose. The fact is that it will not enfold the illustration of the suggested reciprocal simile within its compass. The reason is plain. The essential characteristic of the suggested reciprocal simile consists in delineating similitude subsisting between the object and the standard of comparison and it is rendered a content of apprehension.

by the function of suggestion. It is evident that none of the two rotations of the suggested reciprocal simile can stand as possessed with the terms like two *ivas* and so forth which are the exclusive factors of expressing similitude in a direct manner. Thus the sedulous endeavour of the opponent to rescue the definition from the charge of over-extension proves abortive. (CM, P. 44-45)

The opponent puts forward a plea that *similis* occurs in this instance in respect of only the two substantives qua loci, viz. the son and the father delineated as the object and the standard of comparison. And the two properties, viz. (1) the property of becoming one possessed of a worthy father and (2) the property of becoming one possessed of a worthy son (*putritva*) belonging to the son and the father respectively, are apprehended as numerically identical; for, it is only their numerical identity which is responsible for making their relation common to both the standard and the object of comparison namely, the father and the son. So these two properties cannot serve as a genuine basis of *similis* which rests invariably on the two numerically distinct objects. Thus it is clear that the preceding standard and the object of comparison, viz. the father and the son, stand debarred from mutually exchanging their original status, that is, the standard of comparison shifting to the position of the object of comparison and *vice-versa*. So the very ground of the emergence of the succeeding rotation in the form referred to above is completely rescinded. And this

absence of the two rotations will deter the illegitimate inclusion of the present instance under the fold of the definition of reciprocal simile. So the definition is capable of obviating the charge of over-extension. (CM, P. 45)

But this cannot withstand scrutiny. Because the *similis* is discernible even in the two properties belonging to the two substantives *qua loci* in the following verse. 'I like the black bee (lit. the producer of honey) enjoyed by drinking repeatedly the lotus like face of that slenderly limbed lady who resembles the lotus plant'¹. In this instance of sentence simile the two substantives *qua loci*, viz. (1) the slenderly limbed lady and (2) the lotus plant, have been linked together on the basis of 'the relation of reflection and reflected'. And thereafter the figure *similis* takes its rise on the basis of this relation concerning these two entities, viz. (1) the slenderly limbed lady and (2) the lotus plant depicted as the object and the standard of comparison. But in spite of the presence of even this *similis* the two properties, viz. the fact of becoming a face (*mukhatva*) and (2) the fact of becoming a lotus

- I. Vide KD, chap. 2, śl. 45. It is the second illustration of sentence simile (*vākyaarthopamā*) possessing more than one *iva* (expression of similitude). And it is remarkable that the reading *madhukareṇa* (lit. the avowed sipper of honey) occurs in KD, whereas the reading *madhukareṇa* (the producer of honey) has been adopted by the author of the *Citramīmāṃsā*.

(*padmatva*) belonging to the slenderly limbed lady and the lotus plant respectively have been similized as the object and the standard of comparison. And this latter similitude is obviously appealed to with a view to elevating these two properties to the status of a common property in the true sense of the term. That is to say, these two properties have been accorded a position enabling them to hold a common relation with both the object and the standard of comparison, viz. the slenderly limbed lady and the lotus plant. Thus it is manifest that even the act of making the two properties common is capable of standing as a basis of the act of similization. Now the upshot of this elaborate discussion is that the instance forming the subject matter of dispute remains conformable to the conditions of the definition of reciprocal simile. So the doubt regarding the inevitability of the charge of over extension against the present definition of reciprocal simile remains unresolved. Thus it appears that this definition of reciprocal simlie is admittedly an inappropriate one.
(CM, P. 45)

CHAPTER X

The definition of Reciprocal simile as formulated and illustrated by Appaya Dīkṣita and its Trenchant criticism by the Author of the *Rasagaṅgādhara*

SECTION I

The author of the *Citramīmāṃsā* sets forth his own definition of reciprocal simile by the following verse : 'when the similitude subsists between the one and the other entity' (accompanied with the element of reciprocity) resting exclusively on the basis of a single property and comprehensible either by the function of suggestion or by other functions of word (i. e. 'the primary and the secondary function of word), it is accepted as the figure reciprocal simile.' The utility of each and every adjective employed in the definition is shown *seriatim*. The adjective, viz. 'when the similitude subsists between the one and the other entity' (accompanied with the element of reciprocity) will obviate the charge of over-extension against this definition with reference to the figure girdle simile. The instance of girdle simile has already been referred to by the verse beginning with '*bhaṇitiriva et seq.*' In this illustration of girdle simile, the similitude subsisting between the two entities. viz. (1) the mind and (2) the action, is marked by the lack of the element of reciprocity. That is to say, these two entities do not reciprocate in the matter of exchanging their status. On the contrary, the

mind is similized with the speech and the action is similized with the mind. Thus it is clear that on the strength of this adjective, that is, 'when the similitude subsists between the one and the other entity (accompanied with the element of reciprocity)' the present definition can easily escape from the charge of over-extension. (CM, P. 45)

Moreover, the adjective, viz. 'comprehensible either by the function of suggestion or by other functions of word will exempt the definition from the charge of over-extension to the figure *similis* in which the similitude rests on both the factors.' Since the employment of the term, viz, either and or (*vā*) constituting the body of this adjective has been productive of momentous consequence, it implies the truth of the alternative sense and thereby culminates in the mutual exclusion. That is to say, the function of suggestion will invariably stand in opposition to the other functions of the word and *vice-versa*. It deserves mention that when this *similis* is accompanied with the element of reciprocity subsists between the one and the other entity, these two entities become alternately a counter-term in relation to this *similis*. So this *similis* on its part becomes characterized by the possession of the fact of having them as its counter-term by turn. And this *similis* is to be apprehended by the function of suggestion claiming it (this *similis*) as its object. And this function of suggestion has an autonomous status of its own to the entire exclusion of other functions (primary and secondary

functions) of the word. Or this *similis* is to be comprehended by other functions of the word as conversant with it (this *similis*) and completely dispensing with the service of the function of suggestion. In the event of compliance with these conditions, this distinct variety of *similis* culminates in the figure entitled reciprocal simile. (CM,P.45)

Now the utility of the adjective, viz. comprehensible either by the function of suggestion or by other functions of the word, is discerned in the fact that the present adjective remains unexemplified by the instance of the figure '*similis* in which the similitude rests on both the factors.' For in the instance of this *similis*, the similitude accompanied with the element of reciprocity subsists between the two entities, viz. (1) getting herself burnt and (2) serving as a means of proof. And as a sequel of this these two factors of comparison become the counter-term of the similitude by turn. It is remarkable that this part, that is, the fact of becoming the counter-term by turn has been suggested by the function of suggestion. Because the instance under context is bereft of the terms, viz. two *īvas* which are the expressive of similitude with all its components. And the part, that is, similitude *qua similis* has been expressed by the term, viz. equally (*samam*) constituting the body of the instance by means of the primary function which is distinct from the function of suggestion. Thus it is evident that both the functions, namely, (1) the function of suggestion and (2) the primary function which is an independent function of the word, have been called into requisition in

the matter of comprehending the similitude under examination. And as a consequence of it, the present instance will not be liable to be illegitimately included within the fold of the definition under review. So the doubt of the charge of over-extension against this definition stands finally removed (CM, P. 45)

It is worth mentioning that the present definition of reciprocal simile is specific in character. It can subsume only those cases which are the authentic instances of reciprocal simile *qua* poetic figure. This definition of reciprocal simile with necessary amendment may comprise other instances of reciprocal simile which are the brute matter of fact in nature. It is with this end in view that the function of suggestion and the other functions of the word are conditioned to be associated with the element of reciprocity . That is to say, the *similis* under context is rendered comprehensible by the function of suggestion associated with the other functions of the word and *vice versa*. And in this way, the definition will include the instances of even the pure reciprocal simile. A concrete illustration will make the position clear. ‘Has Pārvatī learnt the mode of casting unsteady glance from the does (mṛgā) ? or have the does learnt the mode of casting unsteady glance from Pārvatī ? It may

1. Vide Ks, canto 1 śl. 46. The complete verse runs as follows :
 “pravātanīlotpala nirviṣeṣam adhīravipreksitam āyatāksyaḥ Tayāgṛhī-
 tam nu mṛgāṅganābhyastato gṛhītam nu mṛgāṅganābhīḥ ||” It

be transformed into the instance of the pure reciprocal simile: As the mode of casting unsteady glance of Pārvatī is learnt from the does so the mode of casting unsteady

may be translated into English 'Has she possessing large eyes learnt the mode of casting the unsteady eyes resembling the blue lotuses facing hard wind from the does ? or have the does learnt it from her (Pārvatī) ' ? The present instance has been exemplified by the latter half of this verse beginning "with' tayā et. seq." as shown in the text. In this context it is not irrelevant to record the view-point of the author of the *Locana* vide DL, PP 121—22 and confer with 'sankarālāṅkāre'pi, etc. occurring in the *Dhvanyāloka* together with the observations of the *Locana*. Ānandavardhana holds that the act of suggestion cannot be subsumed even within the fold of an independent rhetorical figure called commixture. The author of the *Locana* in the course of his commentation on the fourth variety of commixture has cited the present verse. The unsteady glance of Pārvatī has been described as similar to the unsteady glances of the does. And this *similis* is obviously suggested by the function of suggestion due to the absence of any word expressive of it. This instance cannot claim to be an authentic example of *dhvani*. Since the suggested *similis* in this verse serves as the basis for the emergence of the figure poetic doubt which stands as directly expressed in it. This service of the suggested *similis* towards the figure poetic doubt accounts for its inferior position which debars it from reaching the status of *dhvani*. Besides this suggested *similis* ultimately merges in poetic doubt and forfeits its independent status. It is pleasant to remark that the author of the *Citramīmāṃsā* has successfully exhibited this suggested *similis* as reciprocally subsisting between the

glances of the does are learnt from Pārvatī. That is to say, the unsteady glance of Pārvatī is like the unsteady glances of the does and the unsteady glances of the does are like the unsteady glance of Pārvatī. In these two rotations of this instance the *similis* associated with the element of reciprocity exists between the two entities, viz. the glance of Parvatī and the glances of the does, which are depicted as the object and the standard of comparison in the preceding rotation, which are introduced as the standard and the object of comparison in the succeeding one. And this *similis* stands suggested by the function of suggestion on the basis of the secondary function of the word (*lakṣaṇā*). Since none of the two rotations of the instance contains any term which may express *similis* in a direct manner. So the present instance proves to be an authentic example of the pure reciprocal simile in which the function of suggestion is required to remain in association with the other functions of the word. (CM. P. 45)

Further another instance of reciprocal simile qua poetic figure may be cited : 'Water appears like the sky and the sky appears like water, *et seq.*' In this example the *similis* accompanied with the element of reciprocity exists between the two entities, viz. water and the sky. They are portrayed

above two factors of comparison. And the present function of suggestion is indicated as based on the secondary function of the word (*lakṣaṇā*) with a view to apprehending the close resemblance of the unsteady glance of Pārvatī with the unsteady glances of the does.

as the object and the standard of comparison in the preceding rotation and the standard and the object of comparison in the succeeding one. And this *similis* has been directly expressed by the terms, viz. two *ivas* expressive of it. So the present *similis* is made comprehensible by the primary function of the word to the entire exclusion of the function of suggestion. Thus the succeeding instance forms an accurate example of reciprocal simile *qua* recognised poetic figure. It becomes evident that the definition under context is competent to comprise these types of the instances indicated above. Since the latter instance is in compliance with the adjective viz. comprehensible either by the function of suggestion or by the other functions of the word when it (the adjective) is applied in its literal sense. And the former instance also agrees with the same adjective when each of its two constituting factors, viz. (1) the function of suggestion and (2) the other functions of the word is accorded the element of reciprocity in the way expounded above. (CM, PP. 45-46)

A doubt crops up. The suggested *similis* associated with the element of reciprocity is the specific object of the function of suggestion. And the function of suggestion works under the handicap of requisitioning the service of some word. So it follows that it will become directly linked with the function (*śakti*) which, as a matter of course, belongs to that very word. As a consequence of it, it will not be entitled to remain divorced and dissociated from them, (other

functions of the word). Further it is worth-noting that the instance, viz. 'water is like the sky and the sky is like water, et seq'. is an example of the figure reciprocal simile. In it the *similis* associated with the element of reciprocity stands directly expressed by the terms like two *ivas* expressive of it. And still there is absence of the common property as explicitly mentioned. So this common property stands implied by the function of suggestion. Consequently even this instance is forced to enlist the service of the function of suggestion in respect of its implied common property which is expected to be the basis of this *similis*. Thus it is plain that these two constituting factors of the adjective, viz. (1) the function of suggestion and (2), the other functions of the word cannot remain mutually exclusive. That is to say, in all the instances of reciprocal simile, the function of suggestion is bound to appear as associated with the other functions of the word and *vice versa*. (CM, P. 46)

But the above doubt is not entertainable. Since in all the cases of reciprocal simile, the *similis* appears accompanied with the element of reciprocity. Consequently the present *similis* is bound to remain determinable due to the possession of the fact of having its two counter-terms by turn. Now in all the cases of suggested reciprocal simile, this *similis* becomes the exclusive base of the operation of the function of suggestion due to the absence of any term expressive of similitude in them. Thus

although the function of suggestion has enlisted the service of some word together with its function (*śakti*) for its coming into being, yet it totally dispenses with the cooperation of the function (*śakti*) belonging to that very word in the matter of its ultimate act of suggestion. Similarly in the succeeding instance of reciprocal simile *qua* poetic figure and like others, this *similis* stands characterised by the possession of the fact of having its two entities, viz. (1) water and (2) the sky as counter-terms by turn. It is remarkable that this *similis* appears directly expressed by two independent *ivas* expressive of similitude through the medium of the other function of the word, that is, the primary function. So notwithstanding the fact that the common property belonging to these two entities comes to be apprehended by the function of suggestion, the comprehension of this *similis* remains entirely dissociated from the requisiteness of the service of the function of suggestion for its expression. (CM. P. 46)

Further it is worth-noting that this very rarefied analysis of the instance of reciprocal simile *qua* poetic figure assumes the status of even the specific definition of it. Since this definition does not necessitate the word (*vyakti*) as the constitutive element of the adjective, viz. 'comprehensible either by the function of suggestion or by the other function of the word' forming the subject-matter of dispute. Now if the word *vyakti* (the function of suggestion) is deleted, the adjective will find its expression

in the following form : 'Comprehensible only by the other functions of the word.' And the adoption of this specific' definition of reciprocal simile *qua* poetic figure will culminate in the exclusion of the instance of the figure '*similis* in which the similitude rests on both the factors.' Because in this instance the *similis* accompanied with the element of reciprocity subsists 'between the two factors of comparison, viz. (1) getting herself burnt and (2). serving as a means of proof. So this *similis* becomes determinable by the possession of the fact of having these two entities as counter-terms by turn. It transpires on scrutiny that this *similis* does not appear comprehended with all its components exclusively by any of the other functions of the word. That is to say, the fact of becoming the counter-terms by turn is implied by the function of suggestion and the *similis* itself stands expressed by the term equally (*samam*) occurring in the instance. So the present instance stands precluded and this exclusion will successfully evade the charge of over-extension levelled against the definition of reciprocal simile *qua* poetic figure. (CM. P. 46)

Now, it can be argued that it is only one of the two factors of comparison and not both of them that can be entitled to the status of the standard of comparison in the instance cited above. The plain fact is that the present instance appears bereft of the two terms expressive of similitude, namely, two independent *ivas* (like) as are normally found in the examples of reciprocal

simile *qua'* poetic figure. It follows that the ruling out of the present instance from the purview of this definition may be rendered possible by the very adjective viz. when the *similis* 'subsists between the one and the other entity (accompanied with the element of reciprocity) employed in the body of its own self. And as an inevitable consequence of this, the adjective, viz. 'comprehensible only by the other functions of the word' is made entirely superfluous. But this is the outcome of the partial appraisal of the situation. Since it is true that portrayal of similarity takes place with reference to the relevant (*prākaraṇika*) and the irrelevant (*aprākaraṇika*) in normal circumstances. And in such a case it is but the irrelevant which is infallibly accorded the status of the standard of comparison. But there are the instances which are possessed of both the factors of comparison as purely relevant in their essential nature. So there is the complete absence of the decisive proof (*vinigamanāviraha*) as to which of the two alternatives stands endowed with the property of becoming the standard of comparison. And consequently, the fact of becoming the standard of comparison is equally accorded to both the factors of comparison in these instances. Under the present context it is notable that both the factors of comparison, viz. (1) getting herself burnt and (2) serving as a means of proof are *defacto* relevant in character. So it is obvious that both these entities stand reciprocally endowed with the property of becoming the standard of comparison in the instance under review. And as such the utility of the adjective, viz. comprehensible only by the other functions of the word, is rendered untenable. (CM, P. 46)

Further, it is remarkable that the adjective, viz. 'resting exclusively on the basis of a single property' is capable to save the present definition from the charge of its unwarranted extension with reference to the figure '*similis* per rotation' (*parāsparopamā*). And it has already been illustrated by the verse beginning with 'rajobhiḥ *et seq*'¹. Again on the strength of this very adjective the definition will remain immune from the same allegation *apropos* of the *similis* expressed by means of the verse beginning with *pitāsamārādhana, et seq.*'² The ground for thwarting the present charge against these two examples lies in the fact that the two objects of comparison occurring in the two rotations of the two instances are based on the properties which are distinct to each other. The position may be rendered clear. In the first instance, the two entities, viz. (1)

1. The English rendition of this verse may be reproduced for the sake of convenience: 'By the mass of dust produced by the chariots and with the elephants resembling clouds, this sky is being made like the surface of the earth and the surface of the earth like the sky'.
2. The complexity of the situation may be removed by re-stating the meaning of the verse as follows: 'As verily, the father (*kṣemadhanvā*) became one possessed of a worthy son, a son who is ever devoted to the services of the father, in the same way that son (*Devānīka*) became one possessed of a worthy father, a father who is extremely affectionate to him (the son)'.

the sky and (2) the surface of the earth, have been portrayed as the two objects of comparison in the preceding and the succeeding rotation respectively. And as such these two objects of comparison are conferred upon with two distinct properties, viz. (1) by the mass of dust produced by the chariots and (2) with the elephants resembling clouds which serve as the basis of similitude. Thus the distinctness between the two properties belonging to the two objects of comparison is made conspicuous. And identical is the position of the second instance. Since even this example has already been bifurcated into two rotations. And they are possessed of two objects of comparison, viz. (1) the son and the father in their respective order. These objects of comparison on their part are endowed with two properties which are distinct from each other in their essential nature. These two properties are : (1) the property of becoming one possessed of a worthy father belonging to the son in the preceding rotation (2) the property of becoming worthy due to his becoming extremely affectionate to him (the son) belonging to the father in the succeeding rotation. So it is evident that these two instances cannot claim to be possessed with the *similis* accompanied with the element of reciprocity as exclusively based on the one and single property. And consequently, the alleged charge against this definition stands clearly refuted. For it is apparent that these two instances cannot be brought within the sphere of operation of reciprocal simile. (CM, P. 46)

Now, the consideration of the following facts will serve as an elucidation of the proviso, viz. 'resting exclusively on the basis of a single property' inserted as the constitutive element of the present definition. The illustration of reciprocal simile consists of two rotations. In the preceding rotation one entity is compared with the other. In the succeeding rotation the latter in its turn is similized with the former. And the property as the basis of similization stands either common to them or is brought into being by the relatedness *qua vastu* and *prativastu* instituted between them (i. e. the object and the standard of comparison). It is notable that this property should uniformly remain in the self-same status in respect of the object and the standard of comparison occurring in both the rotations of each and every instance. And only in such a case, the *similis* accompanied with the element of reciprocity can pretend to be resting exclusively on the basis of a single property. It deserves mention that the proviso under consideration does not signify that this *similis* may take place on the basis of the property abiding in both the factors of comparison. Since there is complete absence of such property in the accredited instances of reciprocal simile where the property belonging to the two factors of comparison is brought into existence by the relatedness *qua vastu* and *prativastu* pervaded by 'the relation of reflection and reflected.' Let the position be substantiated by a concrete illustration. And it has already been exemplified by the verse

beginning with 'saachāyambhoja et seq.¹ In this authentic instance of reciprocal simile, the two entities, viz. (1) the ponds and (2) the ladies, are reciprocally depicted as the object and the standard of comparison in the two rotations. And the two properties acting as the ground of similitization in both the rotations are: (1) 'bearing the lotuses with charming lustre for their faces' and (2) 'possessing their faces with charming lustre in the form of lotuses.' It becomes conspicuous on scrutiny that these two properties cannot claim to be abiding (*anugāmi*) in respect of both these factors of comparison, viz. the ponds and the ladies. Since the ponds resemble the ladies by means of the lotuses with charming lustre for their faces and the ladies by the loveliness of their faces engendered by the charming lustre in the form of the lotuses. So the abiding property is not exactly the same in both the rotations of the present instance. And this reorientation of the definition of reciprocal simile will place it on stable basis. (CM, P. 46)

This definition serves the purpose of bringing about the fact of becoming a genuine case of

- I. The full meaning of this verse runs: 'where the ponds bearing the lotuses with charming lustre for their faces shine like the ladies and the ladies possessing their faces with charming lustre in the form of the lotuses (shine) like the ponds.'

reciprocal simile only in a general way. But the definition of reciprocal simile which is comprehensive and at the same time immune from the 'over-extension' may be laid down in the following manner : 'Where the fact of becoming the object of comparison is accorded to the one or the other entity (accompanied with the element of reciprocity) for the purpose of the preclusion of the third similar thing, it is called reciprocal simile.' In this context the adjective, viz. 'where the fact of becoming the object of comparison is accorded to the one or the other entity (accompanied with the element of reciprocity)' is intended to exclude the specific type of the figure converse *pratipa* from the area of the operation of reciprocal simile. The instance of it has already been exhibited by the verse beginning with '*Ahameva*, etc'.¹ In this instance the comparison takes place with reference to the poison and the utterances of the mischievous persons. And none of these two entities is entitled to be endowed with the fact of becoming the object of comparison appearing in a reciprocal manner. So the instance is excluded from the compass of the present definition owing to its non-compliance with

-
1. The English rendering of the verse "O friend poison ! don't be arrogant with the following idea 'I am alone the deadliest of all dreadful things', for verily there exist in this world the mischievous persons' utterances in large numbers

the adjective under review. (CM, P. 46)

Now, the examples of the figure reciprocal simile are being cited in due sequence. (1) The instance exhibiting the commonness of the property may be exemplified by the following verse : 'water is like the sky and the sky is like the water, the swan is like the moon and the moon is like the swan and the stars are exactly similar to the lilies and the lilies are exactly similar to the stars.'¹ This single verse illustrates the three cases of reciprocal simile. In all of them, the *similis* accompanied with the element of reciprocity subsists between the two factors of comparison which are too obvious to be mentioned. The *similis* takes up its rise on the basis of three properties. And they are common to both the factors of comparison occurring in every individual case. Further these properties are - (1) clearness, (2) whiteness and (3) brightness. It is worth noting that all the three properties are bound to call into requisition the service of the function of suggestion for their apprehension; for, these cases are destitute of the words expressive of these common properties. So the verse becomes a pure case of reciprocal simile with the common property implied by the function of suggestion. (CM, P. 47)

The instance of the figure reciprocal simile with the common property as directly expressed has already

1, KRS, 4, 3, 15 (reads *haṁsa iva śaśi śaśi'va haṁso'yaṁ*);
Kuv., P. 11 (reads *haṁsa iva candraś candra iva haṁsaḥ*);

been elaborated by the verse beginning with 'sugandhi et saq'. In this verse the two entities, viz. (1) the face and (2) the lotuses, are reciprocally depicted as the object and the standard of comparison in the two rotations. The three properties standing common to both are directly expressed by the three adjectives explicitly mentioned in the present instance. And they are (1) redolent, (2) a source of joy to the eyes and (3) white - red like the colour of liquor. Or another example of identical type : 'This king of elephants shines like the mountain and the mountain like this king of elephants on account of its loftiness ; and the flow of his ichor is like the flowing of the revulet and the revulet is flowing like the flow of his ichor.' This verse too is entitled to be bisected into two apposite instances of reciprocal simile. The two properties qua commonness in respect of the object and the standard of comparison occurring in each of the two instances, viz. (1) loftiness and (2, the act of flowing, appear directly expressed. Further it is not out of place to mention that these two cases of reciprocal simile occurring in the present versé stand mutually linked in an agreeable manner. That is to say, the two factors of comparison, viz. (1) the king of elephants

and (2) the mountain occurring in the first case, assume the status of the constituted whole. And the two factors of comparison of the second instance, viz. (1) the flow of ichor and (2) the revulet, appear as their integral parts due to the presence of close proximity between them. So they successfully produce a special kind of strikingness which renders the instance more graceful and fascinating. (CM, P. 47)

The example of reciprocal simile emerging out on the basis of the relatedness *qua vastu* and *prativastu* cannot appear in its pure and unblended character. But on the other hand it finds its expression in the form of either adjective or substantive through the medium of the relation of reflection and reflected. The position may be rendered clear by the instance commencing with *sacchāyambhoja it seq.* as above elucidated. In the present context 'the relation of reflection and reflected subsists between the lotuses and the faces inserted as the constitutive elements of the two properties, viz. (1) bearing the lotuses with charming lustre for their faces and (2) possessing their faces with charming lustre in the form of the lotuses. Though they (the lotuses and the faces) are distinct from each other in respect of their quality, they are represented as identical on account of their close resemblance. And 'the relatedness *qua vastu* and *prativastu*' is based on the attribute, viz. charming lustre which though one and indivisible is asserted twice owing to the difference of its substrata, namely, the lotuses

and the faces. Further it is remarkable that this attribute is expressed by the word *sacchāya* (charming lustre) standing as an adjective to the substantives, viz. *ambhoja* (the lotuses) and (2) *vadana* (the faces). So it is rendered apparent that this instance of reciprocal simile emerges out on the basis of 'the relatedness *qua vastu* and *prativastu* standing as an adjective with reference to 'the relation of reflection and reflected.' (CM, P. 47)

Moreover, the example of reciprocal simile with the common property established by the relatedness *qua vastu* and *prativastu* standing as a substantive in respect of 'the relation of reflection and reflected' may be shown by the following verse 'Her face shines like the lotus with the black bee fascinating like the eye and the lotus shines like her face adorned with the eyes resembling those of a deer. In this instance the *similis* (accompanied with the element of reciprocity) exists between the two entities, viz. (1) her face and (2) the lotus. And the two properties, viz. (1) with the black bee fascinating like the eyes and (2) adorned with the eyes resembling those of a deer, belong to the lotus and her face which on their part are reciprocally depicted as the standard and the object of comparison. It deserves mention that these two properties are brought into realization by the relatedness *qua vastu* and *prativastu* appearing in the form of a substantive of the relation of reflection and reflected. It is manifest that 'the relation of reflection and reflected' has

been instituted between the two components of these properties, viz. (1) the black bee and (2) 'the eyes' belonging to the lotus and the face respectively. And the relatedness *qua vastu* and *prativastu* appears by laying hold upon the attribute, viz. beautifulness conveyed by the words, viz. (1) fascinating (*manohara*) and (2) adorned (*bhūṣitam*). It is worth-noting that this attribute expressed by these two words occupies a predominant position. For these are the subsequent members of the determinative compound which takes place in the expressions: viz. (1) fascinating like the black bee (*bhr̥ṅgamanoharam*) and (2) adorned with the eye resembling the eye of a deer (*mṛgalocana bhūṣita*). So the present verse becomes an authentic instance of reciprocal simile with its common property established by 'the relatedness *qua vastu* and *prativastu*' which stands as substantive in respect of 'the relation-of-reflection and reflected'. (CM, P. 47)

The examples enumerated above pertain to 'reciprocal simile appearing in succession' (*paryāyopamā*). Since in them the *similis* accompanied with the element of reciprocity takes place by succession in their two rotations. The instance of synchronous reciprocal simile (*yugapad-upameyopamā*) has already been illustrated by the verse beginning with 'tadvalgunā et seq'. The instance is possessed of the term, viz. instantaneously (*sadyah*) as one of its constitutive elements. This term clearly indicates that the act of similization takes place with reference to the two factors of comparison not in succession but in

the self-same unit of time. Further, it is discernible that the comparison between the eyes with their unsteady and tender pupils in interior and the lotus with its moving black bees is unique in its nature. And it assuredly results in divorcing the third similar thing which is the ultimate consequence of reciprocal simile in general. So the present verse becomes a valid instance of synchronous reciprocal simile. The varieties as indicated above can be shown in respect of even this recognised figure, viz. synchronous reciprocal simile as far as feasible. Thus concludes the consideration of the figure reciprocal simile.

(CM, P. 47.)

SECTION II

Now commences the smashing criticism of the definition of reciprocal simile as propounded in the *Citramīmāṃsā* of Appaya Dīkṣita. It is needless to mention that this criticism is chiefly based on the *Rasagaṅgadhara*, the *magnum opus* of Jagannātha.

Jagannātha explains the utility of the adjectives constituting the body of the definition of reciprocal simile as formulated by Appaya Dīkṣita with his own emendations. Afterwards he controverts the alleged definitions with the averment that the definition of reciprocal simile as set forth by Appaya Dīkṣita is not immune from the charge of over-extension. And he puts forward the verse to substantiate his accusation. "O lady of fair complexion never feel excessive remorse on the thought 'I am similar to the creeper; making search of others (i. e. other similar things) is in vain in this connexion, this (the creeper) too is similar to you in all respects.' The following two rotations may evolve from the present verse : (1) This lady is similar to the creeper and (2) the creeper too is similar to this lady. The following dictum of rhetorics has its special bearing in this context : 'The words like similar (*sadṛśa*) and so forth when used after the words ending in the sixth case-ending become possessed with the fact of becoming the counter-term of similarity. It deserves mention that the word similar (*sadṛśa*) comes after the word creeper (*latāyāḥ*) terminating in the sixth case-ending in the preceding rotation. And the *similis* accompanied with the element of reciprocity exists

between the creeper and this lady signified by the word 'I'. So this *similis* stands characterised by the possession of the fact of having the factor, viz. the creeper as its counter-term in the present rotation. In the succeeding rotation, the word similar (*tulya*) comes after the word, namely, this lady denoted by the word *bhavantyaḥ* ending in the sixth case-ending. So the *similis* appears possessed with the fact of having the factor, viz. this lady as its counter-term in this rotation. And it is patent that the *similis* accompanied with the element of reciprocity becomes endowed with the fact of having these two factors as its counter-terms by turn in the verse under discussion. Moreover, the property, viz. slenderness and so forth is one and identical and stands as common to both these factors of comparison occurring in both the rotations. Consequently, the present *similis* remains undoubtedly based on the one and single property in the instance under review. Further it will not be out of place to state that this *similis* is directly expressed by the term similar reiterated twice in both the rotations. So the *similis* becomes comprehensible by the other function of the word, that is, the primary function totally dispensing with the function of suggestion in the matter of its act of expression. The outcome of this lengthy disquisition lies in the fact that the verse under context complies with all the adjectives employed in the body of the definition of reciprocal simile as propounded by the author of the *Citramīmāṃsā*. And this will make the alleged charge of

over-extension inevitable.

A poser arises. In this context the *similis* accompanied with the element of reciprocity does not appear to exist with all its components. That is to say, the possession of the fact of having its two terms as counter - terms by turn is not apprehensible in connexion with this *simili* in the verse under reference. Since the word *simila* (*sadṛśa*) comes after the word creeper (*latāyāḥ*) ending in the sixth case-ending in the first rotation. So the similitude appears determined by the word creeper in it. And consequently, the entity, viz. this lady signified by the word 'I' remains exclusively the locus of this similitude. Further the relation of the term 'this lady' qua the locus of this similitude is fixed finally and it cannot be shifted even in the second rotation. But the present contentior lacks in probative force. For in such a situation even the recognised instance of reciprocal simile will be debarred from its legitimate sphere of operation. The following instance is an appropriate case of reciprocal simile. The moon is similar to the face and the face is similar to the moon.' In this instance too the word similar occurs after the word the face (*mukhasya*) ending in the sixth case-ending in the first rotation. So it is but the moon which will invariably stand as the locus of similitude. And this similitude will have the face as its counter-term in all circumstances. And consequently this *similis* accompanied with the element of reciprocity cannot claim to be possessed with the fact of having the two terms as counter

term by turn even in this instance. So this too will remain outside its domain in the event of acceptance of the aforesaid contention.¹

It may be argued in defence that the verse beginning with '*aham latāyāḥ, et seq.*' cited above is competent to be an accredited case of reciprocal simile. So its inclusion will not entail the alleged allegation. But this is absolutely untenable. Since in no way the verse under context can be regarded as an authentic instance of reciprocal simile. The obvious fact is this that the latter half of this verse is addressed to achieve a distinct objective. And it finds its consummation in thwarting the vanity of this lady regarding her own slenderness. So the apprehension of the exclusion of the third similar thing remains unrealised by the *similis* expressed in the succeeding rotation. And so upon this very ground the following meaning is brought into prominence in the present situation. 'Even other things similar to you are undoubtedly found and as such what will be the gain by making a search of them? And being possessed with this import the latter half of this verse beginning with '*gaveṣaṇena, et seq.*' becomes compatible. Since the rhetoricians evolve the ultimate conclusion that the soul of the figure reciprocal simile is constituted by the exclusion of the third similar thing. It is in accordance with this upshot that the ruling out of the instance of '*similis per rotation*' (*parasparopamā*)

from the scope of this definition becomes significant. And it has already been explained by the verse commencing with '*rajobhiḥ, et seq*'. Otherwise the endeavour of the rhetoricians for its preclusion will be rendered entirely futile. And this verse too is not out of court to the present context. The reason is plain. The meaning of its first rotation, viz. 'this lady is similar to the creeper' cannot imply the meaning of the second rotation, viz. 'the creeper too is similar to this lady'. For the second rotation is fixed to fulfil its own distinct objective indicated above. So the utterance of the second rotation cannot result in the preclusion of the third thing claiming to have its resemblance to them. (i. e. this lady and the creeper)¹.

It may further be pleaded that another adjective of this *similis* will be resorted to in the form of 'possessing the consequence of the exclusion of the third similar thing'. And on the basis of this additional adjective, this verse will not be liable to be comprised under the definition under review. But this amendment cannot bear scrutiny. Because in such a case the other adjectives employed in the definition will be rendered entirely redundant. The obvious fact is this. This novel adjective will rule out all counterfeit instances liable to be excluded by the other adjectives. The position deserves elaboration. The apprehension of the exclusion of the third similar thing

is the ultimate outcome of reciprocal simile. And the right of an instance to be included under this definition is invariably determined by this ultimate outcome. If it is treated as an additional adjective of this definition of reciprocal simile, the other adjectives become totally devoid of any utility¹.

Another plea may be put forth in the present situation. This *similis* as possessed with 'the fact of having the two terms as its counter-terms by turn' may stand comprehensible exclusively by one and identical function of the word. And in such an eventuality, the present verse is susceptible to be excluded from the scope of this definition. Since the word similar as occurring in this instance is expressive of a bare similitude bereft of its other elements. So 'the fact of having the two entities as counter-term by turn' standing as an integral part of it (this *similis*) remains unexpressed by this term. But even this contention is not tenable. Since then, the authentic instances of reciprocal simile will be deprived of their inclusion. And they have already been illustrated by the verse starting with '*khamiva*' *et seq.* In this connection the *similis* accompanied with the element of reciprocity takes place with reference to water and the sky in the first instance and the swan and the moon in the second one. So in the first instance, the two entities,

1. RG, P. 200

viz. (1) water and (2) sky stand syntactically connected with the *similis* accompanied with the element of reciprocity. Consequently, these two factors of comparison, viz. water and the sky are bound to appear reciprocally as counter-term of this *similis* in both the rotations. Again the present *similis*, in its turn, becomes possessed with 'the fact of having these two factors as its counter-term by turn.' Now it is palpable that 'the fact of having the two entities as the counter-term by turn' has come out on the basis of the relation of this *similis* with these two entities. So this part of *similis* cannot be comprehended by the function of the word. Since the *mīmāṃsists* have categorically asserted that the relation subsisting among the meanings of the words is comprehensible by the function belonging to the word. But the relation of the meanings *inter se* cannot be apprehended by it. It is notable that this view has been held by the *mīmāṃsists* in course of repudiating the independent status of intended import (*tātparya*). Otherwise the meaning of a word cannot be expressed in its pure and isolated character. But on the other hand it will become invariably associated with the relation in the form of its adjective. So the relation of the meanings of the words is comprehensible exclusively by dint of its own inherent power. And it can never be conveyed by any of the functions pertaining to the word. So even this amendment of the opponent has failed to effect any improvement in the case under review. And consequently the alleged charge of 'over extension' against this definition remains unanswered,

CHAPTER XI
ELUCIDATION OF THE FIGURE
SELF-COMPARISON

SECTION I

**The definition of self-comparison formulated
by the older rhetorician critically considered**

In the present chapter we propose to give an exposition of the essential nature of the rhetorical figure styled self-comparison after the author of the *Citramīmāṃsā*. The definition of self-comparison has been formulated by the older rhetorician in the following fashion : 'when the fact of becoming the standard and the object of comparison is accorded exclusively to one entity, it is called self-comparison.' In this context, the apprehension of the one and identical act of similization takes up its rise on the basis of the term, viz. exclusively (*eva*) as employed in the body of this definition. And as a result of this the definition becomes capable to escape from the charge of its unwarranted extension in connection with the instances of the two poetic figures, viz. (1) reciprocal simile and (2) girdle simile. An instance of reciprocal simile may be cited : 'water is like the sky and the sky is like the water, *et seq.*' And the example of girdle simile has already been illustrated : 'your mind is like the speech and the action is like the mind, etc.' It is notable that both these instances possess two independent *similis*. And they can be exhibited by bisecting each of these two

1. PR, P. 67; AM, P. 244 (reads *syād ananwayah* for *ananwayo matah*)

instances : (1) water is like the sky and (2) the sky is like water; and (1) your mind is like the speech and (2) action is like the mind. It is evident that each of the two instances is brought into completion by two numerically different acts of similization. Consequently, the fact of becoming the standard and the object of comparison does not take place with reference to the self-same entity in an identical act of similization. So both these two instances stay beyond the purview of this definition. Since they do not comply with the condition indicated by the term, that is, exclusively (*eva*). CM, P. 47

The examples of self-comparison are cited *seriatim*. (1) 'The sky is like the sky itself and the sea is like the sea itself' etc.¹ The present instance may be bifurcated into two genuine illustrations of self-comparison; (1) the sky is like the sky itself and (2) the sea is like the sea itself. And the fact of becoming the standard and the object of comparison has been attributed to the exclusively one entity, viz. the sky and the sea occurring in the first and the second instance. Further each of the two instances is complete and self-sufficient owing to the presence of one and identical act of similization as an accomplished fact. So these instances comply with the

1. HN. chap. 141 śl. 18; KRS; 4, 3, 14; Kuv., p. 10

The complete verse runs as follows :—

*Gaganam gaganākāram sāgaraḥ sāgaropamāḥ Rāma Rāvaṇayor
yuddham Rāma Rāvaṇayor iva ||*"

terms of this definition in all conceivable ways. It is worth noting that the property belonging to the sky *qua* the object of comparison and the sky *qua* the standard of comparison is not directly expressed by any word expressive of it. But it stands implied by the function of suggestion. The instance of self-comparison with its common property as directly expressed may be exemplified by the following verse. It is not only that the lady with high hip and possessed with exquisite beauty shines like the same lady with high hip; in fact her amorous gestures which are the stage for dancing of one with the weapon of amorous gestures (i. e. cupid) shine like her own amorous gestures.¹ This verse too contains two genuine examples of self-comparison. They are too obvious to be bisected. And the two common properties, viz. (1) possessed with exquisite beauty and (2) which are the stage for dancing of cupid pertain to the two entities, viz. (1) the lady with high hip and (2) her amorous gestures. It is remarkable that each of these two entities has been depicted as both the standard and the object of comparison in every one of these two instances. And every example is perfect and self-contained with the one and identical act of similitization. It is needless to elaborate that these two common properties remain directly expressed by the words occurring in the instances under review.

(CM, PP. 47-48)

1. KP, P. 582; KNS, P. 288

It may be contended that the one and identical entity, viz. Raghupati has been depicted as endowed with the fact of becoming the standard and the object of comparison in the instance as follows : 'Having passed over in this way the period of living in the forest under the command of his father and with his kingdom reinstated, Rāma observed the equal treatment towards virtue, wealth and worldly enjoyment, in the self-same way, as towards' his own younger brothers'.¹ And consequently, this verse is entitled to be a valid case of self - comparison. But it has not been included within the realm of self - comparison. On the other hand it is regarded as a genuine example of conjoint *similis*. This *similis* is supposed to subsist between the equal treatment of Rāma towards virtue, wealth and worldly enjoyment and that of him towards his younger brothers. And it is this very equal treatment towards them which is solely intended to be conveyed through the medium of the present conjoint *similis*. So the aim and object of this verse does not culminate in the exclusion of all other similar things, which is the ultimate consequence of the figure Self - comparison. (CM, P. 48)

Moreover, in the same way another instance may be set forth in the following way : 'I will forsake the daughter of Videha (i. e. Sita) like the earth

1. RV, canto, 14, śl. 21

bounded by the sea (which I left before) in accordance with the command of the father.¹ In this instance too the only one entity, viz. Rāma has been accorded the status of the standard and the object of comparison in the sphere of one and identical act of similization. So the inclusion of this instance too under the present figure becomes logically apposite. But it remains excluded from the domain of self-comparison. Since the comparison takes place with reference to the two entities, viz. (1) the forsaking of the earth (*kṣiti*) in accordance with the command of the father and (2) forsaking of *Sītā* on the ground of scandal. And these are delineated as the standard and the object of comparison in the case under consideration. It deserves mention that the act of forsaking though one and unique in its nature has been produced by two distinct grounds in respect of the earth and *Sītā* respectively. These grounds are : (1) in accordance with the command of the father and (2) on the ground of scandal. And as a consequence of this, there is no possibility of other similar things *apropos* of it. So the final outcome of

-
- I. The present instance starts with the latter half of the verse alluded to above. The English rendition of the complete verse 'I will forsake the daughter of Videha (i. e. *Sītā*) in an indifferent manner even at the point of the advent of receiving fruit in order to get it (the scandal) removed like the earth bounded by the sea (which ' I left before) in accordance with the command of the father.'

comparison. And similarly in the third instance 'the head upon which the Ganges was falling down' and 'the crest in proximity to the linen cloth of umbrella' are depicted as possessed of the status of the standard and the object of comparison. It is palpable that all the enumerated factors of comparison provided by the three instances are *de facto* attributes in their essential nature. And as such these three pairs of factors are adjectively abiding in the three substantives, viz. (1) Raghupati (2) Rāma and (3) Hara in their consecutive order. Further these three substantives are the consecutive components of the three instances as referred to above. So it is made abundantly clear that none of these factors *qua* substantives has been described as possessing the fact of becoming the standard and the object of comparison in these instances. Now there is no room for doubt regarding the competency of an adjective to be depicted as the standard and the object of comparison in the present situation. Since it is discernible even in a sentence with its substantive as qualified by its own adjective. And as such when the substantive appears incompatible with the action occasioned by the verb in the same sentence, in such a case it is solely the adjective that comes into prominence and becomes syntactically united with the action under context.⁸ A concrete illustration will render the position clear. 'One possessed of sacred tuft of hair was shaved (*śikhī munḍitah*). In this case the substantive, viz. 'the person *per se*' cannot be shaved in any conceivable ways. So it is the

sacred tuft of hair (*śikhā*) standing as the adjective of the person concerned which is actually chopped off in normal procedure. The consideration of these facts shows that the two distinct adjectives belonging to every substantive of every instance are entitled to be invested with the status of the standard and the object of comparison without any hindrance. And this fact accounts for the non-inclusion of these three instances within the domain of the figure self-comparison. (CM, P. 48)

But this argument lacks cogency. Since it is in no way irrelevant to delineate the only one entity *qua* substantive as holding the rank of the standard and the object of comparison in every one of these instances. The situation deserves amplification. In the first instance it is only Raghupati who can stand for both the standard and the object of comparison in the way as follows. As Raghupati observed his equal treatment towards virtue, wealth and worldly enjoyment, similarly he did it towards his younger brothers. The second instance too may be analysed for clarification. As Rāma deserted the earth bounded by the sea so will he desert Sītā. Thus it is only one entity, viz. Rāma which deserves to be vested with the rank of the standard, and the object of comparison. In like manner the third instance can provide the only one entity, viz., Hara as possessed of the status of the standard and the object of comparison. In this way the representation of the only one entity *qua*

substantive as the standard and the object of comparison has been shown as logically consistent in all these three instances. And in spite of it, the fact of becoming the standard and the object of comparison is assumed as circumscribed by the pair of adjectives in every one of these instances. And this type of assumption will assuredly entail the complexity in the realm of poetics. The position may be rendered clear by the instance beginning with *pāṇḍyo'yam*, *et seq*¹. In this instance the two entities *qua* substantives, viz. (1) the Lord of mountains and (2) the king of Pāṇḍu are brought into relation as the standard and the object of comparison. And the properties *qua* adjectives, that is to say, (1) the morning sun rays and (2) the flowing spring belonging to the former and (1) the yellow sandal-paste and (2) the pendant mecklace pertaining to the latter are brought into being by means of the relation of reflection and reflected. Now it is these very properties *qua* adjectives that become capable to hold the status of the standard and the object of comparison in accordance with the present assumption. And as an inevitable result of this, no example of 'the relation-

-
1. The English translation of the present verse 'The king of pāṇḍu with his shoulder bearing a pendant necklacc and getting his limbs anointed with yellow sandal - paste (*haricandana*) shines like the lord of mountains (*Himālaya*) with a flowing spring and with ridges reddened by the sun rays'.

of-reflection and reflected' can be possible in the field of rhetorics. The truth is this that the relation-of-reflection and reflected' is bound to lay its hold upon the properties *qua* adjectives in all cases without exception. And if they come to the position of the standard and the object of comparison on the basis of this assumption, 'the relation-of-reflection and relected' will become destitute of its *raison d'être*. (CM, P. 48)

Moreover the assumption under context will create another difficulty. Since it is the rhetoricians who concede the existence of the fact of becoming the standard and the object of comparison with reference to the self-same entity. And it stands proved to the hilt in the accredited instance of self-comparison. 'The clash between Rāma and Rāvaṇa is like the clash between Rāma and Rāvaṇśa'. There is absence of difference in respect of the clash between Rāma and Rāvaṇa *qua* the standard of comparison and the clash between Rāma and Rāvaṇa *qua* the object of comparison. To tell the truth, both these factors of comparison are one and identical in their essential nature. And despite this, they have been conferred the rank of the standard and the object of comparison. So the norm indicated above, that is, when the substantive appears incompatible with the action occasioned by the verb, etc.' will come into operation in its unmitigated character. Consequently in no instance of self-comparison, the entities *qua* substantives would be entitled to hold the status of the standard and the object

of comparison if they appear with their properties *qua* adjectives. And so for this very ground the postulation of this norm commencing with 'saviṣeṣaṇa', *et seq.*¹ may be consistent in accordance with the viewpoint of the *mīmāṃsists* in the present situation. And the norm may be rendered into English in the following manner : 'When the positive and the negative injunctions are prescribed with reference to the substantive as circumscribed by the adjective and if the substantive itself becomes incompatible, they (the positive and the negative injunctions) become shifted upon the adjective. That is to say, it is the adjective which becomes the base of the operation of those injunctions.' But this norm cannot be acceptable to the rhetoricians. The reason is plain. The *mīmāṃsists* hold that the fact of becoming the standard and the object of comparison cannot be established on the basis of identity in any possible manner. So they interpret the above accredited instance of self-comparison in consonance with their own position. To put it the other way round, the clash between Rāma and Rāvaṇa which occurred in the preceding cycle of age stands possessed with the rank of the standard of comparison in relation to the clash between Rāma and Rāvaṇa which is taking place in the present

1. The complete norm may be produced into Sanskrit in the way as follows :— 'saviṣeṣaṇe hi vidhiniṣedhau viṣeṣye vādhe viṣeṣaṇam upasaṅkrāmatah'.

cycle of age. And again they maintain that the sky of the other (prior) cycle of age (*kalpa*) stands for the standard of comparison in respect of the sky of the present cycle of age (*kalpa*). Thus the *mīmāṃsists* can defend their position in some way or other even by laying hold upon this norm in the present situation. But the rhetoricians cannot subscribe to this view. Since the enunciation of this norm is bound to involve the complexities in the way indicated above. It has been brought to limelight that the rhetoricians feel called upon to represent these three entities *qua* substantives as the standard and the object of comparison in the instances under consideration. So the present definition of self-comparison cannot remain immune from the charge of its unwarranted extension with reference to these three instances. (CM. P. 48-49)

SECTION II

The figure Self - comparison as elaborated in the *Citramīmāṃsā*

Now the definition of self - comparison is propounded by the author of the *Citramīmāṃsā* in the following form : 'Where the similarity of an entity with its own self appears based on the one and identical abiding property, it is called the figure self comparison (*ananvaya*) which is a 'significant epithet.' The proviso, viz. 'similarity of an entity with its own self is inserted with a view to avoiding the charge of 'overlapping' against this definition with reference to the two figures, viz. (1) girdle simile and (2) reciprocal simile. Since the only one and the same entity has not been similized with its own self in any of these two figures of speech. On the contrary the act of civilization takes place in connexion with the two numerically distinct entities in the instances of both these figures of speech. And this point has been elaborately discussed in the beginning of the present chapter. (CM, P. 49)

Further due to the factual presence of the adjective, viz. 'based on the one and identical abiding property' the present definition is saved from its being an overlapping one concerning these three instances of the specific variety of *similis* as alluded to above. It may be contended that even these instances are not totally dissociated from the present abiding property. And it is

clearly existing in the shape of the part of the property, that is, observance of equal treatment in the first instance. Since this part is equally linked with the other part of the property, viz. towards virtue, wealth and worldly enjoyment, and towards his younger brothers. But despite this, the sumtotal of the property belonging to the entity *qua* substantive, viz. Raghupati in this instance cannot claim to be one and indivisible. Since the remaining portion of the property, viz. towards the virtue, wealth and wordly enjoyment and towards his younger brothers is made to serve the common property through the medium of 'the relation-of-reflection and reflected.' Analogous is the position of the remaining other two instances. And their dissection dispenses with further amplification. And it is entirely banking upon this very fact that the employment of the term, that is, the one and identical (*eka*) too becomes meaningful. It is crystal clear that the adjective, viz. 'based on the abiding property' as bereft of the element of numerical identity cannot operate as decisive factor for the preclusion of these three instances from the domain of self-comparison. (CM, P. 49)

It is worthy of remark that the expression, viz, 'self-comparison (*ananvaya*)' which is a significant epithet cannot be regarded as the constitutive element of the body of this definition of self-comparison. But it is merely an expedient to secure the precise significance of the figure self-comparison (*ananvaya*). That is to say, even the similarity of an entity with its own self is entitled to be designated self-comparison (*ananvaya*) only if it appears exclusively based on the one and identical abiding property. It is an

absolute condition and its non-compliance is bound to act as a deterrent. Since it is an indisputable fact that the similarity of an entity with its own self cannot become associated if it were based on the only one and single property. And the consideration of this fact proves that the figure self-comparison (*ananvaya*) is a significant epithet by its own right. Further it is notable that the ultimate objective of this figure in the shape of the apprehension of peerlessness can be possible on the basis of the etymological significance of the expression self-comparison (*ananvaya*). It is clear that the numerical difference of the property serves the surest ground of the similarity of an entity with its own self. For it is a felt fact that even the self-same entity appears distinct to its own self when stands characterised by different properties. So in the case of the numerically different property the act of similitization becomes associated in a normal course. Since the similitization of the entity determined by the other property easily takes place with reference to its own self if it becomes circumscribed by another different property. And as a consequence of it, the designation of this figure, viz. *ananvaya* (self-comparison) cannot claim to be a significant epithet in the event of numerical difference. Nor the ultimate culmination of self-comparison (*ananvaya*) in the form of peerlessness can possibly be secured if the entity under context stands determined by different properties. The upshot of the present discussion is that the comprehension of the ultimate goal of

self-comparison is exclusively based upon the derivative meaning of the very expression *ananaya* (self-comparison). And the derivative meaning of the present expression can find its expression only in the event of the presence of the only one property in the way above indicated. (CM, P. 49)

The present definition of self-comparison is conducive to the understanding of the essential nature of peerlessness. And the precisely strict definition of self-comparison *qua* poetic figure is to be sought in that adduced by Bhāmaḥa. It runs as follows : 'The figure in which the property of becoming the standard and the object of comparison of an entity with its own self takes place with the purport of importing its peerlessness is called self-comparison'. Now the employment of the adjective, viz. 'the property of becoming the standard and the object of comparison of an entity with its own self' consummates in the evasion of the charge of 'over-extension' against this definition with reference to the instance of the specific type of the figure hyperbole. And it has already been exemplified by the verse beginning with '*ubhaṇ yadi et seq.*'¹ In this instance the ultimate consequence of self-

1 The English rendition of the verse If both the streams of the Heavenly Ganges in distinction were to pour out in the sky, then alone his chest blue like the tamāla (leaves) and wearing the necklace of pearls can be similized with it (sky),

comparison in the shape of the suggestion of peerlessness can be obtained from its first half. Since the two distinct streams of the Heavenly Ganges cannot pour out in any possible ways. So it is evident that the act of pouring out of such streams in the sky stands out unique and matchless in its character. And despite its uniqueness it has been represented as the standard of comparison in relation to the entity, viz. 'his chest blue like tamāla, *et seq.* depicted as the object of comparison. It is plain that the similarity of this entity has been assumed to occur with reference to the ultimate consequence of self-comparison. So this instance may arrogate to its inclusion under the fold of the present definition. And it is entirely due to its non-compliance with the adjective stated above that this instance becomes debarred from the scope of self-comparison. The ground is apparent. The instance of this specific type of the figura hyperbole consists of two distinct entities standing for the standard and the object of comparison. So the property of becoming the standard and the object of comparison of only one entity cannot be reasonably conceded to its own self in this instance. (CM, PP. 49-50)

It is remarkable that the figure self-comparison can also be suggested by means of the function of suggestion. And it may be exhibited by the following verse. 'O Govinda ! the delight which was produced in my mind by your arrival at my house today would be produced in my mind again by your very arrival after the'

lapse of a long time¹. Vidura offers a homage to Śrī kṛṣṇa who has paid a visit to his house. In this context Vidura has spoken in a circumlocutory manner to show proper courtesy. 'The delight produced in my mind by your arrival will be produced by your arrival again after the lapse of a long time. It (delight) cannot be secured by any other means. This round about speech of Vidura acts as a basis of the suggestion of self-comparison in the way as indicated below : The delight produced by your arrival will be like the very delight to be produced by your arrival and it cannot be similar to the delight produced by any other object.' And such instance of the suggested self-comparison requires to be excluded from the jurisdiction of self-comparison *qua* poetic figure. So the adjective, viz. 'the fact of being non-suggested' deserves to be employed as the constitutive factor of the body of the definition of the figure self-comparison. And its insertion is not completely novel in character. But it has been employed to serve identical purpose even in the definition of other poetic figures (CM, P. 50)

**The scathing criticism of the illustration
of suggested self-comparison**

Jagannātha in the course of his trenchant criticism has conceded the definition and illustrations of self-comparison as propounded in the *Citramīmāṃsā*. He has

1, Kv, chap. 3, śl. 5; KD, chap. 2, śl. 276^a, RG, P, 208

controverted only the instance of suggested self-comparison as has been cited in it. In accordance with the viewpoint of Jagannātha the suggested sense of the verse under context may be stated as follows. 'The delight to be produced by your arrival in the next time is similar to this delight produced by your present arrival' And the apprehension of this suggested meaning is a universally felt fact. These two delights are specific in their character and are the two constitutive members of the delight taken in its generic character which is produced by the arrival of Śrī. Kṛṣṇa. Further these two varieties of delight are entitled to be depicted as the object and standard of comparison. Since these two are numerically different from each other in their essential nature. So on the basis of it the act of similization can take place with reference to the two entities, namely, (1) 'the delight which is to be produced and (2) 'the delight which has been produced' without encountering any impediment. Therefore, as the present instance is a case of the suggested *similis*, it cannot be congruent with the etymological significance of the figure self-comparison (*ananvaya*). Now it follows that this verse cannot be an appropriate example of the suggested self-comparison. It is worthy of note that in the context of *similis*. Appaya Dīkṣita has himself asserted the characteristics of self-comparison (*ananvaya*) in the way mentioned below : 'The figure self-comparison is so designated because there is complete absence of

syntactical unity in the event of the similarity of an entity with its own self.¹

Moreover, in this instance the entity, viz. 'the delight which is to be produced' has been delineated as the object of comparison. And as such it is entirely incapable to rule out all other things pretending their similarity with it. Since it is competent to be reasonably compared with the entity, viz. this delight produced by the present arrival. On the other hand, the comparison between these two individual delights culminates in the apprehension of the peerlessness of the delight occasioned by the arrival of Śrī Kṛṣṇa taken in its generic character. And consequently the undifferentiated delight produced by the arrival of Śrī Kṛṣṇa stands suggested as unique and incomparable to any other object. So it is patent that the ultimate result of the suggested self comparison has not been achieved by means of present instance. On the contrary, the final outcome of the suggested self comparison stands transmitted to the undifferentiated delight which cannot claim to be the proper substratum of it in any imaginable ways. The gist of this elaborate discussion is that the verse cited as the instance of the suggested self-comparison is in reality an authentic case of the suggested *similis*.²

1. RG, P. 208

2. RG, P. 209

It may be contended in the present situation that the alleged instance of the suggested self-comparison may be expressed in the following garb: 'The undifferentiated delight produced by the arrival of Śrī Kṛṣṇa is like the undifferentiated delight produced by the arrival of Śrī Kṛṣṇa'. And this suggested form of self-comparison may be felt in the intermediary stage of the process of comparison that takes place with reference to the two individual delights as referred to above. But this far fetched way of suggestion is a downright absurdity. Since it is bound to appear as repulsive to the taste of the rhetorician. And further this suggested form of self-comparison is completely devoid of pragmatic consideration. It may be argued that the substantiation of the peerlessness of the undifferentiated delight produced by the arrival of Śrī Kṛṣṇa will be the ultimate objective of the suggested form of self-comparison. But this cannot be so. Because the instance under reference signifies two individual delights determined by the two distinct units of time, namely, (1) pertaining to the future and (2) pertaining to the present. And they eventually stand as two constitutive components of the undifferentiated delight produced by the arrival of Śrī Kṛṣṇa. Further these two individual delights have been invested with the status of the object and the standard of comparison in their due order. It is noticeable that this *similis* subsisting between these two factors of comparison is

more than adequate to account for the realization of
the peerlessness of the present undifferentiated delight

In this context an instance is necessary to make the position clear. 'Although this wide world is filled up by thousands of beautiful damsels. O fortunate one, the left portion of the body of that lady, imitates the right portion of her body.' In this instance the simile takes place with reference to the entities, viz. (1) the right portion of her body (2) the left portion of her body, which are depicted as the standard and the object of comparison. And these two factors of comparison are really the two components of the organic whole, i. e., of the lady taken in her entirety. It deserves specific mention that the comparison between these two entities consummates in the apprehension of the peerlessness of this present lady taken as an organic whole. And an analogous situation prevails even in respect of the previous instance. And it does not require further elaboration. A poser arises. Even in the present verse beginning with 'Although this wide world, *et seq.*' the suggestion of the peerlessness of the lady taken as an organic whole takes up its rise on the basis of the comparison occurring between the right and the left

[illegible]

portions of her body. So the apprehension of the similarity of the lady with her own self may be imagined to take place in the intermediate stage of the process of comparison. And this is out and out an instance of the suggested self-comparison in its essential nature. Therefore the preceding verse standing on a par with this succeeding verse commencing with 'Although this wide world, or any other, may be a genuine case of the suggested self-comparison' concerning the verse commencing with 'But this suggestion is destitute of substance'. The reason is this that the relation between the peerlessness and self-comparison (*ananvaya*) is not invariably infallible in its nature. To put it the other way round, the apprehension of peerlessness can be brought into being even by the sources other than that of self-comparison. And this is attested by the case of imagined *similis* (*kalpi topam*). An instance will render it evident. 'O friend! his word is like the sky flower, *et seq*'. In this instance the standard of comparison, viz. the sky flower is the mental construction of the poet and bereft of reality. So the comparison between (1) his word and (2) sky flower results in the apprehension of the peerlessness of his word depicted as the object of comparison. But the present instance cannot be an opposite case of self-comparison in any possible ways. So it follows that the apprehension of peerlessness cannot be the invariable result of self-

comparison. Otherwise the present instance too will claim to be included within the gamut of self-comparison. The sum and substance of this discourse is that the apprehension of the peerlessness of the alleged undifferentiated delight is appropriate in the above situation. But this appropriateness cannot act as a ground for the comprehension of the suggested form of self-comparison in the intermediate stage of the process of comparison as referred to above. So the verse commencing with 'O Govinda, etc.' cited as the case of suggested self-comparison remains inconsistent in the light of Jagannātha's findings.¹

A fresh plea crops up. Jagannātha has quoted the definition of self-comparison as has been formulated by Ratnākara along with its three-fold classification and illustrations. And it is remarkable that the verse beginning with 'O Govinda ! etc.' stands in strict compliance with the terms of the definition of the second variety of self-comparison as set forth by Ratnākara². This second variety of self-comparison propounded by Ratnākara may be taken as apparently suggested in the present instance. But this line of argument cannot carry conviction. Since these varieties of self-comparison as shown by Ratnākara have already been repudiated by Jagannātha in his

1. Ibid

2. Vide, RG, P. 206

Rasagangādhara.¹ It should be borne in mind that the etymological meaning of the expression, viz. *ananvaya* (self-comparison) cannot reasonably be appropriate in respect of the instance under review. Moreover Appaya Dīkṣita himself has not mentioned this second variety of self-comparison as alleged by Ratnākara in the context of self-comparison in the *Citramīmāṃsā*.²

Now the following verse will be the legitimate instance of suggested self-comparison which occurs in the *Gaṅgāstava* of Jagannātha : 'Tell, O Ganges ; which of those with banks (i. e. river) flowing down from the mountains resided in the matted knot of hairs of the destroyer of Pura (i.e. Hara), or which other else has washed the foot of the husband of Śrī (Viṣṇu) with its own water, and with which, O mother ! the poets may describe even the slightest similarity of yours.' In this verse the word, viz. which other else (*itarayā*), is the expressive of intended meaning. For it serves the basis of the suggestion of self-comparison in the way mentioned below : 'Your similarity can admittedly be depicted with your own self'. And this comparison of the Ganges with her own self culminates in the apprehension of peerlessness of the river Ganges without encountering any impediment. So there is no shadow of doubt that this verse is an authentic 'case of suggested

1. RG; P. 206

2. RG, P. 209

self-comparison. Another example may be cited to confirm our contention. 'Although the three worlds are filled up by men, gods and demons, no other will be nor is nor had become the supporter of the earth! the bearer of your resemblance.' In this verse the word, viz. 'no other' (*aparāṇ*) occurs with a view to suggesting self-comparison which may be indicated in the following form: 'You are but the bearer of your own resemblance.' In this suggested form of self-comparison, the resemblance of the king with his own self signifies peerlessness of the king within the boundary of the three worlds. Therefore this verse too deserves to be accounted as a valid case of suggested self-comparison. A doubt arises. The last verse clearly conforms with the condition of an independent rhetorical figure entitled the equal (*asama*). Since this figure ultimately culminates in the negation of similarity in all possible ways. It is notable that the present verse is possessed of three negative particles (*na*) which negate the similarity of the king with reference to the three distinct temporal contexts. So this verse obviously fails to comply with the terms of the definition of self-comparison. In such a case it deserves to be included under the realm of the figure unequal. And the present issue has been elaborated and clinched in the *Rasagaṅgadhara*.¹

1, Ibid, P. 210

CHAPTER XII

ESSENTIAL FEATURES OF THE FIGURE

REMINISCENCE ANALYSED AND REVIEWED

SECTION I

The definition and illustrations of reminiscence elaborated

This chapter will be devoted to the elaboration of the poetic figure designated reminiscence (*smarana*). The definition of reminiscence is put forth by Appaya Dikṣita in the following fashion: If the recollection of the other distinct thing takes place on the basis of the similarity, it obtains the status of the poetic figure called reminiscence (*smarana*) and it becomes characterized by the fact of its being non-suggested by the function of suggestion. To take a concrete instance of it. Haṁsa (Daśaratha) did not fix the aim of his arrow on the peacock with the beautiful hinder part even though leaping to an eagle near his horse. Since he (Daśaratha) has his mind instantaneously directed towards the braid of hairs of his lady love adorned by the variegated garlands and with its knots united in the love sport. In this verse Daśarath views the hinder part of the peacock which is similar to the braid of hairs of his lady love adorned by the variegated garlands and with its knots united in the love sport. Th

1. Vide RV, canto, 9, Śl. 67 and notice the variance in reading in connexion with the word *lakṣyī* for *lakṣyī*. SKB 153 (reads *lakṣyī* for *lakṣyī*); RG, P. 218.

sight of the former paves the way for the recollection of the latter correlated distinct object which is exactly similar to the former. It is notable that the recollection of the other correlated distinct object is exclusively based on resemblance for its eventuation. So in the present context the sight of a similar thing acts as a ground for the recollection of the other similar distinct things. (CM, P. 50)

Another instance may be cited in order to reinforce the conclusion. 'Observing yonder a certain lady causing wonder even to the celestial damsels with her hand charming by the possession of the full-blown lotus, coming out from the water and appearing like Śrī (Lakṣmī), Kṛṣṇa recollected the churning of the ocean'. In this instance Kṛṣṇa observes a lady who is extremely similar to Lakṣmī in all respects. So the observation of the lady acts as a basis of the recollection of the churning of the ocean. Because it (the churning of the ocean) is closely associated with the emergence of Lakṣmī from it. Even this recollection becomes effected by the similarity existing between the lady and Lakṣmī portrayed in the present verse. It becomes conspicuous that the recollection of the other correlated distinct objects, viz. (1) the braid of hairs and (2) the churning of the ocean in the preceding and the succeeding instance is equally based on similarity in the way indicated above. And the consideration of this fact

shows that the expression, viz. 'the other correlated distinct object' (*vastvānt'ra*) justifies its employment in the body of the present definition. The reason is not far to seek. This expression is indicative of both the types of other correlated distinct objects which are similar and dissimilar in character. Since in the first instance the object, viz. 'the braid of hairs' appears exactly similar to the hinder part of the peacock and in the second one, the recollected thing, that is, the churning of the ocean, remains diametrically dissimilar to the lady resembling Lakṣmī. So these two instances are proved to be the valid cases of reminiscence. (CM, P. 51)

Now the following instance will remain excluded from the jurisdiction of the figure reminiscence. 'Better take shelter underneath the tree, O Lakṣmaṇa ! for one possessed with burning rays (i. e. sun) rises up; where is the basis for talking about one possessed with burning rays (sun) O Raghupati ? this is the moon which is coming to view, O brother ! how did you even guess it ? Since it bears the black deer (*kurāṅga*) where is O beloved ? O one with the black deer-like eyes ! O one with moon-like face ! O Jānakī¹ ! In this verse Raghupati hears the word (*kurāṅga*) uttered by Lakṣmaṇa, which signifies the idea of the black spot in the moon. The name of the black

1. HN, chap. 5, śl. 18; Maha. of Hanuṃtān chap. 4. P. 277; SR, 281, śl. 120; Kuv., P. 188; RG, P. 218; SM, P. 314.

deer (*kurāṅga*) acts as a basis of the recollection of its own eyes which are related to it (the black deer) like a part to the organic whole. The recollection of the eyes of the black deer serves as a ground for the recollection of the eyes of Sītā which are closely similar to the eyes of the black deer. And finally the recollection of Sītā herself takes place on the basis of the recollection of her eyes which are the components of Sītā *qua* organic whole. In this way the hearing of the word *kurāṅga* (black deer) producing a chain of recollection has culminated in the recollection of Sītā who is the beloved of Raghupati. It deserves to be punctuated that the object Sītā although correlated stands totally distinct from the hearing of the expression *Kurāṅga* (black deer) acting as the basis of the present recollection. And as such this recollection becomes exclusively effected by means of similarity existing between the eyes of *kurāṅga* and the eyes of Sītā who is the beloved of Raghupati. But this verse cannot comply with the proviso, viz. to become characterised by the fact of non-suggestion, as inserted in the body of the present definition. Because the recollection of Sītā to Raghupati stands suggested by the function of suggestion. And the function of suggestion is called into requisition on the ground that the present instance does not possess the words like *smṛti* (recollection) and so forth which are the expressive of reco-

lection. So this recollection which is the ultimate import of this verse cannot be placed in the inferior rank of an emblem. On the contrary it has itself become promoted to the

the present verse. Now the recollection of the arm of the king takes place on the basis of the relation existing between the arm of the king and the earth which are out and out dissimilar to each other in their essential nature. And consequently the recollection of the arm of the king cannot arise by means of similarity in the present context. Therefore this verse has forfeited its right to be a genuine instance of the figure reminiscence. But on the other hand, the recollection of the arm of the king appears purely a transitory feeling of mind (*sancāribhāva*). And it is an accessory and at the same time subservient to the permanent basic feeling (*sthāyibhāva*) called *rati* adoration lying dormant towards this king. That is to say, this recollection is conducive to the excessive adoration offered to the king. And consequently it is placed in a subordinate position in relation to the permanent basic feeling (*sthāyibhāva*) as has been portrayed in the present verse. So this verse comes to be regarded as a valid case of the distinct rhetorical figure designated *preya*. (CM, P. 51)

Further the recollection based on anxiety (*cintā*) may be exemplified by the verse as follows : That subjugator of cupid (Hara) after making a promise, that is, 'I will do in this way' and by forsaking Umā somehow or other, recollected the seven seers endowed with halo.¹ In this verse the recollection of seven seers takes its rise on the

1. KS, cant 6, śl. 3 ; SKV, P. 184

basis of the anxiety of Hara pertaining to Umā. And consequently the present recollection cannot possibly be occasioned by similarity as is required by the terms of the definition of reminiscence. So this verse cannot be a legitimate instance of reminiscence. It deserves to be stressed that this verse cannot be an example of any accredited rhetorical figure, since it is devoid of that strikingness which elevates a verse to the plane of a poetic figure. So the adjective, viz. 'on the basis of the similarity' inserted as the constitutive element of this definition becomes significant by precluding these two instances from the province of the figure reminiscence. In this way these four poetic figures, namely, 1) *similis* (2) reciprocal simile, (3) reminiscence and (4) self-comparison have been elucidated in a comprehensive manner. These four figures of speech are uniformly based on similarity with this distinguishing characteristic that the former three figures take their rise on the basis of difference between the object and the standard of comparison and the latter on the basis of identity between them. With this concluding remark the present discussion on the figure reminiscence comes to an end. (CM, P. 51)

basis of the anxiety of Hara pertaining to Uma. And consequently the present recollection cannot possibly be

SECTION II

occasioned by similarity as is required by the terms of the

Minute dissection of the definition and illustrations

of reminiscence, by Jagannātha

that this verse cannot be an example of the figure of reminiscence. In course of refuting the definition of reminiscence framed by Appaya Dikṣita has formulated his own definition of the figure reminiscence. It may be stated in its normal form: 'The recollection which takes its rise on the basis of similarity, is called the figure reminiscence'. The definition is competent to comprehend both the types of recollection, namely, the recollection of the braid of hairs and the recollection of the churning of the ocean. Since both these recollections are exclusively grounded on the basis of similarity for their emergence. So the adjective, viz. 'the recollection of the other correlated distinct objects occurring in the body of the definition of reminiscence as laid down in the *Citramimamsā* is bereft of utility. The ground is obvious. The sole objective of the present adjective is to comprise these two types of recollections within the fold of the definition of reminiscence. And this purpose is served by this novel definition of reminiscence which is characterized by simplicity and brevity of expressions. The position stands in need of clarification. In the verse beginning with 'He did not fix up, *et seq*'. the king recollects the braid of hairs of his beloved at the sight of its similar object, i. e., the hinder part of the peacock. So this recollection

is produced by the latent mental trace of the recollected object in the mind which becomes awakened by the sight of the similar object. And in the verse commencing with 'observing yonder, etc.', the churning of the ocean is got recollected to Śrī Kṛṣṇa at the sight of the lady who closely resembles Lakṣmī. So this recollection is generated in the mind of Śrī Kṛṣṇa by means of the latent mental trace aroused by the recollection of Lakṣmī. And the recollection of Lakṣmī, in its turn, is brought into being by the latent mental trace stimulated by the sight of the lady bearing a similarity with her. The consideration of this fact, however, shows that the basis of the recollection of both these objects ultimately rests entirely on similarity in these two instances. The only difference lies in the fact that the element of similarity is directly responsible for the production of the recollection in the first instance and it is an indirect condition of the recollection of the churning of the ocean in the second instance. So it is undeniable that the element of similarity is the *raison d'être* of the two individual cases of recollection mentioned above.

It deserves to be punctuated that the adjective, viz. 'the recollection as becoming based on similarity' cannot invariably find its culmination in the meaning, that is, 'the recollection of the other similar thing'. And only in such a case, the recollection of the churning of the

ocean may remain excluded from the compass of the definition of reminiscence. Since the churning of the ocean cannot be similar to the lady referred to in the verse in any possible way. But the case is otherwise. So the recollection of the churning of the ocean becomes comprised within the fold of this amended definition, without any hitch.¹

Further the author of the *Citramīmāṃsā* asserts that the recollection of Sītā by Rāma in the verse beginning with 'Saumitre, *et seq.*' stands suggested by the function of suggestion. And as a result of this, it has assumed the status of the objective of embellishment (*alāṅkārya*). So the adjective, viz. the recollection as becoming characterized by the fact of its being non-suggested by the function of suggestion' is required to be employed in the body of the definition of reminiscence. And it has successfully isolated this type of instance from the jurisdiction of reminiscence. But even this viewpoint of Appaya Dīkṣita will not bear scrutiny. Since this recollection cannot be elevated to the dignity of an objective of embellishment (*alāṅkārya*). The fact is simple. In this context Sītā may be taken as the basic condition (*ālambana*) which generates the intensity of the conjugal love in the mind of Rāma during the state of separation. And this love for Sītā during the state of separation is

inflamed by the moon-lit night, technically known as excitant (*uddīpana*). It is rendered discernible by the affliction that he feels in such a situation. The manifested effects of this affliction are called ensuants (*anubhāvas*). The insanity of Rāma as depicted in the verse partakes the character of variant (*samcārībhava*). And the cumulative effect of them finds its consummation in the experience of sublime poetic ecstasy (*rasa*) technically termed *vipralambha*. So in this verse it is the intensity of love felt during the state of separation (*vipralambha*) that becomes suggested by the function of suggestion. And it is an accomplished fact that this suggested *rasa* will occupy the superior position and the suggested embellishment in the shape of the recollection of Sītā becomes subservient to it. So it is the exclusive intensity of love felt by Rāma during the state of separation that has been accorded the status of an objective of embellishment but admittedly not the recollection of Sītā as indicated by the author of the *Citramīmāṃsā*. On the other hand, it (the recollection of Sītā) becomes conducive to the heightening of the poignancy of the love felt by Rāma at the time of separation. And as a consequence of it, this recollection has got a legitimate right to be accounted as an embellishment pure and simple. So the aforementioned adjective employed for its exclusion is obviously inappropriate. Since the inclusion of the present instance within the domain of reminiscence becomes inevitable¹.

An objection has been raised. There is no shadow of doubt regarding the truth of the suggestedness of the recollection of Sītā by Rāma in the present verse. And consequently its suggested character may act as a prevention to its being considered as an embellishment. But this contention is sterile. Since there is no incompatibility between the fact of being suggested and the fact of becoming an embellishment. And the reason is not far to seek. The poetic ecstasy (*rasa*) and the basic feeling (*bhāva*) and so forth are invariably grounded on the function of suggestion for their own apprehension. Their suggested character is constant and permanent. To put it the other way round, under no circumstances their comprehension is possible if they are deprived of the service of the function of suggestion. And when they are assigned a subordinate position with a view to enhancing the strikingness of the other, namely, an embellishment or a brute matter of fact or a distinct type of poetic ecstasy (*rasa*) they become relegated to the inferior status of an embellishment. Consequently the *other*, viz. an embellishment or a brute matter of fact or a distinct type of poetic ecstasy whether suggested or unsuggested becomes predominant (*pradhāna*) and it will remain so elevated for its becoming the objective of embellishment. A doubt crops up in the mind. Even these three things mentioned above which occupy a superior position may be derogated to the inferior rank of an embellishment. Because there is no hard and fast norm to vouchsafe

their privileged position as an irrevocable fact. But this is unentertainable. Because the very intrinsic character of an embellishment makes it imperative that the definitions of all the rhetorical figures should possess the adjective, viz. 'to become characterized by the fact of being an embellisher'. And this adjective is competent to exclude these suggested things which have become paramount (*pradhāna*) from the province of all rhetorical figures. The reason is too obvious to require elaboration. And this viewpoint has already been expounded by Jagannātha under the context of *similis*.¹ The findings of the present discourse may be expressed in a nutshell. 'The intensity of the conjugal love felt by Rāma during separation is rendered more striking by the assistance of the recollection of Sītā suggested by the word black deer (*kurāṅga*) occurring in the verse under review. So this verse becomes an accredited case of reminiscence and the argument of Appaya Dīkṣita in defence of the alleged adjective stands demolished by the devastating criticism of Jagannātha.'²

Moreover the author of the *Citramīmāṃsā* in connexion with the explanation of the verse beginning with 'the mountains of great height, *et seq.*' has stated that the recollection of

1. cf. "śāḍṛśyam sundaram vākyaarthopaskāraṁ upamālenkṛtiḥ together with its elucidation" RG, PP. 157-58

2. Ibid. P, 220

the arm of the king is purely a transitory feeling of mind *saṃskṛtā*. And is an accessory and at the same time subservient to the permanent basic feeling (*sthayibhava*) called *rati* adoration lying dormant towards the king. So this verse falls under the cognizance of the distinct rhetorical figure styled *preya*. But even this averment of Appaya Dīkṣita lacks cogency. Since the fact of becoming the figure *preya* is originally grounded on the subserviency of one basic feeling (*bhāva*) in respect of another distinct basic feeling as portrayed in an instance. In the verse cited above the recollection of the arm of the king is not entitled to bear the designation of the basic feeling (*bhāva*). Since this recollection becomes directly expressed by the word *smṛtaḥ* which is the expressive of it. It cannot be argued in defence that even the transitory feeling (*vyabhicārī*) which appears directly expressed may be regarded as a veritable basic feeling. Because it will amount to the infringement of the universally recognised theory, namely, 'The basic feeling (*bhāva*) is that which is suggested by the transitory feeling (*vyabhicārī*)'. So it is manifest that a directly expressed transitory feeling can in no way be placed on a par with the basic feeling (*bhāva*).¹

Moreover the *ipsedixit*² of Ruyyaka, the celebrated author of the *Alaṅkārasarvasva*, will clinch the present

1. RG, P. 220

2. AS, P. 42

issue. While discussing the figure reminiscence, he has asserted that the figure *preya* can take its rise on the basis of recollection only if it (the recollection) is generated by the cause other than similarity. Besides it must be manifested by means of excitants, ensuants and variants. The learned author has illustrated the figure *preya* by the part of the verse beginning with 'ho, her face is charming even in her angry mood (*aho kope'pi kāntam mukham*)'. In this instance the recollection of the face of the beloved by the lover is not produced by the sight of anything which may be similar to her face. But it is occasioned by the mental agony that the lover feels during separation of his beloved. It is transparent that this recollection is apprehended by the function of suggestion. Because the present illustration is not possessed of any such word which may be expressive of (recollection). On the other hand, this recollection is primarily produced by his beloved in the capacity of the objective condition (*ālambana*) resting on imagination. And this is intensified by the moon-lit night which takes the place of the inflaming condition (*uddīpana*). It becomes outwardly manifested by means of the marked change of the countenance of the lover. This perceptible physical change is technically known as ensuant. And the feeling of bewilderment of the lover assumes the role of variant. So this recollection has been leavened to the place of the basic feeling (*bhāva*) without meeting any impediment. It is needless to elaborate that this basic feeling (*bhāva*) stands

as subservient to the other permanent basic feeling (*sthāyibhāva*) termed *rati* erotic feeling lying latent in the mind of the lover. And consequently the present instance¹ becomes an authentic case of the rhetorical figure *preya*. It merits to be emphasised that the recollection cannot be regarded as foundation of the figure *preya* when it becomes directly expressed by a word expressive of it. One concrete instance will bring home the appropriateness of this contention. "I recollect that in this region (*Pañcavatī*) near Godāvarī, I slept in the bower of reeds with my head thrown in your lap in privacy when I returned from hunting and got my fatigue removed by the wind having contact with the waves²." In this verse the recollection of the pleasant episode by Rāma becomes directly expressed by the word *smarāmi* (recollect) which is admittedly the expressive of it. So it follows that the present verse has no title to claim to be considered as a genuine instance of the figure *preya*. This detailed discussion figures prominently in the *Alaṅkāra Sarvasva* of Ruyyaka. And the consideration of it renders obvious that the recollection of the arm of the king cannot pretend

1. The complete verse may be reproduced into sanskrit "Kvā kūryam śaśalakṣmaṇaḥ kva ca kulam bhūyo'pi dṛsyeta sū| Doṣānāṁprāśamāya naḥ śrutam aho kop'epi kāntam mukham, kiṁ vakeyanty'apa kalmaṣaḥ kṛtadhiyaḥ svapne'pi sū durlabhā cetāḥ svāsthyamupaihi kaḥ khalu yuvā dhanyo' dharam pāsyati"

2. RV., cante 13 śl. 35, As. P. 41, AM, P. 88

to be the real ground of the figure *preya*. Since although this recollection has not been generated by similarity, it assuredly remains directly expressed by the word *smṛtaḥ* (recollected) occurring in the present verse. So the contention of Appaya Dīkṣita regarding its subsumption under the realm of *preya* stands controverted.¹

The opponent falls back to a new line of defence. He concedes that the subordination of one basic feeling with reference to another may not constitute the actual ground of *preya qua* poetic figure. But it is purely a transitory feeling (*sancāribhāva*) employed as subservient to a distinct basic feeling (*bhāva*) that (a transitory feeling) may pave the way for the emergence of the figure *preya*. In the verse beginning with 'Mountains of great height, *et seq.*' it is true that the recollection of the arm of the king has been directly expressed by the word recollected (*smṛtaḥ*) which is the expressive of it. And as a sequel of this, it cannot be allowed to be promoted to the rank of the basic feeling (*bhāva*). But despite this, the present recollection can in no way be deprived of the possession of the fact of becoming a transitory feeling, pure and simple. So this recollection too *qua* the transitory feeling may serve as a solid basis of the figure *preya* without involving any contradiction.²

1. RG, P. 220

2. RG, PP, 220—21

But even this emendation will not bear scrutiny. Since in such a case even a bare permanent basic feeling (*sthāyībhāva*) will assume the character of *rasa qua* poetic figure. The only condition to be complied with by it is that it must be conducive to the enhancement of the strikingness of the *other*, namely, a distinct type of poetic ecstasy (*rasa*) or a basic feeling. And it will not be incumbent upon this permanent basic feeling (*sthāyībhāva*) as to become invariably suggested by means of excitants, ensuants and variants in order to become *rasa qua* poetic figure. To put it the other way round, there will be no impropriety in the assertion that even a directly expressed permanent basic feeling will itself be modified and ultimately converted into a full fledged *rasa qua* poetic figure irrespective of the question of its becoming suggested by means of excitants, ensuants and variants or not. But in that event *rasa qua* figure will be entitled to claim the following verse as falling within the sphere of its operation. 'I pay obeisance to Hara, who possesses the body which is the cause of the universe in the form of both the movable and the immovable, and becomes the destroyer of all when enraged at the time of the termination of the cycle'. In this verse the permanent basic feeling, namely, 'anger' has been directly expressed by the word enraged (*samkrudham*) which is the expressive of it. And it is contributive to the intensification of the strikingness of adoration called *rati* lying implicit towards the god Hara. Consequently, this permanent basic feeling 'anger' has

been accorded a subordinate position in relation to the present adoration. It is true that the intensification of this anger does not become suggested on the basis of excitants, ensuants and variants so as to get itself transformed into a distinct type of poetic ecstasy. On the contrary, it remains directly expressed by the word as referred to above. But in spite of it, this cannot be divested of its being possessed with the fact of becoming the permanent basic feeling as an irrevocable truth. And this obvious fact accounts for this verse to be considered as a valid instance of *rasa qua* poetic figure¹.

It may be pleaded that the subsumption of this type of the verse under the domain of *rasa qua* poetic figure may not be regarded as inappropriate in its essential nature. But this plea is absolutely untenable. Since it is assuredly a vicious theory and will be productive of the worst consequence in the realm of poetics. So it follows that it is only the suggested transitory feeling (*sañcāri*) which can serve the purpose of the figure *preya*, if it is employed as subservient to the other distinct basic feeling (*bhāva*). That is to say, a directly expressed transitory feeling cannot be converted into the figure *preya* under any circumstances. And as a consequence of it, the recollection of the arm of the king which stands directly expressed cannot act as the *raison d'être* of the figure *preya* in the

1. RG. P. 221

verse beginning with 'Mountains of great height, *et seq.* So the advocacy of Appaya Dīkṣita regarding the emergence of the figure *preya* on the basis of this recollection stands exposed to serious objection¹.

It deserves specific mention that the present verse is competent to become an authentic instance of the figure *preya* by conforming to certain conditions. The feeling of adoration towards the earth which is latent in mind stands suggested in the first half of this verse. So this feeling of adoration is shifted to the position of a basic feeling (*bhāva*) called *rati*. In the latter half of this verse, the feeling of adoration lying dormant towards the king becomes suggested and transformed into the basic feeling (*bhāva*) styled as *rati*. The former basic feeling appears conducive to the heightening of the beauty of the latter basic feeling. And as a result of it, the former has been assigned an inferior rank in respect of the latter as a matter of necessity. So the former basic feeling has been degraded to the status of the distinct variety of embellishment styled *preya*. The following observation of Mammaṭa Bhaṭṭa will shed a flood of light upon the present issue. In the verse beginning with 'Mountains of great height, *et seq.*' the basic feeling called *rati* as lying implicit in connexion with the earth is subservient to the distinct basic feeling designated *rati* as remaining deposited in mind in respect of the king².

1. RG, P. 221

2. KP., P. 197

Moreover it is a great strange that Appaya Dīkṣita has forgotten even the *kuvalayānanda* which has been written by his own self. The following observations have been made in the concluding portion of the present work :—‘The verse in which the renunciation (*nirveda*) and so forth stand suggested by means of excitants and ensuants and become subservient to the other, namely, a brute matter of fact or an embellishment or a distinct type of poetic ecstasy, deserves to be accounted as an authentic instance of the figure *preya*¹. Thus the view of Appaya Dīkṣita regarding the nature of the figure reminiscence is erroneous from its very inception and as such deserves unqualified repudiation².

1. Kuv., P. 188

2. RG, P. 221



APPENDIX

Abbreviations

- Ak.** *Alaṅkāra Kaustubha* of Viṣveṣvara Paṇḍita
Ed. Mm. Paṇḍita Śivadatta and Kaśinātha
Pāṇḍuranga Parab, NSP, Bombay, 1898
- AM.** *Alaṅkāramahodadhī* of Narendra Prabha
Sūri, Ed. Lālchandra Bhagawāndas Gāndhī,
OI, Baroda, 1942.
- AMK.** *Amarakoṣā*
- ANS.** *Amaruṣāta* of Amaru with the *Rasikasamjī-*
vini of Arjunavarma Deva, 3rd Edition,
NSP, Bombay, 1954
- As.** *Alaṅkārasarvasva* of Rājānaka Ruṇyaka
with the Jayaratha, edited and revised
with a historical Introduction by Paṇḍita
Girija Prasad Dvivedi. NSP, Bombay. 1939
- Bal** *Bālaṃanorāmā*, the commentary of Vāsudeva
Dīkṣita on the *Siddhānta Kaumudī*.
- BORI** Bhandarakara Oriental Research Institute.
- CM.** *Citrāmṛtamaṃsā* of Appaya Dīkṣita, 3rd Edi-
tion, NSP, Bombay. 1941
- CHSS** Chowkhambha Sanskrit Series Office
- DL.** Dhvanyaloka of Śrī Ānandavardhanācārya
with the Locana and Balapriyā commentaries
by Śrī Abhinava Gupta and Śrī Rāmaṣāraka
with the Divyānjana notes by Paṇḍita Śrī
Mahādeva Śāstrī, Ed. by Paṇḍita Paṇḍitābhi

rāma Śāstri, CHSS, Benares, 1940

Ed. ... Edited by

GN & Co. ... Gopala Narayana Company

Ga. *Gāthāsaptasati*, compiled by Śrī Satavāhana
alias Hāla, 3rd Edition, NSP, Bombay, 1933

HN *Hanumannāṭaka* of Śrī Hanumāna

KA ... *Kāvyaḷaṁkāra* of Rudraṭa with the commen-
tary Of Namisādhi, Ed. Mm. Pandita Durga
Prasad and Vāsudeva Laxmaṇa Paṇasikara
NSP, Bombay, 1909

KD *Kāvyaḍarsa* of Daṇḍin, Edited with an original
commentary by Vidyābhuṣaṇa Paṇḍitā
Rangacharya Reddi Shastri, BORI, Poona,
1938.

KNS *Kāvyaṇūsāsana* of Hemachandra, Ed. Mm.
Paṇḍita Śivadatta and Kāśinātha Pānduranga
Parab, NSP, Bombay, 1934

KP *Kāvyaṇprakāśa* of Mammaṭa with the comm.
Bālabodhini of Vāmanācārya Jhalakīkara
(Ed. Raghunatha Damodar BORI, Poona
1950)

KRS *Kāvyaḷaṁkārasūtrani* of Vāmana with his
own Vṛtti, Fourth Edition. Ed. Nārāyaṇa
Rāma Ācārya, NSP, Bombay, 1955

KUV Kuvalayananda of Appaya Dīkṣita with the
commentary *Alaṁkāracandrikā* of Vaidyanatha
Suri, Ed. Nārāyaṇa Rāma Achārya, NSP,
Bombay, 1947

- KV.** *Kāvyaśālikāra* of Bhāmaha, Edited with an Introduction, etc. by Batuka Nāth Śarma and Baldeo Upādhyāya, CHSS. Benares, 1928
- Mbh** Mahābhārata
- MHN** *Mahānāṭaka*. of Hanumāna with the commentary the *Tattvadīpikā* of Śrī Kalipada Tarakācārya, SBD, Calcutta, 1945
- Mm** Mālatīmādhava of Bhavabhūti with the com, Tripurārī and Jagaddhara, Ed. Mangesa Rāmakṛṣṇa Telanga, NSP, Bombay. 1936
- Mm** Mahāmāhopādhyāya
- NSP** Nirṇayasagara Press
- OI** Oriental Institute
- Pāṇ** Pāṇini
- PR** *Pratāparudrīyam* of Vidyānātha with the comm. Ratnāpaṇa by Kumāra Svāmī Somapīthī, Ed. C. Śāmakara Rāma Śāstrī, the Śrī Bālamano-ramā Press, Mylapore, Madras, 1950
- Rg.** *Rasagaṅgādhara* of Jagannātha with the comm of Nagesha Bhatta, Ed. Mm Paṇḍita Durga Prasad and Vasudeva Laxmaṇa Śāstrī, NSP Bombay, 1930
- Rg.Bh** *Rgvedabhāṣyopakramaṇikā* of Sāyaṇacārya, Ed. Pandita Baldeva Upadhyaya, CHSS, Benares
- RV,** *Raghuvamśa* of Kālidāsa, CHSS Benares, 1953
- SBD** Sanskrit Book Depo
- SD.** *Sāhityadarpaṇa* of Viśvanātha Kavirāja with the *Kusumapratimā* commentary by Śrī

- Haridāśasiddhānta Vagīśa Bhaṭṭācārya, the
5th Edn. 1875 Śākā Era
- SKB** *Sarasvatikanṭhābharāṇa* of Dhareśvara Bhoja-
deva with the comm. of Ramsiṃha (1-111) and
Jagadhara (IV), Ed. Pandita Kedāranatha
Śarma and Vāsudeva Lakṣmaṇa Śāstrī, NSP,
Bombay, 1934
- Sl.** Śloka
- SM.** Sūktimuktāvali of Bhaga Datta Jalhaṇa, Ed.
Embar Kriṣṇamācārya, OI, Baroda, 1938
- SR** *Subhāṣitaratnabhārḍāgāra*, Ed. Nārāyaṇa
Rāma Acārya NSP, Bombay, 1952
- Sh** Sūtra
- SV** *Śiṣupālavadhā* of Māgha with the commentary
of Mallīnātha, Ed. Mm. Pandita Durga
Prasad
- VP,** *Vedāntaparibhāṣā* of Panditavara Dharma-
rāja dhvarīndra
- VV** *Vyaktiviveka* of Rājānaka Mahimabhaṭṭa,
Edited with a commentary of Rājānaka
Ruyyaka and the Madhusūdanī commentary
by Pt. Śrī Madhusūdana Mishra, CHSS
Benares, 1936
- VRV** *Vṛttivārttika* of Appaya Dīkṣita, NSP Bombay,
1893

Index of Verses

rendered into English

	<i>Page</i>
1. Afterwards the people with their own fully expanded (<i>vikaca</i>) eyes resembling	173
2. Alas ! my mind roves in vain despite the presence of the great God (<i>Śiva</i>)	225
3. Although this wide world is filled up by thousands of beautiful damsels	378
4. Although the three worlds are filled up by men, gods and demons, no other will be	— 382
5. As the <i>Candra</i> is so called owing to its delighting quality and the <i>tapana</i> (sun)	... 104
6. As the killing of the crow was brought about	205, 237
7. As the rain falling from the celestial region and possessed of one and single taste	282
8. As verily that father (<i>Kṣemadhānvā</i>) became one possessed of a worthy son, a son who is	316, 339
9. At first he (<i>Raghu</i>) like <i>Indra</i> proceeded towards the eastern direction with the banners	120
10. At that time the unfortunate lady emaciated extremely under the misery of separation	300
11. (The) Beggar wandering from door to door does not beg for alms but teaches	99
12. By the mass of dust produced by chariots	97, 117, 311 312, 313, 315, 339, 354
13. By the handsome and simultaneous opening, the two objects are mutually held in the balance	115, 309

14. By your face moon, the heat of passion is cooled
down ... 136
15. Both (Dilīpa and Sudakṣiṇā) observing the similitude of their reciprocal eyes 220
16. Behold, in this lotus-leaf the crane appears pearl-oyster carefully placed ... 244
17. By hearing the loud sound of the bow-string of the two (Rāma and Lakṣamaṇa) 280, 284
18. Better take shelter underneath the tree, O Lakṣamāṇa ! for one possessed with burning rays (sun) rises up, where is 385, 392, 395
19. (The) Curling tress of hairs hanging from her cheek upon the surface of the breasts 152
20. (The) Crime of the murder of the trusted committed by the wicked person results 241
21. (The) Dust which has been severed from its source by (the flow of) blood and fanned 50, 240, 251
22. (The) Dusts of the fruits of Ela creepers having the tendency of leaping upwards - 124
23. Even other demons fell (and died) on the crores of monkeys, like the dusts 110
24. Even this world plays the role (similar) to the emancipation to the people engaged in 195, 197, 202
235, 238-39
25. Even a thing kept in hand slipped down like the though-tgem (*Cintāratna*) ... 265
26. Fresh rain-drops stayed for a moment on the eyelashes of her (Pārvatī) 1, 13

27. (The) Face of the young lady with the eyes soiled
by tears appears like the 272
28. (The) Glittering arrows were falling as if from his
mouth remaining in the midst of 272
29. He (Hari) for the first time felt the advent of the
spring which was fragrant — 49
30. (The) Harsh speech issuing from this mouth is,
as it were, the poison from the orbit 92, 295
31. He (Raghu) leading on the vast army advancing
towards the eastern sea 119-20
32. Hear, O lotus eyed (lady) ! this reproach that
the moon is compared with your — 132
33. He (Dilīpa) became unapproachable and apprao-
chable to his dependents 175, 287
34. Her robe worn in befitting manner and so appea-
ring unlike to that of 287-83
35. Has Pārvatī learnt the mode of casting unsteady
glance from the does (*mrgā*) ... 331
36. Her face shines like the lotus with the black bee
fascinating like the eye and the lotus 347
37. Having passed over in this way the period of
living in the forest under the command 360, 364
38. He (Daśaratha) did not fix the aim of his arrow
on the peacock with the 383, 390
39. Ho, her face is charming even in her angry
mood, — 397
40. I pay obeisance to Pārvatī and Supreme God, the
parents of the universe 166, 243

41. I pay obeisance to Hara, who possesses the body
which is the cause of the universe in the form of
both the movable and the immovable 400
42. I recollect that in this region (Pancavaṭī) near
Godāvari, I slept in the bower of reeds 398
43. I like the black bee (the producer of Honey)
enjoyed by drinking repeatedly 326
44. I will forsake the daughter of Videha (Sītā) in
an indifferent manner 268, 360-61
45. I pay worship to him, by viewing whom like the
lamp, that cupid perished 221-24
46. If both the streams of the heavenly Ganges in
distinction were to pour out in the sky 93, 137
139, 153, 372
47. In the presence of your fame the moon-light
appears as it were obscured by darkness 113
48. If the body of the nectar rayed one (moon) be
free from stain in the ... 138
49. If the lotus flower be united with its new leaf and
the pearl be set in the, ... 139
50. In whose hand the sword was observed by the
heroes in battle like the 242
51. In the battle, you while slaying your adversaries
are seen by whom ... 257
52. I string together the poetry with its meanings
greatly extended like the moon ... 270
53. (The) Increased moon decays and so even the sea,
but he (atithi) was ... 289

54. It is not only that the lady with high hip and
possessed with exquisite 359
55. (The) King of Pāṇḍu with the shoulder bearing
a pendant necklace 102, 172, 185, 365
56. Know me Kumbhodara by name, equal to
Nikumbha and the eight — 188
57. Kumudvatī obtained the son named Atithi from
Kakustha like the intellect — 281
58. (The) Lustre of the face of the young lady
becomes extremely gloomy — 46
59. (The) Lady with beautiful hips is a delight to
the eyes like the moon-light 115
60. (A) Lady with elegant limbs is like one possessed
with weapon — 119
61. (The) Lady (Mālatī) with her eyes with the thick
eye-lashes, while proceeding on ... 169
62. (The) Lady Indumatī with her navel handsome
like the whirl-pool 182, 285, 286
63. May Hari protect you while embracing the milk-
maid with her who 40
64. May the boar-incarnation afford good fortune to
you all, who at the termination — 51
65. (The) Moon is white like the female swan and the
sky is clear like lakes 84, 293
66. (The) Moon is not equal to your spotless face 128
67. (The) Moon is made pale by the presence of your
face 69, 165
68. My son ! after the passing away of your brother,
our great lunar lineage — 175

68. May this monarch of all the gods abide in my
heart, whose day is like the fresh ... 213-18
70. May the worship of the enemy of Pura (śiva)
enlighten my mind by removing 224
71. (The) Mountains of great height are visible on
all around and so are even 387,395,399
72. (The) Noble man although the object of hatred
was estimable to him (Dillpa) 289
73. O pious man ! roam about with confidence, for
to-day that dog has been killed ... 15
74. O friend ! it is due to the ill-luck of mine that
sleeplessness, weakness, anxiety 22
75. O Acyuta ! I am going back; for, can there be
the production of gratification ... 40
76. O king ! even the great king Raghu has been
surpassed by means of your ... 165
77. O protector of the earth ! the lion among the
people ! the entire host of your enemy 172
78. O friend poison ! don't be arrogant with the follo-
wing idea : I am alone the deadliest 111-12,343
79. O black bee ! Why do you roam in vain here and
there in the interior of the forest ... 122-23,141
80. O tiger like Rāghava (Rāghava śārdūla) ! may
that virtue undoubtedly protect you ... 194
81. O king ! this sky in the face of your expanding
fame white like the lustre of the rays ... 243
82. O king ! I ate pure grits (saktavaḥ) like a
virtuous wife ... 265

83. O king ! having bestowed wealth on worthy recipients and living only along 269
84. O lady of fair complexion ! never feel excessive remorse on the thought 'I am similar to the creepers... 350, 353
85. O Govinda ! the delight which was produced in my mind by your arrival... 373, 380
86. Oh ! this lake is full in which turning over and over the people take their... 28
87. Oh you, unaware of the occurrence of your friend's pain ! oh self-centred one ! You 35
88. One complete day is the farthest limit 44
89. O wind ! blow on where the lady love lives, after touching her, lend a touch... 257
90. On the path, the dust was converted into the state of mud and again 299
91. Observing yonder a certain lady causing wonder even to the celestial... .. 384, 391
92. Poison produced from the orbit of the moon 140
93. (The) Place bearing the huge quantity of iron (*bahuloha*) shines like the intellect 295
94. (The) Quarters filled with dusts having the wings of the hawk as their tresses 177
95. Sandal-paste has entirely vanished from the fore-parts of your breasts... 5,21,23,24,26,33,35
96. Snow has not effaced the glory of that which is the source of 94,241,251
97. Śiva, brought into contact (with her ownself) by

- the maiden (Pārvatī) with the augmented 173,185
98. (The) Sons of the king being (internally)
contented by the destruction of Pārtha 179-80
99. Salutation to that Śiva whose body is as bright
as the moon, whose... — 210
100. She (Pārvatī) wearing the new linen cloth and
holding the new mirror shone... 277
101. (The) Sage (Vasiṣṭha) having been apprised of in
this way remained only for a moment with his
eyes... 279
102. This one and unique similis appears like the
actress who by adopting — 56
103. This one with his beauty, youth, loveliness 71,203
104. This city which is with indistinct noise (sakala-
kala) has now become 88,100,102-6,109
105. (The) Thousand rayed (sun) bore the novel
umbrella 98,362,363
106. This is not the lotus but is actually the face 117,143
107. This person endowed with extraordinary patience
in the matter of vanquishing 121,128
108. This orbit of the cool-rayed one resembling 124,25
109. This orange is vying with the chin of the intoxi-
cated Hūṇa, which has 125,296
110. That chaste lady trembling with a sudden fright
was seized by him. 170
111. Those kings, with their exasperation suppressed
'by the (ostensible) signs of satisfaction 178
112. That wrathful lady (Kaikeyī) verily being conso-

- led by her husband 180-81
113. This spring time has arrived with its lovely
kesara flowers delicately 183-84
114. This is nothing but the very capability of those
(the students) that in the event of 254
115. This cakravāka sitting in a brooding posture
appears like the Lord 261
116. That seer (Nārada) bearing the woven cloth in
the form of black skin 263
117. That Kṛṣṇa with his yellow dress and bearing the
bow of horn 263
118. This Vindhya mountain with its waterfall adorned
with the dense bower 271
119. This eunuch (ṣaṇḍhaḥ) walks like a woman
(strī) and this woman 291
120. This king of elephants shines like the mountain
and the mountain like ... 345
121. Tell, O Ganges, which of those banks (river)
flowing down from the mountain resided in the 381
122. That subjugator of cupid (Hara) after making a
promise, that is, "I will do in this way" and by 388
123. Uttara observing the army of the king Kuru with
its shining weapons 176
124. Water is like the sky and the sky is like the
water 114,344,355,357
125. What for, O noble lady ! bear this unbearable
pride by the pair of your eyes 133
126. Why do you rejoice, o moon ! by thinking
your 157,250

127. When the godly seer spoke like this, Pārvatī
with her face directed downward 246
128. When that period (summer season) became too
hard to be endured, these two, viz. the rising
king (Kuśa) 298
129. Where the ponds bearing the lotuses with char-
ming lustre for their faces shine like the ladies
306,342,346
130. (O king) your hand being filled up with water-
drops used in making a continuous gift of gold 95
131. Your face is like the moon and the moon is like
your face 56,83,96,126,127,133,274
132. Your face with the restless eyes and having the
lustre of its teeth 118,159,349
133. Your face resembling the autumnal moon may
cool my eyes 247
134. Your navel appears like the nether region, your
breasts resemble the two mountains ... 262
135. Your mind is like the word, the action is like the
mind and the fame is extremely 303,328,357
136. Your face is redolent, a source of joy to the eyes
and white-red under the intoxication 305, 314,345

